Hansaria, J. — The North-Eastern Hill University (NEHU) was established for the benefit of the people of the hill areas of the North-Eastern Region to develop the intellectual, academic and cultural background of the said people as stated in the preamble to the North-Eastern Hill University Act, 1973, hereinafter the Act. Some internal trouble, however, began in the University in the year 1980. There were public statements, letters to the editors, statement by students groups and so on. The University was in turmoil for about one full year. Dr A. K. Dhan, the then Vice-Chancellor left the University in November, 1980. No appointment of a regular Vice-Chancellor could be made for another year. In the mean time Dr S. C. Banwar, the pro-Vice-Chancellor started functioning as acting Vice-Chancellor of the University. The unrest, however, continued unabated. The University had the most agonising experience when the acting Vice-Chancellor was shot by unidentified assailant (s) at his residence on the night of 30th October, 1981, who succumbed to his injuries on the following day. 2. On 31st the police apprehended the petitioner, who was at the relevant time the Reader in the University, and four others : (1) Mr P Pimomo, a Lecturer of the University, (2) Sri P. Gogoi, a Research Fellow, (3) Mr. C. Y. Ngullie, Library Assistant, and (4j Mr. E. Y. Ngullie, a Security Officer, in connection with the murder of Dr. Banwar. The petitioner and others were kept in custody for a week for interrogation. Ultimately, after about 7 months of investigation, the police filed a Final Report on May 19 stating that there was no evidence to link any of the arrested persons with the crime. They were discharged on the same day. While other accused persons who were also employees of the University joined there duties, the petitioner having been under suspension in connec­tion with some other charges could not join the University. 3. A public statement was prepared en 19th May itself by the five persons who had been taken into custody. The petitioner met the Vice-Chancellor of the University on May 20th and made a humble request that as the matter involved the image of the University, a press statement regarding this might be issued and as per the peti­tioner himself the Vice Chancellor was good enough to agree to it immediately, (see Annexure-G at page 54). The petitioner met the Vice-Chancellor of the University on May 20th and made a humble request that as the matter involved the image of the University, a press statement regarding this might be issued and as per the peti­tioner himself the Vice Chancellor was good enough to agree to it immediately, (see Annexure-G at page 54). As, however, no press statement was issued till 25th May, the case of the petitioner is that the public statement prepared by the five accused persons was released on that day. ( The delay at the hand of the Vice-Chancellor might have occurred due to the fact that the Convocation of the University was fixed on 25th by which date the Vice-Chancellor had also not received certified copy of the orders of discharge passed by the Court-the copy was received only on 28th May). A copy of the statement was sent to the Vice Chancellor by post which reached him on 7.6.82. On 9.6.82, the Vice-Chancellor issued a Memorandum to the petitioner in which exception was taken to the public statement issued, inter alia, by the latter stating that the statement had ''the potential of becoming irritant in the University system" and also "an impediment in the process of normalisation, which has been set in only after a great tragedy which itself has brought down the public image of the University." The Vice-Chancellor further stated in this Memorandum that the public statement is "prejudicial to the harmonious academic life and the aims and objectives of the University and is unbecoming the conduct of a senior member of the faculty of the North-Eastern Hill University". The Vice-Chancellor, therefore felt that a situation had arisen calling for urgent measures in the interest of the University and. therefore, called upon the petitioner in exercise of powers vested under section 12(3) of the Act read with clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Statute 27 made under the said Act to explain his conduct, he being the first signatory of the aforesaid public statement having serious implications for University ; and asked the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the service of the University. Ten day's time was given for the purpose and to appear for personal presentation, if so desired. Ten day's time was given for the purpose and to appear for personal presentation, if so desired. The petitioner sent his reply on 19.6.82 in which he stated, inter alia, that he was highly aggrieved at the action of the Vice-Chancellor and so he was preferring an appeal to the Executive Council of the University in accordance with the provisions in section 12(8) of the Act, and to stay the proceedings till the appeal was heard and decided. ''The petitioner stated that the public statement had been issued by the signatories not as members of the University, but as discharged suspects. He also stated the public declaration could have only helped the image of the University. He wanted the Vice-Chancellor to let him know about the Rules under which the proceedings initiated will be proceded with. 4. The Vice-Chancellor replied on 22.6.82 by stating that the appeal could be filed only at the appropriate stage, and as to the prayer of the petitoner to stay further proceedings it was stated that the prayer would be considered "only after having a reply and an ordeal (sic oral) submission to the said Memo" and requested the petitioner to submit his clarification by 23rd June. 5. By his letter of 23rd June, 198^, the petitioner asked the Vice-Chancellor to let him know as to what was meant by appropriate stage for preferring appeal. He also stated that it was difficult for him to understand the purpose and scope of that has been referred to as "personal presentation" and "personal appearance" in the Memo­randum dated 9.6.82 which have been subsequently referred to as "ordeal sub mission" and "oral" submission in the communication dated 22.6.82. 6. The Vice-Chancellor replied the letter on the same day stating that no personal appearance had been made by the petitioner, instead a written request had been submitted seeking certain clarifications about the procedure etc. The Vice-Chancellor stated that the pro­visions of section 12 and Statute 27 were quite clear and did not need any further elaboration. He granted time till 2nd July to submit final reply and for personal appearance as well as on that day. 7. The next event is the reply of the petitioner of 2.7.82 wherein he stated that the arrest, harassment and humiliation of the petitioner had caused irreparable damage to his reputation and professional life which needed to be salvaged. He granted time till 2nd July to submit final reply and for personal appearance as well as on that day. 7. The next event is the reply of the petitioner of 2.7.82 wherein he stated that the arrest, harassment and humiliation of the petitioner had caused irreparable damage to his reputation and professional life which needed to be salvaged. The petitioner stated that if the Vice-Chancellor would have