JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is plaintiffs' First Appeal in a suit for declaration that the lease deed dated 10th of May, 1950 was not binding on them and that they were entitled to immediate possession over the land and for some other alternative reliefs in respect of the disputed property. 2. Initially one Baijnath Prasad was the owner of "Ghariyal Kothi" which consisted of a bungalow with vast open compound. Baijnath Prasad had four sons, including Sheo Nath Prasad, who is now dead, and his widow Kamla Devi is plaintiff No. 4 in the suit. The remaining three sons are defendants 1 to 3 of whom Vishwanath Prasad, defendant No. 1, was admittedly the Karta of the joint family at the time of execution of the impugned lease deed. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the minor sons of defendant No. 2, while defendant No. 4 is the son of Smt. Kamla Devi (plaintiff No. 4). Admittedly the defendant No. 1 had executed the lease deed on 10th of May, 1950 in favour of defendant No. 5 which was also signed by Defendant No. 3, Defendant No. 4 who was then a minor was represented by defendant No. 1 as guardian. On behalf of the lessee Moti Lal Tekriwal had signed the deed who had taken the land for setting up a Cinema Hall thereon. The lease was for an initial period of 25 years with an option to the lessee to renew it for a further period of only 10 years whereafter the land was to revert back to the lessors in a vacant state. 3. The main challenge to the deed was two fold Le. (i) the Karta of the family had not acted prudently in granting the lease and that (ii) the plaintiff had an interest in the coparcenary property. According to the plaint allegations plaintiff No. 1 was born before 10-5-50 and being a minor at that time he was entitled to file the suit on attaining majority within three years thereof. The plaintiff No. 4 claimed that her husband had died in September, 1938, and she had acquired the same interest in the coparcenary property which her husband had in it in view of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The plaintiff No. 4 claimed that her husband had died in September, 1938, and she had acquired the same interest in the coparcenary property which her husband had in it in view of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The plaintiffs claimed that since the lease deed had not been executed either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, it was liable to be cancelled and they were also entitled to immediate possession over it even though its term had not run out. A number of other pleas were also taken as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the plaint. 4. Defendants first set did not contest the suit. They neither filed any written statement nor participated at the time of hearing. Only defendants second set contested the suit. Of the many grounds taken in defence the important ones are that the plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3, had not even been born at the time of execution of the lease deed and had no right to challenge it, the husband of plaintiff No. 4 had died in 1935 and not in 1938, and she too was not competent to institute the suit; that the suit having been brought after a lapse of several years, the suit by plaintiffs by No. 4 was barred by limitation; that the transaction being for the benefit of the family the same was valid and binding on the plaintiffs and finally that the suit was premature as period of the lease had not expired. 5. During the pendency of the suit, the written statement was got amended and a plea was added that due to abolition of Zamindari in Urban Areas, the defendants second set had become Bhumidhars and cannot be dispossessed. It was also contended that the land having vested in the state of U.P., the plaintiffs had ceased to be its owners. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court framed as many as 20 issues which are reproduced hereunder : 1. Whether the suit is under valued and Court-fee paid is insufficient? 2. Whether the plaintiffs No. 1 to 3 were born after the execution of the disputed Patta? If so, its effect? 3. Whether the husband of plaintiff No. 4 died in 1935 or 1938? Its effect on the right of the plaintiff No. 4 in the property in suit? 4. 2. Whether the plaintiffs No. 1 to 3 were born after the execution of the disputed Patta? If so, its effect? 3. Whether the husband of plaintiff No. 4 died in 1935 or 1938? Its effect on the right of the plaintiff No. 4 in the property in suit? 4. Whether the defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the family of the plaintiff and the defendants 1 set'? If so, its effect? 5. Whether the defendant No. 1 was not competent to execute the Patta on behalf of defendant No. 4 as alleged in para 11 (cha) of the Plaint? If so, its effect? 6. Whether the Patta in dispute was not executed for legal necessity? 7. What is the effect of not joining of defendant No. 2 in the execution of the Patta in suit? 8. Whether the Patta in dispute lacks mutuality? If so, its effect'? 9. Whether the execution of the Patta in dispute was not act of prudence and for benefit to the estate? 10. Whether the rent fixed by the Patta was inadequate? If so, its effect? 11. Whether the defendants 1st set had not right to execute the Patta so as to bind the interest of the plaintiffs? 12. Whether the defendants 7 and 8 only are the partners of the defendant No. 5? 13. Whether the suit is barred by estoppel? 14. Whether the suit is barred by time? 15. Whether the defendants No. 5 and 8 have become Bhumidhar of the land in dispute on the enforcement of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition Act? 16. Whether the right of the plaintiffs in the land in dispute extinguished on the enforcement of U.P. Urban Area, Zamindari Abolition Act? 17. Whether the defendants 5, 7 and 8 have valid right of option to extend the period of lease by ten years. If so its effect? 