JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a misc. appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act arising out of a claim for compensation made before the Moto. Accident Claims Tribunal, Udaipur. 2. A sum of L 17 05,000/- was claimed as compensation for a fatal accident before the Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded L 6,17,600/- as compensation to the claimants and rejected the claim for the remaining amount. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'the RSRTC) against which the award had been made preferred an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act wherein the claimants filed cross-objection The learned Single Judge partly allowed the appeal filed by the RSRTC and reduced the amount of compensation payable to the claimants to L 3,20,000/- only and the cross-objection of the claimants was dismissed. The learned Single Judge awarded interest on the amount of compensation only at 6% p a. and time too from the date of award until payment. The RSRTC felt aggrieved even after this reduction in the amount of compensation made by the learned Single Judge and, therefore, it preferred the present appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. The claimants have filed a cross objection for restoration of the Tribunal's award. The result is that the RSRTC in its appeal claims further reduction in the amount of compensation while the claimants in their cross-objection pray for restoration of the Tribunal's award granting L 6,17,600/- as compensation in addition to the interest payable thereon. 3. We shall now refer to the material facts. The fatal motor accident occurred at about 8.30 P.M. on January 29, 1979 on the Banswara-Partapur road near village Talwara in which RSRTC bus No. RRM 3885 driven by Hariram, NAW 2 dashed against a jeep bearing No RJY 3891 coming from the opposite direction. Deceased Prakash Chandra who was sitting in the jeep in the front by the side of the driver of the jeep died ON the spot as a result of injuries sustained by him in the accident. Deceased Prakash Chandra who was sitting in the jeep in the front by the side of the driver of the jeep died ON the spot as a result of injuries sustained by him in the accident. The bus driver did not even stop and get down from the bus to see the consequence of the accident and he did not even care to report the accident at any police station The report of the accident was bow ever, made at a police station at the behest of occupants of the jeep giving particulars of the bus which caused the accident. The driver Hariram NAW 2 admits going to the police station only the next morning when he came to know that the report had already been lodged of that accident. The driver Hariram further admitted that the accident occurred near a curve on the road and the speed of his bus at that, time was 30-40 Kms. per hour. No doubt the bur driver does not accepted his fault but he has admitted in his statement the above facts which together with the undisputed facts and circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the bus driver Hariram was lash and negligent in driving the bus as shown by us later. 4. The deceased Prakash Chandra was aged about 32 years when he was killed in the motor accident survived by his widow Smt. Manorma, then aged about 24 years, and a I minor daughter then aged about 7 years. The deceased came from an apparently affluent family, his father having retired as Additional Commissioner from Government service in Rajasthan. The deceased was engaged in agency business which he was carrying on as the working partner of a partnership firm in which his father was the other partner. The father of the deceased Maganlal, AW 4, was aged 74 years at that time. He has proved that deceased was doing the entire work of the firm in which they two were the only partners with equal shares and the agency work was of well known concerns namely. Sriram Fertilizers, Sriram Chemicals, Kirloskar, Dunlop, Godrej, American Spring and Pressing Works and N.B.C. etc. He further stated that after the death of his son Prakash Chandra he alone was left to look after the work which was apparently beyond his capacity at that age. Sriram Fertilizers, Sriram Chemicals, Kirloskar, Dunlop, Godrej, American Spring and Pressing Works and N.B.C. etc. He further stated that after the death of his son Prakash Chandra he alone was left to look after the work which was apparently beyond his capacity at that age. We are informed that Miganlal, father of the deceased, has since then died. It is significant that there is no cross examination of this witness on any of the matters deposed by him and the only thing asked in cross-examination relates to ownership of the share of deceased Prakash Chandra which has gone to his widow Manorma. It may be added that Maganlal has given particulars of his family to show that there is considerable longevity in his family. His eldest daughter was then aged 57 years and he had a younger brother aged 63 years also living. The learned Single Judge has accepted the annual income of L 36,000/- shown by the deceased in his income-tex return and his not annual income as L 28,000/- on the basis of the assessment made. The learned Single Judge has calculated the annual dependency or the pecuniary loss to the dependents at L 16,000/- by excluding L 12, 000/- from the not income for the personal expenses of the deceased. It has also been held that the deceased would ordinarily have led an active working life upto the age of 65 years. Inspite of this conclusion the learned Single Judge has adopted the multiplier of twenty. On this basis the compensation awarded is L 16,000/-x 20= L 3,20,000/-. The learned Single Judge has awarded interest thereon only @ 6% p.a. from the date of award until payment. The claim petition was filed before the Tribunal on May 30, 1979. The Tribunal gave its award on October 9, 1980 and the judgment of the learned Single Judge in dated December 11, 1981. 