issued the statement as assured m the meeting dated 20th May, there would have been no necessity for the petitioner to issue the statement in question. The stand of the petitioner was that the statement in question made no reference to the University perse and he stated that the University owed a duty to bring to book those responsible for the harassment of innocent members. The petitioner further stated that he had kept the interest of the University uppermost in his mind and no misconduct, act of in discipline, nor even a minor transgression had been established against him. He further averred that if there be any specific objection relating to the statement he might be told so that he could stat his case and make amends if found wrong. The petitioner stated about the efforts being made by the Vice Chancellor to put the University back on rails. He also expressed his gratitude for the steps the Vice-Chancellor had taken to get the accused discharged in the case. This letter ended with tendering very sincere regrets in case the statement had in any way hurt the Vice Chancellor or the University. 8. The petitioner submitted a Memorandum also on the same day questioning the legality of the issuance of the notice dated 7th June 1982 by the Vice-Chancellor and asserted about the existence of his right of appeal. He also questioned as to why the proceedings had been initiated against him only. He regarded the earlier Memora­ndum of the Vice-Chancellor not as charge sheet as it contained vague statements. He asserted his right to get a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 9. Following receipt of these two communications, the Vice-Chancellor issued a formal show cause notice on 3.7.82 stating that the public statement had "serious implication for University life" and that the petitioner had not conducted himself in keeping with the responsibilities and status of a senior member of the Univer­sity Faculty. 9. Following receipt of these two communications, the Vice-Chancellor issued a formal show cause notice on 3.7.82 stating that the public statement had "serious implication for University life" and that the petitioner had not conducted himself in keeping with the responsibilities and status of a senior member of the Univer­sity Faculty. This was regarded as reasonable cause for removing the petitioner from service of the University which act also amounted to misconduct. The Vice-Chancellor therefore issued a notice in exercise of his power under section 12(3) of the Act read with clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Statute 27 made under section 24, e) of the Act to show cause as to why the petitioner's services should not be terminated forthwith. A reply by 14th July was desired The show cause also stated that the petitioner could appear in person at 11 AM of that day. 10. The petitioner in his reply stated that the notice had been given under clause (4) of the Statute made under section 24(c of the Act which dealt with "appointment of teachers and other academic staff working in other University or organisation for specified period for undertaking a joint project", and questioned as to how the notice deriving authority from this action could be served on a confirmed permanent teacher of the University According to the petitioner these contused him and made it difficult to show cause. He, therefore, desired a clarification and reasonable time thereafter to submit the reply. He also stated in this reply that as the Vice-Chancellor was kind enough to permit him to go to Bombay for the admission of his daughter he was proceeding to Bombay and shall report as soon as he returned. 11. The removal order was thereafter passed by the Vice-Chancellor on 16.7.82. The order runs into 62 typed pages and has dealt with practically every aspect of the case in great detail. The petitioner has questioned the validity of this order in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. An objection relating to the maintainability of the petition has been taken by Shri Lahiri appearing for the University on the ground that against the order of removal an appeal to the Executive Council was permissible and the same not having been availed of, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground. 12. An objection relating to the maintainability of the petition has been taken by Shri Lahiri appearing for the University on the ground that against the order of removal an appeal to the Executive Council was permissible and the same not having been availed of, the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground. As, however, question relating to violation of natural justice has been raised in the present application, we have hot felt inclined to dismiss the petition on the ground of availability of efficacious alternative remedy. In a case of the present nature, we have deemed it fit to examine the grievance of the petitioner on merits instead of dismissing the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 13. The impugned order has been assailed by Shri Bhattacharjee on these grounds : (1) The power conferred by section 12(3) of the Act was not available to the Vice-Chancellor in the present case, (2) the removal order was in gross violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner did not get "reason­able opportunity to show cause", (3) the charges were vague, (4) the petitioner was a victim of discrimination inasmuch as he alone of the five signatories was picked up for disciplinary action, and (5) no misconduct had been committed by the petitioner, and there was no "good cause" for his removal. 14. To appreciate the above submissions and to come to a grip of the controversy at hand it would be necessary to set out the public statement issued by the petitioner in its entirety. PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME A PUBLIC STATEMENT The night Dr. Banwar was shot the police came and searched our houses. They had no warrant to do so, and in two cases this was done at gunpoint. Although nothing incriminating was found we were taken to the police station for questioning. Nothing was revealed in the questioning too to link any of us in any way with the crime. However, we were placed under arrest. After more then 34 hours in custody, while we were produced before the Magistrate for remand, we heard it being argued that though our names did not figure in the F. I. R. and though there was no specific evidence against us, we should be kept in further custody because a sensational crime" had occurred in Shillong. After more then 34 hours in custody, while we were produced before the Magistrate for remand, we heard it being argued that though our names did not figure in the F. I. R. and though there was no specific evidence against us, we should be kept in further custody because a sensational crime" had occurred in Shillong. Thus, we were kept in custody for a week ostensibly for interrogation which itself got reduced to a farce. It looked as if the officials doing it, though con­vinced of our innocence, were being forced to prolong it. Finally, when we had to be released on bail very severe and humiliating restrictions such as are placed on confirmed criminals were imposed on us. We went through all this in a spirit of co-operation believing that we have the duty to help the police in their efforts to the