JUDGMENT 1. - On 30th of November, 1983, at about 7-30 P.M. Tanker No. R.J.Q. 3905, driven by respondent No. 1, dashed with the Motor cycle and crushed Chandra Sen Singh. Pritam Das, who was also in the motor cycle was thrown 15 ft. away from the main road in its left side near Jawai Canal. Chandra Sen Singh, who was also thrown by this impact of the accident became unconscious and then was brought in Car by Jai Singh, AW 2, who was coming from Sumerpur side, to the hospital in Pali but Chandra Sen Singh succumbed to the injuries and could not be saved, in the night The Tribunal, in this respect, found that the truck No. R.J.Q. 3905 was being driven rashly and negligently and the accident happened in which the late Chandra Sen Singh died, due to the injuries caused in the accident, 2. The claimants are, widow and sons and daughters of Chandra Sen Singh. The Tribunal has allowed compensation by applying the multiplier of 9 years and treating the dependency benefits at Rs. 350/- per month from the deceased who was 46 years of age at the time of death. 3. The Tribunal has allowed the amount of compensation at Rs. 38,000/- by applying the multiplier of 9 years and the benefit of Rs. 350/- per month. 4. Mr. Gupta appearing for the claimants has pointed out that the deceased was of 46 years only and in such cases, the normal age upto which the deceased would have worked and earned, should be treated on the basis of the earlier procedence as 65 to 70 years. He also submits that in view of the fact that the deceased had a family in which there are, in addition to the widow and 5 children, who are almost minor or just attained majority, the finding of the Tribunal that deceased was given benefit only of Rs. 350/- is grossly erroneous. Mr. Gupta, in this respect, has placed reliance upon R.S.R T.C. v. Kistoori Devi and Ors. 1986 ACJ 960 and Sukhpal Singh v. Darshana Rani and Ors. 1986 ACJ 776 in which, in such circumstances, the multiplier applied is based on the expectation of the life and earning and compensation was given normally upto 65 to 70 or so. Mr. Gupta, in this respect, has placed reliance upon R.S.R T.C. v. Kistoori Devi and Ors. 1986 ACJ 960 and Sukhpal Singh v. Darshana Rani and Ors. 1986 ACJ 776 in which, in such circumstances, the multiplier applied is based on the expectation of the life and earning and compensation was given normally upto 65 to 70 or so. According to him, in such cases the multiplier of atleast 16 should be applied and further the benefit to the dependents which they were expecting to get and which they were getting should be atleast Rs. 500/-. 5. Mr. Gupta further submitted that the policy of the Insurance was comprehensive and, therefore, the liability of the Insurance Company should be complete and comprehensive and co-extensive with that of the insurer. In this respect he placed reliance upon the various judgments of this Court which have been discussed in Virendra Kumar and Ors. v. Smt. Veena and Ors. S.B.C. Misc. Appeal No 30/83, decided on January 7, 1988 , namely, Chand Kanwar v. Manna Ram and Ors. 1986 ACJ 269 and Supyar Kanwar and Ors. v. Ramesh Chand and Ors. 1987 (1) RLR 373 . 6. He further pointed out that the consortium has not been awarded in this case at all, whereas according to the judgment of this Court in Sohanlal and Anr. v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar and Ors. 1987 ACJ 113 it should have been allowed. Reliance is placed on the judgment in R.S.R T.C. v. Kistoori Devi and Ors. 1986 ACJ 960 in which the full bench of This Court had held that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are over-riding over the Fatal Accidents Act and the amount of compensation for consortium should be allowed. 7. Mr. Gupta further pointed out that the policy of the insurance is comprehensive one and, therefore, the Tribunal should have allowed full compensation from Insurance Company also. 8. According to Mr. Gupta, the amount which should be allowed is as follows:- 16 x 400 x 12= 76,800+15,000= 91,800 Mr. Bhansali has vehemently opposed the appeal on behalf of the Insurance Company but only on the conditions which are permissible to the Insurance Company under the law. According to him the policy has a limited liability and not a comprehensive one. He pointed out that the Caption in the policy Ex. Bhansali has vehemently opposed the appeal on behalf of the Insurance Company but only on the conditions which are permissible to the Insurance Company under the law. According to him the policy has a limited liability and not a comprehensive one. He pointed out that the Caption in the policy Ex. NA 3/1 shows that it is a Commercial Vehicle (comprehensive) (third party) policy and on the right side of the policy also it it printed (Commercial Vehicle) comprehensive. Mr. Bhansali's explanation is that in those days there used to be only one form and, therefore, merely writing of comprehensive is not meant for getting the entire liability. Mr. Bhansali further pointed out that if this comprehensive policy is argued, then he may be allowed further time to show that it was never comprehensive. 9. No one has appeared on behalf of M/s Bhoot Brothers, truck owner, nor any one has appeared on behalf of Nainuram, driver. 10. I have given a very serious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. The basic fact so far as the accident, the negligence and rashness, as held by the Tribunal are not in dispute before this Court and, therefore, would not repeat the entire facts again. 11. The controversy which has no emerged has been spelled out above. In my opinion, Mr. Gupta is justified in his contention that claim should be allowed at least by applying the multiplier of 16 years and the expected benefit, in the facts and circumstances of the family of deceased, where deceased was supporting five children in addition to the widow and who are all mostly of tender age, the youngest being of 11 and the eldest being of 21, should be Rs. 400/- out of Rs. 623/- at least. I am further convinced that the Tribunal should have allowed the amount of compensation for loss of love and affection and consortium after the authoritative pronouncements of the Full Bench of this Court in R.S.R.T.C v. Kistoori Devi (supra), and which should be minimum 15,000/-. Thus, I increase the amount of compensation from Rs. 38,000/- to Rs. 91,800/-. 12. The next question is regarding the liability of the Insurance Company. Mr. Bhansali has also invited my attention to the clause inside the Policy contained limits of liabilities as Rs. 50,000/-. 13. Thus, I increase the amount of compensation from Rs. 38,000/- to Rs. 91,800/-. 12. The next question is regarding the liability of the Insurance Company. Mr. Bhansali has also invited my attention to the clause inside the Policy contained limits of liabilities as Rs. 50,000/-. 13. I have discussed these various aspects regarding the comprehensive liability and the condition mentioned inside the Insurance Policy in Chand Kanwar's case (supra), and Supyar Kanwar's case (supra). In Virendra Kumar's case (supra) again the entire law of this aspect of comprehensive liability has been discussed. In the latest case of Virendra Kumar I have observed as under: "The reliance placed by the appellants on the later judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in Supyar Kanwar's case (supra), makes it very clear that when the clause in the Insurance Policy mentions liability as unlimited, this is irrespective of the implications of Section 95. The Insurance Co. is to make full payment. 14. In view of the judgment in Chand Kanwar's case (supra), and the subsequent judgment of Supyar Kanwar's case (supra), the position of law is very clear that in cases of comprehensive insurance, the Insurance Co. is liable to the full extent. "In view of the above, it is held that the liability of the Insurance Co. would be to the full extent and not limited in any manner whatsoever." 15. The conditions and terms inside the Policy after the policy is displayed and declared as comprehensive one at two places in the front captions, in my opinion, are subsidiary and cannot alter the basic feature of the policy normally, that it is comprehensive. If this is allowed to be done, whereas the caption makes it comprehensive, not once but twice. But inside some conditions are implied by which whatever has been insured by the insurer is taken away, it would tantamount to this that there has been lack of bona fides and good faith in the transaction. Because the insurer is effected by the comprehensive nature of the policy and detailed conditions which may be innumerable and most of them being stereo-type one, in very small letters, cannot be allowed to alter and change the basic feature and nature of the policy. Because the insurer is effected by the comprehensive nature of the policy and detailed conditions which may be innumerable and most of them being stereo-type one, in very small letters, cannot be allowed to alter and change the basic feature and nature of the policy. Once an insurer is allowed a front-door entry, to have a transaction on the comprehensive nature and on the understanding that the policy would be comprehensive of the so called captions of the policy, then after having attracted the consumer from the front-door side, the Company cannot be allowed to knock the bottom and betray the expectations of the insurer by a back door covenant in the policy. The submission that there used to be only one type of Form and it was not debated or cut out, fails to carry any conclusion, because there was no dearth of printing press of printing arrangements in the year 1972 when the policy was taken. If the Assurance Company has committed this mistake, the insured cannot be allowed to suffer for it and the sufferance must be of the Insurance Company, rather than the insured. 16. It is well known that the Insurance concept is a social welfare concept and it is not a simple, pure commercial transaction for profitering, though the Company may have an element of it, but is certainly to be incorporate in the spirit of the Constitution, which provide social justice to the people. In compensation of the accident cases this aspect should be kept in the forefront and have a beneficial approach to the insured, while awarding compensation. Time and again 1 have emphasised that the compensation should not be treated at par with the easement but they have to be considered as a duty of the Court to as minister social justice in a beneficial manner to rehabilitate the unfortunate victims of the bereaved family under a Constitution which guarantees social justice to its citizens. In that view of the matter I have got no hesitation in accepting the contention of Mr. Gupta that the policy being comprehensive, in view of the judgment of this Court, the liability would also be that of comprehensive and co-extensive which means to the full extent of the award. Mr. Gupta then pointed out that as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narchinva v. Kamat and Anr. etc. Gupta that the policy being comprehensive, in view of the judgment of this Court, the liability would also be that of comprehensive and co-extensive which means to the full extent of the award. Mr. Gupta then pointed out that as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narchinva v. Kamat and Anr. etc. v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins and Ors. 1985 SC 1281 , Chameli Wati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation and Ors. and, AIR 1986 SC 1191 and Jagbir Singh and Ors. v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways and Ors. 1 (1987) ACC 1 the interest should be 12% from the date of application till the date of realisation. Para 3 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagbir Singh's case (supra), based on the earlier judgment of Chameli Wati's case (supra), reads as under: "3. In regard to the interest, however, we think the petitioners are entitled to a higher rate of interest than that awarded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. We find that in Narchinva V. Kamat and Anr. etc. v. Alfredo Antonio Deo Martins and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1281 this Court awarded interest at 12 per cent from the date of the accident upto the date of payment. Subsequently in Smt. Chameli Wati and Anr. v. Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1191 , a larger Bench of this Court awarded compensation at 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application for compensation. We are of opinion that the petitioners should be entitled to interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of application for compensation to the date of payment. We order accordingly." 17. The same was followed by this Court in Virendra Kumar's case referred to above. 18. Consequently, the award would also carry interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the application to the date of realisation. Adjustments would be made of the amount paid by the Insurance Company and the interest of 12% would run against the Insurance Company for that amount only, upto the date of payment from the date of application. In all other respects the calculation will be from the date of application to the date of realisation. The appeal under cross-objection, are decided as above. 19. In all other respects the calculation will be from the date of application to the date of realisation. The appeal under cross-objection, are decided as above. 19. The parties would bear their own costs, so far as this Court is concerned.Appeal allowed. *******