5. Both the sides are aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The RSRTC, which is owner of the bus involved in the accident, claims reduction of the amount of compensation in the appeal filed by it. On the other hand, the claimants in their cross-objection pray for enhancement of the compensation by restoration of the award of L 6,17,600/- made by the Tribunal. The points raised in the appeal and the cross-objection have to be decided on these facts. 6. On the other hand, the claimants in their cross-objection pray for enhancement of the compensation by restoration of the award of L 6,17,600/- made by the Tribunal. The points raised in the appeal and the cross-objection have to be decided on these facts. 6. We shall now mention the points which arise for decision in the appeal and the cross-objection. Learned counsel for the RSRTC Shri R.N. Munshi in support of the appeal contended that there is no liability of the RSRTC since negligence or rashness of the has driver is not proved; and the quantum of compensation awarded even by the learned Single Judge is excessive and should be reduced Learned counsel for the RSRTC aha contended that the cross-objection filed by the 'claimants is not maintainable since no cross-objection can be Sled in this special appeal even if a cross-objection was maintainable in the appeal under Section 110 D of the Motor Vehicles Act decided by the learned Single Judge. Sari Munshi also contended that the cross-objection is time barred. On behalf of the claimants Shri Mridul contended that reduction of the compensation by the learned Single Judge was unjustified since the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not excessive. He also contended that the award of interest @ 6% pa is too low and the rate should be raised to 12% P a-, the interest being payable from the date of claim petition May, 30, 1979 and not from the date of the award October 9, 1980 Accordingly, he contended that the appeal should be dismissed and the cross-objection allowed In respect of the crow-objection Shri Mridul contended that it was clearly maintainable and that it was also filed within time. 7. We shall first dispose of Shri Munshi's objections relating to the maintainability of the cross-objection and limitation. The remaining points are common in the appeal as well as the cross-objection since they relate to the question of negligence of the bus driver resulting in liability of the RSRTC and the amount of just compensation payable to the claimants. These points relating to the merits shall then be considered together. 8. The first question is, whether the cross-objection is time barred. The relevant particulars are these: The judgment of the learned Single Judge was delivered on December 11, 1981. These points relating to the merits shall then be considered together. 8. The first question is, whether the cross-objection is time barred. The relevant particulars are these: The judgment of the learned Single Judge was delivered on December 11, 1981. The special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was filed by the RSRTC on February 8, 1982. A caveat on behalf of the claimants to oppose admission of the appeal was filed on August 20, 1982 stating that the date fixed for admission was October 7, 1982. The claimants entered appearance through their counsel on December 21, 1982. A Division Bench admitted the appeal on March 20, 1984 on which date the claimants were represented by a counsel. The cross-objection was filed on April 17, 1984 within one month of the date of admission of the appeal The argument of Shri Munshi is that the cross-objection filed on April 17, 1984 is time barred because it should have been filed within one month of claimants entering appearance through their counsel on December 21, 1982. We have no doubt that there is no merit in this contention. 9. It cannot be doubted that in the absence of any special procedure for the hearing of an appeal Under Section 18 of the Raj. High Court Ordinance it is the general law contained in the CPC which must apply to regulate the procedure of hearing of a special. This is considered at length while dealing with objection relating to maintainability of cross-objection considered here after. The procedure for hearing of a special appeal is, therefore, governed by Order 41 CPC. Rule 11 of Order 41 CPC relates to the power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and without serving notice on the respondent or his pleader. The procedure for hearing of a special appeal is, therefore, governed by Order 41 CPC. Rule 11 of Order 41 CPC relates to the power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and without serving notice on the respondent or his pleader. Rule 12 of Order 41 says that unless the appellate court dismisses the appeal under Rule 11, it shall fix a day for hearing the appeal, This order is to be made when the appeal is admitted for hearing Order 41 Rule 22 permits a respondent who appears in response to the notice pursuant to the admission of the appeal to support the decree by assailing any of the findings in the decree under appeal and the