solve the crime. However, after seven long months of investigation the crime seems to be no nearer solution today. The police on May 19th reported that there is absolutely no evidence to link any of us with the crime. This belated discharge gives us the chance to raise a few questions which have been bothering us for long. 1. Even now nobody knows the basis on which the five of u& (who have in fact nothing in common except the dislike some people in the university have developed for us) were picked up as suspects. As it has nothing to do with the crime itself, it could only have been an ugly projection of the undefined personal hatred of certain influential people in the University who welcomed and used the crime as an opportunity to persecute us. 2. The agency responsible for crime detection has also the duty to protect the honour, reputation and interests of innocent people. Arrests are generally made only when there is a reasonable tear that the suspect may abscond and only when there is something to link a person with I Lie crime, ; Was our arrest and harassment the result of a sincere, honest, and professional effort to solve the crime ? Or was it the result of somebody interfering with the process of investigation to mislead and divert attention with motive of helping the actual culprit to escape and cover the trail ? Or was it the result of somebody interfering with the process of investigation to mislead and divert attention with motive of helping the actual culprit to escape and cover the trail ? If so, those who took personal interest in having us apprehended may have been accomplices in this sordid act. Will the impartial arms of the law reach them ? 3. There is some strong evidence to suggest that the major pre­occupation was not crime detection but something else. While we were being released on bail the police registered a case against us under section 107 Gr. P. G. that the five of us have been con­spiring to disturb peace in Shillong. That we were brought together for the first time in our lives by the police and that too in their custody and also the fact that they invariably failed to turn up in Court whenever this came up for consideration is typical of the manner in which things were being done. Later top police officials disclaimed any knowledge of this case. 4. And now how about the murder itself? Is it going to be yet another unsolved crime in Shillong ? After all this messing up, will it be possible to apprehend the culprit ? We strongly endorse the view that an impartial central agency should take over the investigation of this case and that the role some university people played in misleading the police and interfering with the process of investigation should also be looked into. 5. As peaceful and law abiding citizens of this country, who firmly believe in democratic and peaceful methods of solving problems, we strongly feel that there is need for effective safeguards against innocent persons being subjected to such harrowing experience. With malice towards none, we would only assert our faith in the laws of natural justice which will call to account anyone abusing public office and authority to seek private vengeance. We also place on record our deep sense of gratitude to those who stood by us. Truth has prevailed : Where is justice ? North-Eastern Hill University Dr K. J. Joseph, Reader Shillong. Mr Paul Pimomo, Lecturer May 19, 1982. Mr Pradip Gogoi, Research Fellow. Mr C. Y. Ngullie, Library Assistant. Mr E. Y. Ngullie, Security Officer." 15. Before proceeding further we may note the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes. Truth has prevailed : Where is justice ? North-Eastern Hill University Dr K. J. Joseph, Reader Shillong. Mr Paul Pimomo, Lecturer May 19, 1982. Mr Pradip Gogoi, Research Fellow. Mr C. Y. Ngullie, Library Assistant. Mr E. Y. Ngullie, Security Officer." 15. Before proceeding further we may note the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes. The most important section for our purpose is section 12 of the Act which reads as below :- "12. (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Visitor in such manner as may be prescribed by the Statutes. (2) The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University, and shall exercise general supervision and control over the affairs to the University and give affect to the decisions of all the authorities of the University. (3) The Vice-Chancellor may, if he is of opinion that immediate action is necessary on any matter, exercise any power conferred on any authority of the University by or under this Act and shall report to such authority the action taken by him on such matter : Provided that if the authority concerned is of opinion that such action ought not to have been taken it may refer the matter to the Visitor whose decision thereon shall be final : Provided further that any person in the service of the University who is aggrieved by the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor under this sub-section shall have the right to appeal against such section to the Executive Council within three months from the date on which decision on such action is communicated to him and thereupon the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor. (4) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such other powers and performs such other functions as may be prescribed by the Statutes or Ordinances.” Sub-section (3) of this section shows that the Vice-Chancellor may, if he is of the opinion that immediate action is necessary on any matter, exercise any power conferred on any authority of the Uni­versity by or under the Act and shall report to such authority the action taken by him on such act. As per section 18 of the Act the Executive Council is one of the authorities of the University. As per section 18 of the Act the Executive Council is one of the authorities of the University. Section 24 of the Act has given power to make Statutes, inter alia, relating to "the condition of service of employees including provision for pension, insurance and provident fund, manner of termination of service and disciplinary action". The expression "employee" includes a teacher as per section 2 (h) of the Act; the word "teacher" includes a Reader also as defined in section 2 (q) of the Act. 16. Statute 27 deals with the subject matter of "Removal of teachers". This Statute is very vital for our purpose and is relevant part of the same reads as below :- "27. (1) Where there is an allegation of misconduct against a teacher, or a member of the academic staff, the Vice-Chancellor may, if he thinks fit, by order in writing, place teacher under suspension and shall forthwith report to the Executive Council the circumstances in which the order was made : Provided that the Executive Council may, if it is of the opinion, that the circumstances of the case do not warrant the suspension of the teacher or a member of the academic staff, revoke such order. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the terms of his contract of service or of his appointment, the Executive Council shall be entitled to remove a teacher, or a member of the academic staff on the ground of misconduct. (3) Save as aforesaid, the Executive Council shall not be entitled to remove a teacher or a member of the academic staff except for good cause and after giving three months' notice in writing or on payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice. (4) No teacher or a member of the academic staff shall be removed under clause (2) or under clause (3) until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. (5) The removal of a teacher or a member of the academic staff shall require a two-thirds majority of the members of the Executive Council present and voting." 17. Before the submissions advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee are examined, it would be worthwhile to say a few words about the petitioner. He had joined the University as a Reader in the Education Department on 19.1.75. Before the submissions advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee are examined, it would be worthwhile to say a few words about the petitioner. He had joined the University as a Reader in the Education Department on 19.1.75. He was earlier a Research Officer in the National Staff College of Educational Planner and Administrators. He was appointed as ex-officio Principal of Nagaland College of Education at Kohima from 25.3.75 and was released from that post by the Government of Nagaland with effect from 15 3.76. Thereafter he joined the Education Department in the University Headquarters at Shillong. In connection with some departmental enquiry he was placed under suspension with effect from 13.7.81 and he continued to be under suspension till the date of removal. 18. We may now examine the contentions of Shri Bhattacharjee. The first submission, as already noted, is that power under section 12 (3) of the Act was not available to the Vice-Chancellor in the present case inasmuch as the same can be invoked only where "imme­diate action" is necessary. The contention of the learned counsel is that in a matter relating to removal no immediate action is possible as reasonable opportunity to show cause has to be given. This submission of Shri Bhattacharjee is met by Shri Lahiri by stating that whether immediate action is necessary or not is a matter to be decided exclusively by the Vice-Chancellor. His submission is that it is not for this Court to examine the same. In support of this submission, Shri Lahiri has first referred to Bhagat Singh vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 PC 111, which had dealt with this aspect of the matter in the context of section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1919 which had clothed the Governor-General with the power to promulgate ordinance for the peace and good government in case of emergency. The petitioners asked the Privy Council to say that state of emergency did not exist. This raised the question as to who is to judge whether state of emergency exists. The Privy Council stated that "(a) state of emergency is something that does not permit of any exact definition. It connotes a set of matters calling for drastic action which is to be judged as such by someone. It is more than obvious that someone must be the Governor-General and he alone. Any other view would render utterly inept the whole provision. It connotes a set of matters calling for drastic action which is to be judged as such by someone. It is more than obvious that someone must be the Governor-General and he alone. Any other view would render utterly inept the whole provision. Emergency demands immediate action and that action is prescribed to be taken by the Governor General. It is he alone who can promulgate the Ordinance". Reference was then made to Emperor vs. Banwori Lai, AIR 1945 PC 48, wherein, while dealing with the power of the Governor to issue ordinance conferred on him by para 72 of Schedule-9 of the Gover­nment of India Act, 1935, which power could be-exercised in case of emergency, it was stated that the Governor-General alone was the sole judge whether emergency existed or not; and the Court could not challenge his authority. 19. We were then referred to Virendra vs. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 896 , in para 11 of which, while dealing with the powers to be exercised by the State Government under sections 2 and 3 of the concerned Act which had state 1 that where the State Gover­nment or any authority so authorised in this behalf if satisfied that any action was necessary for the purpose of preventing or curbing any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order such orders could be made as visualised by the section, it was observed that the matter was left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government charged with the duty of maintaining law and order, and to make exercise of these powers justifiable and subject to judicial scrutiny will defeat the very purpose of enactment. Some assistance is also sought to be derived by Shri Lahiri from T. Cajee vs. K Jormanik Siem, AIR 1961 SC 276 , wherein some power had been given to the Executive Committee of the District Council by Rule 30 (a) of the concerned Rules, to take certain steps where immediate action was deemed necessary, as the emergency appeared to it to require. The Apex Court observed that it was not for the Court to go into the question whether there was any emergency or not with respect to the excepted matters and so it was held that in the circumstances, the action taken by the Executive Committee could not be challenged on the ground that the action was beyond its power, (see Para 12). 20. By referring to the Press Censorship case of this Court reported in 1983 (1) GLR NOC 12, it was stated by Shri Lahiri that the exercise of power conferred by the relevant Act on the satisfaction of the Governor could be assailed before the Court only on three grounds (1) power was not exercised bonafide ; (2) relevant and proxi­mate materials were not considered ; and (3) extraneous and irrelevant matters were considered. The learned counsel states that in the present case none of these exceptions exists. 21. We are lastly referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in DC. Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579, wherein also it was accepted that the Court cannot examine the question of satisfaction of the Governor in issuing ordinance. 22. From what has been stated above and from the situation which was prevailing at the relevant time in and around NEHTJ of 'which reference has been made above ( which we have taken from the removal order passed by the Vice-Chancellor), we cannot substitute our satisfaction for that of the Vice-Chancellor in saying whether any immediate action was called for or not in the interest of the University. At times even immediate removal orders may be thought necessary to preserve, and protect the interest of the University. The contention of Shri Bhattacharjee that if the power of removal is exercised by the Executive Council, the same shall require majority of two thirds of the members of the Council present and voting as per Statute 27 (5), whereas if the power is exercised by the Vice Chancellor, simple majority would be as follow from what has been stated in the second proviso to section 12 (3) of the Act, has not been regarded as sufficient reason by us to deny the power of removal to the Vice-Chancellor if, according to him, need for "immediate action” were to demand the same. The first submission of Shri Bhittacharjee cannot therefore be accepted. 23. The first submission of Shri Bhittacharjee cannot therefore be accepted. 