JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment dated the 20th May, 1978, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar. whereby the accused-respondents have been acquitted of the offence under Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, (for brevity, 'the Act') in criminal case No. 431/1974. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that on a search by Central Excise and Customs Officers, 642 grammes of gold in primary form was found in possession of the accused from their house in village Ramgarh (Shekhawati. District Sikar) on 14.12.1957, and 134.500 grammes of primary gold and other gold ornaments were found in their possession at their business premises on 15.12.67. Certain other ornaments of gold weighing 6990.500 gms. were also found, which were returned to the accused confiscating 776.500 gms. of primary gold. The statements of the accused persons were taken by the Assistant Collector wherein accused admitted that they have no accounts to explain the possession of primary gold weighing 776.500 gms. which were confiscated by the custom authorities. The accused persons were challaned under Section 85 of the Act in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate. 1st Class, Fatehpur who later on transferred the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar. The Chief Judicial Magistrate. Sikar, believing the defence version that they have accounted for the primary gold, acquitted the accused persons including the respondents herein, on 20th May, 1977. Hence this appeal. 3. In the complaint filed by the complainant, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Jaipur, it has been stated that the sanction under Section 97 of the Act has been accorded for the institution of prosecution vide order dated 26.12.73 which his been appended to the complaint, alongwith copy of notification dated 7.1.1965 as Annexures A and B. As per the facts averred in the complaint, the offence against the respondents was that they were in possession, custody and control of primary gold weighing 776.500 gms. without any permit or licence from the Gold Control Administrator, which is an offence punishable under Rule 126-P(ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1952 (as amended) (in short, 'the defence Rules') corresponding to Section 85 of the Act. 4. I have carefully heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. without any permit or licence from the Gold Control Administrator, which is an offence punishable under Rule 126-P(ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1952 (as amended) (in short, 'the defence Rules') corresponding to Section 85 of the Act. 4. I have carefully heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. In view of the proposition of law laid down in Awadhesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1988 SC 1158 ) , the appeal against acquittal can be allowed only when the Appellate Court feels that the findings arrived at by the trial Court are perverse and erroneous, the finding of fact cannot be interfered with in the appeal against acquittal; the judgment of acquittal cannot be set aside merely when the two views are possible and that the view taken by the trial Court does not appear to be correct. 6. In the instant case, the learned trial Court while appreciating the evidence on record, found that the statements of the accused-respondents recorded by the Customs Officers are retracted and no conviction can be passed on these statements. The finding of the learned trial Court on this aspect cannot be said to be arbitrary and no interference is called for specially after 21 years. On the above premises alone, this appeal deserves dismissal but during the course of the arguments, certain important questions of law have been raised by the learned Special Public Prosecutor which requires earnest consideration and which in my view also would go in favour of the accused-respondents. 7. One of the questions of law raised is by contending that the offence is said to have been committed under Rule 126 (P) of the Defence Rules but the accused respondents have been charged under Section 85 of the Gold Act which was not in existence at the time when the offence is said to have been committed by the accused-respondents. The learned counsel for the accused- respondents. therefore, submitted that in these circumstances, the trial is vitiated and according to him, on this ground also, this appeal fails. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents then added that the complaint has been filed by the Assistant Collector. Central Excise and Customs with the sanction accorded under Section 97 (1) of the Act. The learned counsel for the accused- respondents. therefore, submitted that in these circumstances, the trial is vitiated and according to him, on this ground also, this appeal fails. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents then added that the complaint has been filed by the Assistant Collector. Central Excise and Customs with the sanction accorded under Section 97 (1) of the Act. Section 97 of the Act envisages that no court shall take cognizance of any offence against the Act except on a complaint in writing made by a Gold Control Officer, not below the rank of a Collector of Central Excise or of Customs, having jurisdiction over the area in which the offence is committed or any person authorised by him in writing in this behalf. 8. On bestowing our earnest consideration to the aforesaid arguments, I find that no reply satisfactorily has been put forwarded by the learned counsel for the appellant. And, in the instant case, neither the complainant, Shri M.R. Sachdeva has appeared in witness box nor any authority or sanction given by the Collector, Central Excise and Customs has been proved. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the authority or sanction of the Collector and therefore, in these circumstances, the entire proceedings are without jurisdiction. 9. As stated earlier, before filing the challan papers, the sanction is required and it must be satisfied that the person is competent to file the complaint. It is thus clear that the sanction as contemplated under the relevant provisions is not an empty formality and the prosecution must establish that the facts constituting the offence have been considered by the authority before sanctioning prosecution. Further, a sanction which itself exhibits non-application of mind is vitiated in the eyes of law. 10. In a particular case, a valid sanction, has to be proved by some direct evidence. In the instant case, neither the complainant nor any person authorised, appeared in the witness box so as to prove the alleged sanction, inasmuch as the complainant, Assistant Collector, or the Collector of Central Excise or of Customs was not examined to indicate on what materials it was considered by them that the prosecution has to be launched against the accused- respondents. In the absence of which. In the absence of which. it cannot be said that the sanction conforms to the requirement of law and hence it cannot be held to be a valid sanction in the eye of law. Therefore, in the present case, it can be said that there is no valid sanction for prosecution against the accused-respondents for the Offences under Rule 126-P of the Defence Rules or Section 85 of the Act. Consequently, no conviction against the accused-respondents is possible without obtaining a valid sanction for their prosecution for the alleged offences. Thus, on this account also, this appeal must fail. 11. For these observations, I find comfort and strength from the view taken in Doki Sriramullu v. Asstt. Collector of C. E. and C. 1988 (36) Excise Law Times p. 247 (Ori.) . 12. The next contention on behalf of the learned counsel for the accused- respondents is that the offence is said to have been committed at the time when the Gold (Control) Act was not enacted and that being so, being not in existence, it cannot be applied. Even after that, the learned trial Court framed the charges against the accused-respondents for the offence under Section 85 of the Act and no charges under Rule 106-P of the Defence Rules was possible to be framed against the accused-respondents because, on the day when the complaint against the respondents was filed, these Defence Rules were repealed. 13. In the present case, the complaint had been filed on 7.2.1974. The provisions of the Defence Rules which were applicable at the time of the alleged search have to repeal after the Gold (Control) Act came into force. Section 116 of the Act is the relevant provision which deals with the repeal and savings. It is being reproduced as under: "116. Repeal and savings, (1) The Gold (Control) Act, 1965 (18 of 1965), and the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1968 (6 of 1968), are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken including any notification, order or appointment made, direction given, notice, licence. It is being reproduced as under: "116. Repeal and savings, (1) The Gold (Control) Act, 1965 (18 of 1965), and the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1968 (6 of 1968), are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken including any notification, order or appointment made, direction given, notice, licence. or certificate issued, permission, authorisation or exemption granted, confiscation adjudged, penalty or fine imposed, or forfeiture ordered, or Part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done, taken, made, given, issued, granted, adjudged, imposed or ordered, as the case may be, under the corresponding provision of this Act, as if this Act had commenced on the 29th day of June, 1968." On the day when the Gold (Control) Act, came into force, no criminal complaint was pending against the accused respondents. Hence in view of the provisions contained in Section 116 of the Act, (quoted above), no action can be taken against the accused-respondents either under the repealed provisions or under the Gold (Control) Act. 14. A careful study of Section 116 (2) of the Act (reproduced above) would show that there is nothing therein which could be said to have saved the liabilities incurred under the Defence of India Rules which we e repealed by the Gold (Control) Act which were also repealed by the Gold (Control) Ordinance, 1908 and that also was repealed by the Act of 1968. 15. In M/s. Rayala Corpn. v. Director of Enforcement ( AIR 1970 SC 494 ) , while relying upon, the general principle enunciated in Seth Jugmendar Das v. State ( AIR 1951 All. 703 ) held that the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act only apply to repeals and not to omissions, and apply when the repeals is of a Central Act or regulation and not of a Rule. Their Lordships then held that the offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terminate. 16. Similarly, in J.K. Gas plant Manufacturing Co. Their Lordships then held that the offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terminate. 16. Similarly, in J.K. Gas plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. v. King Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 38) , it was held that the general rule in regard to the expiration of the temporary statute is that unless it contains some special provision to the contrary after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it aid it ceases to have any further effect. The enlightments (supra derived from the decision; referred to above, provide me contort and strength to hold that no action under R. 126-P of the Defence of India Rules and Section 85 of the Act can be taken against the respondents. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents-accused that action could also not be taken against them under Section 85 of the Act is well-founded. The said Act not being in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, action against the respondents thereunder would neither be just nor legally appropriate. For these observations, I find support from the decision of the Apex Court in Ran Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh ( AIR 1953 SC 394 ) wherein it was held : "Article 20 (1), in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under "ex past facto" laws. This article must be taken to prohibit all convictions or sub-jections to penalty after the Constitution in respect of ' ex post facto" laws whether the same was a post- Constitution or a pre-Constitution law." Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot also be invoked by the respondents as the entire provisions of that Section have not be i incorporated in section 116 (2) of the Gold (Control) Act. To import Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, would be tantamount to importing something in the Gold (Control, Act which is inconsistent with Section 116 (2) thereof. 17. Under the Act of 1968 special provisions regarding pending or post transactions have been made. It is the latter provision that will determine whether the liability arising under the repealing Act survives or is extinguished. 17. Under the Act of 1968 special provisions regarding pending or post transactions have been made. It is the latter provision that will determine whether the liability arising under the repealing Act survives or is extinguished. The ordinary rule is that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply if there is no saving clause in the repealing Act or unless a different intention appears. 18. As stated earlier, under Section 116 (2) of the Act, any liability which could have been fastened under the Rules has not been served alter coming into force of the Act of 1968. 19. From what has been discussed above, there can be gainsaying that the learned trial Court committed an error in framining the charge against the accused-respondents for the offences under section 85 of the Act because, section under which the respondents have been charged with being not in existence on account of not coming into force of the Act of 1968 when the offence is said to have been committed by the respondents, could not have been made applicable for charging the respondents for the alleged offences. Thus, viewed, on this count also, the respondents are entitled for their acquittal because of vitiated trial. 20. It is not in dispute that M/s. Gauri Dutt Jain Narain, Ramgarh (Shekbawati) which had four partners including the accused-respondents, lad applied for Gold dealership licence on 24.5.1967 before the alleged date of commission of the offence, and the licence was made available to them on 12.12.1967. It is also not in dispute that the register was submitted before the checking staff. It was the defence of the accused respondents that the register (Fx. D. 1) was made available to the authorities making search at that time and in the said register, there were entries making mention of account of the Gold held by them which was sealed by the customs authority at the time of search. The learned trial Court did not disbelieve the aforesaid defence of the accused- respondents, and has made it basis for acquittal of the accused-respondents. As stated earlier, on the finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court, the appeal against acquittal cannot be allowed and these findings cannot be disturbed unless, it is found to be perverse or unsustainable, and in the present case, these findings of facts cannot be said to be perverse. As stated earlier, on the finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court, the appeal against acquittal cannot be allowed and these findings cannot be disturbed unless, it is found to be perverse or unsustainable, and in the present case, these findings of facts cannot be said to be perverse. Under Section 16 (5) of the Gold (Control) Act, no declaration is required in relation to articles in case of a family if the ornaments or articles do not exceed 4000 grammes. Under Section 16(3) a person possessing in excess quantity specified in sub-section (s) has to make a declaration in the form prescribed under the Act. Thus, it is obvious that under sub-section (3) of Section 16 read with sub-section (5) thereof, if a family which did not own or possess before commencement of 1968 Act in excess of 4000 grammes and acquires gold in excess of that quantity after the commencement of the Act alone is required to give declaration in prescribed form. Therefore, if the gold possessed is not exceeding 4000 grammes, no declaration ;s required to be submitted by the family and hence no offence can be said to have been committed. So, if assuming that the accused-respondents can be held responsible for the offence defined under the Act of 1968, then too, they cannot he convicted for their having possessed the Gold which was admittedly less than 4000 grammes. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any force in this appeal and find no reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court. 22. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. The accused-respondents are on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled and they need not surrender.Appeal dismissed. *******