Judgment :- 1. The harijan woman is still a prey to the lascivious deceit of the rich and the mighty. She would literally be thrown into the street, once the use is over. The child born out of a connection not recognised by law an innocent victim has to carry the crown of sorrow. The existing legal mechanism and the obsolescent administrative set up are grossly inadequate to give a timely help to the needy child. These appear to be the lessons of the second appeal, which reveals tragic facts. 2. Santha is the harijan girl involved in this case. In a rural setting in the suburb of the Cochin city, in Edakkattuvayal Village, she was living with her parents. Mathai of Manayidathil house, owned many items of properties. The property adjacent to Santha's house had an extent of two acres. There was a small house. Mathai stayed there alone, though aged about thirty five. There was nothing to block the passage between his house and the hut of Santha. An illegitimate intimacy led to her pregnancy. Mathai, initially anxious in the matter, took her to a nurse to verify whether she was pregnant at all; and if pregnant to ascertain whether the pregnancy was an advanced one. The nurse answered both the questions apparently in the affirmative. Santha in due time gave birth to a baby. Baby is her name. The nurse recorded the name of the child as Baby and gave particulars as "daughter of Santha Mathai". Some money was paid to Santha by Mathai at the time of delivery. There was, however, no enduring arrangement in relation to the maintenance of the mother and the child. As it happens quite frequently, Mathai repudiated liability in that behalf. That drove the helpless girl to seek the aid of law. An unimaginative Magistrate dismissed her claim. The order was rightly reversed by the Sessions Court. It awarded a maintenance of Rs. 60/- for the child. There being no marriage, Santha could not claim the status of a wife. That should mean, in the existing state of affairs, that she should suffer privation, and sometimes even starvation, till the every end of her life. 3. Mathai took up the matter in revision before this Court in Crl. R. P. No. 507 of 1979. That was dismissed by order dated 31-3-1980. That should mean, in the existing state of affairs, that she should suffer privation, and sometimes even starvation, till the every end of her life. 3. Mathai took up the matter in revision before this Court in Crl. R. P. No. 507 of 1979. That was dismissed by order dated 31-3-1980. This Court held that the reasoning and conclusion of the Sessions judge and the appreciation of evidence made by him were "quite sound and requires no interference in revision." A fervent appeal lastly made before the court for an added opportunity to adduce evidence was also rejected, by observing that Mathai bad "ample opportunities to give evidence" and that there was no good reason to accede to the request for remand. 4. It is necessary in the context of the contentions arising in the second appeal, to allude in greater detail, to the discussion of the evidence and the ultimate findings of the Court. 5. This Court bad very elaborately referred to the evidence on record in the case. A neighbour had intervened between the parties when Santha revealed to her father her pregnancy through Mathai, He was examined there as pw. 2. He spoke about Mathai's initial denial and ultimate admission of paternity and his payment of a sum of Rs. 500/- which he passed on to Santha's father. pw. 3 who used to work in the neighbourhood gave evidence that she had seen Santha residing with Mathai in Mathai's bouse. Two midwives had been examined as pws. 4 and 5. The latter went to the house of Santha when she was told that a child had been born to her by Mathai. She had noted the facts in Ext. P1 diary and Ext. P2 register. The father of the child was noted as 'Mathai'. This Court observed: "but the names of both the parents of the child are given as Santha Mathai Santha is the name of the second respondent and Mathai is the name of the petitioner." 6. This Court discountenanced a suggestion that pw. 2 was related to, and that way interested, in Santha. This Court found the criticism of the Magistrate about pw. 3 to be unjustified and agreed with the sentiment expressed by the Sessions Judge on that aspect. The evidence of the midwife pw. This Court discountenanced a suggestion that pw. 2 was related to, and that way interested, in Santha. This Court found the criticism of the Magistrate about pw. 3 to be unjustified and agreed with the sentiment expressed by the Sessions Judge on that aspect. The evidence of the midwife pw. 4 about Mathai having taken Santha to her to ascertain the factum of her pregnancy, was found to be very significant by this Court. This Court held that Exts. Pi and P2 lend strong corroboration to the unbiased evidence of Pw 5." (emphasis supplied). 7. Other circumstances were also relied on in that connection. It was found that Mathai was a bachelor aged about 35 living all alone in his building. Mathai attempted to wriggle out of that significant situation. He put forward a plea that he was residing far away with his own parents. He was constrained to abandon that plea. He admitted his lonely residence in the building close to Santha's hut. This Court found it difficult to believe his version that Mathai (who was transparently affluent) swept even his courtyard and cooked his meals. Yet another false plea put forward by Mathai was feigning illness disabling him in having a conjugal life. That too was found to be unacceptable by this Court. 