23. Having been satisfied that the Vice-Chancellor had the power of removal vested in him because of what has been provided in Statutes 27 (2) and 27 (3), we are not addressing ourselves to the question that the Vice-Chancellor had this power by virtue of what has been provided in section 16 of the General Clauses Act, as is the submission of Shri Lahiri, to support which our attention is invited to Rayarappan, vs. Madhvi Amma, AIR 1950 FC 140, P. K. Bose vs. C. J. of Calcutta, AIR 1956 SC 285 , and Lekhraj vs Dy Custodian, AIR 1966 SC 334 . 24. The second grievance of the learned counsel is that reasonable opportunity of showing cause was not given in the present case. It has been impressed upon us that the expression "reasonable opportunity of showing cause" is well-entrenched and its ramification are too well known by this time inasmuch as this expression had found place in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as it was first enacted. A number of pronouncement by the Supreme Court have been brought to our notice by Shri Bhattacharjee to bring home the real import of this expression. We have been first referred to Union of India vs. T. R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882 , wherein it was stated in para 10 that what rules of natural justice required in this regard are (1) that a party should have opportunity to adduce all evidence on which he relies, (2) the evidence of the witnesses should be taken in his presence and that he should be given opportunity to cross-examine them ; and (3) no material should be relied against the delinquent without his being given an opportunity of explaining the same. 25. 25. In Khemchand vs Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 , the law in this regard was summarised in para 19 by stating that the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the concerned statute includes (a) an opportunity to deny guilt and establish his innocence, which can be done only on being told what the charges are and the allegations on which such charges are based ; (b) opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself and other witnesses in support of his defence ; and (3) opportunity to make representation as to why proposed punishment should not be inflicted upon him. 26. This was also the view expressed in State of Assam vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612 By refarring to State of Mysore vs. Shiva Basappa, AIR 1963 SC 375 , it is submitted by Shri Bhattacharjee that if any information is obtained by an Enquiring Officer, in law there is an obligation that he should not act on it unless it is put to the party against whom it is to be used and after giving him a fair opportunity to explain. Meenglas Tea Estate vs. Its Workmen, 1962 (2) LU 392 (SC) is then cited which has held that it is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. For this purpose he must given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given chance to rebut evidence led against him. It was emphasised that is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be subatantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted. By referring to Town Area Committee vs. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 1978 SC 1407 , Shri Bhattacharjee contends that a reasonable opportunity is a term of weilknown legal significance and includes an opportunity given to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him and to lead evidence in support of his version. It was stated in this case that merely submitting a charge-sheet and getting explanation and thereafter to straightway pass an order of dismissal was clearly in violation of the requirement of law. It was stated in this case that merely submitting a charge-sheet and getting explanation and thereafter to straightway pass an order of dismissal was clearly in violation of the requirement of law. On this aspect of the case we are lastly referred to Managing Director, U. P. Warehonsing Corporation vs. N. N. Bajpayee, 1980 -3) SCC 459, in para 14 of which it was stated that an enquiry of the present nature is quasi judicial in character and a reasonable opportunity of denying guilt and to defend himself must be given which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence. The passing of the order of dismissal in that case after perusing the respondents' explanation was said to be in total breach of rules of natural justice. 27. Despite what has been stated above, we say that the principles of natural justice cannot be imprisoned in a straight-jacket of a cast iron formula. It has been stated by the Supreme Court on innumerable occasions that these rules are not embodied rules and the question whether the requirements of these principles have been met in a given case must depend on a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case. This aspect of the matter can be brought home by referring to the views expressed in Hari Nath vs. Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 , in which case some students were expelled from the College by the Principal on the charge of nude march in a girls' hostel, after perusing the report of the Inquiry Committee which had examined the girls in absence of the students, no opportunity was given to cross-examine the witnesses and the Committee's report was also not made available to the students. The expulsion order was therefore challenged being violative of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court, however, negative this contention. In support of its conclusion, the Court noted the decisions in Board of Education vs. Rice, 1911 AC 179 which had stated that the Board need not examine witnesses, and it could obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any statement prejudicial to those who were parties. In support of its conclusion, the Court noted the decisions in Board of Education vs. Rice, 1911 AC 179 which had stated that the Board need not examine witnesses, and it could obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any statement prejudicial to those who were parties. Russell vs. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 AH E. R. 109 was then noted which had stated that one essential in this context was that the person concerned should have a reason­able opportunity of presenting his case. It then quoted the following observation of Harman J. in Byrne vs. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. (1958) 2 All E. R. 579 : "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case ; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal shall act in good faith. I do not think that there is really anything more". Being assured from these decisions as to what were the requirements of natural justice, the Supreme Court did not read any violation of these principles in the case because the girls who were affected would not have otherwise come forward to give evidence for fear of retaliation and harassment. The Court was also satisfied that the Committee whose integrity could not be impeached had collected and sifted the evidence given by the girls. Thereafter the students definitely named by the girls were informed about the complaint against them and the charge. They were given an opport­unity to state their case. Nothing more was to be done, stated the Court, on the facts and circumstances of the case. 28. In the present case, the issuance of the public statement in question being an admitted fact, there was no necessity of examining any witness and to allow them to be cross-examined by the petitioner; nor was there any scope for allowing the petitioner to lead his evidence in support of his defence. 