Adarsh Kumar Jain v. Rent Control And Eviction Officer, Kashipur, District Nainital
1988-09-12
R.K.GULATI
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R. K. Gulati, J. 1. The petitioner Adarsh Kumar Jain being aggrieved by an order dated 26-2-88 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kashipur, District Nainital (hereinafter referred to as the Prescribed Authority) has filed this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari and asking for quashing of the said order. By the impugned order the Prescribed Authority has declared a deemed vacancy under section 12 (3) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short 'the Act') in respect of premises no. 299, Mohalla Maheshpura, Kashipur which is under the tenancy of the petitioner. 2. It appears that respondent no. 2 the landlord of the aforesaid premises applied to the Prescribed Authority under section 12 (3) of the Act for declaring a vacancy in respect of the disputed accommodation on the ground that the petitioner had constructed his own house. The Prescribed Authority called for a report through his Inspector who by his report dated 2-7-87 endorsed the assertion of the landlord and reported that the petitioner had built his own house in Mohalla Katora Tal and as such the accommodation in dispute could be declared vacant under the aforesaid provisions. On receipt of the Inspector's report, the prescribed authority invited objections from the petitioner who contested the application of the landlord. The petitioner admitted having constructed a new building but his case was that the building constructed by him was outside the municipal limits of Kashipur Municipal Board and, therefore, section 12 (3) had no application. In support of his objection amongst other things, he filed his own affidavit and a certificate from Kashipur Municipal Board showing the Khasra no. 354 M, situated in village Kachnala Gazi, Tahsil Kashipur, district Nainital is outside Municipal limit of Kashipur Municipal Board. The petitioner also by an application requested the Prescribed Authority for summoning one Sri R. P. Singh Yadav, Junior Engineer, Municipal Board, Kashipur for recording his oral evidence in order to prove that the land over which petitioner had built his house was not within the limits of Kashipur. The request of the petitioner was allowed by the Prescribed Authority who fixed 22-2-88 for oral evidence of Sri R. P. Singh Yadav. On that date the said official did not appear before the prescribed authority when a warrant was issued requiring him to appear for evidence on 18-2-88.
The request of the petitioner was allowed by the Prescribed Authority who fixed 22-2-88 for oral evidence of Sri R. P. Singh Yadav. On that date the said official did not appear before the prescribed authority when a warrant was issued requiring him to appear for evidence on 18-2-88. As the prescribed authority was on leave on 18-2-88 the case was adjourned to 26-2-88, On the adjourned date no oral evidence was recorded. Instead the prescribed authority passed the impugned order declaring a deemed vacancy in respect of the disputed premises. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. For the petitioner a number of grounds were raised but it is not necessary to refer them all as the petition is liable to succeed on a short ground namely the impugned order is a non speaking order which does not disclose any reason or application of mind of the Prescribed Authority in declaring the deemed vacancy. The order under challenge is a brief one and is quoted below : "26-2-88. Patrawali pesh awaj lagvane par Farikan hajir hai. Dono paksho ki bahas suni gai vivadit bhawan ke sambandh me rikt ghoshana ki gayee. Rikt ghoshana jari ho patrawali vaste Nistaran release prarthana patra dinank 8-3-88 ko pesh ho. (Sd/- Avinash Gaur) (Parganadhikari/Ki. Ni. avam Ni. Adhikari Kashipur. " Section 12 (3) of the Act in so far it is relevant for the purpose of this case is extracted below : "(3) In the case of a residential building if the tenant or any member of his family builts, or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy fs situated, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy." It is evident from the above that powers of the prescribed authority to declare a deemed vacancy in respect of tenanted accommodation or premises are not uncontrolled and unrestricted. The limitations of those powers are implicit in the provisions contained in section 12 (3) itself. Under the above provision vacancy is deemed to be caused by a tenant on the happening of a contingency which has two fold requirements.
The limitations of those powers are implicit in the provisions contained in section 12 (3) itself. Under the above provision vacancy is deemed to be caused by a tenant on the happening of a contingency which has two fold requirements. In order that a vacancy could be declared the Prescribed Authority must come to a conclusion that a tenant or any member of his family has built or acquired in vacant state or has got vacated a residential I building. Secondly the Prescribed Authority must further find, particularly where a I dispute has been raised by a tenant or on his behalf, that the newly constructed | building or the other building acquired by modes specified under section 12 (3) I or otherwise is located in the same city, Municipality* Notified Area or town ana in which the building under tenancy is situated. If any one of the two requirements aforesaid, in a given case are found wanting an order declaring a deemed vacancy cannot be validly made. Mere constructing of a residential building or acquiring another residential building by a tenant in another City or outside the municipal limit etc. is not sufficient to hold that tenant of the disputed accommodation under his tenancy has ceased to occupy it and that accommodation is deemed to be vacant for fresh allotment. The Legislative intent of section 12 (3) appears to be that where a person residing in a tenanted building has constructed or has otherwise acquired another residential building in the same city or Municipality etc. he must make available the tenanted building for the allotment to other needy persons. 4. As seen earlier the objection in the instant case was that the petitioner had not built or acquired any residential accommodation within the municipal limits of Kashipur where the disputed accommodation is located. In the written objections filed by the petitioner paras 5 and 9 are pertinent in which he stated as under :- "Para 5. That the tenant or any of his family members have not built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state or got vacated any residential building in Kashipur city or within Municipal limits of Kashipur Municipality. " "Para 9.