8. It took some further time for the Court to determine the amount of maintenance. The obstructionist attitude of Mathai continued all through. (It may be noted that Pw. 2 had complained before the Magistrate Court, in writing, bow he was beaten up by Mathai for tendering evidence against him in the maintenance proceedings.) 9. Even the scanty sum of Rs. 60 per month awarded as maintenance was not paid by Mathai. This was despite his own proud assertion as a man of means and as one having substantial income from various properties. Recovery proceedings, sad to say, has not secured her even a single copper so far However, when recovery was attempted and things became fairly hot. Mathai filed the suit for a declaration that Baby was not his child and that he had no legal obligation for the maintenance of that child. The trial court dismissed the suit. 10. There was an appeal. Mathai filed the suit for a declaration that Baby was not his child and that he had no legal obligation for the maintenance of that child. The trial court dismissed the suit. 10. There was an appeal. After very many vicissitudes, there was initially a rejection of the appeal, a review petition which was allowed, and a re-hearing of the appeal the appeal was disposed of by judgment dated 21-6-1984. The appellate "court allowed the appeal, decreed the suit and denied the maintenance to the child. 11. The mother and child have arrived in this Court, seeking a ventilation of their long standing grievances. 12. In the light of the findings of the Sessions Court and of this Court on the question of paternity of the plaintiff, in the criminal proceedings (though summary in character) it required cogent and strong evidence to get over the effect and impact of those lawful orders passed by the competent authorities. All that the plaintiff attempted is the suit was to examine himself and two witnesses. From the defence side, the deposition of Mathai in the Magistrate Court proceedings and the order of the Sessions Court were produced as Exts. B1 and B2. The voters's list of Piravom constituency of 1979 proved as Ext. B3, falsified Mathai's version about his residence elsewhere. It fully corroborated Santha's evidence that be was residing alone in the house near her hut. Pws. 2 and 3 are the workers engaged in the paddy field of the plaintiff. The two witnesses are closely related. pw. 2 is the mother-in-law of pw. 3. They went to the extent of supporting the plaintiff's false version of his residing with his parents and brothers. A story was put forward that the building at Valadiparamb (hear the but of Santha) was only used for cooking food for the workers. That story is too artificial to be accepted. Pw. 2 herself admitted that the house at Valadiparamb was a tiled one. Mathai, (described by the trial court as a rich man having 15 acres of land in his tarwad) had stated in his evidence of his owning 15 acres of land, indicative of his being very rich. It was ordinarily impossible to assume that such a person would himself do works like sweeping the court-yard and cooking the food. Pws. Mathai, (described by the trial court as a rich man having 15 acres of land in his tarwad) had stated in his evidence of his owning 15 acres of land, indicative of his being very rich. It was ordinarily impossible to assume that such a person would himself do works like sweeping the court-yard and cooking the food. Pws. 2 and 3 on their own showing used to work only 8 to 10 days in a year in the paddy field. The trial court observed: "Hence the evidence of Dws. 2 and 3 that they did not see the 2nd defendant residing in the house at Valadiyil' cannot be accepted" In addition to the evidence of Santha as dw. 1, and a corroborative material like the voters' list Ext. B3, there was further corroborative evidence furnished by dw. 2. (He had given evidence in the Magistrate Court also.) His residence is within a furlong of the plaintiff's house. He on behalf of the owner of the properties Shri. Sankaran Nair, was supervising the agricultural activities in the paddy fields touching the plaintiff's property. He spoke about having seen Santha and Mathai in that bouse. He had seen Mathai standing by her side while she was having her bath. He bad not seen anyone other than Mathai and Santha at that place. In cross-examination he reiterated the fact that Santha and Mathai were known to him from 1975 onwards. He repeated having seen many times Mathai standing by the side of Santha when she was having her bath and that it was his direct knowledge. 13. The only reasons urged by the appellate court for reversing the judgment of the trial court are: (1) The inference drawn from the voters' list about Santha not being a resident with Mathai. (2) The non-examination of the nurse and the person who mediated between the plaintiff and the parents of Santha at the time of her delivery and through whom the payment of Rs. 500/- was made and (3) the inadequacy of the evidence of dw. 2 as a corroborative material. 14. At one time. Courts entertained doubts whether a civil Court would have jurisdiction at all to invalidate an order duly passed by the Criminal Courts in the maintenance proceedings dealt by them. 500/- was made and (3) the inadequacy of the evidence of dw. 2 as a corroborative material. 14. At one time. Courts entertained doubts whether a civil Court would have jurisdiction at all to invalidate an order duly passed by the Criminal Courts in the maintenance proceedings dealt by them. That the judicial decisions were not uniform were noted by a Division Bench of this Court while delivering the judgment in Johnson v. Sarasamma, 1956 Tra-Co 204. The Court observed: "Whether the civil court can entertain a suit to declare a criminal court's order under S.488 Cr. PC. invalid or to set it aside is a moot question. Authorities bearing on the point are not uniform." Even when the maintainability of the suit is assumed, rigorous are the requirements for invalidating an order duly passed by a criminal court. (vide Gauri Devi v. Bishwanath, AIR 1970 Allahabad 185.) 