28. In the present case, the issuance of the public statement in question being an admitted fact, there was no necessity of examining any witness and to allow them to be cross-examined by the petitioner; nor was there any scope for allowing the petitioner to lead his evidence in support of his defence. The only real requirement of natural justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case was to give a personal hearing to the petitioner to satisfy that he had not committed any act which could be regarded as having "the potential of becoming an irritant in the University system0 or having adversely affected "harmonious academic life" or the public statement having “serious implication for University life". Such an opportunity was amply given by the Vice-Chancellor. It is a matter of pity that the petitioner did not avail of the same. We are inclined to think that if the petitioner would have appeared personally before the Vice-Chancellor, who had taken steps to get the petitioner disc argued, as acknowledged by the petitioner himself, the same would have perhaps saved the petitioner from the agony of receiving the present order of removal. To start with, it was a storm in a cup of tea. The real storm would have been avoided, if the petitioner would have shown a little more patience by way or allowing the Vice-Chancellor some more time to issue a press statement as promised by him. A little more sagacity would have saved the petitioner from this legal battle. But the events took a different turn. The wounded feeling perhaps did not allow the petitioner to wait. The petitioner did not act wisely also in not appearing before the Vice-Chancellor. We are inclined to think that if he would have done so, some solution of the tangle could have been found out, as the Vice-Chancellor was, to start with, very sympathetic towards the petitioner, 29. From what has been stated above, we are satisfied that the requirements of natural justice were duly met in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner was made known of the nature of accusation against him and was given an opportunity to state his case and the Vice-Chancellor did act in good faith. May we states that no submission was made before us either by Shri Bhattacharjee or by Shri Goswami about any bias on the part of the Vice-Chancellor. May we states that no submission was made before us either by Shri Bhattacharjee or by Shri Goswami about any bias on the part of the Vice-Chancellor. The only materials used by the Vice-Chancellor while removing the petitioner copies of which were not made available to the petitioner were a number of open statements and counter statements" found floating in the University campus after the aforesaid public statement of the petitioner. Rules of natural justice would have required an opportunity to be given to the petitioner to explain these statements and counter-statements. But failure to do so has not occasioned a failure of justice in the present case inasmuch as the statements and counter statements did not really form the basis of removal of the petitioner by the Vice-Chancellor. In this view of the matter we would not regard the submission advanced by Shri Lahiri about the fulfillment of requirement of natural justice in the present case to be an argument which might have been addressed acceptable to the Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles-1 about which mention has been made at page 244 of Liversidge vs. Anderson, 1942 AC 206 which was brought to our notice by Shri Goswami appearing for the petitioner, 30. This takes us to the third submission of Shri Bhattacharjee that the charges in the present case were vague and as such the order of removal is not sustainable. The learned counsel has referred in ibis connection to Surath Chmdra vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 , in para 4 of which it has been stated that the whole object of statement of allegation which has to accompany that the charge is to give all necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. In that case despite the appellant repeatedly stating to the authorities concerned that the charges were extremely vague and indefinite nobody had cared to inform the appellant of the facts, circumstances and particulars relating to the charges. It was therefore accepted by the Court that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself. The facts of the present case are entirely different as the charges are based upon the public statement issued by the petitioner himself. There was nothing more to be told in this regard to the petitioner. It was therefore accepted by the Court that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself. The facts of the present case are entirely different as the charges are based upon the public statement issued by the petitioner himself. There was nothing more to be told in this regard to the petitioner. The case of Siwai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 985, has also no application to the case at hand inasmuch as we would not regard the charges as vague in the present case. 31. The fourth submission of Shri Bhattacharjee is that the petitioner alone was picked up out of the five signatories to award the punishment of removal, which shows that the petitioner was a victim of discrimination. A perusal of the impugned order shows that three factors had weighed with the Vice-Chancellor in selecting the petitioner alone for his hammer to fall on him. These factors have been mentioned at para 57 of the impugned order in these words : “'Dr Joseph is the seniormost teacher amongst the group of five who signed the Public Statement. He is a Reader with Ion? experience of life. He is the first signatory of the letter." It had earlier been stated by the Vice-Chancellor that when the conduct of a senior professor is to be judged, the yardsticks had to be completely different than those for judging the conduct of a young Lecturer who had just joined the University Faculty. It has also been pointed out in this regard that the most important factor in this context is the position of the incumbent. 32. We think that good reasons have been given for selecting the petitioner alone to take action against him. May we reiterate here that apart from the petitioner the four signatories were a young lecturer of the University, a student of the University and two employees of the University. The action taken by the Vice-Chancellor against the petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as arbitrary or discriminatory, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 33. The last contention advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee is that the issuance of the public statement could not be regarded as misconduct, nor was there any "good cause" to remove the petitioner. The action taken by the Vice-Chancellor against the petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as arbitrary or discriminatory, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 33. The last contention advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee is that the issuance of the public statement could not be regarded as misconduct, nor was there any "good cause" to remove the petitioner. In this connection, it has been urged that the Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances having not defined "misconduct" the Vice-Chancellor could not have regarded the issuance of the public statement by the petitioner as misconduct. In this context our attention drawn to the resolution adopted by the Executive Council of the University in its meeting held on 26th April, 75 for consideration of the Academic Council. In that meeting a resolution was taken relating to "Code of Conduct" which was required to be incorporated in the Ordinance of the University but nothing was really done in this regard. It is urged by Sbri Bhattacharjee that the allegation that the action of the petitioner in issuing public statement was "unbeseeming for an Institution of higher learning" as observed in para 93 of the impugned order cannot be regarded to be a misconduct, so also the observations that the issuance of public statement was "unbecoming the conduct of a senior member of the faculty of the North-Eastern Hill Univer­sity" as stated in the Memorandum of the Vice-Chancellor, and that the petitioner has “not conducted himself in keeping with responsibil­ities and status of a senior member of the University faculty" as observed in the show cause notice. 34. To support this submission, Shri Bhattacharjee first refers us to A. L. Kalra vs. Project and Equipment Corporation, (1984) 3 SCC 316 , in which any act “unbecoming of public servant" was not regarded as a misconduct. A perusal of paras 21 and 22 of this judgment would show that this view was taken because in that case the appellant was said to be guilty of misconduct as prescribed in Rules 4 (1) (i) and (iii) which read as under :- " 4. (1) Every employee shall at all times (i) maintain absolute integrity (ii) *** *** (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a public servant." Rule 5 prescribed various misconducts for which action could be taken against an employee governed by the Rules. (1) Every employee shall at all times (i) maintain absolute integrity (ii) *** *** (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a public servant." Rule 5 prescribed various misconducts for which action could be taken against an employee governed by the Rules. Rule 4 was under heading 'General' whereas Rule 5 found its place under the heading 'Misconduct'. It was therefore stated that the draftsmen of the Rules made a clear distinction as to what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation observed the Supreme Court, but then failure to keep such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour by itself cannot constitute misconduct stated the Court, unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconducts in Rule 5. It was further stated that Rule 4 styled as 'General' specified a norm of behaviour but did not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5 it was not stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per-se a misconduct within any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specified misconduct. It was on these facts that it was held that if any act was committed unbecoming of public servant, the same could not be regarded as misconduct. In the present case, the facts being entirely different, it cannot be held that if the act in question were to be "unbeseeming for an Institution of higher learning" the same would not be misconduct because of anything stated in the aforesaid decision. 35. We are then referred to Union of India ts. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 para 11 of which is relevant for our purposes In this decision the definition of 'misconduct' as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, which had been noted by this Court, was first set out which runs as under : "Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill-motive; acts of negligence, error of judgment, or innocent misconduct, do not constitute such misconduct". After referring to this definition, the Supreme Court stated that a single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or strocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct. After referring to this definition, the Supreme Court stated that a single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or strocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct. It was then observed :- " It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attaintment of the highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm then deliberate wickedness or malvolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar (examples) instances of ••• But in any case failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct •••" In countering this submission of Shri Bhattacbarjee, Shri Lahiri has brought to our notice the definition of misconduct as given in the Oxford English Dictionary and in Black's Law Dictionary. In Oxford, the word "misconduct" has been defined, inter alia, to mean "Improper conduct; wrong behaviour”. In Flack's the meaning given is a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, or forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mism­anagement, offence but not negligence or carelessness”. Our attention has also been invited to the definition of misconduct as given in Words and Phrases published by the West Publishing Company wherein this aspect of the matter has been dealt very elaborately in about 34 pages. We may only note one definition of misconduct given herein which is "wrong or improper conduct; bad behaviour, unlawful behaviour or conduct; malfeasance". It has, however, been stated that the term "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. 36. We may only note one definition of misconduct given herein which is "wrong or improper conduct; bad behaviour, unlawful behaviour or conduct; malfeasance". It has, however, been stated that the term "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. 36. For the case at hand, we may not pursue this matter further inasmuch as the petitioner has been really removed not on the ground of his having committed "misconduct" of which mention has been made in Statute 27^2), but because the removal had become a necessity for ''good cause” of which mention has been made in Statute 27 (3). In fact, the Vice-Chancellor has stated that the removal under Statute 27 3) being more beneficial may be adopted. The petitioner was, therefore, given three months salary in lieu of the three months, notice as visualised by Statute 27 (3). 