MONOJ KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) - Ten Development Officers of Life Insurance Corporation of India ('corporation' for short) for selves and in their representative capacity filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before a learned judge of this Court calling in question the legality and validity of the Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers' (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Order') framed by the Government of India in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 ('act' for short) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Sixth Amendment Regulations, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Regulations), made by the Corporation under Section 49 of the Act and praying, inter alia, for appropriate writ for quashing the same. On that application a Rule nisi was issued and an interim Order was passed staying operation of the impugned Order and Regulations. After hearing the parties at length the learned Judge ultimately discharged the Rule nisi and aggrieved thereby those Officers preferred the instant appeal. ( 2 ) MR. A. P. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, raised various contentions in support of the appeal for appreciation whereof it is necessary to notice the facts and circumstances that led to the passing of the impugned Order and Regulations. ( 3 ) TO ensure absolute security to the policy-holder in the matter of his Life Insurance protection, to spread insurance much more widely and in particular to the rural areas, and as a further step in the direction of more effective mobilisation of public savings the Government of India decided to nationalise the Life insurance business in India. To implement that decision, the Government first promulgated an Ordinance in January, 1956 whereby pending the passing of a Bill to nationalise, the management of the life insurance business, which was then being carried on by about 240 companies, was vested in the Central Government. Thereafter the Act was proclaimed and brought into force on July 1, 1956. Under Section 3 of the said Act the Central Government was empowered to establish the Corporation with effect from such date as might be notified in the Official Gazette. This Corporation was to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal. Thereafter the Act was proclaimed and brought into force on July 1, 1956. Under Section 3 of the said Act the Central Government was empowered to establish the Corporation with effect from such date as might be notified in the Official Gazette. This Corporation was to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal. The primary function of the Corporation was to carry on Life Insurance Business in and outside India. Section 7 of the Act provided for transfer of assets and liabilities of existing insurers carrying on controlled business to the Corporation and for vesting of the said business in the Corporation on the appointed date, which was to be the date of establishment of the Corporation. To deal with transfer of service of whole-time employees of an insurer, whose controlled business was to stand transferred provision was made in Section 11 of the Act. Since substantial controversy in this appeal centres round the interpretation of this Section, we extract below its entire provision. "11. Transfer of service of existing employees of insurers to the Corporation. (1) Every whole-time employee of an insurer whose controlled business has been transferred to and vested in the Corporation and who was employed by the insurer wholly or mainly in connection with his controlled business, immediately before the appointed day shall, on and from the appointed day, become an employee of the Corporation, and shall hold his office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension and gratuity and other matters as he would have held the same on the appointed day if this Act had not been passed, and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment in the Corporation is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duly altered by the Corporation: provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any such employee who has, by notice in writing given to the Central Government prior to the appointed day, intimated his intention of not becoming an employee of the Corporation. (2) Where the Central Government is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service applicable to employees of insurers whose controlled business has been transferred to, and vested in the Corporation, it is necessary so to do, or that, in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders, a reduction in the remuneration payable, or a revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable, to employees or any class of them is called for, the Central Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), or in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force, alter (whether by way of reduction or otherwise) the remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service to such extent and in such manner as it things fit, and if the alteration is not acceptable to any employee, the Corporation may terminate his employment by giving him compensation equivalent to three months' remuneration unless the contract of service with such employee provides for a shorter notice of termination. Explanation.-The compensation payable to an employee under this sub-section shall be in addition to, and shall not affect, any pension, gratuity, provident fund money or any other benefit to which the employee may be entitled under his contract of service. " (3) If any question arises as to whether any person was a whole-time employee of an insurer or as to whether any employee was employed wholly or mainly in connection with the controlled business of an insurer immediately before the appointed day, the question shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision shall be final. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or in any other law for the time being in force, the transfer of the services of any employee of an insurer to the Corporation shall not entitle any such employee to any compensation under that Act or other law, and no such claim shall be entertained by any Court, Tribunal or other authority. " ( 4 ) SECTION 23 of the Act empowers the Corporation to employ such number of persons, as it may think fit, to discharge its functions. " ( 4 ) SECTION 23 of the Act empowers the Corporation to employ such number of persons, as it may think fit, to discharge its functions. While Section 48 of the Act deals with the power of the Central Government to make rules relating to various matters including those mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof, Section 49 empowers the Corporation to make regulations, not inconsistent with the Act and the rules so made, with the previous approval of the Central Government and by notification in the Gazette of India. Clause (b) and (bb) of sub-section (2) thereof, as it stood originally, dealt with the "method of recruitment of employees and agents of the Corporation and the terms and conditions of service of such employee or agents" and "the terms and conditions of-service of persons who have become employees of the Corporation under sub-section (1) of Section 11. " ( 5 ) IN terms of Section 3 of the Act the Corporation came to be established on September 1, 1956 and with its formation the employees of the erstwhile insurers became employees of the Corporation, under Section 11 (1) of the Act, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, gratuity and other matters until and unless such employment in the Corporation was terminated or until the remuneration, terms and conditions of services were duly altered by the Corporation. The pre-existing service conditions of these transferred employees were, however, subject to alteration by the Central Government through issuance of an Order under sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act, on the requisite satisfaction, as envisaged therein. ( 6 ) IT is common case that in exercise of its powers under Section 11 (2) of the Act, the Government of India passed the Life Insurance Corporation Field Officers' (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1957 which popularly came to be known as the "blue Order". The designation of the employees referred to as "field Officers" in the "blue Order" has been subsequently changed to "development Officers", to which category the appellants belong. In that Order the duties of the Field Officers were detailed and their scales of pay prescribed. The designation of the employees referred to as "field Officers" in the "blue Order" has been subsequently changed to "development Officers", to which category the appellants belong. In that Order the duties of the Field Officers were detailed and their scales of pay prescribed. Amongst various duties assigned to a Field Officer one was to develop and increase the production of new life insurance business in the area allotted to him or in which he was allowed to work through the agents placed under his supervision by the Corporation. Under this Order the Field Officers were entitle to get, apart from basic salary, dearness and conveyance allowance. Besides they were entitled to annual increments. The increments, however, were not to be granted as a matter of routine, but only on an over-all appraisal of the work done during the twelve months preceding the date on which the increment fell due. In making such appraisal the concerned authorities were to take the following factors into considerations. (I)the volume of new business procured by or through the efforts of the Field Officer; "under this item will be taken into account not only the total sums assured but also the number of lives assured and the increase in the volume of new business procured by or through the efforts of the Field Officers"; (ii)the ratio of expenses to the first year's scheduled premium income; (iii) the efforts made in recurring training and motivating new agents and in activating existing agents; and (iv) the routine service rendered to policy-holders. In that Order there was also a provision that if the performance of the Field Officers was unsatisfactory or if he was negligent in his work or guilty of misconduct or was otherwise incapable of discharging his duties satisfactorily, his remuneration might be reduced or his services terminated after affording him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. ( 7 ) TO make similar provisions for employees recruited by it, the Corporation, in, exercise of its powers under Section 40 had earlier framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1956 which were substituted by similar Regulations framed in 1960. ( 7 ) TO make similar provisions for employees recruited by it, the Corporation, in, exercise of its powers under Section 40 had earlier framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1956 which were substituted by similar Regulations framed in 1960. As some of the appellants before us are transferred employees while others are direct recruits of the Corporation their service conditions, though identical, were initially governed by the "blue Order" and the "1960 Regulations" respectively, ( 8 ) THEREAFTER, by various agreements entered into by and between the Representative Organisations of the employees and the Corporation the service conditions of the Development Officers were modified in 1964, 1965 and 1971. Under the agreement of 1971 the Development Officers were required, to fetch a first year's premium of not less than Rs. 25,000 and insurance of at least 100 lives, with effect from 1-4-71; and with effect from 1-4-74 the amount and number of lives were to be increased to Rs. 30,000 and 125 respectively. This agreement further provided that a Joint Divisional Committee was to consider representations of any employee falling behind the above norms of performance and