18. To what relief, if any is the plaintiff entitled? 19. Whether the term regarding extension of lease period is not binding on the plaintiffs No. 1 to 3 after their attainment of majority? 20. What has been transferred under transaction dated 28-3-72 and what is its effect on the right of the parties? 7. If so its effect? 18. To what relief, if any is the plaintiff entitled? 19. Whether the term regarding extension of lease period is not binding on the plaintiffs No. 1 to 3 after their attainment of majority? 20. What has been transferred under transaction dated 28-3-72 and what is its effect on the right of the parties? 7. The trial Court on a consideration of evidence before it, held that plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 had not been born at the time when the lease deed was executed, the husband of plaintiff No. 4, had died prior to the enforcement of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and that the land had vested in the State under the Provisions of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition Act, 1956 (U.P. Act No. IX of 1957). Aggrieved by the decision, the plaintiffs have come up in appeal before this Court. 8. In appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants has seriously challenged before us the findings given by the Court below on the question of date of birth of plaintiff No. 1, the date of death of husband of plaintiff No. 4 and on the question of vesting of the land in the State of U.P. under U.P. Act No. IX of 1957. We propose to deal with these points in the same order. 9. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of this appeal, we are prompted to express our dismay and surprise about the actual manner in which the suit appears to have been conducted in the trial Court. It is sad to notice that evidence on many obvious points has not been led at all and even where documentary evidence could be available, no effort has been made to place it on record. Even the cross-examination of witnesses conducted on either side is more in the nature of fishing expedition rather than pointed and searching. 10. Admittedly plaintiffs 2 and 3 had not been born on or before 10th of May, 1950 and only plaintiff No. 1 claims to have been born some time in 1949. In order to prove his date of birth, he has neither filed any horoscope nor the original High School Certificate or any entry of birth register. 10. Admittedly plaintiffs 2 and 3 had not been born on or before 10th of May, 1950 and only plaintiff No. 1 claims to have been born some time in 1949. In order to prove his date of birth, he has neither filed any horoscope nor the original High School Certificate or any entry of birth register. He solely relied on an attested copy of the High School Certificate but he did not prove the same either himself or by examining the person who had attested the copy. It admits of no doubt that secondary evidence of a document can be let in only under limited circumstances, none of which, however, seem to exist in the present case. As mentioned above, the original High School Certificate was not filed in the trial Court for reasons best known to the plaintiffs. However, a belated attempt has now been made to file the same as additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code after the conclusion of the arguments in the appeal. From the grounds mentioned in the application and the affidavit in support thereof, we do not consider it proper to admit this evidence now as none of the conditions prescribed by Rule 27 have been satisfied. The Court cannot allow any party to file fresh evidence merely to fill in the lacunae in the evidence. The application is, therefore, rejected. The original High School Certificate shall be returned to the appellants in accordance with the rules. In these circumstances, the learned trial Court has very rightly refused to take the attested copy of the High School Certificate into consideration in proof of the plaintiffs age being inadmissible in evidence. 11. Apart from the High School Certificate, the appellants could have filed either a horoscope or at least a copy of the birth register which admittedly had been inspected by P.W. 1. Surprisingly none of the parents though alive have been examined in this connection. Thus there is hardly any evidence worth the name to prove the plaintiffs age. It is only in the opening sentence of the cross-examination that in reply to a question he gave out his date of birth as 23-9-1949. Beyond this there is no further cross-examination even on this point. Relying upon this statement, it is urged that this should be treated as enough evidence in proof of plaintiffs age. It is only in the opening sentence of the cross-examination that in reply to a question he gave out his date of birth as 23-9-1949. Beyond this there is no further cross-examination even on this point. Relying upon this statement, it is urged that this should be treated as enough evidence in proof of plaintiffs age. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. It is an elementary principle of evidence that only the best evidence should be led which admittedly has not been done in this case. No doubt the plaintiff gave out his date of birth in cross- examination but from its very nature the plaintiff could not have direct knowledge of his own date of birth. Obviously he must have acquired this knowledge from other sources, none of which have been disclosed. At best the statement of P.W. 1 can be regarded as one based on hearsay and is not admissible. We, therefore, cannot find our way to agree with the appellants' submissions in this regard. The view taken by the Court below appears to be correct there being no reliable material at all, that plaintiff No. 1 had been born before the lease deed was executed. 12. Coming now to plaintiff No. 4, her claim is that since her husband had died in September, 1938 she acquired an interest in the property. In support, a certified copy of an entry in the death register maintained by the relevant authorities has been filed. The trial Court, however, rejected it for two reasons, firstly that she did not appear as witness and secondly, because the entry appeared to be doubtful. In appeal, the appellants' learned counsel submitted that the only controversy was whether her husband had died in 1938 or in 1935 and there was no dispute as to the date of death. The entry in the death register has been rejected because two dates 26 and 23 are mentioned in the first column of the document. This column in the Register is meant for recording the date of death of the person concerned. However, what actually is entered therein is the name of one Bhagelu Prasad followed by figures 26-23 followed by the words 'September 1938'. Since the entry mentioned two dates 26 and 23 September 1938, the trial Court found this to be doubtful. This column in the Register is meant for recording the date of death of the person concerned. However, what actually is entered therein is the name of one Bhagelu Prasad followed by figures 26-23 followed by the words 'September 1938'. Since the entry mentioned two dates 26 and 23 September 1938, the trial Court found this to be doubtful. However, the heading, it will be noticed, shows that the copy pertained to an entry dated 23rd September, 1938. The copy has been issued from the Register of death for 1938. Apart from this in column No. 1, as we have seen above, the only thing required to be noted was the date of death However, we find the name of Bhagelu Prasad entered there. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that probably this was the name of the person who had given the information about the death. If that be so it is quite possible that the figure 26 may be the age of that informant which had been recorded there. In any case, for this reason alone the entry should not have been rejected After all it was obtained from a Public Officer charged with the duty of maintaining the death register. Even if there was some ambiguity and the Court felt doubt about its correctness either the defendant himself could file another certified copy or the Court could summon the original in order to satisfy itself as to the correctness or otherwise thereof. We also find it difficult to agree with the trial Court on this question because, as rightly urged by the appellant, the dispute between the parties was only as to the year of death and not about the date. The document very clearly shows that it relates to the death of a person in 1938. In column No. 3, where the name and cause of death of the deceased is to be recorded the name Sheo Prasad is entered and the cause of his death mentioned is fever. In the last column, the name of deceased's father Baijnath Prasad Agrawal,, is entered All these entries tally with the particulars of the deceased. In column No. 3, where the name and cause of death of the deceased is to be recorded the name Sheo Prasad is entered and the cause of his death mentioned is fever. In the last column, the name of deceased's father Baijnath Prasad Agrawal,, is entered All these entries tally with the particulars of the deceased. Thus taking an overall view of the evidence we are satisfied that there was enough evidence tin the record to establish that the husband of plaintiff No. 4 had died in 1938 and not before the commencement of Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act, this is so despite her failure to appear as a witness 13. This then leads us the second aspect as to the limitation. Obviously a suit for cancellation of any decree or instrument can be filed within a period of 3 years from the date of execution of the instrument sought to be cancelled under Article 59, of the Limitation Act. It is not denied that plaintiff No. 4 was major even in the year 1960. She could, therefore, institute the suit for cancellation of the lease deed within a period of 3 years from the date of its execution and she could not wait until 1970 to do so. Her claim in that regard is obviously barred by time. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to show to us any provision of law which would enable her to cross the bar of limitation. 14. Sri Ravi Kant learned counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that even if Sheo Prasad had died in 1938 and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was applicable in respect of his interest in the Joint family property, yet the plaintiff No. 4 cannot get any benefit thereunder. According to him, the Act has no application where succession to agricultural property is concerned He relies on AIR 1941 FC 72 and AIR 945 FC 25. These two cases certainly support the contention of the respondents but before the principles laid down in these cases are applied to the instant case, we must be satisfied if the case involves succession to any agricultural land. The suit property was admittedly part of the open compound of a Kothi or bungalow known as 'Ghariyal Kothi' comprising of a number of plots. The suit property was admittedly part of the open compound of a Kothi or bungalow known as 'Ghariyal Kothi' comprising of a number of plots. There is no evidence to show that the disputed property lies in a particular Khasra plot. Evidence is also not forthcoming about the land being put under agricultural operations except a faint plea that the erstwhile owners used to grow some vegetables worth Rs. 100/- or so per year. The respondents place stronger reliance on Khatauni, a revenue extract for 1356 Fasli pertaining to 1948, in which only one of the plots comprising the compound of the 'Ghariyal Kothi' is recorded as agricultural. The corresponding Khasra entry has not been filed. Apart from this, the relevant period is 1937 and for this there is no document on record. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, referred to a remark made in the Khatauni for 1356 Fasli according to which the period of cultivation is mentioned as 'since 1333 F'. This in our opinion, is a very weak evidence and we do not consider it safe to place reliance over it. The respondent himself has no direct knowledge of land being used for agricultural before 1937. There is also no sufficient documentary evidence to prove that the land was in use as agricultural land since before 1937. We also do not find any evidence to show that the land leased out was in fact situate in the plots mentioned in the Khatauni of 1356 Fasli. 15. Besides, the defendant did not take up this point in his written statement apart from saying that the 1937 Act did not confer any right on plaintiff No. 4. It was a vague and general plea totally insufficient to forewarn the plaintiff as to the factual aspect involved therein. When a legal plea is taken either in the plaint or in the written statement which is not a pure question of law but depends on the existence or non-existence of certain facts it is the duty of the party so pleading to lay sufficient factual basis to support it so as to forewarn the other party to be on guard. In an adversary system of dispensing justice, as we have in our country, this principle has more relevance. Both the parties to the lis must have sufficient notice of the rival case. 16. In an adversary system of dispensing justice, as we have in our country, this principle has more relevance. Both the parties to the lis must have sufficient notice of the rival case. 16. The defendants did not plead specifically or even by necessary implication that the right of plaintiff No. 4 was also being questioned because the land in suit was agricultural in nature in 1937. In the absence of a pleading to such an effect, we do not propose to allow the defendants to raise this plea in appeal. Since we have found that evidence on record is much too meagre for us to hold that the disputed land was agricultural land in 1938, the contention of the respondent in this behalf is rejected. Consequently the decisions of the Federal Court, AIR 1941 FC 72 and AIR 1945 FC 25. (supra) do not help the case of the respondents. 17. The appellants also assail the validity of the lease deed on the ground that the Karta of the family had no right to execute it. According to the plaint, execution of the lease deed was not a prudent act and the family had not benefited thereby. It is also said that neither the family was then faced with any distress or other pressing circumstances nor was there any legal necessity for granting a long term (lease) since the family was then well placed and was possessed of other valuable properties also. It is now well established that a transfer made by the Karta of a family is binding on its coparceners only if it was executed either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the family or for discharging some pious obligation. If any of these conditions is satisfied, the transaction would be valid and binding. Stress has been laid in the present case on the first of these conditions. It is alleged that the transaction was not for the benefit of the family and the Karta of the family had not acted prudently. 18. On the evidence on the record, we are satisfied that the transaction was one for benefit of the family. Ever since the exposition of the law by the Privy Council in the celebrated authority of Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonwaree, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393. 18. On the evidence on the record, we are satisfied that the transaction was one for benefit of the family. Ever since the exposition of the law by the Privy Council in the celebrated authority of Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonwaree, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393. the law on the point is now well established Although in that case their Lordships of the Privy Council were dealing with the power of the Manager of an infant heir but the same principles have been applied as governing the powers of a manager of a joint Hindu family also. This case was later relied upon by a Full Bench of this Court in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das, AIR 1928 All 454 where it was held : "If the transaction was to the benefit of the estate and was such as a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge that was available to him at the time, it cannot be set aside. The degree or prudence would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him; and the transaction would have to be judged not by its results but by what might have been expected to be its result at the time it was entered into. The degree of prudence to be demanded might well be held to be that which would be demanded in ordinary cases from a trustee". 19. This very principle was later followed by a Division Bench in Sohan Lal v. Zorawar Singh, AIR 1937 All 219, where it was held : "In order to sustain an alienation of joint family property made by the managing member of the family, the transaction must be one which is for the benefit of the estate and such as a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge available to him at the time. Transactions justifiable on the principle of 'benefit to the estate' are not limited to those transactions which are of a defensive nature." 20. So also was the view of a Division Bench of this Court in Markandey Singh v. Badan Singh, AIR 1933 All 568. 