15. It is unfortunate that the appellate court totally missed the correct legal position and the proper approach to be made in a case of this nature. 16. The background that a harassed woman bad attempted elaborate I evidence in the course of a judicial proceeding-despite the summary character of the proceedings-cannot he lost sight of. This aspect has been emphasised by this Court in Babeebulla v. Shakeela (S.A. 103) of 1983). In that case too, a civil suit was instituted soon after the culmination of the maintenance proceedings is which elaborate evidence bad been adduced to establish the paternity of the person from whom maintenance had been sought. This Court indicated the approach to be made by the civil court in the background of such orders passed in the maintenance case. 17. The approach to be made in evaluating the evidence of a woman, has also gone considerable change. The special characteristics of the Indian woman in relation to the evidence in such sensitive issues had been indicated by judicial decisions of the Supreme Court. The Indian woman is ordinarily not likely to foist a case of rape against another person. It may not therefor be imprudent even to convict a person on her uncorroborated testimony, (vide Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753). The decision indicates a direction and throws new light about the course which the courts below have to pursue to find out the truth 18. It may not therefor be imprudent even to convict a person on her uncorroborated testimony, (vide Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753). The decision indicates a direction and throws new light about the course which the courts below have to pursue to find out the truth 18. Attendant circumstances could furnish adequate corroboration to the testimony given by the victim of a misbehaving man. A false plea, demonstrated as a false one, could be one such circumstance. In the present case, the plaintiff had a plea about bis residence with his parents. That was a false plea. His residence is established at Validiparamb by Ext. B3. 19. The appellate court saw much in Santha's name missing in the voter's list. It, however, overlooked the fact that Santha had not earned eligibility to be a voter in 1975. (She was only about 18 in the year 1975, the time of preparation of the voters' list.) The only ground mentioned by the appellate court for its unsympathetic treatment of a helpless girl, is totally unsustainable. 20. It is further unfortunate that the appellate court did not have a close reading of the evidence of Dw. 2 The appellate court thought that there was only astray instance of Mathai standing by the side of Santha when she was taking bath in a public place. This is a perverse reading of the evidence of Dw. 2. As noted earlier, be has given clear evidence of Santha and Mathai being together, in Mathai's house, at Valadiparamb. The evidence reads: "There is a house at Valadiparamb. Mathai has residence there. Besides Mathai, Santha has also been seen there." (emphasis supplied) This crucial statement should not have been missed by the appellate court. 21. The significant admissions made by Mathai were also regrettably overlooked by the appellate court. He admitted having suppressed the dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the High Court. He was confronted with his statement in bis deposition before the Magistrate Court, admitting bis separate and single residence at Valadiparamb. To a pointed question whether Santha had not gone to his house before 6-9-1975, bis answer is: "I do not remember." To a question whether the relevant document regarding the delivery of Baby by Santha had not been produced before the Magistrate Court, he again affected ignorance. To a pointed question whether Santha had not gone to his house before 6-9-1975, bis answer is: "I do not remember." To a question whether the relevant document regarding the delivery of Baby by Santha had not been produced before the Magistrate Court, he again affected ignorance. When he was questioned about his having taken Santha to the midwife to ascertain the facts of her pregnancy, his initial answer was evasive. 22. It is sufficient to say that the appellate court acted perversely and against the well settled legal principles, in interfering with the judgment of the trial court which dismissed the plaintiff's suit The appellate judgment has necessarily to be reversed. I do so. Accordingly the judgment and decree of the appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court restored. The suit will stand dismissed with costs (which will include costs in every interlocutory matter as well) throughout. 