That the tenant or any of his family members have not built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state or got vacated any residential building in Kashipur city or within Municipal limits of Kashipur Municipality. " "Para 9. That the tenant objector has certainly got constructed a new building in village Kachnalgazi, Tahsil Kashipur, District Nainital, beyond the Municipal limits of Kashipur Municipal Board which does not come within the purview of the Act XIII of 1972. " From the impugned order which has already been re-produced in its entirety, would show that there is no discussion whatsoever about the petitioner's case nor does that order show that there was any application of mind by the Prescribed Authority on the issue raised before him. The impugned order does not give any reason worth the name in support of the view taken therein. Sub-clause (7) of Section 34 of the Act casts an obligation on the authorities constituted under the Act, including the Prescribed Authority to record reason for every order made under the Act. That provision reads as under :- "Section 34 (7) :- The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or Revisional Authorities shall record reasons for every order made under this Act. " In view of the above provision an order under section 12 (3) must contain reasons in support of the decision taken by the Prescribed Authority. Reasons necessarily means intangible reason which even if not very elaborate, exhaustive or lucid, must show application of mind and consideration of the case set up by the contesting parties. The proceedings relating to declaration of vacancy under section 12 of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature. The question about determination of vacancy of a quasi judicial authority must conform to the provisions of the Act and Rules relating thereto. In Siemens Engineering and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 , the Supreme Court observed as under :- "It is now settled law that when an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial functions, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi judicial order must he supported by reasons.........
Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 , the Supreme Court observed as under :- "It is now settled law that when an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial functions, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi judicial order must he supported by reasons......... The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. " 5. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M. L. Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 at page 97 the reasons recorded must not be an apology for reasons, which art required to be recorded by the quasi judicial authority. It was further pointed out that the reasons are the links between the material on which certain conclusions are based on the actual conclusions. They disclosed how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusion reached only in this way can an opinion or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. 6. In Woolcombes of India Ltd. v. Woolcom Workers Union, AIR 1973 SC 2756, 2761, Dwivedi J. speaking for the Supreme Court, has observed: " .........Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. Third, it should be remembered that an appeal generally lies from the decision of the judicial and quasi judicial to this Court by special leave granted under Article 136. A judgment which does not disclose the reasons will be of little assistance and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong. In many cases this investment of time and of industry will be saved if reasons are given in support of the conclusions.
A judgment which does not disclose the reasons will be of little assistance and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong. In many cases this investment of time and of industry will be saved if reasons are given in support of the conclusions. " As pointed out earlier the order does not disclose that there was any application of mind by the Prescribed Authority when it declared the vacancy in respect of the disputed accommodation and consequently it failed to discharge its obligation of recording reasons in support of its order as it was required to do so under sub-section (7) of Section 34 of the Act. The vacancy in respect of the disputed accommodation could only be declared after a finding had been recorded that the house built by the petitioner was within the municipal limits of Kashipur. Inspite of a specific objection and a case being set up by the petitioner in that respect the Prescribed Authority has not gone into that question. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord contended that in any case the house was within 3 Kms. of the municipal area and landlord had filed a certificate to that effect from the concerned municipal authorities. A copy of the certificate has been annexed as Annexure III with the counter affidavit. A sketch map has also been filed with the counter affidavit to show that the house was within 3 Kms. of the local limits of Kashipur Municipal Board. This contention was raised in view of a Notification No. 3752/29-55-73 issued by the State Government under the first proviso to clause (d) of sub section (3) of Section 1. The question whether the aforesaid notification has any application to the facts of the present case. It is not necessary for me to decide at this stage of proceedings. Assuming without deciding that the aforesaid notification will apply to the facts of the case in hand it would still be necessary for the Prescribed Authority to record its finding of fact whether the disputed building is within 3 Kms. of the municipality of Kashipur. 8. It is thus, evident that question raised by the contesting parties are pure questions of fact which required investigation and consideration of the Prescribed Authority on the basis of the evidence adduced in that regard.
of the municipality of Kashipur. 8. It is thus, evident that question raised by the contesting parties are pure questions of fact which required investigation and consideration of the Prescribed Authority on the basis of the evidence adduced in that regard. Those questions cannot be decided in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. If on evidence it is found that the building constructed by the - petitioner was not within the municipal limits of Kashipur, the Prescribed Authority would not be justified in declaring a deemed vacancy in respect of the disputed premises. This, of course, is subject to alternate contention of the respondent landlord relating to notification of the State Government of which a mention has been made earlier. As the Prescribed Authority has failed to record its appropriate finding on a vital question which was necessary for the application of Section 12 (3) of the Act, it is not possible to sustain the impugned order, For the reasons indicated above the impugned order dated 26-2-88 which is contained in Annexure X to the writ petition declaring the vacancy under section 12 (3) in respect of disputed premises is quashed. The case is sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kashipur, District Nainital for fresh consideration with a direction to decide the application of the landlord seeking declaration of a deemed vacancy in respect of disputed premises in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. He would permit the parties to adduce such evidence as they may like to produce before him. In deciding the application afresh be will also permit the parties to raise such other questions which the parties may like to canvass before him. The questions so raised shall be dealt with in accordance with law by passing a speaking order. 9. For what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.