JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. - This is plaintiffs second appeal against the judgment and decree, dated April 23, 1978 passed by Civil Judge, Sultanpur in Civil Appeal No. 391 of 1977 (T. P. Pandey v. Union of India and another) affirming the judgment and decree, dated September 10, 1977 passed by the 1st Additional Munsif, Sultanpur in Regular Suit No. 96 of 1976 (T. P. Pandey v. Union of India). 2. Brief facts giving rise to the case are that the plaintiff appellant filed a suit for declaration that the order of suspension, dated July 29, 1975 and the order, dated September 30, 1975 withholding his next yearly increment were illegal and unenforceable. The plaintiff further sought relief for mandatory injunction to the effect that the order, dated September 30, 1975 for withholding ms next yearly increment be withdrawn and the plaintiff be given usual yearly increment including the period for which his next yearly increment has been withheld with a further direction for payment of full salary by the defendant to the plaintiff during the period of suspension. The plaintiff was R. S. A. in the Department of Post and Telegraphs Sultanpur since November 2, 1974 and was suspended on July 29, 1975 with a direction to stay at Sultanpur and with a further direction that he was not to leave Sultanpur without the permission of the S. D. 0 concerned. Thereafter the plaintiff received a letter, dated August 27, 1975 from the Office of the S. D. O. Telegraphs, Allahabad that there was a proposal to take disciplinary action against him under Rule 14 of the C. C. A. Rules for imputation of misconduct etc. The plaintiff was given ten days time to file representation against the proposal. The plaintiff's suspension order was revoked thereafter by letter, dated September 4, 1976 and the plaintiff' requested the authorities to supply him necessary documents so that he may be in a position to make representation but the defendant No. 2 failed to supply him he material demanded and as such he could not submit his representation. A communication was again received by the plaintiff from the authorities concerned chat he was given a further time of three days to file his representation failing which ex-parte decision would be taken against him. A communication was again received by the plaintiff from the authorities concerned chat he was given a further time of three days to file his representation failing which ex-parte decision would be taken against him. The plaintiff' admittedly did not submit any representation and that resulted in passing of the order directing stoppage of one next yearly increment on September 30, 1975 which was served on the plaintiff on October 1, 1975. 3. The defendants contested the case and on the pleadings of the parties the under-noted issues were framed : (1) Whether the defendants have not complied with Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution as alleged ? (2) Whether the order, dated July 29, 1975 suspending the plaintiff' was illegal ? If so its effect. (3) Whether the order, dated September 30, 1975 for withholding the next increment of the plaintiff was illegal, so its effect ? (4) Whether the plaintiff has exhausted the departmental remedies open to him ? (5) Whether the suit is properly valued ? (6) Whether the court fees paid is insufficient ? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. The courts below recorded the findings against the plaintiff', as a result, the suit having been dismissed with costs and the said judgment and decree of the trial court was affirmed by the lower appellate court. 5. The plaintiff has come up in the second appeal. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and perused the judgments of the two courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that he seriously assailed the finding on issue No. 3 which was to the effect as to whether the order, dated September 30, 1975 for withholding the next yearly increment of the plaintiff was illegal or not. His submission was that in any view of the matter since he had been suspended by letter, doled August 27. 1975 and the suspension order having teen revoked only on September 4, 1975. it was not justified for the defendants to proceed against the plaintiff under the provisions of Rule 14 of the C. C. A. Rules. His submission was that in any view of the matter since he had been suspended by letter, doled August 27. 1975 and the suspension order having teen revoked only on September 4, 1975. it was not justified for the defendants to proceed against the plaintiff under the provisions of Rule 14 of the C. C. A. Rules. The learned counsel contended that after placing the plaintiff under suspension it was incumbent upon the defendants to serve a charge-sheet and comply with all the relevant provisions contained in Rule 14 and without such compliance the order withholding the increment could not be passed. The learned counsel further contended that suspension was to be resorted only when a major penally was to be imposed and for his submissions he placed reliance on Rule 20 as also the other relevant provisions of the C. C. A. Rules. 6. The learned Standing Counsel for the defendants-respondents on the other hand contended that there was no bar in placing a Government servant under suspension on a preliminary inquiry to the effect as to whether a disciplinary proceeding was to be initiated in respect of major or minor punishment and for purposes of suspension on prima facie determination of the type of punishment to be imposed-major or minor-could be indicated before hand. He further submitted that in any view of the matter this being disciplinary proceeding which was initiated by order, dated August 27, 1975 and the proceedings ultimately concluded on September 30, 1975 before which the suspension has already been revoked with effect from September 4, 1975 no prejudice or injustice was caused to the plaintiff and there was no violation of provisions of C. C. A. Rules. 7. 7. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , where in their lordships have dealt with the scope and ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution and have in fact held that the Article applies with equal force to any statutory authority of the State involved in any work and in such event the administrative action of the state or his instrumentality was equally bound by a same norms, standards and procedures as laid down by the Court, and the disregard of norms or standards would invalidate its action unless based on some valid principles which was neither international nor unreasonable or discriminatory. As contended by the learned counsel for the appellants this decision applies to the fact of the instant case. The learned counsel for the defendants-respondents on the other hand has cited the case of the Delhi High Court reported in I. D. Gupta v. Delhi Administration and others, (1973) 2 SLR 1 in which the court has directly dealt with the scope and ambit of Rule 19 the C. C. A. Rules and held that minor punishment could be imposed although charge-sheet contemplated major punishment and went on further to hold that detailed inquiry was not necessary when minor punishment was imposed. The Standing Counsel submitted that admittedly stoppage of increment was a minor punishment which position was not disputed by the appellant's counsel and even in that view of the matter although detailed inquiry was not necessary the plaintiff was given full opportunity to make representation but he failed to avail of that opportunity. This being the position the Standing Counsel submitted that the orders of the authorities, dated July 29, 1975 suspending the plaintiff and the order, dated September 30, 1975 withholding the increments were neither illegal nor in violation of the C.C.A. Rules and no relief prayed for could be granted to the plaintiff in the suit. The contention is not without force and it is upheld. The decision of their lordship in Remane's case (supra) is not attracted in this case on its facts. 8. For the reasons indicated herein above the second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without order as to costs.