JUDGMENT K.G. Balakrishnan, J. 1. The defendants are the appellants. The plaintiff- 1st respondent filed a suit for recovery of arrears of salary due from the defendants. The first appellant is a registered partnership firm and the 2nd appellant is the Managing Partner of the firm and the appellants 3 to 5 are the partners of the firm. The main business activity of the appellants is that they are having an estate by name "Dorland Cardamom Estate". The plaintiff's case is that the 2nd appellant obtained a coupe contract from the Government for cutting and re-making the trees belonging to the Government, After having obtained this contract, the 2nd appellant appointed the plaintiff as the coupe agent from 1-1-1973 on a monthly salary of Rs. 300/- with an additional bonus of Rs. 50/-per mensem. The plaintiff's further case is that he continued as a coupe agent till 21-9-1976 and the appellants in all paid only Rs. 2440/- towards salary and bonus, and the balance was due from the appellants. The plaintiff voluntarily relinquished his job on 21-9-1976 because of the recalcitrant attitude of the appellants. Plaintiff caused to send a registered notice to the appellants demanding arrears of salary. The second appellant refused to accept the notice, but appellants 3 and 5 accepted the notice and sent reply raising frivolous contentions. They denied the fact of employment. The plaintiff filed the suit for the recovery of the entire salary due to him. 2. Appellants 1 and 2 filed separate written statements. They contended that the plaintiff was appointed only on 23.1.1973 and he continued in service, for a short period. The appellants also denied the genuineness of two letters produced by the plaintiff. The 2nd appellant contended that when the service of the plaintiff was terminated by the appellants, the husband of the 2nd appellant one K. R. Sankar engaged the plaintiff to do some personal work and he had been rendering some service to this Sankar and for which the plaintiff was duly paid. The appellants also contended that the Government subsequently prohibited the cutting of trees and the appellants had completely given up the cutting of trees. Therefore, the service of the plaintiff was not required after March, 1974. The 4th appellant also filed separate written statement raising similar contentions. 2A. The court below accepted the plaintiff's contention and decreed the suit as prayed for. 3. Therefore, the service of the plaintiff was not required after March, 1974. The 4th appellant also filed separate written statement raising similar contentions. 2A. The court below accepted the plaintiff's contention and decreed the suit as prayed for. 3. After the filing of the appeal plaintiff died and legal representatives have been impleaded as additional respondents. The main contention urged by the appellant is that the court below went wrong in deciding the question as to whether the respondent had been working as a coupe agent from 1-1-1973 to 21-9-1976There is some" dispute regarding the quantum of monthly salary payable to the respondent. According to the appellants the plaintiff was entitled to get monthly salary only at the rate of Rs.300/- and the claim of bonus is denied. The fact that the salary inclusive of bonus was Rs.350/-per mensem is evident from the letters produced by the plaintiff- respondent. Many of the contentions raised by the appellants are proved to be false in view of the two letters marked as Ext. A2 and A7. In Ext. A2 letter dated 7-4-1974 it has been stated that Rs. 5250/- is due to the plaintiff towards salary for the period from 1-1-1973 to 31-3-1974. From Ext. A7 letter also it is evident that the 2nd appellant was having correspondence with the plaintiff. The genuineness of these two letters has been challenged by the 2nd appellant However, she had admitted that it was her signature that was found in these two letters, and it has been contended that these letters were concocted in the blank signed papers which were originally available with the plaintiff. This contention does not in any way inspire confidence The learned counsel for the appellants also painted out that 2nd appellant was generally in the habit of writing letters of this sort only in her letter pad and the name written on the top of the letter is misspelt. According to the 2nd appellant, she usually uses letter 'S' as the third letter in her name, whereas in its place 'z' has been used as the 3rd letter in Ext. A2. This contention also does not appear to be true. In several of the court records the name of the 2nd appellant has been written differently. Probably the letter might have been typed by the clerk and the mistake, if any, might have been committed by him. A2. This contention also does not appear to be true. In several of the court records the name of the 2nd appellant has been written differently. Probably the letter might have been typed by the clerk and the mistake, if any, might have been committed by him. But that alone is not a criterion to suspect the genuineness of the document 4. Apart from Ext. A2 and A7 the plaintiff produced series of documents to show that he had been working as a coupe agent till 21-9-1976. Exts. A10 to A20 are the various letters received by him during the years 1974, 1975 and 1976. In all these letters reference has been made to the work undertaken by the plaintiff. Some of these letters have been issued by the workers who were engaged by him for cutting and removing the trees from forest area. 5. It is important to note that the 1st appellant is a registered partnership firm. The appellants admit that they had appointed the plaintiff as the coupe agent. Ext.A1 is the document to prove that the plaintiff was appointed as the coupe agent of the appellants. Ext.A1 is the letter issued by the Deputy Conservator of Forests on 29-1-1973. The appellants made a feeble attempt to contend that the appointment if any of the plaintiff had only taken effect from 29-1-1973. The plaintiff had deposed that though he was appointed on 1-1-1973 the approval of the Deputy Conservator of Forests is only a subsequent event and the appointment had taken effect from 1-1-1973. The case set up by the plaintiff appears to be more probable. Anyway the fact that the plaintiff took charge as a coupe agent of the appellants in the month of January, 1973 is not disputed. The appellants could not produce any document to prove that the services of the plaintiff was terminated