B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER the court on an application for restitution can pass an order in terms of compromise, alleged to have been filed by the parties before the decision or the proceedings for restitution have to be decided independent of the compromise application, is the short question for determination in the present petition filed by the plaintiffs, the petitioners who have obtained an ex parte order on 19-9-85 and got actual possession in respect of the accommodation on 23-4-86 in a small cause court suit for arrears of rent and damages and mesne profits, filed by them against respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and the suit was restored on 26-10-87 on payment of Rs. 300/- as cost. Thereafter it became necessary on the application of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to deliver back the possession to them, which was obtained by the petitioners in execution of the decree dated 19-9-85. Under these circumstances, the application for execution moved by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under S. 144 (one forty four) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for short the Code) came up for consideration before respondent No. 1. ( 2 ) IT was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the parties during the pendency of the application had filed a compromise application, a certified copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1 to the petition, and as the compromise application was filed before respondent No. 1, and the proceedings for restitution were pending that the provisions of O. 23, R. 3 of the Code were so comprehensive that it applies to any application or proceedings, Hence the restitution application could not have been disposed of by the impugned order without taking into account the validity and legality of the compromise filed by the parties. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 urged that there was no such compromise and the compromise was fictitious and did not bear the signature of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Consequently it would not be obligatory for respondent No. 1 to have taken into account that alleged compromise. It was further urged that the nature of proceedings under S. 144 do not warrant its disposal on the basis of compromise. The learned counsel for the parties agreed that the petition may be decided on merits. 3a. 2 and 3. Consequently it would not be obligatory for respondent No. 1 to have taken into account that alleged compromise. It was further urged that the nature of proceedings under S. 144 do not warrant its disposal on the basis of compromise. The learned counsel for the parties agreed that the petition may be decided on merits. 3a. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties broadly speaking there is only one question to be decided as to whether the proceedings for restoration under S. 144 of the Code could be disposed of on the basis of the compromise. The next point, however emanating from the first, is as to whether the nature of proceedings under S. 144 of the Code is such that the same could be disposed of on the basis of a compromise alleged to have been filed under O. 23, R. 3 of the Code. Broadly speaking, I am of the opinion that the restitution proceedings are execution proceedings with a slight difference that in execution proceedings the decree in favour of the plaintiff is put in execution, whereas in restitution proceedings it is not the decree, rather a variance or reversal or any benefit which have been obtained by the successful party and the same has not been maintained in appeal or revision or in some other similar proceedings, including the revision application which is sought to be given effect to. In the present case, the person who has succeeded, may make an application that the benefits given to other party may be set at naught as the order has been reversed. May be that some sort of codification or reversal or variance of a decree or order might have been occasioned in any proceeding. In fact, provisions of S. 144 of the Code are based on principles of two equitable doctrines. The first is based on two Latin Maxims, i. e. actus CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVABIT (which connotes that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man); and the next is actus LEGIS NEMINI EST DAMNOSUS (which connotes that an act of law shall prejudice no man ). The next is that nobody should suffer an injury on account of that order of the Court which has been varied or reversed later on in appeal or revision or in some other proceedings. The next is that nobody should suffer an injury on account of that order of the Court which has been varied or reversed later on in appeal or revision or in some other proceedings. The leading English case of Rodger v. Comptoir D. Escompta De Paris, (1871) 19 WR (Eng.) 449, was the basis for these two doctrines and the relevant observations are as follows : "one of the first and highest duties of the Court is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to the suitors and when the expression act of the court is used, it does not mean merely the act of primary court or of an intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains the jurisdiction over the matter up to highest Court shall finally dispose of the case. " ( 4 ) THE word restitution itself means restoring to a party on the reversal, variance or revision of a decree or order either in appeal, revision or a review petition, as has been lost to him in execution of the decree or in some effect of the earlier decree or order which was passed in favour of the other party. In such matters it is not the right or title of a party that has to be looked into, but only the deprivation of a party from benefits of possession etc. under an order or decree which has been reversed or varied, that has to be looked into. See Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, 1984 Supp SCC 505. ( 5 ) IN case the compromise was alleged to