respondent I may also take any cross-objection, provided he has filed such objection within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal or within such further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow. It is obvious that the limitation prescribed for filing such cross objection in in Order 41 Rule 22 is one month from the date of service of notice of admission of the appeal as contemplated by Order 41 Rule 12, CPC. This period of one month cannot commence prior to the date of admission of the appeal as required by Order 11 Rule 12 CPC. In the present case the appeal was admitted only on March 20, 1984 and since the claimants-respondents were represented by a counsel and they had notice of admission of the appeal on the same day, the period of limitation of one month for filing the cross-objection commenced on March 20, 1984 itself. The crosss-objection filed on April 17, 1984 is therefore, admittedly within time There is no basis in law to support the contention of Shri Munshi that the starting point of limitation of one month for filing the cross-objection in accordance with 0.41 Rule 22 CPC in the present case was December 21, 1982 when respondent-claimants entered appearance to oppose admission and not the actual date of admission March 20, 1984 The contention that the cross-objection is time barred is, therefore, rejected 10. The other objection raised by Shri Munshi relates to maintainability of the cross-objection. The other objection raised by Shri Munshi relates to maintainability of the cross-objection. A Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Automobile Transport (Raj) Pvt. Ltd and another v. Dewalal and Ors. AIR 1987 Rajasthan 121 , has clearly held that in an appeal under Section 110 D of the Motor Vehicles Act the respondent can file cross-objection by invoking the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 CPC. Shri Munshi attempted to distinguish that decision by contending that the decision was rendered in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and not a special appeal thereafter under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Shri Munshi placed reliance on the decisions of the Allahabad and Jammu and Kashmir High Courts in Mst. Daroupadi Debi v. S.K. Dutt AIR 1957 Allahabad 48 ; Sukhanand Mathura Prasad v. Bainkunath Nath AIR 1962 All, 509 . The Assessing Authority and another v. Jammu Metal Rolling Mills 1971 Tax, L.R. 1861 (J & K) Excise and Taxation Officer v. Caltex India Ltd. AIR 1962 J&K 89 . In our opinion, there is ample authority for the proposition that cross objection can be filed in a Letters Patent Appeal to the Division Bench against the judgment of a Single Judge, which principle equally applies to a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. 11. In Mahendra Singh v. Sohan Raj AIR 1973 Rajasthan 219 , it was held by a Division Bench that the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 does not provide for any procedure for special appeal provided under Section 18, therefore, the general law contained in the CPC applies. In our opinion, this decision of this Court is alone sufficient to conclude the point. However, there is ample authority to support this view. In Mst. Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi and another AIR 1921 P.C. 80 their Lordships of the Privy Council held that there is no reason why there should be any general difference between the procedure of the High Court in matters coming under the Letters Patent and its procedure in other matters It was clearly held therein that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 10 apply equally to Letters Patent Appeals as to appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Magam D, Venkatesham Chettey and Ors. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Magam D, Venkatesham Chettey and Ors. v. Mothichand Gulabchand AIR 1926 Madras 316 also held that the provisions of Order 41 applies to appeals under the Letters patent. It is not necessary to refer to several other decisions of different High Courts taking the same view because of the aforesaid Privy Council decision and a Division Bench decision of this Court We may how ever, add that the decisions relied on by Shri Munshi are distinguishable. 12. The decision in Mst. Daroupadi Debi's case (supra) related to a second appeal wherein no Letters Patent Appeal lay without leave of the Single Judge. The question was of maintainability of cross-objection in that situation in a Letters Patent Appeal filed against the decision of the Single Judge in a second appeal. Obviously, when no Letters Patent Appeal could be filed without leave of the Single Judge entertaining the cross-objection by the respondent in a Letters Patent appeal filed by the other side would amount to circumventing the requirement of leave of the Single Judge. The conclusion reached in that decision can be supported and distinguished on this ground alone. The decision in Sukhanand Mathura Prasad's case (supra) is based on Daroupadi Debi's case (supra) which is distinguishable for the same reason. It is significant that a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court following the aforesaid Privy Council decision clearly held in Mst. Abhilakhi v. Sadanand and Ors. AIR 1931 Allahabad 244 that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the High Courts in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction including their jurisdiction in Letters Patent Appeals. In our opinion, this Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court itself supports our conclusion that the later two Allahabad decisions on which Shri Munshi relies are distinguishable for the reasons given by us. The decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Jammu Metal Rolling Mills' case (supra) related to maintainability of cross-objection in Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of a Single Judge in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. That decision is based on the aforesaid two Allahabad decisions and an earlier decision of the same court in Caltex India Ltd. is case (supra). It is also significant that the aforesaid Privy Council decision is not considered therein. 