23. There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiff has been maliciously harassing the defendants, without any bona fides whatever. He had freely perjured while giving evidence as Pw1. The litigation is a clear instance of the plaintiff's putting forward a claim false and vexatious to his knowledge. I would have granted the full compensation provided under the amended provisions of the Civil Procedure Code if it bad been sought for. As there is no such claim in the written statement T decline to award such compensatory costs. The defendants would be entitled to institute appropriate legal proceedings for such relief. If and when such a suit is instituted, the Civil Court will, no doubt, be alive to the manifold sufferings the mother and child had been subjected to throughout. Even the expenses to come to the Court and to pay her counsel for every one of the postings of the case and of the petitions for enforcing the maintenance ordered would be considerable. A minimum payment of Rs. 50 for every such hearing would appear to be justifiably called for. 24. The distressing facts which have unfolded the agony of a child in need and a woman in distress, would provoke some serious thoughts about tangible and immediate steps for remedying this disgraceful situation. Inviting the attention of the Governmental agencies in this regard would appear to be an exercise in futility in the light of the past experience. 24. The distressing facts which have unfolded the agony of a child in need and a woman in distress, would provoke some serious thoughts about tangible and immediate steps for remedying this disgraceful situation. Inviting the attention of the Governmental agencies in this regard would appear to be an exercise in futility in the light of the past experience. A thundering speech delivered or a longish paper read at a Seminar, national or international, about the suffering woman and weaker sections, would yield no consolation to the starving woman or the suffering child. 25. The facts of the case should melt the hardest heart. A hurried calculation of the postings of the case would indicate that there were nearly 500 postings. (19 in M. C. 17/1977,104 in M. P. 6783/1979, 85 in M.P. 6900/80, 71 in M. P. 5092/81, 58 in M. P. 72/1983 and 26 in M. P. 1145/1985, very many other and collateral proceedings are not reckoned for this figure) in connection with the legal proceedings initiated by the woman. She could not even get anything whatever for one decade, from the person bound to pay and who had the means to pay. The entirety of the amount aggregating to about 7.000 rupees as on date, would be eaten away by the expenses incurred in the travel and in the long wait in the corridors of the court by the woman and the child coming from a long distance. There was avoidable waste of judicial time, involved in the fruitless adjournments in the M. C. proceedings, the appeal and revision therein, the civil suit, the appeal and the second appeal, and in the petition for realisation of the maintenance decree. M. P. 6783/1979, MY 6900/1980, M. P. 5092/1981, M P. 72/1983 and M. P.1145/1985. These exercises have resulted in much of paper work, posting work and correspondence with other authorities. It is time, atleast for this Court to seriously think of measures which would obviate such avoidable prolongation of the proceedings. The common sight of the long queues of women and children restlessly waiting in the crowded courts (most of which do lack even basic amenities) has to be ended at the earliest point of time. It will be presumptuous to straightaway indicate possible remedial situations. The common sight of the long queues of women and children restlessly waiting in the crowded courts (most of which do lack even basic amenities) has to be ended at the earliest point of time. It will be presumptuous to straightaway indicate possible remedial situations. Could not the Rules provide for making a reference to the properties and source of income of the opposite party even when the petition for maintenance is filed? A stipulation about a specific answer in relation to that allegation, and an affidavit in that behalf, would help to delineate clearly and pointedly the controversy on that aspect. If the Court could straightaway refer the matter to the employer (in case the opposite party is an employed person) or to the revenue officials if he derives income from properties movable or immovable, it would enable the Court to have relevant materials even as the trial stage is reached. An enabling power and a judicial exercise thereof requiring the opposite party to furnish security for any possible maintenance award can obviate to a large extent, the time consuming correspondence and other steps in toe realisation of a paltry sum, payable by every month. A directive to the employer to credit maintenance amount to the petitioner's account (in these days of popularisation of banking system and the spread of banking institutions even in remote villages such a directive may not be difficult at all) would enable a smooth functioning of the recovery process. Enacting statutory provisions that an order of maintenance by itself will operate as an attachment on the properties owned by the defaulting opposite party, and a stipulation that the sale for recovery of the defaulted amount shall peremptorily be held within a short period, could all be thought of in that connection. 26. The Courts' proceedings in this case show that atleast for substantial periods, the judicial officers had not bestowed enough of serious attention in relation to the realisation of the amount decreed by it by way of maintenance to a needy party. The High Court can issue definite and clear instructions giving the necessary guidelines for judicial officers to be prompt and peremptory in their dealings with recalcitrant parties deliberately evading payments even when they have all the capacity to pay. 27. The High Court can issue definite and clear instructions giving the necessary guidelines for judicial officers to be prompt and peremptory in their dealings with recalcitrant parties deliberately evading payments even when they have all the capacity to pay. 27. I would direct a copy of this judgment be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for taking such institutional steps as are necessary and possible at the High Court level. 