be filed by the petitioner and a certified copy of the same was filed vide averments in para 14 of the petition, even though said allegations were denied under para 23 of the counter-affidavit, but there was nothing in the impugned order to indicate as to whether the compromise was considered by the Court itself or not. I have read the contents of compromise. I have read the contents of compromise. The provisions of O. 23, R. 3 were very wide and it provides that whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement, or where the defendants satisfy the plaintiff in respect of whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded. In the present case the compromise was alleged to have been filed and without any discussion by the Court about the validity or otherwise of the said compromise, it cannot be assumed that the same was not filed. A certified copy of the said compromise has been filed and it means that the same was on record, otherwise the certified copy would not have been issued. I, however, refrain from expressing any concluded opinion on the adjustment between the parties on the basis of compromise, but just on the basis of allegation in the counter-affidavit it could not be assumed that the compromise was not there. The certified copy itself indicates that the compromise has been filed. It was with a view to bring an adjustment between the parties. Order 22, R. 3 provides adjustment in the suit by a lawful compromise. The restitution proceedings are the part of proceedings in the suit, hence the same could have been adjusted on the basis of the compromise. Even though notices were given to respondent No. 1 and to the Standing Counsel, but no counter-affidavit has been filed. It is open to respondent No. 1 to hear the parties on the compromise and to satisfy about the bona fides and genuineness of the compromise. So many safeguards have been provided under O. 23, R. 3 that the proceedings in restitution or execution can be adjusted between the parties on the basis of compromise. The first safeguard is that the compromise must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and the next is that any such agreement or compromise must be lawful, it must be in writing and signed by the parties and the same must be in respect of whole or a part of the subject-matter of the suit. The first safeguard is that the compromise must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and the next is that any such agreement or compromise must be lawful, it must be in writing and signed by the parties and the same must be in respect of whole or a part of the subject-matter of the suit. It is for respondent No. 1 to apply his mind on these aspects of the matters and in case he records a finding about his satisfaction about the compromise or its lawful nature, or as to whether the same was in writing and signed by the parties and whether the compromise was in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, it shall be open to respondent No. 1 to record these findings he may pass an appropriate order on the compromise application filed in the restitution proceedings before him. ( 6 ) THE petitioners have given in detail the development that has taken place after the ex parte degree was passed in their favour and even the details of compromise and its effect between the parties have also been stated in paras 15, 16, 17, 19 etc. of the writ petition. However, this observation need not be taken to be an expression of opinion on the feasibility, genuineness, lawfulness and merits of the compromise. ( 7 ) IT would not be out of place to make a mention of the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court regarding the scope of compromise filed in connection with the eviction suits governed by the Rent Control Statutes or otherwise in Roshanlal v. Madanlal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 as follows :"if the agreement or compromise for eviction of the tenant is found in the facts of a particular case to be in violation of a particular Rent Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the Compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement. If, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of compromise and if necessary by considering them in the context of pleadings and other materials of the case that the agreement is lawful, the Court is bound to record the compromise. If, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of compromise and if necessary by considering them in the context of pleadings and other materials of the case that the agreement is lawful, the Court is bound to record the compromise. " ( 8 ) IN Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpat Ram Iccha Ram AIR 1974 SC 471 , it was observed as follows :"if at the time of passing of the decree there was some material before the Court on the basis of which the Court may be prima facie satisfied about the existence of statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of compromise, would be valid. Such material cannot take shape of evidence recorded or produced in the Court or it may partly or wholly be in the shape of expression employed in the compromise itself. " ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid observations it was imperative for the Court below to have recorded a clear finding about the compromise alleged to have been filed, in case the same was lawful, genuine and was to the satisfaction of the Court and the same was in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. In that event the restitution proceedings could have been disposed of in accordance with the terms of the compromise filed before the Court. I am accordingly of the view that the impugned order dated 11-08-88 cannot be sustained. ( 10 ) IN the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 11-8-88 is hereby quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to treat the restitution application pending before him and to dispose it of within a period of three months in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .