AMARENDRA NATH VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THE following question has been referred to us for our opinion at the instance of the commissioner of Wealth-tax, Lucknow : "whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the value of the books owned by the assessee was exempt from wealth-tax under Section 5 (1) (xii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in its entirety and not to the extent of Rs. 20,000 only within the meaning of Section 5 (1) (x) of the same Act ?" ( 2 ) THE assessee, a leading senior advocate, then also the Advocate-General of the State of Uttar pradesh, owned law books of the value of Rs. 28,944 for use in his profession. In his wealth-tax return for the assessment year in question, namely, 1972-73, he claimed that the value of such books was totally exempt from wealth-tax under Clause (xii) of Section 5 (1) of the Wealth-tax act, 1957. The Wealth-tax Officer, however, allowed him exemption to the extent of Rs. 20,000 only, treating the assets comprising such books as covered by Clause (x) under which there was then a ceiling of exemption amounting to Rs. 20,000 only. In the opinion of the Wealth-tax officer, the assessees case was not covered by Clause (xii) of Section 5 (1 ). Consequently, a sum of Rs. 8,944 was added to the total wealth of the assessee in the assessment of wealth-tax. ( 3 ) ON appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, concurring with the Wealth-tax Officer, observed that in Clause (xii) of Section 5 (1), the terms "books or manuscripts" must, on the principle of ejusdem generis, be construed to refer only to works of art and collections of the category mentioned in that clause and not to the books used by the assessee for his profession. The order passed by the Wealth-tax Officer was accordingly affirmed by the Appellate Assistant commissioner. ( 4 ) ON a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by the assessee, the Tribunal differred from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Wealth-tax Officer and held that the books in question were clearly covered by Clause (xii) of Section 5 (1) and, consequently, the value thereof could not be taken into account in the computation of the net wealth of the assessee. The Tribunal further held that the words "tools" and "instruments", mentioned in clause (x), would not include books owned by a lawyer for use in his profession. It observed that, according to the primary and plain dictionary meaning of the words "tools" and "instruments", it was difficult to accept that the books used by an advocate in his profession are "tools" and "instruments" within the meaning of Clause (x ). In the alternative, the Tribunal has observed that even if it be assumed that the books used by a lawyer are covered by both the clauses, namely, (x) and (xii), Clause (xii) being more favourable to the assessee, must be adopted on the settled rules of interpretation of fiscal statutes. The appeal of the assessee was accordingly allowed and consequential reliefs were granted to him so far as the value of the books was concerned. Thereafter, at the instance of the Revenue, the question quoted above has been referred for our opinion. ( 5 ) FOR the decision of the question referred for our opinion, it will be convenient to have the relevant provisions of Section 5 (1) of the Wealth-tax Act before us : "5. (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1a), wealth-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following assets, and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee- -. . . (x) the tools and instruments necessary to enable the assessee to carry on his profession or vocation, subject to a maximum of twenty thousand rupees in value ;. . . (xii) any works of art, archaelogical, scientific or art collections, books or manuscripts belonging to the assessee and not intended for sale ;. . . " ( 6 ) WE will begin with an analysis of Clause (xii ). It is divisible into three parts ; (1) works of art ; (2) collections--archaeological, scientific or art ; and (3) books or manuscripts. It will immediately be seen that whereas the first part is confined exclusively to works of art, the second part is wider in its scope in that it takes within its sweep not only collections of art, but also those pertaining to archaeology and science. More explicitly, from pure aesthetics covered by the first, it has travelled to archaeology and science under the second part. More explicitly, from pure aesthetics covered by the first, it has travelled to archaeology and science under the second part. ( 7 ) FINALLY, we come to the third part which mentions books or manuscripts. It will at once be noticed that unlike the first part which is confined to works of art or the second part concerned with collections of three specific types, namely, archaeological, scientific or art, there is significantly no such limitation or restriction as to the subjects which the books or manuscripts belonging to the assessee in which he may be dealing in. ( 8 ) THE legislative intent seems clear. The law-makers did not intend to place any restrictions as to the subjects of study for which the assessee may acquire the books without being subjected to wealth-tax. The only limitations placed are : (1) the books or manuscripts must be owned by him, and (2) they are not intended for sale. The Legislature, it is apparent, had no intention of imposing wealth-tax on assets comprising books or manuscripts acquired by the assessee solely for enrichment of his intellect or knowledge or improvement of his apprehension and perception even if the purpose of study is to equip himself for the profession or vocation he might be engaged in. The reason behind exempting the entire value of books or manuscripts acquired solely for studies and not for sale is not far to seek. Books and manuscripts constitute a distinct class being the primary and primeval source of learning. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the lawmakers declined to place any restrictions under Clause (xii) as to the subjects in the case of books save that the books should be owned by the assessee and not intended for sale. ( 9 ) FOR the Revenue, however, the principle of ejusdem generis was sought to be invoked in support of the contention that books or manuscripts referred to in Clause (xii) must be interpreted to mean only those books or manuscripts which relate to art, archaeology or science. ( 10 ) WE are unable to agree. The principle of ejusdem generis, it must be remembered, is but a rule of construction and is to be applied with some care and caution. ( 10 ) WE are unable to agree. The principle of ejusdem generis, it must be remembered, is but a rule of construction and is to be applied with some care and caution. Craies on Statute Law (VI edition) has summarised the legal position thus at page 181 : "the ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution and not pushed too far, as in the case of many decisions, which treat it as automatically applicable, and not as being, what it is, a mere presumption, in the absence of other indications of the intention of the legislature. The modern tendency of the law, it was said, is to attenuate the application of the rule of ejusdem generis. To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. " ( 11 ) TO the same effect is the statement one finds in Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), volume 14, page 217. It reads : "the office of the rule of ejusdem generis is to afford aid to the court in construing statutes, and the rule cannot be employed to restrict operation thereof within narrower limits than was intended by lawmakers. (Sherfey v. City of Brazil, 13 NE 2d 568, 570, 213 Ind. 493 ). " ( 12 ) THE next thing to be borne in mind is that this rule is subject to a more fundamental principle, namely, that the words used in a statute which are of general import should receive their full and unrestricted meaning unless there are indications intrinsic in the statute to the contrary. Again, it should not be forgotten that the rule of ejusdem generis is a deviation from the normal rule of giving the words used in the statute their plain and natural meaning. This premise finds affirmation in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Ali gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 . It was observed (p. 812 ). This premise finds affirmation in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Ali gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 . It was observed (p. 812 ). "apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied. " ( 13 ) IN Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521 , again, their Lordships of the supreme Court ruled that a restricted meaning to the words of general import following specific words of the same nature can be given only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object of the enactment do not require such a restricted meaning to be attached to the words of general import, it becomes the duty of the court to give those words their plain and unrestricted meaning. ( 14 ) APPLYING these principles to the statute under consideration, namely, Clause (xii), we find that whereas the first part thereof is confined only to works of art, the second part is much wider in its scope in that it takes within its fold not only the subject of art but also archaeology and science. Finally, when we come to the third part, namely, books and manuscripts owned by the assessee and not intended for sale, the Legislature refused to restrict its scope to any particular subject or subjects. The only limitation placed by the Legislature in regard to the assets comprising books and manuscripts are (i) that the books must be owned by the assessee, and (ii)that they should not be intended for sale. "books and manuscripts" are undoubtedly words of wide and unqualified amplitude. They must, therefore, receive their full and unrestricted meaning and we see no ground whatever as to why the words "books and manuscripts" must be read down so as to be confined only to the subjects dealt with earlier. Neither the language of the statute nor the scheme of the enactment nor even the legislative intendment justify cutting down the scope of the third part of Clause (xii ). Neither the language of the statute nor the scheme of the enactment nor even the legislative intendment justify cutting down the scope of the third part of Clause (xii ). Books and manuscripts must, therefore, be deemed to refer to any kind of books or manuscripts so long as they are not intended for sale so as to entitle the assessee under Clause (xii) to the exemption of the total value thereof. ( 15 ) FINALLY, it is a trite saying that in order to attract the principle of ejusdem generis, a distinct genus or category must be discernible in the statute under examination. We find no such common genus or category in the three classes of assets exempted under Clause (xii), namely, works of art, collections of archaeology, science or art, so as to justify giving a restricted meaning to the words "books and manuscripts". ( 16 ) OUR conclusion, therefore, is that the entire value of books or manuscripts, owned by the assessee and not intended for sale, is entitled to be excluded in the computation of his net wealth. ( 17 ) THAT takes us to Clause (x) of Section 5 (1) on which the Revenue relied heavily. The question which immediately arises is whether books possessed by a lawyer for use in his profession can be regarded as "tools and instruments" within the meaning of Clause (x ). We think that books owned by lawyers for use in their profession can be called "instruments or tools" only in a figurative sense. The primary meaning of these words implies a kind of mechanical implement for working upon something or as a means employed for manual operation. To our mind, in their ordinary sense, these words refer only to mechanical or manual means of an operation for working upon something in contradistinction to intellectual means. ( 18 ) THUS, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the primary meaning of the words "tool" as "any instrument of manual operation ; a mechanical implement for working upon something as by cutting, striking, rubbing, or other process, in any manual art or industry ; usu. , one held in and operated directly by the hand, but including also certain simple machines, as the lathe. , one held in and operated directly by the hand, but including also certain simple machines, as the lathe. " The figurative meaning of the same word has been given as "anything used in the manner of a tool" ; "a person who is or allows himself to be, made a mere instrument by another". Likewise, "instrument" has also been defined in its primary meaning in the above dictionary as "a thing with or through which something is done or effected", in the figurative sense, this word carries the same meaning as has been assigned to the word "tool" quoted above. ( 19 ) WE have discovered nothing either in the language of the statute or its scheme to discard the primary meaning of these words. As mentioned above, words must receive their plain, ordinary meaning. Our conclusion, therefore, is that books used by lawyers for carrying on their profession cannot be regarded as "tools or instruments" within the meaning of Clause (x ). ( 20 ) AS books are covered specifically by Clause (xii), Clause (x) must stand excluded on the principle "special excludes the general". On yet another ground, the question is liable to be answered in favour of the assessee. The ground is that in construing taxing statutes, the construction which is more favourable to the assessee ought to be adopted. Even if, therefore, it is assumed that both the clauses, viz. , (x) and (xii), are attracted to the instant case, Clause (xii)being more favourable to the assessee ought to be preferred. ( 21 ) WE, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue as follows : "the Tribunal was justified in holding that the value of the books owned by the assessee was exempt from wealth-tax under Section 5 (1) (xii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in its entirety and not to the extent of Rs. 20,000 only within the meaning of Section 5 (1) (x) of the same Act. " ( 22 ) THE assessee will be entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200.