28. This Court passed an order on 2-2-1988 directing the Government Pleader to furnish to the Court material information in relation to the realisation of the maintenance amount awarded by the court. I am happy to record my appreciation for the very diligent steps taken by the learned Government Pleader who could, within the very short time, collect and collate useful information in that behalf. The Deputy Collector who has filed a detailed affidavit in relation to the official acts, actions, omissions and lapses, has taken considerable pains to assist the Court with relevant information, after intelligently analysing the large number of files in different offices of the Revenue Department. Even before the court has passed orders, the Tahsildar who had taken over from 1-4-1987, bad displayed commendable interest in the recovery steps. Within eight days of passing of the order by this Court, she has been able to make the hither to recalcitrant party deposit a sum of Rs. 2,220/-. The fact that such an amount has been deposited in the court is corroborated by the report of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate. Unlike his predecessors, the present Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate also has viewed the matter with some involvement and concern. I have no hesitation in expressing my liberal appreciation for such dedication displayed by the officers. As for the Government officials, whether and what further incentive should be given, would be for the superior authorities and the Government to consider. 29. The affidavit of the Deputy Collector discloses that some of the officers have been deliberately attempting to obstruct the recovery proceedings. A serious view will have necessarily to be taken as against them. I direct the District Collector to conduct an enquiry into the matter and submit a report about such erring officers within three months from today. 29. The affidavit of the Deputy Collector discloses that some of the officers have been deliberately attempting to obstruct the recovery proceedings. A serious view will have necessarily to be taken as against them. I direct the District Collector to conduct an enquiry into the matter and submit a report about such erring officers within three months from today. This is particularly necessary when the directive of the Revenue Divisional Officer issued on 4-8-1984, was ignored by the subordinate officials like the Tahsildar and the Village Officer. Prima facie a mala fide conduct is inferable. It is significant that even in relation to the requisition from the court, some of the officers have refused to respond. The Chief Judicial Magistrate in his report stated: "Though the Tahsildar, Kanayannur was addressed on three occasions ie. on 20-8-81, 23-4-85 and 1-8-85, the Tahsildar has not cared even to send a reply to those communications." The Tahsildar who was on duty during 1985, appears to be particularly guilty of a serious misconduct and disobedience of the orders of the court. I direct the Advocate-General to consider the question whether proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act could not be justifiably initiated against that officer. (The name of the officer is available from the affidavit filed by the Deputy Collector.) Similarly, the respondent in the second appeal would appear to have misled this Court when he filed Crl. M.C. 797 of 1987 and obtained an order on 6-10-1987. Consequent on the order passed by this Court, the recovery proceedings bad to be slowed down, though there was no express order of stay passed by this Court. Having gone through the petition, I am prima facie of the view that this Court was persuaded to pass such an order in Crl. M.C 797 of 1987 due to the suppression of a material fact by the respondent. The impediment in the recovery of the maintenance amount a temporary one was the passing of the judgment by the appellate court in the present case. The operation of that judgment was, however, stayed by this Court on 12-4-1985. This fact was suppressed in the petition Crl.M.C. 797 of 1987 filed on 6-10-1987. It is nearly two months after the order passed in Crl.M.C. 797 of 1987 that the respondent sought to have a final hearing of the petition for stay in the second appeal. The operation of that judgment was, however, stayed by this Court on 12-4-1985. This fact was suppressed in the petition Crl.M.C. 797 of 1987 filed on 6-10-1987. It is nearly two months after the order passed in Crl.M.C. 797 of 1987 that the respondent sought to have a final hearing of the petition for stay in the second appeal. That too was unsuccessful as the stay was made absolute by order passed by this Court on 16-12-1987. Having regard to the cumulative effect of the conduct of the respondent all through, this prima facie deliberate suppression of materials from this Court, and bis misleading of the court, would warrant serious action against him. The learned Advocate-General would consider whether proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act should be initiated against him also. The decision of the Advocate-General and report on the action, if any, taken by him in that behalf shall be submitted before this Court within a period of two months. A copy of the judgment would also be forwarded to the Government, so that, if inclined in that behalf, it could think of legal and other steps for the elimination or the reduction of the agony of the suffering women and children in position similar to the appellants in the present case.