JUDGMENT 1. - Mst. Shakura made an application on December 19, 1983 before the Judicial Magistrate at Bhadra under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an order against her husband Mohd. Sheriff petitioner to make a monthly allowance at the rate of Rs. 500/- with effect from September 30, 1982 for her maintenance Mst. Shakura was married to the petitioner about ten years before the making of the above application according to Muslim rites and she lived with for about eight years in the matrimonial home. About 21/4 years before the date of making of the application Yusuf, father of Mst. Shakura, had brought the latter to his house at Bhadra. According to Mst. Shakura, her husband did not thereafter come to her father's house to take her back and, therefore, her father himself brought her to the house of her husband but the latter refused to admit her to the matrimonial home. Yusuf had, therefore, to make her back to his own house. On September 30, 1982 Mst. Shakura, therefore. made an application under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner. After the evidence of Mst. Shakura was over in that case, her husband showed readiness to take her to the matrimonial home and, therefore, those proceedings were consigned to record on December 7, 1983. Mst. Shakura then alone with her husband and her father came to Nohar. Mohd. Shariff took her to the house of his cousin Sahabdeen and made her to stay there. Mohd. Shariff told that he would take Mst. Shakura to the house of his father on the next day whereupon Yusuf returned to his village Bhadra. However, Mohd. Shariff did not come back to the Mst. Shakura to the matrimonial home and Sahabdeen took her to Bhadra and left her at the house of her father. Mst. Shakura, therefore, filed anywhere application under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code on December 19, 1983 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Bhadra. 2. The petitioner contested this application and filed a reply on April 24, 1984. His case was that Mst. Shakura generally goes to her father's house without informing him. It was stated by him that Mst Shakura's father and brothers wanted to keep her at Bhadra. Mohd. 2. The petitioner contested this application and filed a reply on April 24, 1984. His case was that Mst. Shakura generally goes to her father's house without informing him. It was stated by him that Mst Shakura's father and brothers wanted to keep her at Bhadra. Mohd. Shariff also stated that he is an ordinary tailor and stitches clothes of persons by visiting their houses. His earning was not more than Rs. 150/- per month. He was ready to keep Mst. Shakura with him according to his meagre financial means. His father had 32 bighas of barani land and its cultivation depended on rains. His father has also mortgaged this land with Sampat Cheepa. He himself had no interest in the said agricultural land. His father had also separated him and had not given him anything. After separating from his father, he has started living in a kotha in the Dhani of Sahabdeen. It was admitted that Mst. Shakura had previously made an application under sub- section (1) of Section 125 Cr. P. C. on September 30, 1982. During the pendency of that application, he had taken Mst. Shakura with her to the Dhani of Sahabdeen. He himself used to go to the town of Nohar to earn his livelihood and used to return in the evening. Mst. Shakura stayed in he Dhani of Sahabdeen for a week and when he himself had gone to Nohar for earning his livelihood. she went away to her father's house alongwith her brothers without informing him. Mohd. Shariff pleaded that Mst. Shakura is under misguiding influence of her father and brothers. Lastly, it was stated that both the parties are muslims and according to their personal law the application was not maintainable. 3. After recording the evidence adduced by the parties, the Judicial Magistrate decided the application of Mst. Shakura on July 20, 1984 and he ordered Muted. Shariff to make a monthly allowance of Rs. 200/- to Mst. Shakura with effect from October 1, 1982 for her maintenance. Mohd. Shariff filed a revision petition No. 25 of 1984 against this order before the Sessions Court. The Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar held that there was no justification to grant maintenance to Mst. Shariff to make a monthly allowance of Rs. 200/- to Mst. Shakura with effect from October 1, 1982 for her maintenance. Mohd. Shariff filed a revision petition No. 25 of 1984 against this order before the Sessions Court. The Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar held that there was no justification to grant maintenance to Mst. Shakura with effect from October 1, 1982 i. e. from the date of her earlier application under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code which was consigned to record on December, 7, 1983. The Additional Sessions Judge further held that the Judicial Magistrate had given no findings regarding the means of Mohd. Shariff and about his refusal to maintain her. Without giving findings on these matters, he held that no order under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code could be passed by the Judicial Magistrate. The Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, on August 21, 1985 allowed the revision filed by Mohd Shariff, set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate. Bhadra dated July 20, 1984 and remanded the application to the Judicial Magistrate to re-decide the matter in accordance with law having regard to the observations made by him in his revisional order. After the remand, the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra re decided the application of Mst. Shakura on April 9. 1986 and ordered Mohd. Shariff to make a monthly allowance of Rs. 200/- for the maintenance of Mst. Shakura with effect from December 19, 1983 i.e. the date on which Mst. Shakura had made her second application for grant of maintenance under the said provisions of the Code. 4. After the above order dated April 9, 1986 had been obtained by Mst. Shakura, she made an application to the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra on May 26, 1986 stating that her husband Mohd. Shariff had failed without sufficient cause to comply with the said order and an amount of Rs. 5800/- in respect of maintenance allowance was due against him upto May, 1986. She, therefore, prayed that a warrant for levying the said amount be issued against Mohd. Shariff and in case the allowance remained unpaid, Mohd. Shariff be imprisoned under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code. On August 1, 1986 appearance was made by Mohd. Shariff before the Judicial Magistrate and time was sought for making the payment. However, on August 7, 1986 Mohd. Shariff and in case the allowance remained unpaid, Mohd. Shariff be imprisoned under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code. On August 1, 1986 appearance was made by Mohd. Shariff before the Judicial Magistrate and time was sought for making the payment. However, on August 7, 1986 Mohd. Shariff and his counsel became absent and warrant for levying the amount due was ordered to he issued. However, on August 29, 1986 Mohd. Shariff made an application to the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra under sub-section (3 of Section 127 of the Code stating that he had divorced Mst. Shakura according to personal law before the order awarding maintenance was passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra on April 9, 1986 and he had also made a statement to that effect during his examination in proceedings under section 125(l) of the Code. Mohd. Shariff' also pleaded that the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 had already come into force and according to the provisions of the said Act, a divorced woman was only entitled to an amount equal to the sum of mahr and was not entitled to the grant of any maintenance allowance from her former husband. Consequently he pleaded that the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 was not executable. The Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra by his order dated November 20, 1986 accepted the objections put forward by Mohd Sharif in his application dated August 29, 1986 and Closed the proceedings which had been initiated on the application filed by Mst Shakura on May 29, 1986 under sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code and ordered that Smt Shakura should now act under and in accordance with the provision, contained in the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereafter, for short, the Act). 5. It may further be mentioned that Mohd. Shariff had also filed a criminal revision No. 37 of 1996 before the Court of Sessions against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 whereby the maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- was ordered to be paid to Mst. Shakura. 5. It may further be mentioned that Mohd. Shariff had also filed a criminal revision No. 37 of 1996 before the Court of Sessions against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 whereby the maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- was ordered to be paid to Mst. Shakura. Mst Shakura also filed a revision No. 11 of 1987 against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986 whereby the Magistrate had closed the proceedings under sub- section (3) of Section 125 of the Code on account of the coming into force of the Act. Both these revisions were decided by the Additional Sessions Judge. Nohar by his order dated March 23, 1987. Before the Addl Sessions Judge, it was urged on behalf of Mohd. Shariff that since the Judicial Magistrate. Bhadra had by his order dated November 20, 1986 closed the proceedings under sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code against Mohd. Shariff on account of coming into force of the Act, his revision No. 37 of 1986 hid become infructuous and he does not want to press it. The Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that in both the revisions two important legal points were involved Firstly whether Mohd. Shariff had legally divorced Mst. Shakura according to Muslim personal Law. Secondly, even if it is hid that Mohd. Shariff had legally divorced Mst Shakura, was he not liable to maintain her and whether the Act was applicable; in the instant case. He, therefore, decided both these revisions. The Addl. Sessions Judge by his judgment dated March 23, 1987 held that Mohd Shariff had not divorced Mst. Shakura and the Judicial Magistrate. Bhadra was wrong in holding by his order dated November 20, 1986 that Mst. Shakura was a divorce. The Addl. Sessions Judge further held that even if it is held that Mohd. Shiriff has divorced Mst. Shakura as pleaded by him the order granting maintenance was passed on April 9, 1986 and the Act had come into force subsequent to that date and, therefore, it did not effect the order granting maintenance allowance passed by the judicial Magistrate, Bhadra on April 9, 1986 The Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the revision filed by Mohd. Shariff against the order of Judicial Magistrate dated April 9, 1986. He allowed the revision filed by Mst. Shariff against the order of Judicial Magistrate dated April 9, 1986. He allowed the revision filed by Mst. Shakura and quashed the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986 closing the proceedings under sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code and directed the Judicial Magistrate to restore the application of Mst Shakura and to take steps for recovery of the amount of maintenance due to Mst. Shakura in accordance with law. 6. Mohd. Shariff has filed this revision against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar passed on March 23, 1987 and has also moved under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 19, 1986. 7. In the revision petition, Mohd. Shariff has stated that the Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in deciding both the revisions filed by Mohd. Sharift and Mst. Shakura by a common order. Mohd. Shariff had filed a revision No. 37 of 1986 against the order of the Judicial Magistrate. Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 ordering the grant of maintenance allowance to Mst. Shakura and once that order stood annulled by the later order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986 the revision filed by Mohd. Shariff had become in fructuous and the Addl. Sessions Judge should not have decided revision No. 37 of 1986. It is next stated that while deciding revision No. 11 of 1987 filed by Mst. Shakura, the Additional Sessions Judge has relied upon the evidence which formed part of record of revision No. 37 of 1986 which was against the original application under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Code. The revision filed by Mst. Shakura was against order of the Judicial Magistrate dated November 20, 1986 dropping the proceedings under sub-section (3) of section 125. The Judicial Magistrate has held that Mst. Shakura stood divorced and this finding should not have been interfered by the Additional Sessions Judge. Mst. Shakura had not contested the question of divorce before the Judicial Magistrate. In any event, the Additional Sessions Judge should not have re-appraised the evidence. Lastly, it was contended that according to the provisions of the Act, a divorced woman shall not be entitled to maintenance under sub-section (1) of Section 125 and the only remedy available to Mst. Shakura was under the Act. 8. In any event, the Additional Sessions Judge should not have re-appraised the evidence. Lastly, it was contended that according to the provisions of the Act, a divorced woman shall not be entitled to maintenance under sub-section (1) of Section 125 and the only remedy available to Mst. Shakura was under the Act. 8. Under section 488 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 the right of a wife to maintenance was based upon the existence and continuance of conjugal relations, it was a condition precedent to a claim for maintenance. The one ceased with the other. The factum of marriage and the cessation thereof was to be ascertained by reference to personal law of the parties. The wife's right to maintenance under Section 488 of the Old Code could be defeated by the husband by obtaining a divorce under the personal law. To remove this hardship the Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended that the benefit of the provision should be extended to a woman who has been divorced by her husband so long as she had not remarried after the divorce. Accordingly, Clause (b) of Explanation to Section 125 (1) of the new Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 had been enate. It provides that "Wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. 9. His Lordship Subba Rao, J. in Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 , dealing with the scope of Chapter XXXVI of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, which contained Section 488, observed : "Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing the maintenance of wives and children intends to serve social purpose, Section 488 prescribes alternative forums to enable a deserted wife or a helpless child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent relief". 10. In Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal & Others, 1969 (3) SCC 802 children of Nanak Chand were awarded maintenance allowance. It was contended on behalf of Nanak Chand before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that Section 488 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code, in so far as it provides for the grant of maintenance to Hindu, was inconsistent with Chapter III of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1986. This contention was rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. This contention was rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was observed that there was no inconsistency between section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 483 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure. Both could stand together. The Maintenance Act was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. The law was substantially similar before and nobody ever suggested that Hindu Law, as in force immediately before the commencement of the Maintenance Act, in so far as it dealt with the maintenance of children; was in any way inconsistent with Section 488 of the old Code. The scope of two laws was different. Section 488 provided a summary remedy and was applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and had no relationship with the personal law of the parties. Similarly it was held in Captain Ramesh Chandra Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1807 , that the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of Hindu Marriage Act did not stand in the way of the Magistrate in granting relief under section 125 of the Code if the conditions requisite were satisfied. Similarly it was held in Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi, AIR 1975 SC 83 , that the scope of Section 23 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and Section 125 of the Code is different and both can stand together. 11. In Bai Tabira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia, AIR 1979 SC 362 , his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J. observed:-- "We hold that every divorce, otherwise eligible, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance and the dissolution of the marriage makes no difference to this right under the current code, In the normal course, an order for maintenance must follow, the quantum having been determined by the learned Magistrate at the trial level ................surely. Parliament in keeping with Article 15 (3) and deliberate by design, made a special provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce. Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in Article 39 is part of special and economic justice, specified in Article 38, fulfilment of which is fundamental to the governance of the country (Article 37). From this coign of vantage we must view the printed to st of the particular code............The last defence based on 'mahr' payment, merits more serious attention. Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in Article 39 is part of special and economic justice, specified in Article 38, fulfilment of which is fundamental to the governance of the country (Article 37). From this coign of vantage we must view the printed to st of the particular code............The last defence based on 'mahr' payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available. But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual right. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right of the divorce us 125 can operate to negate that claim............Nor can section 127 rescue the respondent from his obligation ................The point must be clearly understood that the scheme of the complex of provisions of Chapter IX has a social purpose. III used wives and desperate divorce shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets. This traumatic horror animates the amplitude of Section 127. Where the husband, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorce, a subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra-indicated and the husband liberated. This is the teleological interpretation, the sociological decoding of the text of section 127. The key-note thought is adequacy of payment which would take reasonable care for her maintenance ................ There must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance; to interpret otherwise is to stultify the project. Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful. The proposition, therefore, is that no husband can claim under section 127 (3) (h) absolution from his obligation under section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance". 12. The same view was again reiterated in Fuzlumbi v. K. Khadervali (1980) 4 SCC 125 . 12. The same view was again reiterated in Fuzlumbi v. K. Khadervali (1980) 4 SCC 125 . His Lordship Krishna Iyer, J. said that there was no warrant whatever for the High Court to reduce to a husk the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira's case by its doctrinal gloss. 13. Then came the Constitution Bench decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Sbahbano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945 . Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for the Constitution Bench, laid down that benefit of the provisions regarding maintenance has been extended by clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 12(1) to a divorced woman so long as she has not remarried The statutory right available to a divorced woman is unaffected by the provisions of the personal law applicable to her. According to the Explanation to second proviso of Section 125(3), if a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. This Explanation unmistakably shows that Section 125 of the Code overrides the Muslim personal Law under which a muhammdan may have as many as four wives at the same time. Thereafter his Lordship referred to Aiyate Nos. 241 & 242 of the holy quaran and their English version even by various authors and translators and came to the conclusion that these Aiyate left no doubt that qua ran imposed an obligation on the muslim husband to make provision for or to provide maintenance to the divorced wife and the contrary argument to this does less than justice to the teachings of Quaran. Dealing with mahr' it was held that it was not in consideration of the marriage but was an obligation imposed by law on the husband as a mark of respect for the wife. In any event, the payment of the amount of deferred 'Mahr' on divorce is not occasioned by the divorce. A sum payable to wife as mark of respect for her cannot be a sum payable in divorce. It was observed that the provision contained in section 127 (3) (b) may have been introduced in the Code because of the misconception that mahr' is an amount payable on divorce but that cannot convert an amount payable as a mark of respect for the wife into an amount payable on divorce. It was observed that the provision contained in section 127 (3) (b) may have been introduced in the Code because of the misconception that mahr' is an amount payable on divorce but that cannot convert an amount payable as a mark of respect for the wife into an amount payable on divorce. The Constitution Bench approved the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira's case and Fuzlunbi's case (both supra). It was, however, pointed out that though Bai Tahira's case was correctly decided, there was an error which had crept in the judgment. There was a statement in Bai Tahira's case that "Payment of mahr' money as a customary discharge, is within the cognizance of section 127(3) (b) of the Code". The Constitutional Bench had further taken the view that mahr' not being payable on divorce does not fall within the meaning of section 127 (3) (b) of the Code. His Lordship also referred to Article 44 of the Constitution which provides that the State shall enjoy to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India which would help the cause of national integration by removing desperate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. On the basis of above reasonings, their Lordships dismissed the appeal filed by Mohd. Ahmad Khan. 14. The decision in Shahbano Begum's case led to some controversies in a section of muslim community as to the obligation of a muslim husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife even after the expiry of the period of iddat. This controversy led the Parliament to intervene to enact the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (Central Act No. 25 of 1986) which received the assent of the President on May 19, 1986 and was published in the Gazette of India Extra-ordinary part II, Section I. The preamble of the Act is that it is an Act to protect the rights of the muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Section 2(a) defines the expression "divorced woman" as meaning a Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law, and has been divorced by, or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law. Section 2(a) defines the expression "divorced woman" as meaning a Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law, and has been divorced by, or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law. "Iddat period" has been defined in section 2(b) of the Act as meaning, in the case of a divorced woman, (i) three menstrual courses after the date of divorce, if she is subject to menstruation; (ii) three tuner months after her divorce, if she is not subject to menstruation; and (iii) if she is enceinte at the time of her divorce, the period between the divorce and the delivery of her child or the termination of her pregnancy, whichever the earlier, section 3 and 4 of the Act are the heart and soul of the Act. Section 3 starts with a non-obstente clause. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to; (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband; (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to he paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim Law; and (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of niahr or dower has not been made or paid of the properties referred in clause (d) above have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she can make an application for the purpose to a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction where she resides and the Magistrate on being satisfied that the husband with sufficient means has failed or neglected to make or pay to the divorced woman within the iddat period. the provisions, maintenance, mahr and the properties referred to in sub clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of section 3, he shall make an order for their payment or the delivery of the property, as the case may he. to the divorced woman. Sub-section (4) is more or less on the lines of sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Code. Then follows section 4 which makes provision regarding maintenance of divorced woman who has not remarried in relation to the period after iddat. For this period after iddat, all conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) being satisfied order for maintenance can be passed against her relative as would be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to Muslim Law. This is subject to a proviso that where the divorced woman the children, the Magistrate shall only order such children to pay maintenance to her after the iddat period and in case children are unable to pay such maintenance, the Magistrate shall order the parents of such divorced woman to pay maintenance. Then there is a second proviso to meet with the contingencies where the parents are unable to pay his or her share of the maintenance's ordered by the Magistrate. In that event order can be passed against such other relatives of the divorced woman as have means of paving the same in such proportions as the Magistrate may think fit to order. Then sub-section (2) of section 4 deals with the contingencies when the divorced woman has no relatives as mentioned above or suer relatives or any of them have not enough means to pay the maintenance in such cases the Magistrate may order the State Waqf Board to pay such maintenance as determined by him or, as the case may be, to pay the shares of such of the relatives who are unable to pay, such periods as he may specify in his order. 15. Section (illegible) of the Act gives option to the divorced woman and her former husband to exercise it by affidavit or any other declaration in writing to the effect that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions or sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 15. Section (illegible) of the Act gives option to the divorced woman and her former husband to exercise it by affidavit or any other declaration in writing to the effect that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions or sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Such affidavit or declaration have to be filed bath by the divorced woman and her former husband on the date of the first hearing of the application under sub-section (2) of section 3 made before a Magistrate by the divorced woman. On filing of such affidavit or declaration on the date of the first hearing of the application under sub sec. (2) of section 3 by the divoced woman and her former husband, shall dispose of the application under sub sec. (2) of section 3 accordingly. Then there is section 7 in the Act which makes provision in relation to every application by a divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 of the Code pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act. In relation to such pending applications it is provided that not withstanding anything in the Code and subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Act, such application as aforesaid be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with the Act. This is broadly the scheme and scope of the Act. 16. Marriage (nikah), under Muslim law brings about a relation based on and arising from a permanent contract for intercourse and procreation of children between a man and a woman and who, after being married, become husband and wife. Marriage among Muslims is not sacrament but purely a civil contract. The husband is bound to maintain his wife (unless she is too young for matrimonial intercourse) so long as she is faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders. But he is not bound to maintain a wife who refuses herself to him or is otherwise disobedient, unless the refusal or disobedience is justified by non-payment of prompt dower or she leaves the husband's house on account of his cruelty. If the husband having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife unable to maintain herself, a Magistrate of the first class may under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 upon proof of such neglect or refusal. If the husband having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife unable to maintain herself, a Magistrate of the first class may under sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 upon proof of such neglect or refusal. order the husband to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees, as such Magistrate thinks fit. If the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition of living with him, and she refused to live with him, the Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under section 125 notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. If a husband has contracted marriage with another w man or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. No wife is entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under section 125 if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. Apart from section 125 of the Code, if the husband neglects or refuses to maintain his wife without any lawful cause. the wife can also sue the husband for maintenance, but she is not entitled to a decree for past maintenance. unless the claim is based on a specific agreement. 17. "Mahr" or dower is a sum that becomes payable by the husband to the wife in marriage, either by agreement between the parties, or by operation of law. It may be either prompt or exigable (in Arabic Muwjjal i. e. payable immediately on marriage if demanded by the wife or deferred (in Arabic muwajjal) i.e. payable on the dissolution of marriage or the happening of some specified event. 'Mahr' or dower is not the exchange or consideration given by the man to the woman for entering into the contract of marriage, but an effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband as a token of respect for its subject, the woman. 18. Any Muhammadan of same (sane) mind who has attained puberty can divorce his wife without assigning any cause. The divorce called talak may be either irrevocable (ain) or revocable (raja). 18. Any Muhammadan of same (sane) mind who has attained puberty can divorce his wife without assigning any cause. The divorce called talak may be either irrevocable (ain) or revocable (raja). A talak bain, while it always operates as an immediate and complete dissolution of the marriage bond, differ, as to one of its ulterior effects according to the form in which it is pronounced. A talak bain may be effected by words addressed to the wife clearly indicating an intention to dissolve the marriage; either; (a) Once, followed by abstinence from sexual intercourse for the period called iddat or (b) Three times during successive intervals or purity, i.e, between successive menstruations, no intercourse taking place during any of the three intervals; or (c) Three times at shorter intervals or even in immediate succession; or (d) Once, by words showing a clear intention that the divorce shall immediately become irrevocable. The first named of the above methods is called ahsan (best), the second hasan (good), the third and fourth are said to be biddat (sinful) but are, nevertheless regarded by sunni lawyers as legally valid. In the biddat from the divorce at once becomes irrevocable, irrespective of the iddat. Where the words of talak are addresred to the wife by name, it is enough and it is not necessary that the wife should be present when the talak is pronounced though her right to maintenance any (may) continue until she is informed of the divorce. A talak actually pronounced is valid and effective and its validity and effectiveness would not be affected by the mental intention of the maker that it should not be a genuine. 19. In Mami and another v. Kallander Ammal, AIR 1927 P.C. 15 , it was held that according to Muhammaden law, a husband can effect a divorce whenever he desires. He may do so by words without any talaknama or written document and no particular form of words is prescribed. If the words used are express or well understood as implying divorce, such as talak, no proof of intention is required. If the words used are ambiguous, the mention of the user must be proved. It is not necessary that the repudiation should be pronounced in the presence of the wife, or even addressed to her. 20. If the words used are express or well understood as implying divorce, such as talak, no proof of intention is required. If the words used are ambiguous, the mention of the user must be proved. It is not necessary that the repudiation should be pronounced in the presence of the wife, or even addressed to her. 20. There are authorities for the proposition that where to an application for maintenance under section 488 by a Muhammadan wife, the husband filed a written statement to the effect that he has already divorced the wife, the statement, even if the fact of such divorce was not proved was to operate as a declaration of divorce from the date of the written statement and the wife is entitled to maintenance for a period of iddat from that date (see the decisions reported in AIR 1926 Calcutta 242; (1967) All W R. C H.C.) 21 (1968) M.L.J. (Cr.) 660; AIR 1970 A.P 298 ; (1975) M.L.J. (Cri) 570; A.I.R. 1967 A.P 344; A I.R. 1961 Bombay 121; 1972 K.L.T. 512; 1971 All Cri.R. 339; 1977 All Cri.R. 151; 1975, Cr.L.J. 1884 (A.P.); 1966 Ker.L R. 489 and A.I.R. 1967 Patna 344). 21. In State v. Mohammad Nabi Khan (a Pakistani case, P.L.D. 1961 W.P. Karachi 12) in a maintenance case under Section 488 Criminal Procedure Code the husband while giving evidence pronounced the divorce even though he divorced the wife earlier. It was held that the Magistrate ought to have given effect to the second divorce under the Islamic Law. The wife was held to be entitled to maintenance for the period of iddat only. 22. In the decision reported in 1975 Cr.L.J. 1884 (A.P.) it was laid down that notwithstanding the failure of a Mohammadan husband to prove his allegation that he had divorced his wife some years or months age, or the statement made by him to the effect that he had divorced his wife earlier being found to be false, nevertheless it would operate as an acknowledgement of divorce as from the date on which such clear and unambiguous statement was made in a notice issued by him to his wife or a pleading or an affidavit filed by him in court proceeding to which his wife was a party. The husband need not prove the form of talak adopted by him. The husband need not prove the form of talak adopted by him. Such declaration irrespective of form of talak would be complete, irrevocable and effective from the date of the filing of the pleading or affidavit or the communication of the notice and he would not be liable to maintain her any longer except for the period of iddat. 