37. The most important question is whether there was "good cause" for the removal of the petitioner. As the removal has affected the livelihood of the petitioner attracting operation of Article 21 of the Constitution, we have given our deep thought to the matter. To answer this question it would be worthwhile to note what the petitioner had stated 11 his Public Statement relating to the University. We find mention of this in two places of the Statement-in peras 1 and 4. We may reproduce the same for ready reference :- 'l. Even now nobody knows the basis on which the five of us (who have in fact nothing in common except the dislike some people in the university have developed for us) were picked up as suspects. As it has nothing to do with the crime itself, it could only have been an ugly projection of the undefined personal hatred of certain influential people in the university who welcomed and used the crime as an opportunity to prosecute us. * * * 4. And now how about the murder itself? Is it going to be yet another unsolved crime in Shillong ? After all this messing up, will it be possible to apprehend the culprit ? We strongly endorse the view that an impartial central agency should take over the investigation of this case and that the role some university people played in misleading the police and inter­fering with the process of investigation should also be looked into". After all this messing up, will it be possible to apprehend the culprit ? We strongly endorse the view that an impartial central agency should take over the investigation of this case and that the role some university people played in misleading the police and inter­fering with the process of investigation should also be looked into". The reference to the University in the Public Statement can alone be regarded as "potential of becoming irritant in the University system” as having serious implications on the University life" mention of which has been made by the Vice-Chancellor in his Memorandum dated 9.6 82 or in his show cause notice dated 3.7.82 38. Whether this provided a "good cause" as contemplated by Statute 27 (3) ? According to Shri Lahiri, the matter has to be adjudged in the background of the depressed and troubled situation which was prevailing in the University at the relevant time in the wake of assassination of Dr. Banwar. If so viewed, contends Shri Lahiri, the removal has to be regarded as actuated for the good cause. The counter submission of Shri Bhattacharjee is that there was no cause at all to remove the petitioner as what he had done was just to publicly ventilate his grievances. ' 39. Before expressing our opinion on this important aspect of the case, we may say that "good cause" of which mention has been made in Statute 27 (4), has to exist as an objective fact ; subjective satisfaction alone would not do in this regard. This follows from the language of the Statute 27(4), which is apparently different from the language used in the opening part of section 12 (3) of the Act. The result of this is that a Court can apply its own mind to judge the question whether "good cause" existed, in the same way as it can opine on the question whether a teacher had committed "misconduct". 40. If the matter is viewed objectively, as it has to be, we are inclined to think that the petitioner's action in issuing the Public Statement did not constitute a ''good cause" demanding the extreme penalty of removal from service. After all, what bad he done? 40. If the matter is viewed objectively, as it has to be, we are inclined to think that the petitioner's action in issuing the Public Statement did not constitute a ''good cause" demanding the extreme penalty of removal from service. After all, what bad he done? He (alongwith four others) had stated publicly what he had felt about his arrest, detention in custody for a week, stringent conditions while releasing on bail followed by a proceeding under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code etc. All these had obviously harmed publicly the reputation of the petitioner, and so he publicly ventilated his grievances and said what he had to say on the matters relating to his arrest etc. Anybody feeling deeply injured would have liked to say something on his honorable release from a charge so serious as murder. Even the Vice-Chancellor has accepted this, as he has stated in para 102 of his order: "It could be conceded that perhaps as an individual Dr. Joseph (the petitioner) could have made a personal statement, even public, to ventilate his stand and position in the criminal case". But according to the Vice-Chancellor, he overstepped the limit, for which reasons have been given. As stated earlier, it would have been a wiser step to await for some days to enable the Vic; Chancellor himself to clear the mud thrown at the petitioner; but the latter's wounded feelings did not permit patience to take control of him-the result was issuance of the Public Statement The view taken by the Vice Chancellor that it had the ''potential of becoming an irritant in the University system" is really based on the fact that "a number of open statements and counter-statements were found floating in the University campus" after the petitioner had released his Public Statement, mention of which has been made in para 6 of the impugned order. How far can we hold the petitioner liable for the same? It is nobody's case that the petitioner was responsible for the same, or had any hand in the same. We do not also think if he could have visualised that his statement will lead to a spate of statements and counter-statements. Then why penalise the petitioner ? In the long 62 pages order of removal, we find practically the following para only at page 130 of the brief dealing with "good cause". We do not also think if he could have visualised that his statement will lead to a spate of statements and counter-statements. Then why penalise the petitioner ? In the long 62 pages order of removal, we find practically the following para only at page 130 of the brief dealing with "good cause". The Vice-Chancellor has stated this in para 105 of his order :- "Even if the maximum benefit of doubt on technical and procedural consideration is given to him in relation to the question of misconduct, it is quite clear that the issue of a Public Statement by him, which brings down the reputation of the University and drags the University in a public controversy does compromise its long-term interests. This fact itself is a reasonably good cause for taking action under Statute 27 (3)." 41. From the materials on record we do not know how the long term interest of the University had really been affected by the Public Statement of the petitioner. Even if the same had been so affected, as it tended to bring down the reputation of the University and dragged it in public controversy, as mentioned in the aforesaid para, the tender of ''very sincere regret in case the Statement has in any way hurt you or the University" by which words the reply of 2nd July, 82 was closed, could have been accepted. It cannot be forgotten that the petitioner's feelings were seriously wounded by his arrest etc. and if he overstepped his limit, some indulgence could have been, really, ought to have been given. 42. In view of all that has been stated above, our sense of justice does not permit us to uphold the severe action of removal which has taken away the means of livelihood of the petitioner. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the order of removal by allowing the petition. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. 43. Before parting we would like to observe that the petitioner may not loss sight of the aims and objects of establishing the University which are to develop the intellectual, academic and cultural background of the people of the hill areas of the North-Eastern region. We hope and trust that he would advance these aims and objects by his deeds and actions, and would do nothing to hamper the same.