with effect from a particular date. Definitely the first appellant would have been keeping some accounts regarding the payment of wages to the plaintiff. No documents have been produced from the side of the appellants to prove that the service of the plaintiff was terminated in March 1974, whereas there is overwhelming evidence on the side of the plaintiff to prove that he had been continuing as coupe agent till 21-9-1976. No documents have been produced from the side of the appellants to prove that the service of the plaintiff was terminated in March 1974, whereas there is overwhelming evidence on the side of the plaintiff to prove that he had been continuing as coupe agent till 21-9-1976. The court below has considered all these evidence in detail and we are not persuaded to take a different view. 6. The appellants have no case that they have paid the entire salary due to the respondents. In Ext. A2 it has been admitted that a sum of Rs.5250/- was due to the 1st respondent by way of arrears of salary. It is also satisfactorily proved that the 1st respondent continued in service till 21-9-1976. It is upto the appellants to prove that the they have discharged the liability. They have not produced any document to prove discharge of their liability. Therefore, the 1st respondent is entitled to recover the salary as prayed for in the suit. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants raised a contention that the suit itself is not maintainable in view of S.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the counsel for the appellants the first respondent should have approached the labour court for appropriate remedy. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that a suit of this nature is not barred by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the civil court alone has got jurisdiction. 8. We may at the outset state that the jurisdiction of the civil court is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. The courts have consistently taken the view that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied, and even in cases where the jurisdiction was excluded the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The Supreme Court in 1969 SC 78 (Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.) has usefully quoted the opinion expressed by Willes, J. in Wolverhamtos New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (1859 (6) CB (NS) 336. The Supreme Court in 1969 SC 78 (Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.) has usefully quoted the opinion expressed by Willes, J. in Wolverhamtos New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (1859 (6) CB (NS) 336. "One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of case is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class". In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1969 S.C. 78 ) the question of exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court came up for consideration. The Court held : "(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." The question of similar nature came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in C. I. W. T. Corpn. v. Workmen ( AIR 1974 SC 1604 ). The Supreme Court held: "A proceeding under S.33C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money." This . Court followed this decision in Bhaskara Menon v. K.S.R.T.C. 5 ( 1979 KLT 334 ) and held that S.33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is enacted for enabling individual rights against their employer without being compelled to have recourse to S.10 by raising dispute and securing a reference which is obviously lengthy process. In Fibre Foam Ltd. v. Kantian Nair ( 1979 KLT 30 ) also the same view was taken. 9. In Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke ( AIR 1975 SC 2238 ) the dispute related to the enforcement of an agreement executed by a group of 3 workmen of the company. The appellant company was a big industry. Three groups of the workmen in the appellant company instituted suit in the city civil court at Bombay challenging certain alleged change in the service conditions. The workers based their claim on the memorandum of settlement. The appellant company challenged the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit which related to an industrial dispute and it was further asserted that in any view of the matter no decree for permanent injunction could be made. The Supreme Court held that the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated as follows:- "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. "(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right of liability under the general common law and not under the Act. the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. "(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right of liability under the general common law and not under the Act. the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. "(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. "(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA than the remedy for its enforcement is either S.33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be," 10. Applying the above principle to the instant case it is to be noted that the plaintiff claimed arrears of salary on the basis that he was appointed as a coupe agent. The plaintiff sent a registered notice alleging that so much amount was due from the employer. Some of the appellants sent reply denying the contention of the plaintiff that he had been working as coupe agent, The liability of the defendants-appellants arose out of the agreement between themselves and the plaintiff. It cannot be said that the right of the plaintiff to recover the arrears of salary arose by virtue of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The liability of the appellants cannot be said to be an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act. Under such circumstances the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's claim. We are also of the view that S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not specifically exclude the jurisdiction of the court in adjudicating a case of this nature, since the liability of the appellants to pay the arrears of salary cannot be said to be an obligation created under the Act. The suit has been rightly decreed and we see no reason to take a different view. We confirm the finding of the Trial Court and dismiss the appeal suit with costs.