13. That decision is based on the aforesaid two Allahabad decisions and an earlier decision of the same court in Caltex India Ltd. is case (supra). It is also significant that the aforesaid Privy Council decision is not considered therein. 13. For the above reasons we have no doubt that the objection of Shri Munshi to the maintainability of the cross-objection filed by the claimants in this appeal has no merit. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 14. We shall now consider the questions relating to merits. The first question is of the Bust Driver's negligence. In our opinion, there is no merit in the contention of Shri Hanshi that the bus driver HAW 2 Hariram was Not negligent in driving the bus that it was not his negligence which caused the motor accident resulting in fatal injuries to Prakash Chandra We have already mentioned the facts admitted by the bus driver Hari Ram NAW 2. In short the bus driver Hari Ram NAW 2 admitted that the accident occurred near a culvert where there was also an acute curve; his bus collided with the jeep when it was travelling as a speed of 30-40 Kms. per hour; the foot board of his bus broke and fell at the spot he did not get down from the bus and see the effect of the accident which he had known; and it was only the next morning that he went to the police station to make a report where he came to know that a report had already been lodged against him. From his statement as well as the site plan and the photographs of the site which are in evidence it is clear that the road was sufficiently wide and the bus could have easily crossed the jeep without any mishap if the bus had been driven carefully. The admitted conduct of the bus driver in not performing the obligation of stopping after the accident to ascertain the result of the impact with the jeep end reporting the accident to police also support the inference that the bus driver tried to hide his involvement in the accident. In our opinion, the concurrent finding reached by the Tribunal 8nd the learned Single Judge to the same effect is fully justified and even are appropriation of the evidence, which not necessary in a special appeal, we have reached the same conclusion merits. In our opinion, the concurrent finding reached by the Tribunal 8nd the learned Single Judge to the same effect is fully justified and even are appropriation of the evidence, which not necessary in a special appeal, we have reached the same conclusion merits. On this conclusion the liability of the owner of the bus, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, in evident and the only question now is of the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the claimants. 15. On the above conclusion the only surviving question is of determining the amount which can be treated as just compensation' to be awarded to the claimants. This being so, the question of the reasonable rate of interest to be paid thereon also arises since the liability of the RSRTC being fixed the only surviving question is of the quantum of compensation. we shall first deal with the question of interest payable. 16. The learned Single Judge has granted interest at rate of 6% pa. on the amount of compensation awarded. Shri Munshi, learned Counsel for the RSRTC could not argue for its reduction but he contended that the rate of interest could not be raised since this point was not specifically taken in the cross-objection. In our opinion, there is no merit in this objection of Shri Munshi. In the cross-objection there is a specific claim for enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act requires determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just or in other words, 'just compensation to be paid to the claimants This was the position even prior to insertion of Section 110-CC with effect from 1970 which enables grant of simple interest from a date not earlier than the date of making the claim. Even prior to inspection of Section 110 CC it had been held in certain decisions that the Tribunal had power to grant interest in addition to the amount of compensation since section 110-B required award of just compensation' to the claimants That apart, in the absence of any specific provision to this effect, the general law would apply and the provisions in CPC enable grant of any 'other relief including interest from the date of claim without any specific prayer being made. In our opinion, increase in the rate of interest to make it reasonable is clearly permissible even without any express prayer in the cross-objection to that effect. We would add that it is in fact the duty of the court to increase the rate of interest to make it reasonable in order to ensure award of 'just compensation' as required originally by Section 110B and later also by Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act. We see no impediment in doing so. 17. The question now is of the rate of interest which would be reasonable. We have no doubt that interest at rate of 6% pa. from the date of award is too low by any standard and interest should be awarded to the claimants on the amount of compensation at rate of 12 per cent pa. from the date of claim, i.e. May 30, 1979. The rate of 12 percent pa. is the reasonable rate even according to some recent decisions of the Supreme Court (See Smt. Chameli Wati and another v. Delhi Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 119 and Jagbir Singh and Ors. v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 70 . Accordingly we direct that interest shall be paid on the amount of compensation determined as payable to the claimants at rate of 12 per cent p a. from the date of the claim petition May 30, 1979 instead of at rate of 6 per cent p a. from the date of award granted by the learned Single Judge. 18. Now remains for consideration the question relating to quantum of compensation. The factors are relevant for determining the amount of compensation. One is, the annual dependency or the pecuniary loss to the claimants and the other is, multiplier to be applied taking into account the life expectancy of the deceased In our opinion, even the facts found proved by the learned Single Judge which are not assailed by Shri Munshi justify grant of higher amount of compensation than that awarded by the learned Single Judge. 19. The learned Single Judge has held that the net income of the deceased was L 28,000-per annum, out of which he spent L 12,000/-on himself resulting in pecuniary loss to his widow and child of L 16,000-only. The annual dependency is taken at L 16,000/-. 19. The learned Single Judge has held that the net income of the deceased was L 28,000-per annum, out of which he spent L 12,000/-on himself resulting in pecuniary loss to his widow and child of L 16,000-only. The annual dependency is taken at L 16,000/-. The learned Singly Judge has not taken into account the factor that the deceased was a promising young man aged 32 years engaged in flourishing agency business of reputed concerns and his future income was bound to increase. That apart the learned Single Judge has calculated the personal expenses of the deceased at L 12,000/- per annum on the basis of the statement of his widow, Manorma without also taking into account her entire statement relating to the income and expenditure of the deceased. The widow no doubt said that the expenses of the deceased were L 1000/-per month or L 12 000/-per annum but she also said that his monthly income was L 4,000/- out of which he spent L 1,000/- on himself. In other words, her statement is that her deceased husband spent 1/4th of his income on himself so that the pecuniary loss was 3/4th of his income. The learned Single Judge has accepted this figure of L 1,000/- per month as personal expenses of the deceased but not the remaining part of her statement relating to income made in the same context. In such a situation if the annual income of the deceased is taken to be L 28,000/ according to income-tax assessment, then the personal expenses of the deceased are to be taken at only 1/4th of this amount i e. L 7,000/- and the remaining 3/4th i.e. L 21,000/- per annum must be taken as pecuniary loss to the dependents. The learned Single Judge mis-read the statement of the widow to take the figure of L 16,000/- instead of L 21,000/- as the annual dependency which is evident for the reason given. Thus even on the basis of the facts found proved by the Id. Single Judge the correct figure of annual dependency is L 21,000/-instead of L 16,000/- taken by the learned Single Judge. This conclusion is reached even without taking into account the factor of future increase in the increase in the income of the deceased. 20. Now comes the question of multiplier. Single Judge the correct figure of annual dependency is L 21,000/-instead of L 16,000/- taken by the learned Single Judge. This conclusion is reached even without taking into account the factor of future increase in the increase in the income of the deceased. 20. Now comes the question of multiplier. In view of the longevity in the family of the deceased and the fact that the father of the deceased was active even at the age of 74 years when he was examined, there is no reason to accept any figure blow 70 years as the age upto which the accused could reasonably have been expected to live. Similarly, the active working age of the deceased could easily be 65 years. How ever, even accepting the acting working age of the deceased as 60 years as found by the learned Single Judge it is obvious that he would have worked actively for atleast another 27-28 years. The pecuniary loss to the dependents is, therefore, to be calculated on this basis. 21. Shri Munshi feebly contended that the multiplier of 20 applied by the learned Single Judge is on the higher side and the proper figure would be 16 as appears in some decisions. Shri Munshi also contended that the statement of Maganlal, AW 4, father of the deceased, shows that really there is no pecuniary loss to the widow since she was taken into partnership in place of his husband. It is significant that Manorma, widow of the deceased, was not cross-examined on any of the paints significant for proving the pecuniary loss. Even Maganlal, AW 4, father of the deceased, was only suggested that the share of the deceased in the partnership had gone to his widow. But there was no cross-examination on his statement that deceased was the working partner and it was not possible to carry on the business after his death, This argument of Shri Munshi has, therefore, no basis. 