23. A Muslim marriage may be dissolved not only by talak which is the arbitrary act of the husband, but also by agreement between the husband and wife. A dissolution of marriage by agreement may take the form of khula or mubara'at. When the aversion is on the side of the wife and she desires a separation, the transaction is called khula. When the aversion is mutual, and both the sides desire a separation, the transaction is called mubara' at. As in talak, so in Khula and Mubara at, the wife is bound to observe the iddat. 24. 'Iddat", according to the Hidaya, may generally be described as "the term by the completion of which a new marriage is rendered lawful", or as the period during which a woman is prohibited from marrying again after dissolution of her marriage, or during which a previously existing marriage is for certain purposes, considered to be undissolved notwithstanding that the husband has died or pronounced a divorce. 25. In the background of above facts and proposition of law, the present revision filed by Mohd. Shariff has to be decided. It is true that on a criminal miscellaneous petition No. 41 of 1986 filed by Mohd. Shariff under section 127 (3) of the Code read with the Act, the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra by his order dated November 20, 1986 closed the proceedings of criminal miscellaneous petition No. 28 of 1986 which had been filed by Mst. Shakura on May 26, 1986 under section 125(3) of the Code for levy of the maintenance allowance which had been all allowed to her against Mohd. Shariff by the Judicial Magistrate dated April 9, 1986 passed under section 125(1) in Criminal Miscellanous Petition No. 42 of 1983 of his Court. It is also a fact that Mst. Shakura had filed criminal revision No. 11 of 1987 in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar on December 18, 1986 against the aforesaid order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986. It is equally a fact that Mohd. It is also a fact that Mst. Shakura had filed criminal revision No. 11 of 1987 in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar on December 18, 1986 against the aforesaid order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986. It is equally a fact that Mohd. Sariff had filed Criminal Revision No. 37 of 1986 in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar on June 12, 1986 against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 passed under section 125(1) of the Code granting maintenance in favour of Mohd. Shariff. Both revision Nos. 37 of 1986 and 11 of 1987 were heard and decided together by the Addl. Sessions Judge by a common order dated March 23, 1981 with the results already mentioned. In her revision No. 11 of 1987 Mst. Shakura had pleaded in para 4 of the memo of revision that the Judicial Magistrate. Bhadra in his order dated November 20, 1986 had erred in holding that she was a divorced woman because the question whether she was a divorced woman or not was in issue between the parties in prior reason No. 37 of 1986 which had been filed by Mohd. Shariff before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar It is pertinent to note that in criminal revision No. 37 of 1986 filed by Mohd. Shariff he had pleaded in his memo of revision that had divorced Mst. Shakura during the pendency of proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra and which fact was proved from the proceedings held on the application of Mst. Shakura under section 125(1) of the Code, Mohd. Shariff had further pleaded that according to Muslim personal Law, a divorced woman was only entitled to 'mahr' and maintenance during the period of iddat and not maintenance allowance under that section to last till her remarriage. From these facts, it is quite clear that there was controversy between the parties on the point whether Mohd. Shariff had divorced Mst. Shakura during the pendency of proceedings under section 125(1) of the Code. In his reply to the application of Mst. Shakura under section 125(l) filed on April 24, 1984 Mohd. Sharif' had not pleaded that he had divorced Mst. Shukura. The Addl. Sessions Judge, Nohar by his interim order passed on August 21, 1986 in revision No. 37 of 1986 had allowed to Mst. In his reply to the application of Mst. Shakura under section 125(l) filed on April 24, 1984 Mohd. Sharif' had not pleaded that he had divorced Mst. Shukura. The Addl. Sessions Judge, Nohar by his interim order passed on August 21, 1986 in revision No. 37 of 1986 had allowed to Mst. Shakura an interim allowance at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month till the hearing of the revision. It is also pertinent to note that in reply to the criminal miscellaneous application No. 41 of 1986 filed by Mohd. Shariff under section 127(3) of the Code, Mst. Shakura had filed a reply on October 9, 1986 stating that Mohd. Shariff had not divorced her in accordance with Muslim Law and she was still his wife. The Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra relied on recitals in the order dated April 9, 1986 passed on the application of Mst. Shakura No. 42 of 1983 under section 125(1) of the Code and stated that on perusal of the said order, it is found that the earlier Judicial Magistrate in the earlier order dated July 20, 1984 had mentioned that Mohd. Shariff had divorced Mst. Shakura. Only on this basis, the Judicial Magistrate Bhadra by his order dated November 20, 1986 held that since Mst. Shakura was a divorced woman and since the Act had come into force, she could now only proceed under the provisions of the Act and consequently he closed the proceedings under section 125(3) of the Code which had been initiated by Mst. Shakura. It was completely forgotten that the earlier order dated July 20, 1984 had been set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar in Criminal Revision No. 25 of 1984 filed by Mohd. Shariff. It was also not given due consideration that criminal revision No. 37 of 1986 filed by Mohd. Shariff against the order of the judicial Magistrate dated April 9, 1986 was still pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar in which both the questions of divorce and the right of Mst. Shakura to maintenance was to be decided by the revisional court. Mohd. Sbariff had filed criminal revision No. 37 of 1986 on June 12, 1986 after the Act had come into force. Shakura to maintenance was to be decided by the revisional court. Mohd. Sbariff had filed criminal revision No. 37 of 1986 on June 12, 1986 after the Act had come into force. When these two matters were pending decision of the Additional Sessionss Judge, Nohar, in Criminal Revision No. 37 of 1986 against the order of maintenance dated April 9, 1986 passed under section 125(l) of the Code, there was no justification for the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra to close the proceedings under section 125(3) of the Code without taking evidence and without deciding, and assuming that Mst. Shakura was a divorced woman and even without deciding as to on what date Mohd. Shariff had divorced Mst. Shakura according to Muslim personal Law. The only legal and proper course for the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra was to stay further proceedings on the application of Mohd. Shariff under section 127(3) and that of Mst Shakura under section 125(3) till Criminal Revision No. 37 of 1986 was decided by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Nohar. In these extraordinary circumstances, the Additional Sessions Judge, Nohar was right in deciding criminal revision No. 37 of 1986 filed by Mohd. Shariff and in holding that the same had not become infructuous on account of the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986. Revisional remedy is not only a remedy to a party but is also the right of the Court to correct the illegality committed by the inferior criminal courts. Mst. Shakura had to file a criminal revision No. 11 of 1987 on account of the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate on November 20, 1986 closing all further proceedings in relation to the application filed by Mst. Shakura under section 125(3) of the Code. 26. The next question that arises is as to whether Mohd. Shariff had divorced Mst. Shakura according to Muslim personal Law. As has already been stated that in his reply to the application No. 42 of 1983 filed by Mst. Shakura under section 125 (1) of the Code, Mohd. Shairff had not pleaded that he had already divorced Mst. Shakura. All that he pleaded was that parties were Muslims and according to their personal law, application for maintenance under section 125 (1) Cr. P.C. was not maintainable. On facts, he had pleaded that Mst. Shakura had herself left the matrimonial home out of her own will and without informing him. Shakura. All that he pleaded was that parties were Muslims and according to their personal law, application for maintenance under section 125 (1) Cr. P.C. was not maintainable. On facts, he had pleaded that Mst. Shakura had herself left the matrimonial home out of her own will and without informing him. The other facts pleaded by him were that he was a man of meagre financial means and he was ready to maintain Mst. Shakura provided she lived with him. Nothing was said in this reply that he had divorced Mst. Shakura. Mst. Shakura was examined in proceedings under section 125 (1) of the Code on April 30, 1984. Not a single question was put suggesting to her that Mohd. Shariff had divorced her. Mohd. Shariff himself was examined in proceedings under section 125 (1) of the Code on June 4, 1984. In his examination in chief Mohd. Shariff did not say a word that he had divorced Mst. Shakura. In his across examination, Mohd. Shariff stated as follows : "I did not give talak to the applicant. According to our Muslim religion, I had given talak to the applicant at Nohar and had sent a document of talak by post to applicant. After talak, the applicant is not his wife. I now do not want to take the applicant from her house". 27. The main question, therefore, is whether by the above quoted statement of Mohd. Shariff in his cross examination recorded on June 4, 1984, it should be held that by his above statement he had at least divorced Mst. Shakura on June 4, 1984. I have already discussed above the forms and modes, in which a talak by a Muhammadan husband can be pronounced. A talak bain can be effected by words addressed to the wife clearly indicating an intention to dissolve the marriage even once, by words showing such a clear intention and divorce shall immediately become as irrevocable. This mode of talak may be biddat (sinful) but nevertheless it is regarded by Sunni lawyers as legally valid. In biddat form the divorce at once becomes irrevocable, irrespective of the iddat. It is not necessary that the wife should be present when the talak is pronounced. This mode of talak may be biddat (sinful) but nevertheless it is regarded by Sunni lawyers as legally valid. In biddat form the divorce at once becomes irrevocable, irrespective of the iddat. It is not necessary that the wife should be present when the talak is pronounced. Authorities have already been quoted wherein it has been held that even in cases where the husband has filed a written statement in the proceedings under section 488 of the old Criminal Procedure Code and has pleaded therein that he has already divorced the wife. it would operate as a declaration of divorce from the date of the written statement. The same would be the effect when the husband has made a clear and unambiguous statement declaring that he had divorced the wife. In State v. Mohd. Nabi Khan (a Pakistan case) (supra), in a maintenance case under Section 488 Cr. P.C. the husband while giving the evidence pronounced the divorce and it was held that the Magistrate ought to have given effect to get divorce and the wife was held to be entitled to the maintenance for the period of iddat only. In view of the above, I am of the view that Mohd. Shariff divorced Mst Shakura on June 4, 1984 when he made the above statement in his cross examination. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nohar was wrong in holding that the divorce made by Mohd. Shariff by his statement in cross examination could not be held to be valid divorce for the reason that he made this statement in order to take advantage of the Act. A Muslim marriage can be dissolved by the husband even arbitrarily and the divorce made in the above manner is to be held to be a valid divorce by the decisions already referred to above. 28. The alternative finding given by the Addl. Sessions Judge is that even if Mst. Shakura was a divorced woman, the provisions of the Act cannot be applied for the reason that the Judicial Magistrate had already passed the order for maintenance ups 125 (1) of the Code on April 9, 1986 i.e. before the commencement of the Act on May 10, 1986. In this connection the Additional Sessions Judge relied upon a Single Judge decision of this court in Ali Mohammed v. Smt. Zaida. 1987 Cr. L.R (Rajasthan) 129 = 1987 (1) RLR 156 . In this connection the Additional Sessions Judge relied upon a Single Judge decision of this court in Ali Mohammed v. Smt. Zaida. 1987 Cr. L.R (Rajasthan) 129 = 1987 (1) RLR 156 . In this case his Lordship G.K. Sharma, J. held that the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 came into force on a date when the application under Section 125 Cr. P.C. was not pending before the Magistrate. The Magistrate in that case had pronounced his order granting maintenance on April 29, 1980 much before the said Act into force. The husband had filed a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge. He held that in view of Section 7 of the Act, the application under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code was not pending but was disposed of. It was only revision which was pending against the order. He negatived the argument that after coming into force of the said Act, Mst. Zaida had no right to claim the maintenance allowance. It may be mentioned here that the similar matter came before a Division Bench of this Court in Abid Ali etc. v. Mst. Raisa Begum, 1988(1) RLR 104 . By its common Judgment dated December 8, 1987 the Division Bench had decided Criminal Misc. Petition No. 405 of 1987 and five other criminal appeals Nos. 315, 339, 334 and 283 of 1987 and also Criminal Appeal No. 483 of 1986. In Criminal Misc, petition No. 405 of 1987 Mst. Raisa Begum had made an application under section 125 of the Code on June 6, 1984 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Sikar. On April 29, 1984 a deed of divorce was sent by her husband Abid Ali to Mst. Raisa Begum bearing dated April 24, 1984. The Chief Judicial Magistrate Sikar granted the application of Mst. Raisa Begum and the revision filed by the husband was dismissed on March 26, 1987 by the Additional Sessions Judge. Against that Abid Ali filed Criminal Miscellaneous petition No. 405 of 1987. The other case was that the family court by its order dated April 11, 1986 granted maintenance to Mst. Najma. Her husband Iqbal Khan had moved an application before the Family Court stating that he had divorced Mst. Najma in October, 1984 and information of the same had been given to her by a registered post. The other case was that the family court by its order dated April 11, 1986 granted maintenance to Mst. Najma. Her husband Iqbal Khan had moved an application before the Family Court stating that he had divorced Mst. Najma in October, 1984 and information of the same had been given to her by a registered post. It was contended by lqbal Khan before the Family Court that after divorce, Mst. Najma was not entitled to maintenance because of the provisions of the Act. He therefore prayed that the order granting maintenance passed on April 11, 1986 be quashed in the changed circumstances. The Family Court recorded the statement of Mst. Najma in the absence of Iqbal Khan and after trial dismissed the application of Iqbal Khan on July 9, 1987 holding that the factum of divorce was not admitted by the wife and it held that no divorce had taken place. It was also held by the family Court that the application under section 125(l) Cr. P.C. of Mst. Najma for grant of maintenance had been decided prior to the coming into force of the Act. Against this order lqbal Khan filed Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1987. The third case was that Mst. Asal Bano had applied for maintenance to the Family Court. The Family Court passed an order for maintenance on April 13, 1986. Thereafter Saline moved an application before the Family Court alleging therein that he had divorced Mst. Asal Bano on June 10, 1985 in the presence of two witnesses and talaknama was sent to her which she refused to receive. To this application Mst. Asal Bano replied and denied the fact of divorce. The Family Court recorded 'he evidence and the basis of the statement of Salim recorded on May 14, 1987, it came to the conclusion that in the statement, Salim stated that he had divorced Asal Bano and such a declaration of divorce operated as divorce from the date of his statement. However, the family Court dismissed the application of Salim on the ground that the order of maintenance under section 125(1) of the Code was passed by the Family Court on April 13, 1986 i.e. prior to the coming into force of the Act. Salim, therefore, filed the Criminal Appeal No. 334 of 1987. However, the family Court dismissed the application of Salim on the ground that the order of maintenance under section 125(1) of the Code was passed by the Family Court on April 13, 1986 i.e. prior to the coming into force of the Act. Salim, therefore, filed the Criminal Appeal No. 334 of 1987. The fourth Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 1987 related to an order of maintenance passed on January 27, 1986 on an application under section 125(1) Cr. P.C. filed by Mst. Amana against her husband Mohd. Siddique. After the coming into force of the Act. Mohd. Siddique moved an application before the Family Court contending that Mst. Amana was not entitled to any maintenance from him after the coming into force of the Act because under the Act, he was bound to pay maintenance for the plied of Iddat only. The family Court recorded the evidence. Mohd. Siddique gave statement on April 14, 1987 stating that he has divorced Mst. Amana. The Family Court held that divorce operated from April 14, 1987 when Mohd. Saddique gave the statement. However, the Family Court held that the order of maintenance was passed in January, 1986 i.e. before the commencement of the Act and the provisions of the Act were not retrospective in nature. The Court, therefore dismissed the application of Mohd. Saddique who filed Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 1987 before the High Court. Facts of Criminal Appeal No.283 of 1987 were that an order of maintenance was passed on application filed by Abeda Begam on April 25, 1986 under section 125. The reaper Mohd. Hanif moved before the Family Court that he had divorced Abeda Begam on April 25, 1987 and information of the same had been given to her by registered post and in view of the provisions of the Act, he was not hound to pay the amount of maintenance awarded on April 19, 1986 beyond the period of Iddat. The Family Court dismissed the application on the ground that the Act was not retrospective in nature and the orders passed under Section 125 Cr. P.C. are not affected. Mohd. Hanif, therefore, filed Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 1987. Facts of Criminal Appeal No. 483 of 1986 were that on the application of Mst. Rashida under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code maintenance was granted by the family Court by order dated September 26, 1986. P.C. are not affected. Mohd. Hanif, therefore, filed Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 1987. Facts of Criminal Appeal No. 483 of 1986 were that on the application of Mst. Rashida under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code maintenance was granted by the family Court by order dated September 26, 1986. The application was contested by Qumariddi on several grounds and one of the grounds taken was that he had divorced Mst. Rashida two and half years back. In his statement recorded by the Family Court Qumariddi also disposed that he had divorced Mst. Rashida. The Family Court held that Qumariddi had failed to prove the factum of divorce. It was urged before the High Court that since Qumariddi had acknowledged divorce in his statement made before the Family Court, it operated as a declaration of divorce at least on the date of the statement. All these matters were decided by the Division Bench of this Court by a common Judgment. 29. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Farooq Hassan, J , speaking for the Bench, held as under : (a) The statements given by the husbands in the Family Court will operate as a declaration of divorce from the date of their statements and the wife was then entitled to maintenance for the period of iddat only under the Act of 1986. Under the provisions of the Act of 1986 at the time of deciding application of maintenance. the Court has to see as to whether the divorced woman is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat and in that situation the Court is bound to pass further orders for maintenance after the period of iddat against the persons mentioned in the Act of 1986 (b) After examining the provisions of Chapter IX of Cr.P C. and the Act of 1986 it was held that Section 125 of the Code entitled the divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried and section 3 (1) (a) of the Act of 1986 curtails her said rights to get maintenance till the period of iddat. Section 125 Cr P C. so far as it had created a right to a muslim divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried. has been impliedly repealed. Section 125 Cr P C. so far as it had created a right to a muslim divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried. has been impliedly repealed. That being so a muslim divorced woman is no longer entitled to get maintenance from her husband after the period of iddat as there is no saving clause in the Act of 1986. Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code in so far as it had created a right to a muslim divorced woman to get maintenance until she is remarried, has been, impliedly repealed. Having lost her right to get maintenance from her former husband after the period of iddat she has lost her remedy also as provided under section 125 (3) Criminal Procedure Code to enforce her said rights in case her former husband fails without sufficient cause to comply with order of the maintenance. Thus if a divorced muslim woman files the petition under section 125 (3) Cr.P.C., which in substance is a penal provision, it will be an action without remedy because after the passing of the Act of 1986 all the applications under sections 125 and 127 Criminal Procedure Code are to be discovered of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1986 as is laid down in Section 7 of the Act of 1985. (c) Act of 1986 has completely obliterated the right of such woman to get maintainance. The repeal without saving such right means that such woman had never acquired such right and the said right now cannot be enforced under section 125 (3) Criminal Procedure Code Therefore, if a Muslim woman divorced prior to the coming into force, in whose favour order of maintenance has been passed and has become final or is pending in revision or in other Courts is being challenged by the husband and such order is held to be executable, then it will be in complete contravention of the intention of the legislature and will amount to frustrate the very object of the Act of 1986 for which it had been enacted. The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by Qumaruddin and remanded the case back to the Family Court with the direction that the application of Rashida be decided afresh according to the provisions of the Act of 1986 treating that Qumaridi had divorced Smt. Rashida on the day when his statement was recorded. The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by Qumaruddin and remanded the case back to the Family Court with the direction that the application of Rashida be decided afresh according to the provisions of the Act of 1986 treating that Qumaridi had divorced Smt. Rashida on the day when his statement was recorded. With regard to rest of the four appeals and the miscellaneous petition No. 405 of 1987, they were allowed to extent that respondents wives (divorced women) were entitled to get the maintenance for the period of iddat only after coming into force of the Act of 1986 and any proceeding pending for the recovery of maintenance after the period of iddat and after coming into force of the Act of 1986 were quashed against the appellant. The divorced women were held to be entitled to file separate application under the Act of 1986 for maintenance in case they were unable to maintain themselves after iddat period against the persons mentioned in Section 4 of the Act of 1986. The judgment was not to affect the order of the maintenance granted under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code to the minor children in any of these cases. 30. I am not only bound but am also in humble agreement with the Division Bench decision in Abid Ali's case (supra) that the statement given by the husband in a Court will operate as a declaration of divorce by him to his wife from the date of the statement. This aspect of the law I have already discussed that where the husband files a written statement to the effect that he has already divorced his wife, the statement, even if the fact of such divorce was not proved, was to operate as a declaration of divorce from the date of the written statement. Similarly if the husband while giving evidence pronounces the divorce, it would operate as an acknowledgement of divorce as from the date on which such clear and unambiguous statement was made by the husband in the Court proceeding to which the wife was a party. 31. In all humbleness, I find some difficulty in accepting the view of the Division Bench that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as it had created a right in a muslim divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried has been impliedly repealed. 31. In all humbleness, I find some difficulty in accepting the view of the Division Bench that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as it had created a right in a muslim divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried has been impliedly repealed. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations made in paras 30, 41 and 43 of the judgment reported in 1988 (1) R.L.R. 104 at pages 114, 115 and 117. I may give my reasons for the different view on this point which I hold. Admittedly the Act of 1986 does not contain any repealing clause. On the other hand, there is section 7 in the Act in the shape of transitional provisions. Section 7 of the Act provides that every application by a divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 1973 pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of this Act, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in that Code and subject to the provisions of Section 5 of this Act be disposed of by such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of this Act. This provision, in my view, indicates two things. Firstly, it was not the intention of the legislature to give the Act of 1986 more retrospective operation than what is provided in Section 7. Section 7 postulates that if an application by a divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 of the Code is pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act i.e. 19-5-1986, then such an application. subject to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This means that the Act of 1986 was to apply only to applications by divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 which were pending before a Magistrate on 19.5.1986. Thus the Act applied only to pending applications before the Magistrate. No more retrospectively has been given to the Act of 1986 than this. Second thing which the provisions continued in section 7 indicate is that it is subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Act. Thus the Act applied only to pending applications before the Magistrate. No more retrospectively has been given to the Act of 1986 than this. Second thing which the provisions continued in section 7 indicate is that it is subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Act. As already stated, section 5 of the Act provides that if, on the date of the first hearing of the application u/ss (2) of Section 3, a divorced woman and her former husband declare by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed either jointly or separately. that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and file such affidavit or declaration in the Court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly. It is clear from section 5 that option has been given to a divorced woman and her former husband to choose to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 instead of by the provisions of the Act of 1986. How could one contemplate the express or implied repeal of the provisions contained in sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to a divorced Muslim woman and her former husband, when option has been given to them to be governed by the aforesaid provisions the Code. In my humble view, the Act of 1986 is no more retrospective than this that it applies to application pending before a Magistrate on its commencement and there is neither an express nor an implied repeal of the provisions contained in sections 125 to 128 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 32. As to the question of retrospectivity, no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be constructed as perspective only. But if the language is plainly retrospective it must be so interpreted. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be constructed as perspective only. But if the language is plainly retrospective it must be so interpreted. At the same time, it is laid down that regard must be paid to the dominant intention. Thus in Barber v. Pigden, (1937) 1 KB 664 the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors), Act 1935 was held to be retrospective and was construed as putting an end to the liability of a husband for his wife's torts whenever committed unless legal proceedings had been started before the passing of the Act. It is equally well settled that a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary (see Maxwell on The Interpretation of the Statutes-11th edition page 205). 33. In Sukbram Singh v. Smt. M. Harbheji, 1969(1) SCC 604 , his Lordship Hidaytullah, C.J. observed as under : "Now a law is undoubtedly retrospective, if the law says so expressly but it is not always necessary to say so expressly to make the law retrospective. There are occasions when a law may be held to be retrospective in operation. Retrospectivity is not to be presumed for the presumption is the other way but many statutes have been regarded as retrospective without a declaration. Thus it is that remedial statutes are always regarded as prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly sometimes statutes have a retrospective effect when the declared intention is clearly an unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the particular law or in the context of connected provisions. It is always a question whether a Legislature has sufficiently expressed itself. To find this one must look at the general scope and purview of the Act and the remedy Legislature intends to apply in the former state of the law and then determine what the Legislature intended to do. This line of investigation is, of course, only open if it is necessary. In the words of Lord Selborne in Main v. Stark (1890) 15 AC 384 at page 388) , there might be something in the context of an Act or be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation. This line of investigation is, of course, only open if it is necessary. In the words of Lord Selborne in Main v. Stark (1890) 15 AC 384 at page 388) , there might be something in the context of an Act or be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation. More retrospectively is not to be given than what can be gathered from expressed or clearly implied intention of a Legislature." 34. The Act of 1986 cannot be said to be declaratory Act. For modern purposes a declaratory act is defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law or the meaning or effect of any statute. Declaratory Acts have usually been held to be retrospective. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had general application. The Parliament. in keeping with Article 15(3) of the Constitution and deliberate by design. had made a special provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce The law was accordingly interpreted by the Supreme Court right from Bai Tahira's case (supra) to Shahbano Begum's case (supra). The Act of 1986 was not meant to remove doubts existing as to the general law contained in section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was, therefore, not a declaratory Act. Rather it was a remedial Act which is always regarded as prospective unless there is a declared intention in it or in the content of its provisions to indicate a contrary intention. A statutory provision is held to be retrospective either when it is so declared by express terms or the intention to make it retrospective clearly follows from the words and the context in which they occur. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Shah Bhagraj Kuberji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra, AIR 1961 SC 1596 and Mst. Refiqunnessa v. Lal Bahadur Chatri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 . 35. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Shah Bhagraj Kuberji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra, AIR 1961 SC 1596 and Mst. Refiqunnessa v. Lal Bahadur Chatri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 . 35. As to the approach of implied repeal adopted by the Division Bench of this Court in Ali's case (supra) their Lordships the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561 had laid down that the Legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication, but there is a presumption against an implied repeal upon the assumption that the legislature enacts lass with a complete knowledge of all exiting laws pertaining to the subject. the failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation. This presumption will be rebutted if the provisions of the new Act are so inconsistent with the old ones that the two cannot stand together. A provision which is added subsequently, i. e. which represents the latest will of the Legislature, will have an overriding effect on the earlier provision. 36. In Indian Tobacco Company Limited v. Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhavampore and others, AIR 1975 SC 155 it was laid down that repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the intention of the Legislature. If the intention indicated expressly or by necessary implications in the subsequent statue was to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment wholly or in part then it would be a case of total or protant to repeal. If the intuition was merely to modify the former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an exemption or by superadding conditions or by restricting, intercepting or suspending its operation, such modification would not amount to a repeal. 37. Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication, the Court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together and the repeal of the express prior enactment must flow from necessary implication of the language of the latter enactment (see T.S. Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701 ) . 38. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 162 has said : "But repeal by implication is not favoured. 38. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 162 has said : "But repeal by implication is not favoured. A sufficient Act ought not to be held to be repealed by implication without some strong reason. It is a reasonable presumption that the Legislature did not intend to keep really contradicting enactments on the statutes book, on the other hand, to effect so important measure as the repeal of the law without expression an intention to do so. Subtend interpretation, therefore, is not to be adopted unless it is inevitable. Any reasonable construction which offers an escape from it is more likely to be in consonance with the real intention." 39. Judged in the light of the above well settled rules of construction, it is quite clear that the Act of 1986 contains no repealing clause repealing sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to a divorced Muslim woman. The Act of 1986 is not declaratory Act and is a remedial Act. There is clear indication in Section 5 of the Act that the divorced Muslim woman and her husband can opt to be governed by the provisions of section 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The intention of the Legislature was thus not expressly or by necessary implications to abrogate or wipe off sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in relation to a divorced Muslim woman. Both sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Act of 1986 were intended to run parallel and Muslim woman and her former husband were at liberty to opt to be governed by the general provisions contained in sections 115 to 128 of the Code. In my humble view, no question of implied repeal arises and none was in the contemplation of the Legislature. 40. There is yet another well known rule of construction and that rule is that general provisions yield to a special provision. In my humble view, no question of implied repeal arises and none was in the contemplation of the Legislature. 40. There is yet another well known rule of construction and that rule is that general provisions yield to a special provision. His Lordship Das Gupta, J. in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills and Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1961 SC 1170 observed as under:-- The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principal made by lawyers and judged but springs from the common understanding of man and woman that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect, in Pretty v. Solly (1859-53 ER 1032) quoted in Caries on Statute Law at p. 206. 6th Edition) Romilly, M.R. mentioned the rule thus The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." 41. In my view, this rule of construction more properly applies is the present case rather than the rule of implied rule. The Act of 1986 is a special statute dealing with matter regarding grant of maintenance to a divorced muslim woman who has not remarried. It contains special provision in its sections 3 and 4. Simultaneously section 5 makes it optative for a Muslim divorced woman and her former husband to choose to be governed by the general enactment. The special provisions contained in the Act of 1986 thus prevail over the general provisions contained in sections 125 to 128 of the Code. This rule is designed to resolve conflict between different provisions in different statutes as well as in the same statute. 42. In the present case Mst. Shakura had made application tinder sub-sec.(1) of Ec.125 of the code on Dec.19, 1983 in the court of judicial magistrate, Bhadra. This rule is designed to resolve conflict between different provisions in different statutes as well as in the same statute. 42. In the present case Mst. Shakura had made application tinder sub-sec.(1) of Ec.125 of the code on Dec.19, 1983 in the court of judicial magistrate, Bhadra. this application was finally decided by the judicial magistrate, Bhadra on April 9, 1986 i.e. before the commencement of the act of 1986. Section 7 of the act of 1986 could not obviously apply because on the day the act of 1986 came into force, no application of Mst. Shakura under section 125 or under section 127 of the code was pending before the magistrate. However, Mst. Shakura had made an application to the judicial magistrate, bhadra on may 26, 1986 under section 125 (3) of the code for levying the amount of maintenance of Rs. 5800/- due against Mohd. Shariff upto may, 1986. Mohd. Shariff had filed a revision no. 37 of 1986 before the additional sessions judge nohar against the order of the judicial magistrate dated April 9, 1986 on June 12, 1986, that revision was decided by the additional sessions judge by his order dated march 23, 1987 along with another revision no. 11 of 1987 filed by Mst. Shakura against the subsequent order of the judicial magistrate, Bhadra dated November 20, 1986, thus as a matter of fact. No petition by a divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 was pending before the magistrate on the commencement of the act of 1986. Literally and grammatically construed, section 7 of the act of 1986 would not apply. However, it is equally a fact that revision no. 37 of 1985 of Mohd. Shariff and that of Mst. Shakura No. 11 of 1987 were decided by the additional sessions judge. Nohar after the act of 1986 had come into force, the question which therefore, arises is whether the court of revision should have been given effect to the new law even if the judgment or order by the magistrate was given before the commencement of the act of 1986 as a matter of necessary corollary, the question also is whether this court in this revision should give effect to the provisions contained in the act of 1986. in this connection, reference may be made to the decision of their lordships of the supreme court in Dayawanti v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423 . in this case the mortgagee had filed a suit for enforcement of the mortgage by sale of properties mortgaged. the claim was for Rs. 76,(92-9-8 by calculating interest at 9 percent per annum for the first three months and at 12 percent per annum till institution of the suit. The defendants admitted the mortgage but pleaded that the rate of interest was both penal and excessive. This plea was not accepted and a preliminary decree was passed for the full claim on August 12, 1953. One of the mortgagors appealed on January 6, 1954 and asked for reduction of interest. During the pendency of the appeal the decree was made final on April 3, 1954. The usurious loans act, 1918 was amended by section 5 of the Punjab relief of indebtedness act when the latter act was extended to Delhi on June 8, 195.). Section 6 of the Punjab act gave retrospective effect to the provisions of Section 5. The language of section 6 was as under:- "The provisions of this part of the Act shall apply to all suits pending on or instituted after the commencement of this Act." The legal representatives of the mortgagor presented an application under section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act as amended by section 5 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act as extended to Delhi on June 8, 1956 and claimed that interest in excess of 71/2% per annum could not be awarded in the suit. The mortgagees decree-holders opposed the application. The Division Bench of the Punjab High Court allowed the application of the legal representatives of Hajarilal mortgagee by applying the provisions of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act and modified the preliminary decree by reducing interest and awarding it at the rate of Rs. 71/2%. The mortgagees decree holders came before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on their behalf that section 5 of the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act can only apply to a suit instituted after or pending on the date the section came into force and not in an appeal after the suit had ended in a decree. The mortgagees decree holders came before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on their behalf that section 5 of the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act can only apply to a suit instituted after or pending on the date the section came into force and not in an appeal after the suit had ended in a decree. It was also contended that this would be all the more so, because the section itself was made retrospective for suits pending on or instituted after the commencement of the Act and this cannot effect the vested right which the judgment had given to them. Dealing with this contention, his Lordships Hidayatullah, J. observed as under : "Now as a general proposition, it may be admitted that ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit. Even before the days of Coke, whose maxim a new law ought to be prospective, not retrospective in its operation, is oft-quoted, Courts have looked with disfavour upon laws which take away vested rights or effect pending cases. Matters of procedure are, however, different and the law affecting procedure is always retrospective. But it does not mean that there is an absolute rule of inviolability of substantive rights. If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear interpretation takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance. The distinction between laws affecting procedure and those affecting vested rights does not matter when the Court is invited by law to take away from a successful plaintiff, what he has obtained under a judgment. See Qualiter v. Mapleson, (1882) 9 QBD 672 and Stoving v. Fairbress (1919) 88, LJKB 10 which are instances of new laws being applied. In the former the vested rights of the landlord to recover possession and in the latter the vested rights of the statutory tenant to remain in possession were taken away after judgments. See Qualiter v. Mapleson, (1882) 9 QBD 672 and Stoving v. Fairbress (1919) 88, LJKB 10 which are instances of new laws being applied. In the former the vested rights of the landlord to recover possession and in the latter the vested rights of the statutory tenant to remain in possession were taken away after judgments. See also Maxwell interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) pp 211 and 213. and K. C. Mukherjee v. Mst. Ramratan Kuer, 63 Ind. App 47 ( AIR 1936 PC 49 ) where no saving in respect of pending suits was implied when section 26 (N) and (o) of the Bihar Tenancy Act (as amended by Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934) were clearly applicable to all cases without exception. Section 6 of the Relief of Indebtedness Act is clearly retrospective. Indeed the heading of the section shows that it lays down the retrospective effect. This being so, the core of the problem really is whether the suit could be said to be pending on June 8, 1956 when only an appeal from the judgment in the suit was pending. This requires the consideration whether the word 'suit' includes an appeal from the judgment in the suit. An appeal has been said to be "the right of entering a superior Court, and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. (per Lord Westbury in Attorney General v. Silem, (1864) 11 (ER 1200 at p. 1209) . The only difference between a suit and an appeal is this that an appeal only reviews and corrects the proceedings in a cause already constituted but does not create the cause". As it is intended to interfere in the cause by its means, it is a part of it, and in connection with some matters and some statutes it is said that an appeal is a continuation of a suit. In the present Act the intention is to give relief in respect of excessive interest in a suit which