21. Transactions justifiable on the principle of 'benefit to the estate' are not limited to those transactions which are of a defensive nature." 20. So also was the view of a Division Bench of this Court in Markandey Singh v. Badan Singh, AIR 1933 All 568. 21. A similar matter also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bal Mukund v. Kamlawati, AIR 1964 SC 1385 where it was held : "For a transaction to be regarded as of benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character so as to be binding on the family. In each case the Court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was in fact such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. Where adult members are in existence the judgment is to be not that of the manager of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager." 22. Thus from the law cited above, it is clear that in order to determine if a transaction was for the benefit of a family, what is necessary to look into is the circumstances in which the Manager was placed when the transaction was entered into and in view of the surrounding circumstances prevailing at that time whether it could be reasonably expected by the manager that the transaction was likely to confer any benefit to the family. Examining the evidence produced in this case in the light of the above, we will notice that the evidence of the plaintiff is totally silent on this point. P.W. 1 who is the sole witness of the plaintiffs in this case was just an infant at the relevant time and he is hardly expected to know the circumstances prevailing in 1950. He was unable to say if Ghariyal Kothi in the compound of which the disputed Cinema building is situate was in the shape of an Ahata. He admits that he has recollection of events only from the age of 18 to 20 years; he cannot say as to what was the annual income from the land in question. He was also not aware if there was any habitation at the time of granting the lease in the locality where now the Cinema building is situate. 23. He admits that he has recollection of events only from the age of 18 to 20 years; he cannot say as to what was the annual income from the land in question. He was also not aware if there was any habitation at the time of granting the lease in the locality where now the Cinema building is situate. 23. As against this, D.W. 1 Ram Krishna Tekriwal who was defendant No. 8 in the suit has stated that the land at the time of the lease was situated in an isolated area where there was neither any market nor any residential buildings. The disputed land was being used for growing vegetables and was yielding an income of Rs. 100/- or so per year. According to him at that time an income of Rs. 120/- per month and that too for a regular period of 25 years was pre-eminently for the benefit of the family. Despite detailed cross-examination, nothing tangible has been extracted from this witness which may go to show that the transaction did not result in any benefit to the family. 24. From the evidence, it is obvious that the plaintiffs' family was residing in a different place and the disputed property having a building and open compound known as Ghariyal Kothi was lying unused. This fact is also recited in the lease deed itself in paragraph 4 whereof it is mentioned that the land was lying practically waste and was yielding no income whatsoever. Since the property was yielding only an income of Rs. 100/- per year, a regular income ensured for 25 years in the neighbourhood of Rs. 120/- per month must obviously have resulted in benefit to the family. This income was only from a portion of the compound of Ghariyal Kothi which admittedly stood on a very large areaof land. All this shows that the transaction was prima facie for the benefit of the family. Out of three adult male members then alive, two had signed on the lease deed The third adult male member was the own father of the plaintiffs, Gopal Das, who admittedly did not sign on the lease deed. Evidence, however, has been led to show that on the draft lease deed he had signed and in this manner his implied consent for the lease ought to be inferred. Evidence, however, has been led to show that on the draft lease deed he had signed and in this manner his implied consent for the lease ought to be inferred. The evidence, therefore, clearly shows that even if Gopal Das was not an executant of the lease deed, yet his implied or tacit consent to the transaction was there. Apart from this even if he had not consented to the grant of the lease, yet he never assailed the same within 3 years which he could do under law. He having failed to do so clearly hows that he consented to the grant of the ease deed. Having considered the evidence on the record and looking to the legal position, it is obvious that the lease deed had been executed in accordance with law for the benefit of the family and it cannot be invalid dated at the instance of the plaintiffs. Since we have found that the transaction was for the benefit of the family, it is no more necessary for us to examine whether there was any legal necessity also for that transaction. 