JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, Member - This is a second appeal under Section 331 of U.P. Act I of 1951 filed by Isham Singh against Gokul Singh and others challenging the judgment and decree dated 19-7-1982 passed by Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut through which the judgment and decree dated 15-9-1980 passed by S.D.O. Saharanpur were confirmed. 2. The facts of this case in brief are that appellant Isham Singh brought a suit under Sections 229-B/176/209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act that the disputed land is sir and khudkast of the plaintiff and his ancestors and that on the date of vesting the plaintiff and his father both were alive, hence both of them had half share therein. The plaintiff's father Narsingh had executed a sale deed on 27-2-1968 in favour of Sardar Sardool Singh and Smt. Harbansh Kaur both of whom again disposed of the land to the defendants 1, 2 and 3 by a registered sale deed on 4-8-1970. The plaintiff's father had no right to transfer whole of the land including the share of the plaintiff, hence the sale deed executed by him is not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed to be declared co-bhumidhar along with defendants 1 to 3 claiming partition of his half share therein. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants on several grounds including the plea that the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act because the plaintiffs had not raised any objection before the consolidation court. 4. The trial court decided the issue about the suit being barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act first and gave its finding against the plaintiffs holding the suit to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act and accordingly dismissed the suit. The appeal against the judgment was also dismissed. Hence this second appeal. 5. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties, perused the record. 6. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the disputed land was sir and khudkast and since the plaintiff and his father both were Hindus and were alive on the dale of vesting, hence both of them are co-sharers because under Hindu law a person on his very birth in the family becomes a co-sharer of the ancestral property. It was further argued that the name of the plaintiff's father alone was recorded in the papers but it was so in the representative capacity and it continued to be so recorded during the consolidation operation as well and that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to have moved the consolidation courts for getting his name also recorded because there was no dispute of title between the plaintiff and his father. It, was therefore, contended that even if the plaintiff did not raise any objection before the consolidation courts for the inclusion of his name as a co-tenant along with his father the suit would not be barred under Section 49 of the U.P.C.C. Act. Reliance was placed on 1980 R.D. page 300 (SC) Karbalai Begum v. S. Mohd. Sayed & another in this connection. 7. I have carefully gone through this ruling and I find that it is fully applicable in the present case. It is proved from the record that the land was sir and khudsast of the ancestors of the plaintiff and the latter was also alive on the date of vesting, hence on account of his birth in the family he had became a co-sharer of his father and his name should have also been recorded in the papers. However, naturally, the father of the plaintiff must have been the karta of the family, hence even if his sole name continued to be recorded in the papers that could not have adversely affected the title of the plaintiff and so for the same reason there was no necessity for him to have raised any objection before the consolidation courts for getting his name recorded and, therefore, the suit could not be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The trial court has placed reliance on some rulings but they have all lost significance on account of the Supreme Court judgment (Supra,) and, therefore, the suit cannot be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 8. The trial court has placed reliance on some rulings but they have all lost significance on account of the Supreme Court judgment (Supra,) and, therefore, the suit cannot be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that even though it is admitted that the suit would not be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act merely because the plaintiff did not file any objection for getting his name recorded as a co-tenure-holder along with his father but it would be barred by the provisions of that Section on the ground that no objection was filed when Sardul Singh and another applied for mutation on the basis of the sale deed executed in their favour by the father of the plaintiff. I do not find much force in this argument because the proceedings for amaldaramad would be governed by Section 12 of the U.P.C.H. Act which do not have the same applicability as Section 11 of the said Act. Consequently if the plaintiff did not file any objection during the amaldaramad proceedings his suit would not be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 9. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff himself is a witness to the sale deed executed by his father in favour of Sardui Singh & others, hence this conduct definitely makes the suit barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act. I do not think that this argument too is of any help to the respondent. In case the plaintiff had himself become a witness to the sale deed executed by his father, the principle of estoppel and acquiescence may once but it has to be examined by the trial, court itself. Consequently at this stage this court would be reluctant in giving finding on that issue since it has to be decided by the trial court first and there is no finding recorded by it so far about the same. 10. Consequently at this stage this court would be reluctant in giving finding on that issue since it has to be decided by the trial court first and there is no finding recorded by it so far about the same. 10. In view of the above discussion I find that the suit cannot be held to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act, and therefore, the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court to decide it cross the issue afresh according to law after hearing both the parties.