thereby was subject to penal consequences. The unanimous recommendation of such Committee was to be given effect to by the Divisional Manager; and in case of difference the Divisional Manager was to decide the course of action at his discretion. ( 9 ) IN the meantime - in August, 1969 to be precise - a Committee was set up by the Central Government under the chairmanship of Sri R. P. Morarka, M. P. to enquire into the cause of high level of expenditure of the Corporation and to recommend measures to control and bring down the expenses to a level consistent with the canons of sound management and the maximum interests of the policy-holders. This Committee found that annual increment unrelated to volume of business generated by the organisation of the Development Officers was counter-productive and suggested immediate steps to re-organise the wage structure. This Committee recommended that those Development Officers whose cost-ratio was above 15% should be given the option of having their emoluments reduced to conform to the limit of 15% or their services being terminated. This Committee recommended that those Development Officers whose cost-ratio was above 15% should be given the option of having their emoluments reduced to conform to the limit of 15% or their services being terminated. ( 10 ) KEEPING in view the recommendation of the above Committee, the Central Government issued an Order on April 8, 1976 under Section 11 (2) of the Act known as the Life Insurance Corporation Development Officers' (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service) Order 1976; and on April 22, 1976 the Corporation amended the Staff Regulations in relation to Development Officers recruited by it to fall in line with the above Order. Under the above Order and Regulations the Development Officers were required to ensure, within three years, that the cost-ratio did not exceed 20,% and they provided that if it did exceed 20% it would result in refixation of the pay of the Development Officers automatically. They also provided that grade-increments were to be allowed to only those whose cost ratio did not exceed 20%, that the Development Officers who failed to conform to the stipulated norms would have their remuneration, adjusted for three consecutive years, and that those Development Officers, whose cost-ratio was so high that on revision of their emoluments they could not be fixed even at the minimum of the basis scale, were liable to termination of service. The 1976 Orders and Regulations also introduced revised and improved scale of pay. The 1976 Order and Regulations were challenged by the Development Officers in some of the High Courts of the country, including ours but without success. Despite such judicial pronouncements, there was some discontent and resentment which resulted in the issuance of the 1987 Order and Regulations in line with the earlier Order and Regulations but with some alternations and modifications. ( 11 ) MR. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate, appearing for the appellants first contended that the power under Section 11 (2) of the Act could be exercised only in the process of transfer and integration of service of employees of erstwhile insurers and not after such uniformity and integration had been brought about. In other words, according to Mr. Chatterjee the Government of India could not issue Orders in exercise of powers under Section 11 (2), solely in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. In support of his contention Mr. In other words, according to Mr. Chatterjee the Government of India could not issue Orders in exercise of powers under Section 11 (2), solely in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee relied on the judgment in the case of L. I. C. of India v. D. J. Bahadur, reported in A. I. R. 1980 S. C. page 2181. ( 12 ) IN combating the above contention of Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Ghose appearing for the Corporation submitted that Section 11 (2) of the Act had two limbs; while the former dealt with transfer and integration of employees and standardisation of the terms and conditions of the service as a consequence thereof the latter empowered the Corporation to reduce in public interest and in the interest of the policy-holders, the remuneration of its employees or to revise other terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees of the Corporation. According to Mr. Ghosh the second limb was independent of the first and in support of his contention he also relied upon the judgment in the case of D. J. Bahadur (supra) and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Himangshu Kumar vs. L. I. C. of India, reported in 1079, Labour and Industrial Cases 1417. ( 13 ) IN the case of Himanyshu Kumar (supra) Mr. Chatterjee also appeared for the Development Officers and made identical submission in assailing the validity of the 1976 Order and Regulation. In negativing the contention of Mr. Chatterjee, the Division Bench observed as under:". . . . . . . . . . Thus S. 11 (2) has conferred powers upon the Central Government to alter whether by way of reduction or otherwise the remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service to such extent and in such manner as it thinks fit. The said power of the Central Government may be exercised for the following purposes :- (i) for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service applicable to employees whose services were transferred by operation of S. 11 (1); or (ii) in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. We uphold the submission of Mr. Das, learned Advocate for the appellant, that sub-sec. We uphold the submission of Mr. Das, learned Advocate for the appellant, that sub-sec. (2) of S. 11 provides for the circumstances under which the terms and conditions of service of those whose services were transferred to the Corporation could be altered, reduced or revised. In other words, sub-sec. (2) of S. 11 has given to the Central Government overriding powers