is pending and a preliminary decree in a suit of this kind does not terminate the suit. The appeal is a part of the cause because the preliminary decree which emerges from the appeal will be the decree, which can become a final decree. Such an appeal cannot have an independent existence. The appeal is a part of the cause because the preliminary decree which emerges from the appeal will be the decree, which can become a final decree. Such an appeal cannot have an independent existence. If this be not accepted for the pus pose of the application of S. 3 of the Usurious Loans Act (as amended) curious results will follow. The appeal Court in the appeal is not able to resort to the section but if the suit were remanded the trial Court would be compelled to apply it. For although, in the appeal proper that judgment must be rendered which could be rendered by the Court of trial, but if the suit is to he reheard, then the judgment must be given on the existing state of the law and that must include Section 5 by reason of Section 6 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act. It is hardly to be suggested that this obvious anomaly was allowed to exist. It would, therefore, appear that in speaking of a pending suit, the legislature was thinking not only in terms of the suit proper but also of those stages in the life of the suit which ordinarily take place before a final executable document comes into existence. The words of the section we are concerned with, speak of a suit pending on the commencement of the Act and it means a live suit whether in the Court of first instance or in an appeal Court where the judgment of the court of first instance is being considered. It only excludes those suits in which nothing further needs to be done in relation to the rights of or claims litigated because an executable decree which may not be reopened is already in existence. The decision of the High Court was right in applying Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act (as amended) to the case. 43. It would appear from the above observations that it was recognised that as a general proposition ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been reheard because the right of the litigants in appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of the suit. It would appear from the above observations that it was recognised that as a general proposition ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been reheard because the right of the litigants in appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of the suit. The features in Dayawati's case, firstly were that when the Punjab Act was extended to Delhi on June 8, 1956, appeal of Hazari Lal was pending before the Punjab High Court. Secondly, in section 6 of the Punjab Act apart from the words "all suits pending on the commencement of the Act" further words instituted after the commencement of the Act" were also there. In the case before me, application under section 125 or under section 127 of the Code at the instance of Mst. Shakura was neither pending before the Magistrate nor before the Addl. Sessions Judge and nor before this Court on 19th May, 1986. However, the period of limitation for filing a revision against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 before the Addl. Sessions Judge had not expired. His Lordship Hidayatullah, J, in Dayawati's case based his views on three grounds. Firstly, that an appeal was a continuation of suit and in that case the appeal was pending when the Punjab Act was extended to Delhi. The second consideration was that if the contention of the mortgagors was not accepted, curious results would have followed. The curious results would have been that the appellate Court in the appeal was not able to resort to the changed law, but if the suit was remanded by the trial Court, the later would be compelled to apply it on account of the wordings of Section 6. Thirdly, his Lordship also adopted a liberal construction to avoid curious results by observing that in speaking of a pending suit, the Legislature "as thinking not only in terms of the suit proper, but also those stages in life of the suit which ordinarily take place before a final executable document comes into existence. It was construed that the expression "suit pending on the commencement of this Act" live suit whether in the Court of first instance or in an appellate court whether the judgment of the Court of first instance is being construed. It was construed that the expression "suit pending on the commencement of this Act" live suit whether in the Court of first instance or in an appellate court whether the judgment of the Court of first instance is being construed. It was held that it only excludes those suits in which nothing further needs to be done in relation to the parties or claims litigated because the executable decree which may not be reopened is already in existence. These observations of his Lordships deserve to be given effect to while deciding the matter in question before me. 44. It is also worthy to be mentioned that section 7 of the Act of 1986 also uses the expression notwithstanding anything in that Court". This is a non-obstante clause. In relation to such clauses, it has been held in M/s Raval and Co. v. K. C. Ramchandran and others. 1974 (1) SCC 424 , that where non-obstante clause is used, the intention is that the legislature should take effect notwithstanding any earlier legislation. In M/s B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmic and another, 1981(2) SCC 407 it was laid down that it is a well known rule of law for remedial amendments have to be liberally construed so as not to deny their efficacy and it is the duty of the Courts to avoid the conflict between two factions. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 (576) it was laid down that the Court will interpret a statute as far as possible agreeably to justice and reason and in that case of two or more interpretations, one which is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there is always a presumption against the law maker intending injustice and unreason. The provision in a statute will not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general value which animate its structure. Similarly in Dy. Custodian v. Official Receiver, AIR 1965 SC 951 , 955 it was held that if it appears that the obvious aim and object of statutory provisions would be frustrated by accepting the literal construction, then it may be open to the Court to enquire where in an alternative construction which would serve the purpose of achieving the aim and object of the Act is reasonably possible. 45. 45. Judged in the light of these pronouncements, it is clear from the language of section 7 of the Act of 1986 that the intention of the legislature was that every application by a divorced woman under section 125 of the Code which was pending on the commencement of the Act should, notwithstanding, anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Act, should he disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1986, Although the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra had decided the application of Mst. Shakura under section 125 of the Code on April 9, 1986 i.e. before the commencement of the Act of 1986, but the expression -pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act" should in the light of the observations made by the High Court in Dayawati's case (supra) be construed to mean a live application on the commencement of the Act whether before the Magistrate or before an appellate or revisions Court. The above expression only excludes those applications in which nothing further needs to be done in relation to the rights or claims litigate because an executable order which may not be reopened either by an appellate older or revisional order has already come into an existence. To that extent only. the Act of 1986 has no retrospectivity in operation but in respect of pending matters whether before the Magistrate or in the Court of appeal or revision, the new law will have to be given effect to in order to avoid the anomaly and also in order to adopt a reasonable and just construction in order to avoid injustice and unreason. The Act of 1986 will, therefore, be construed in a manner which would not defeat its manifest purpose and general values which animate its structure and more so when pending matters were intended by section 7 of the Act to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1986. 46. Another point to be considered in the case is that Mst. Shakura had filed the application under sub-section (1)of section 125 of the Code on December 19, 1983. The Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra had granted monthly maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- to Mst. Shakura with effect from December 19, 1983. When Mst. Shakura made the application under sub-sec.(1) of Section 125 of the Code on Dec. Shakura had filed the application under sub-section (1)of section 125 of the Code on December 19, 1983. The Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra had granted monthly maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- to Mst. Shakura with effect from December 19, 1983. When Mst. Shakura made the application under sub-sec.(1) of Section 125 of the Code on Dec. 19, 1983. She was not a divorced Muslim woman. On the other hand, she was a wedded wife of Mohd. Shariff According to the findings given above, Mohd Shaiiff divorced Mst. Shakura on June 4, 1984 when he made a clear and unequivocal statement before the Judicial Magistrate in his cross examination. Under sub-section (I) of Section 125 a married woman is also entitled to maintenance. The Act of 1986 has no application to a claim of maintenance of married Muslim woman. It only applies to a divorced Muslim woman. Consequently the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 awarding maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month to Mst. Shakura from December 19, 1983 to June 3, 1984 holds good and could not have been interfered. Her claim for maintenance from June 4, 1984 and onwards has to be regulated by the provisions contained in the Act of 1986. 47. Before parting with this order, I may observe that despite the fact that on the question of implied repeal I hold a different view than held by the Division Bench of this Court in Abid Ali's case (Supra), it is not necessary to refer the matter to the Full Bench of this Court for the reason that in the ultimate result I am arriving at the same conclusion as was arrived at in Abid Ali's case. 48. I would further like to observe that before me the vires of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce), Act, 1986 were not challenged by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner on the ground of discrimination that while every other divorced woman belonging to other religion are entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 until they may remarry but only in relation to a Muslim divorced worn in the liability on the husband to maintain her has been limited upto the period of iddat only and therefore, I do not express any opinion in this case on the vires of the Act of 1986. 49. 49. I accordingly partly allow this revision of Mohd. Shariff holding that the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra dated April 9, 1986 awarding maintenance to Mst. Shakura at a monthly rate of Rs. 200/- from December 19, 1983 to June 3, 1984 will remain intact, with respect to her claim for maintenance from June 4, 1984 and onwards when she became a divorced Muslim woman, it shall be governed by the provisions contained in the Muslim Women (Provision of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. For that claim, I remand the case to the Judicial Magistrate, Bhadra with the direction that the application of Mst. Shakura with respect to claim for maintenance from June 4, 1984 (When she became a divorced Muslim woman) will be decided afresh by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions for the said Act of 1986.Revision partly allowed. *******