25. The Court below has found that the plaintiff's have ceased to have any title in the property in view of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 and the title to the same has vested in the State of U.P. The trial Court has also held that the defendants second set have become Bhumidhars of the lard in_question and for that reason they are not liable to ejectment. This finding has been seriously assailed by the plaintiffs-appellants. The Act was enacted to provide for abolition of Zamindari system in agricultural areas situate in urban areas in U.P. and for the acquisition of the rights, title and interest of intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in such areas and for the introduction of the land reforms therein. Keeping this object in mind, the State Legislature defined 'agricultural area' in Section 2(1) of the Act as respects any urban area as meaning an area which, with reference to such date as the State Government may notify in that behalf, is (a) to (c) .............................. Keeping this object in mind, the State Legislature defined 'agricultural area' in Section 2(1) of the Act as respects any urban area as meaning an area which, with reference to such date as the State Government may notify in that behalf, is (a) to (c) .............................. Provided always that land which on the date aforesaid is occupied by building not being 'improvements' as defined in Section 3 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, and land appurtenant to such buildings shall not be deemed to be agricultural area. (d) held on a lease duly executed before the first day of July, 1955 for the purposes of erecting building thereon; (e) .............................. 26. The submission of the appellants was that where a building was standing on the land which was leased out for the purposes of erecting buildings and was not being used for agricultural purpose, such land will not come within the definition of agricultural area. He relied for this-submission on Durga Prasad v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad, AIR 1970 All 159 . where the learned single Judge of this Court while referring to the preamble said as below : "The long title and the preamble show that the Act deals only with agricultural areas falling within the municipality, a notified area or a cantonment. 'Agricultural area' here means agricultural area as commonly understood. The aim and object of the Act is to acquire the rights of intermediaries in the agricultural areas where they stand between the State and the tiller of the soil. The further object is to introduce land reforms in the agricultural area. None of these objects can be achieved by holding that agricultural area includes an area covered by buildings. In such areas, the Zbamindari does not stand in the position of an intermediary between the State and the tiller of the soil. Equally, no land reforms can be introduced in such an area." 27. The learned Judge thereafter concluded as under: "I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that an area which is held on a lease duly executed before July 1, 1955, for the purposes of erecting buildings therein, can be included within the meaning of "agricultural area" as defined in Section 2(1), only if the area is being used by the lessee or his sub-lessee for cultivation. It follows from this that, if the area is not being so used for cultivation but has been built upon, it does not come within the mischief of Cl. (d) of S. 2(1) of the Act and cannot be demarcated as agricultural area." 28. The same view was taken by another single Judge of this Court in State of U.P. v. Jagdish Sharan Singhal, 1982 All LJ 1302. 29. The proviso to sub-clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act is also indicative of the fact that where a building has been erected on agricultural land, it will be excluded from 'agricultural area' as defined in the Act. This is also in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Act. 30. In view of this exposition of law in the two cases referred to above, it is obvious that the land in dispute in this case cannot be said to be agricultural area within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The Court below was, therefore, clearly wrong in holding that the disputed land was agricultural area and the same had vested in the State of U. P. The Court was also wrong in granting Bhumidhari rights to the defendants second set in the land in question. 31. Apart from the above, before any area can be declared as agricultural area, it is necessary that it should be demarcated as such under section 3. Any land can become agricultural area only after necessary proceedings under Sections 3 and 4 have been taken and a final demarcation is notified under Section 5(2) of the Act. It is obvious that no such proceedings have taken place in respect of the land in question and for this reason also it was not proper on the part of the trial Court to hold that this land had vested in the State as an agricultural area We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the land in dispute belongs to the appellants and defendants first set and the same had not vested in the State of U.P. 32. In the end Sri Radha Krishna for the appellants urged that the Court should take notice of certain facts which had happened subsequently during the pendency of the suit and appeal His submission was that although the original lease had been granted on 10th of May, 1950 for an initial period of 25 years and there was also a clause giving an option to the lessee for renewal for 10 years, both these periods having come to an end and the lease deed having thus expired by efflux of time, the appellants have become entitled to possession over the land despite the fact that their suit for cancellation of the lease deed may otherwise fail. It is contended that the plaintiffs had claimed the relief of possession in the alternative and even though they may not succeed in establishing that the lease deed had been executed otherwise than for the benefit of the family, yet instead of sending the parties to another litigation, it would be just and proper if the relief of possession is granted in this proceeding itself. On the other hand Sri Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the contesting respondents has contended that such a course would cause serious prejudice to the rights of the defendants who will be deprived of their right to raise a number pleas that may be available to them to defeat the claim for possession. It is true the normally the Court will not adopt a court which will work to the prejudice of any of t parties to the litigation but at the same time, the Court must take into account events which have happened since the passing of the decree of the Court below and which give rise to a new right to the appellants for the relief already claimed by them. We have examined the matter in this light and while doing sow e have permitted the respondents to spell out the various likely pleas which may be open to the defendants to meet the plaintiffs' case. 33. It is undisputed that the initial period of lease expired on 10th May 1975, a few days before the suit was decided by the trial Court i.e. on 30th May, 1975. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, the period of 10 years for which the defendants had an option to renew their lease has also expired. 33. It is undisputed that the initial period of lease expired on 10th May 1975, a few days before the suit was decided by the trial Court i.e. on 30th May, 1975. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, the period of 10 years for which the defendants had an option to renew their lease has also expired. Under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, the lease must be deemed to have been determined. Sri Ravi Kant for the respondents, however, submitted that the tenant was entitled to claim the benefit of Section 116 of the Act. According to him, the lessee would be within his rights to claim that he was a tenant holding over and. therefore, not liable to ejectment. Under Section 116, however, mere continuation of possession after the determination of the lease is not sufficient to entitle a lessee to claim that he was a tenant holding over. It is further necessary for the tenant to establish that the lessor or his legal representative had accepted the rent from the lessee or otherwise assented to his continuing in possession. This, however, is impossible in this case because the present suit for dispossession is already pending. The initial term of the lease had expired in May, 1975 and the optional period of another 10 years also has expired in May, 1985. There is nothing to suggest that any rent was ever aid or accepted by any of the landlords. In fact, such a course was not open to the defendants at all as they had themselves sought an amendment in their written statement leading divesting of landlord's ownership in he suit land and statutory vesting thereof in he State of U.P. under the provision of U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956. It was also pleaded by hem that as a consequence of abolition of intermediaries' right in the urban area of Gorakhpur since July, 1964, there was conferment of Bhumidhari rights on them I vis-a-vis the suit land. It was also pleaded by hem that as a consequence of abolition of intermediaries' right in the urban area of Gorakhpur since July, 1964, there was conferment of Bhumidhari rights on them I vis-a-vis the suit land. In view of these pleadings, it is urged for the appellants that the defendants should not be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath While on the one hand the defendants claim to be tenants holding over under their erstwhile landlords, on the other hand their very right of ownership is said to have been extinguished with the conferment of Bhumidhari rights on them. There is much force in this contention. As soon as the defendants assert that plaintiffs had ceased to be owners of the suit, the very foundation of the claim under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act vanishes. Benefit under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act can be claimed only where there is a subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 34. A faint attempt was made to urge that the defendants had denied their lessors' title far back in 1973 when it was asserted that title thereto had vested in the State of U.P. but the plaintiffs have failed to take any action forfeiting their tenancy under sub-clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. From this, it is urged, the Court should presume that the plaintiffs had condoned the defendants' action. However, this argument has no merit. Even though the plaintiffs may be debarred from basing their claim for eviction of the defendants under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, yet it does not give any advantage to the defendants. If the plaintiffs are estopped in relying upon Section 111(g) of the Act the defendants also are estopped from claiming any benefit of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act contrary to their pleadings. The defendants are clearly estopped from claiming as tenants holding over when they have denied lessors' title, claim themselves to be Bhumidhars under the State of U.P. and thereby denying any subsisting relationship as landlord and tenant. 35. Respondents' learned counsel also pointed out that to obtain their eviction, a notice to determine the tenancy was necessary and the defendants could contest such a suit on this ground also. 35. Respondents' learned counsel also pointed out that to obtain their eviction, a notice to determine the tenancy was necessary and the defendants could contest such a suit on this ground also. This matter, however, stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1981 SC 1550 , where it was held as under: "Undoubtedly, S. 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with determination of a lease by efflux of time, has to be read with S. 116 of the Act. But in the present case there is no allegation by the defendant that he was a tenant holding over within the meaning of S. 116 of the Act. Now, in order that a lease should be deemed to have been continued in favour of the defendant it was necessary to show that he remained in possession of the premises demised after the determination of the lease granted to him and the plaintiff had expressly or by necessary implication assented to his continued possession. There being no such plea of holding over, the matter falls to be governed by S. 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. If the period of lease had expired on January 10, 1970 the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased and the defendant became a trespasser. In the present case, the respondent who was the defendant, in Ground No. 6 of his memorandum of appeal before the High Court urged that the Courts below should have held on the basis of the plaintiffs case read with the lease deed that the lease would expire on January 10, 1970. There was, therefore, no question of service of 1970. There was, therefore, no question of service of any notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act." 36. Similarly in The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Ahad, AIR 1970 Patna 338 a suit was filed after serving notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act but during the pendency of the suit, the period of lease expired. The Court took notice of subsequent events and granted a decree for possession on the basis of determination of lease by efflux of time. Ltd. v. Abdul Ahad, AIR 1970 Patna 338 a suit was filed after serving notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act but during the pendency of the suit, the period of lease expired. The Court took notice of subsequent events and granted a decree for possession on the basis of determination of lease by efflux of time. In that case, the Court pointedly asked the counsel for the contesting defendant to spell out the possible defences open to the defendant in the event of a fresh suit for eviction being filed. After holding that those pleas were not open for the defendant, the Court granted a decree for possession in that very suit. 37. It was next contended that the present suit has been filed by some of the members of coparcenery and as such the defendants are entitled to plead that the suit was not properly constituted. This matter also stands concluded by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Gopal Das v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, 1987 All LJ 494: AIR 1987 All 261 where it has been held that some of the co-sharers also are entitled to a decree for eviction in case the other co-sharers are arrayed as parties to the suit. The Full Bench had relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 and Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 . 38. In view of what we have said above, it is obvious that the defendants have no possible plea to defeat the suit which the plaintiffs may now have to file for their eviction after the expiry of the lease by efflux of time. Wei do not consider it proper that a party should be left to engage themselves, in long draw litigation once again. It is the duty of the Court to see that multiplicity of proceedings and litigation should, as far as possible b avoided. Care needs to be taken that it may not cause any prejudice to any of the parties. Wei do not consider it proper that a party should be left to engage themselves, in long draw litigation once again. It is the duty of the Court to see that multiplicity of proceedings and litigation should, as far as possible b avoided. Care needs to be taken that it may not cause any prejudice to any of the parties. In the instant case, as already mentioned earlier we have given an opportunity to the learned counsel for the respondent to point out the possible lines of defence which may be available to the defendants so as to enable us to examine prima facie whether they have any contestable plea requiring a full and detailed enquiry into it by the trial Court. We have already pointed out the various points which might have been available to the respondents but we do not feel satisfied that any of them is a sustainable plea. Sri Ravi Kant, who appears for the respondents in this Court is a senior and accomplished Advocate and we have no reason to think that he has not considered all the aspects of the respondents' claim. In our opinion, it would be proper to grant a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants first set now and here instead of forcing the parties to another bout of litigation Although, in our opinion, the plaintiffs cann get the relief of cancellation of the lea deed, yet in the circumstances as discuss above, they are entitled to the relief o possession in view of the fact that t he term o the lease had already expire.L 39. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The suit of the plaintiffs' is decreed for delivery of possession over the suit after removal of the construction raised by defendants 5 to 11 which they shall remove within a period of 3 months from the date of the decree failing which it will be open to the plaintiffs to have the same removed in execution of the decree at the risk an d cost of defendants 5 to 11. The plaintiffs' claim is also decreed for rent and damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 130/- per month until the date of delivery of possession. The plaintiffs' claim is also decreed for rent and damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 130/- per month until the date of delivery of possession. Defendants 5 to 11 will, however, be entitled to adjust any amount which they might have paid or deposited towards rent or damages during the pendency of the suit or the appeal. In view of the partial success of the parties, we deem it reasonable and proper to leave the parties to bear their own costs both in this appeal and in the Court below. The suit in respect of other reliefs shall stand dismissed