to make orders revising the terms and conditions of service of the transferred employee for either of the aforesaid two objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Central Government under Section 11 (2) has been also given power to reduce the remuneration or revise other terms and conditions of these transferred employees in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. Such interests may undergo changes from time to time and with alteration of circumstances, the Central Government may be required to revise the terms and conditions of the employees of the Corporation. Therefore, there is no reason to limit the exercise of power under Section 11 ( (2) of the Act in the manner contended by Mr. Chatterjee. " ( 14 ) THE above observation of the Division Bench of our High Court with which we respectfully agree, is sufficient to reject the contention of Mr. Chatterjee particularly when, as the following discussion will show, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. J. Bahadur (supra) has not interpreted Section 11 (2) in a different way. ( 15 ) IN the case of D. J. Bahadur (supra) an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had been filed by Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation in the Allahabad High Court Challenging a notice, dated May 6, 1978 issued by the Corporation under Section 9a of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and a notification, dated May 26, 1978 issued under sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act. The application was allowed by the High Court and aggrieved thereby the Corporation preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court. Another similar application under Section 226 of the Constitution of India which was at that time pending before our High Court was transferred to the Supreme Court and both the matters were disposed of together. The application was allowed by the High Court and aggrieved thereby the Corporation preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court. Another similar application under Section 226 of the Constitution of India which was at that time pending before our High Court was transferred to the Supreme Court and both the matters were disposed of together. The contention of the petitioners in the Allahabad High Court was that their employers or the Union of India had no right to change, detriment to their interest, a condition of service regarding payment of bonus to them as they had earlier become entitled to it through a settlement arrived at under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court by a majority of 2 to 1 and the transferred petition was allowed directing issue of a Writ to the Corporation to give effect to the terms of the settlement of 1984 relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, industrial award or relevant legislation. In that judgment Krishna Iyer, J. one of the members of the Bench made the following observations, on which Mr. Chatterjee relied to bring home his contention:"the Corporation, to begin with, had to take over the staff of the private insurers lest they would be thrown out of employment, on nationalisation. These private companies had no homogeneous policy regarding conditions of service for their personnel, but when these heterogeneous crowds (came) under the same management (the Corporation) divergent emoluments and other terms of service could not service and broad uniformity became a necessity. Thus the statutory transfer of service from former employers and standardisation of scales of remuneration and other conditions of employment had to be and were taken care of by S. 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (for short, the LIC Act ). The obvious purpose of this provision was to enable the Corporation initially to absorb the motley multitudes from many companies who carried with them varying incidents of service so as to fit them into a fair pattern, regardless of their antecedent contracts of employment or industrial settlements or awards. It was elementary that the Corporation could not perpetuate incongruous features of service of parent insurers, and statutory power had to be vested to vary, modify or supersede these contracts, geared to fair, equitable and, as far as possible, uniform treatment of the transferred staff. It was elementary that the Corporation could not perpetuate incongruous features of service of parent insurers, and statutory power had to be vested to vary, modify or supersede these contracts, geared to fair, equitable and, as far as possible, uniform treatment of the transferred staff. Unless there be unmistakable expression of such intention, the ID Act will continue to apply to the Corporation employees. The office of S. 11 of the LIC Act was to provide for a smooth takeover and to promote some common conditions of service in a situation where a jungle of divergent contracts of employment and industrial awards or settlements confronted the State. Unless such rationalisation and standardization were evolved the ensuing chaos would itself have spelt confusion, conflicts and difficulties. This functional focus of S. 11 of the LIC Act will dispel scope for interpretative exercises unrelated to the natural setting in which the problem occurs. " ( 16 ) ON a careful perusal of the entire judgment we are unable to hold that the above observations support Mr. Chatterjee. The observations were made by the learned Judge in the context of - to put it in his own words - "the competing claims for dominance as between the I. D. Act and the L. I. C. Act in areas of conflict". This would be further evident from the fact that the learned Judge did not separately consider or analyse the provision of subsection (2) of Section 11, Pathak, J. (as His Lordship then was) however, specifically considered the provision of the said subsection and observed as under in paragraph 66 of the judgment:"while the first limb of the sub-section provides for securing uniformity among the transferred employees