22. But there was no cross-examination on his statement that deceased was the working partner and it was not possible to carry on the business after his death, This argument of Shri Munshi has, therefore, no basis. 22. So far as the question of multiplier is concerned, in our opinion the multiplier of 20 is too low since the deceased was expected to live an active life fur atleast another 27-28 years if not atleast 33 years upto the age of 65 years The multiplier of 20 also appears to be too low for the reason that the reasonable prospect of increase in the future income of the deceased has not been taken into account by the learned Single Judge. Cases have been cited in which multiplier upto 27 has been applied on several occasions there the deceased was a promising young man with good future prospects. The deceased in the present case was a promising young man whose life was tragically and abruptly suffered out by the motor accident at the age of 32 years when he would ordinarily have lived upto atleast 70 years and worked actively easily upto 65 years. In such a situation 25 appears to be the appropriate minimum figure of multiplier required to be applied in the present case. We, therefore, hold that the multiplier hf 25 should be applied to the annual dependency of L 21,000/- instead of the multiplier of 20 to the annual dependency of L 16,000/- according to the learned Single Judge. 23. Applying the multiplier of 25 to the annual dependency of L 21,000/-, the amount of compensation for pecuniary loss comes to L 21,000/-x 25 = L 5,25,000/-. In our opinion, this is the proper compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the dependents. 24. One more question now remains for consideration. Shri Mridul, learned Counsel for the claimants, placed reliance on a Full Bench decision in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Kistoori Devi 1986 R.LR. 590 to contend that some amount should be awarded as compensation for loss of love and affection/consortium to the widow. It has been held by the Full Bench that in determining the just compensation the court is entitled to grant compensation under this head also. 590 to contend that some amount should be awarded as compensation for loss of love and affection/consortium to the widow. It has been held by the Full Bench that in determining the just compensation the court is entitled to grant compensation under this head also. The Full Bench decision distinguishes this head from the head of mental and physical agony etc' There can be no doubt that in accordance with this Full Bench decision some amount should be awarded to the widow under the head of loss of love and affection of spouse/consortium. The widow was only 24 years old when she lost her husband in the fatal motor accident. Remarriage is out of question in her society. The widow is, therefore, entitled to some further amount under this head. It is reasonable to assume that she would have led a happily married life for a minimum of another 25 years but for the tragic death of her husband in the motor accident. She has been deprived of the same for atleast 25 years, if not more. The amount of L 50,000/- under this head cannot be excessive and would be appropriate or proper compensation for loss of love and affection of spouse or consortium The widow Manorama is, therefore entitled to a further amount of L 50,000/- under this head. 25. We may mention that an application under order 41 Rule 27 CPC filed by the claimants was withdrawn by Shri Mridul. Accordingly, we have not considered that application which is dismissed as withdrawn. 26. It follows from the above discussion that the claimants i.e. the widow and daughter of the deceased are entitled to a sum of L 5,25,000/- as. compensation on account of pecuniary loss; and the widow is entitled to a further amount of L 50,000/- as compensation under the head of loss of love and affection of spouse or consortium. In this manner the total compensation awarded to the claimants is L 5,25,000/- plus L 50,000/- or in all L 5,75,000/-. The claimants shall also be paid interest at rate of 12% p.a from the date of the claim petition (May 30, 1979) on the entire amount unit payment.) We are informed that the amount awarded by the learned Single Judge has been paid to the claimants. The claimants shall also be paid interest at rate of 12% p.a from the date of the claim petition (May 30, 1979) on the entire amount unit payment.) We are informed that the amount awarded by the learned Single Judge has been paid to the claimants. In that case on the amount already paid to the claimants the remaining amount of interest calculated at rate of 12% p.a. shall be paid from the date of the claim petition to the date on which the payment was made, and the excess amount of compensation shall be paid with interest at rate of 12% p a from the date of claim petition until payment. Out of the total amount of L 5,25,000/- awarded as compensate on for pecuniary loss the daughter of She deceased will be paid in all L 2,0,000/- inclusive of the amount of L 1,20.000/-paid to her in accordance with the direction of the learned Single Judge The claimants shall also get their entire costs throughout on the amount of compensation awarded while the RSRTC would bear its costs throughout, counsel's fee according to the schedule, if certified. The appeal Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation dismissed. while the claimants' cross objection is allowed to the extend Indicated.Order accordingly. *******