in regard to their scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service, the second limb provides that if after such uniformity has been secured (emphasis supplied) or even in the process of securing such uniformity, the Central Government finds that the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders require a reduction in the remuneration payable or revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable to those employees, it may make an order accordingly. It is true that the words "employees or any class of them" in the second limb are not prefaced by the qualifying word "transferred" or "such". It is true that the words "employees or any class of them" in the second limb are not prefaced by the qualifying word "transferred" or "such". But that was hardly necessary when regard is had to the mosaic of sections in which the provision is located. Admittedly, the first limb of sub-section (2) relates to transferred employees only, and it must be held that so does the second limb. Both provisions are intended to constitute a composite process for rationalising the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of transferred employees with a view not only to effecting a standardisation between the transferred employees but also to revising their scales of remuneration, and terms and conditions of service to a pattern which will enable the newly established Corporation to become a viable and commercially successful enterprise. The standpoint of the second limb of the sub-section as its language plaintly indicates, is provided by the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders, (emphasis supplied ). " ( 17 ) HAVING read the provisions of Section 11 (2) in the light of the above two judgments we are of the view that while the power under the first limb of sub-section (2) of Section 11 is exercisable for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of transferred employees, the power under the second limb of subsection (2) may be exercised solely in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders. Then again, that power may be exercised not merely in the process of securing uniformity of scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service but also from time to time as and when the occasion demands. When the second limb clearly envisages the exercise of that power-in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders and employ's a different expression than the one employed in the first limb, it is patently clear that the Parliament wanted that the power under the two limbs should be exercised for different purposes. If the intention of the legislature had been that the emoluments and the condition of service of the employees can be altered to their detriment only in the process of bringing about uniformity then the conjunctive "and" would have been used in between the two limbs and not the disjunctive 'or'. ( 18 ) MR. If the intention of the legislature had been that the emoluments and the condition of service of the employees can be altered to their detriment only in the process of bringing about uniformity then the conjunctive "and" would have been used in between the two limbs and not the disjunctive 'or'. ( 18 ) MR. Chatterjee next contended that before the impugned Order and Regulations were issued by Government of India and the Corporation respectively the Development Officers were legally entitled to an opportunity of being heard particularly when they were to prejudicially affect their terms and conditions of service. According to Mr. Chatterjee, for violation of the principles of natural justice the 1978 Order and Regulations mulct be declared invalid. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam vs. Bharat Kala Bhandar Limited, reported in AIR 1967 S. C. 1766. Mr. Ghosh on the other hand submitted that the 1978 Order and Regulations did not prejudicially affect the interest of the Development Officers and as such they were not entitled to any hearing. He further submitted that even if it was assumed that their interest was so affected the principles of natural justice were not required to be followed as the authorities concerned were exercising their statutory rights and the Statute did not provide for any prior hearing. In support of his contention he relied upon the case of Himangshu Kumar (supra ). ( 19 ) IN the case of Himangshu Kumar (supra) Mr. Chatterjee also made a similar submission, relying upon the case of Bharat Kala Bhandar (supra), to assail the 1976 Order and Regulations. In negativing his contention this Court made the following observations, with which we fully concur :"mr. Chakraborty correctly submitted that both the impugned Order and the Regulations were made in exercise of powers conferred by the Statute, viz. , Life Insurance Corporation Act. The relevant sections do not provide for any hearing before making of Orders and Regulations. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. , Life Insurance Corporation Act. The relevant sections do not provide for any hearing before making of Orders and Regulations. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. Further, if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature or statutory authority and read into the concerned provisions the principles of natural justice. In State of Assam vs. Bharat Kala Bhandar (supra) a notification under Rule 126-AA (4) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 was made upon (sic) without consulting the interests concerned. Although individual notices were not required and oral evidence net not have been recorded, the Supreme Court held that some kind of collection of data with the help of interests concerned, some kind of hearing or consulting with them were the barest minimum necessity. The Supreme Court in A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 150 (para 20), had relied upon the judgment in State of Assam vs. Bharat Kala Bhandar (supra) but had recognized that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice would apply to a given case must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In each particular case, the court had to decide whether observance of the said rule was renecessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. In the present case, Morarka Committee after giving opportunity to the in rested parties made detailed recommendations about the expenses and efficiency in the working of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The Government of India had opportunity to consider the same and then made the impugned Order under Section 11 (2) of "the Act. In the above view, we hold that the Government did not violate the principles of natural justice by making the aforesaid order. The same observations apply in respect of the Staff Regulations, 1976 invade by the Life Insurance Corporation. " ( 20 ) THE next submission of Mr. In the above view, we hold that the Government did not violate the principles of natural justice by making the aforesaid order. The same observations apply in respect of the Staff Regulations, 1976 invade by the Life Insurance Corporation. " ( 20 ) THE next submission of Mr. Chatterjee was that the Development Officers were singled out for discriminatory treatment in as much only their emoluments - and not of other employees - have been linked to the cost ratio and the volume of business secured by them. The materials placed before us clearly indicate that since the formation of the Corporation the Development Officers are being treated as a well defined and separate class by reason of the nature of duties performed by them, the conditions of their service and the benefits which they are enjoying. Unlike other categories of employees the Development Officers are working in the field without any fixed hours of work to motivate the agents in the areas allotted to them for securing new business and the entire working of the Corporation would depend upon the volume of new business secured by the agents working under the instruction supervision and general direction of the Development Officers. In that context the only method of measuring their work is to assess the volume of business procured by them through ascertainable standards. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Corporation has acted in a discriminatory manner by linking the remuneration of the Development Officers to the coat ratio and the volume of business they secure for the Corporation. ( 21 ) THE fourth submission of Mr. Chatterjee was that the impugned Order and the Regulations altered the pre-existing conditions of service of the Development Officers to their detriment and as the Development Officers were "workmen" under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 such alteration could not be made without complying with Section 9a thereof. Mr. Chatterjee contended that any. prejudicial alteration in service conditions specified in the Fourth schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act; without complying with Section 9a thereof was void ab initio and could not be validated by the. impugned Order and Regulations. To bring home his contention that, the 1978 Order and Regulations prejudicially altered the service conditions of the appellants Mr. Chatterjee contended that any. prejudicial alteration in service conditions specified in the Fourth schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act; without complying with Section 9a thereof was void ab initio and could not be validated by the. impugned Order and Regulations. To bring home his contention that, the 1978 Order and Regulations prejudicially altered the service conditions of the appellants Mr. Chatterjee drew our attention to the terms of the 1964, 1965 and 1971 agreements which supplemented the Blue Order of 1957, the Staff Regulations of 1960 and the various provisions of the impugned Order and Regulations; and in support of his contention that the Development Officers were "workmen" Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra, reported in A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1462. Mr. Ghosh did not and could not contest the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the Development Officers were "workmen" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act as held by the Supreme Court, in the case of S. K. Verma (supra), but he contended that Section 9a of the Industrial Disputes Act had no manner of application to the facts of the instant case in as much as the impugned Order and Regulations did not prejudicially affect the existing conditions of service of the appellants. On the contrary, according to Mr. Ghosh, the 1978 Order and Regulations have improved the service conditions of the appellants. He next contended that even if it was assumed that the 1978 Order and Regulations prejudicially affected their service conditions, Act I of 1981, whereby the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 was amended legalised such change. ( 22 ) EVEN if we proceed on the basis that Section 9a of the Industrial Disputes Act is attracted to the facts of the instant case and that non-compliance thereof makes the 1978 Order and Regulations invalid, still then the contention of Mr. Chatterjee cannot be accepted in view of the provisions of th6 Act I of 1981, which amended the Act. The amending Act of 1981 has empowered the Central Government to frame Rules regarding terms and conditions of all classes of employees and agents of the Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Chatterjee cannot be accepted in view of the provisions of th6 Act I of 1981, which amended the Act. The amending Act of 1981 has empowered the Central Government to frame Rules regarding terms and conditions of all classes of employees and agents of the Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The purpose of that amendment was to delete Clause (bb) of Section 49 of the Act which enabled the Corporation to frame regulations relating to service conditions of the transferred employees and to confer that power as part of the Rule-making power of the Central Government under Section 48 (2) by inserting Clause (cc) after Clause (c) thereof. The amending Act has further provided that Regulations framed under Section 49 (2) (bb) and other provisions shall be deemed to be Rules made under Section 48 (2) (cc) and the Rules are to take effect retrospectively from July 20, 1979. The relevant amendments are extracted below:"2. Amendment of S. 48.- In the Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956 (31 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in Section 48. (a) in sub-sec. (2), after Clause (c), the following Clause shall be inserted and, shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the 20th day of June, 1979, namely: - (cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the Corporation including those who become employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act,"; (b) after sub-sec. (2) the following sub-sections shall be inserted, namely: -" (2a) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under Cl. (cc) of sub-sec. (2) and shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, have effected accordingly. (2b) The power to make rules conferred by Cl. (cc) of sub-sec. (2) shall include - (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules, and (ii) the power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-sec. (2b) The power to make rules conferred by Cl. (cc) of sub-sec. (2) shall include - (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules, and (ii) the power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal, the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-sec. (2a) with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2c) The provisions of Cl. (cc) of sub-sec. (2) and sub-sec. (28) and any rules made under the said Cl. (cc) shall have effect and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. "3. Amendment of S. 40 - In S. 49 of the Principal Act - (a) in sub-section (2) (i) in Clause (b), the words "and the terms and conditions of service of employees or agents" shall be omitted. (ii) Clause (bb) shall be omitted; and (b) after sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely -" (3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or mare successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid or both Houses agree in, making any modification in the regulation or both Houses agree that the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation. " ( 23 ) THE validity of the above amending Act of 1981 was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of A. V. Nachane vs. Union of India, reported in A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 1126. " ( 23 ) THE validity of the above amending Act of 1981 was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of A. V. Nachane vs. Union of India, reported in A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 1126. In negativing the challenge the Supreme Court held that the Section 48 (2c) read with Section 48 (2) (cc) authorised the Central Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act notwithstanding the Industrial Disputes Act or any other law and that meant that in respect of the matters covered by the rules the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or any other law would not be operative. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of Act I of 1981 and that too with retrospective effect from 20-6-1979, the 1978 Order and Regulations must be held to be legal and valid notwithstanding the assumed contravention of Section 94 of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 24 ) ANOTHER contention of Mr. Chatterjee was that when the circumstances envisaged by Section 11 (2), which were conditions precedent for issuing an Order thereunder, namely, "that the Central Government is satisfied that in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders the reduction in the remuneration payable or revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable to the employees is called for" were not existing, the impugned Order must be declared invalid. To bring home his above contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Barium Chemicals Ltd. , vs. Company Law Board (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 295), Raja Anand vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1081), Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. S. D. Agarwal (A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 707) and M. A. Rashid vs. State of Kerala (A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 2249 ). The above cases are authorities for the proposition that when powers are conferred on public authorities to take administrative decisions when "they are satisfied" or when "it appears to them" or when "in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists, the Courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an Executive Authority's opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated; and the Courts will and out whether conditions precedent to the formation of the opinion have a factual basis. ( 25 ) THE above principle, which relates to executive actions and decisions will have no application here as, the power exerciseable under Section 11 (2) for fixing the terms and conditions of service by way of an Order constitutes subordinate legislative power. In other words, the 1978 Order is a legislative Order and not an executive Order. The power-to make the Order is the power to regulate the terms and conditions of service of the employees or a class of employees of the Corporation and is similar to the one vested in the President under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Both these powers are legislative with the only difference about their source in that, while the President derives the powers from the Constitution, the Central Government derives it from Section 11 (2 ). In the case of Life Insurance Corporation vs. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee reported in A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 847 the Supreme Court made the following observation with reference to Section 11 (2) of the Act:"it is plain that the provisions contained in Section 11 (2) of the Act are paramount and would override any contrary provisions contained in the order or the regulations. Subject to the provisions of Section 11 (2), the provisions of the order will prevail, because the order has been issued by the Central Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Section 11 (2) itself. The provisions of the order in law partake of the character of the rules framed under Section 48 of the Act. Subject to the provisions of Section 11 (2), the provisions of the order will prevail, because the order has been issued by the Central Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Section 11 (2) itself. The provisions of the order in law partake of the character of the rules framed under Section 48 of the Act. " ( 26 ) THE impugned Order being a piece of delegated legislation, its validity can be adjudged by the following three tests only - as held in the case of Maharastra S. B. O. S. and H. S. Education vs. Paritosh reported in A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1543 : (I)whether its provisions fall within the scope and ambit of the power conferred by the Statute on the delegate; (ii)whether its provisions are to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of the parent enactment, and (iii) Whether they infringe any of the fundamental rights or other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution. ( 27 ) JUDGED in the light of the above principles, the 1978 Order must be said to be a valid piece of subordinate legislation and it cannot be subjected to any further judicial scrutiny on the question whether the circumstances warranting the exercise of the power under Section 11 (2) existed or not as canvassed by Mr. Chatterjee. Before we part with our discussion on this aspect of the matter, we may point out that the question whether the Central Government was exercising its administrative power or legislative power in, making the 1978 Order has now become purely academic, for it shall be deemed to be Rules according to the Amending Act 1 of 1981 and there can not be any dispute that in framing Rules the framers exercise legislative power. ( 28 ) MR. Chatterjee assailed the impugned Order and Regulations also on the ground that they were hit by principles of promissory estoppel. We do not, However, find any material from which it can be said even remotely, that any promise was made either by the Government or the Corporation and that by such promise the appellants altered their positions. That apart there cannot be estoppel against law. ( 29 ) MR. We do not, However, find any material from which it can be said even remotely, that any promise was made either by the Government or the Corporation and that by such promise the appellants altered their positions. That apart there cannot be estoppel against law. ( 29 ) MR. Chatterjee assailed the 1978 Regulations also on the ground that they were issued by the Corporation, on the same day the 1978 Order was issued, pursuant to the command and in obedience to the dictates of the Central Government and not on the former's independent application of mind to the need for changing the conditions of service as suggested. According to Mr. Chatterjee the power to make regulations under Section 49 is of the Corporation and consequently it has to form its own opinion regarding the necessity or desirability of exercising such power uninfluenced by any other agency, however, high or mighty it might be. Any departure therefrom would make the action bad, argued Mr. Chatterjee. To reinforce his submission Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhandas, reported in A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 16, State of Punjab vs. Hari Kishan, reported in A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1081 and Purtabpur Company vs. Cane Commissioner, reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1896. ( 30 ) UNDER Section 49 of the Act the regulations framed by Corporation have to be consistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder and they should be framed only for purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Then again, the regulations, so framed, can be brought into force with the previous approval of the Central Government. Apparently, therefore, the antecedent directive of the Central Government to frame regulations in conformity with the 1978 Order was not a proper and discreet exercise of power. Inspite of our above observation we are unable to hold that the 1978 Regulations are illegal or invalid as Section 21 of the Act expressly provides that in the discharge of its functions under the Act, the Corporation shall be guided by such directions in matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may give to it in writing. The Central Government, therefore, was within its competence to direct the Corporation to make the regulations which undoubtedly related to matters of policy involving public interest, The cases referred to by Mr. Chatterjee are clearly distinguishable. The proposition of law that has been laid down in those cases is that in administrative and quasi-judicial actions the persons who are statutorily empowered to take such actions must exercise their personal judgment unless explicit statutory provision has been made for them to be given binding instructions by a superior. In our case, apart from the fact that the action is a legislative one, Section 21 of the Act expressly entitles the Central Government to give binding directions. ( 31 ) AS no other point was raised by Mr. Chatterjee in support of the appeal, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. ( 32 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. S. S. Ganguly, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed .