JUDGMENT R. K. Gulat], J. 1. This writ petition is directed against two orders one dated 4-2-1988 and the other dated 31-3-1988 passed by 9th Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr, Respondent No. 3. By the first order, the revision filed by the respondent no. 1 landlady was allowed on merits ex-parte against the petitioner. By the second order the said respondent no. 3 dismissed the application of the petitioner seeking recall of the former order, and restoration of the revision for fresh consideration. 2. The petitioner Krishna Kumar Sharma, an office-bearer of District National Union of India was allotted House No. 6 (new number being 19/16) Bhoor, Bulandshahr on 1st October, 1975, of which Smt. Raj Garg, respondent no. 1 is the landlady and the owner thereof. The said allotment order was unsuccessfully challenged in revision under section 18 of the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") by the respondent no. 1. However, the order passed in revision was set aside by this Court on a writ petition being filed at the instance of respondent no. 1. The case was remanded to the Revisional Court for fresh consideration. The revisional court in its turn set aside the allotment order and remanded the case to the Prescribed Authority, namely, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the allotment application afresh. During the pendency of remand proceedings, the respondent no. 1 moved an application under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act for release of the disputed house in her favour on the ground that she required the same for her personal needs. The Prescribed Authority however, once again made the allotment in favour of the petitioner. The fresh allotment order was again challenged in revision by the respondent no. 1 in the Court of district Judge, Bulandshahr. On August 20, 1987 the District Judge Bulandshahr transferred the case to the Court of 9th Additional District Judge, i. e. respondent no. 3, who allowed the revision on merits in absence of the petitioner by an order dated 4-2-1988. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application for recall and for setting aside the ex-parte order. That application was dismissed by the impugned order dated 21st March, 1988. It is in this background that the present writ petition has been filed. 3. At the admission stage of the writ petition contesting respondent no. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application for recall and for setting aside the ex-parte order. That application was dismissed by the impugned order dated 21st March, 1988. It is in this background that the present writ petition has been filed. 3. At the admission stage of the writ petition contesting respondent no. 1 has put in appearance and has also filed a Counter Affidavit. With the consent of the parties and in accordance with the Rules of the Court, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. 4. The reason for proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner as indicated in the order dated 4-2-1988 of the respondent no. 3 was that "the petitioner remained absent in the case inspite of personal and sufficient service.". The petitioner's case in the present petition is and that was also his case before the revisional court in proceedings for setting aside the order passed in revision, that he had no notice of the revision being filed by respondent no. 1 nor any notice was given to him when the case was transferred to the Court of respondent no. 3 nor any notice was given to him by the transferee court at any stage of the proceedings which took place before that Court including about the date when the case was finally heard and disposed of. According to the petitioner, he came to know of the ex-parte decree against him for the first time through the husband of respondent no. 1 i. e. the landlady and immediately, thereafter he took steps for setting aside the ex-parte order. 5. It is not in dispute that in view of the provisions contained in Rule 32 and Rule 22 (b) of the Rules framed under the Act, the revisional authority possesses the power to set aside an ex parte order passed in revision under section 18 of the Act for sufficient cause being shown in that regard. Further, the powers to proceed ex-parte and to set aside for sufficient cause an order passed ex-parte are the same as are possessed by the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while trying a suit. In other words, the powers conferred under the above Rule are analogous to the powers contained in Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the powers conferred under the above Rule are analogous to the powers contained in Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To put it differently, a respondent against whom an ex parte order has been passed in revision, may apply for setting aside the same on the ground that he was not duly served with summons or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the case was heard and decided. 6. As stated above, the petitioner's case was that he could not appear when the revision was decided because he had no notice of those proceedings. Thus, he was prevented by sufficient cause. The limited question for consideration is whether the petitioner had been able to make out his case about the want of knowledge of the proceedings resulting in ex-parte decree against him. The question whether in a given case the notice was, in fact, served or not, is essentially a question of fact and such findings are normally not interfered with by this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, an interference in such matter will be fully justified where the Court recording the findings of fact, has based its decision on considerations not warranted by law or where the findings are palpably and manifestly erroneous having regard to the material brought on record. In the order dated 21st March, 1988, rejecting the petitioner's application for restoration, it is stated that on April 8, 1987 when the case was still pending before the District Judge, notices by registered post and ordinary process was issued against the petitioner. The notice sent by registered post was personally served on the petitioner whereas the other notice was served on Sri Lava Kush Sharma, the brother of the petitioner for 18th May, 1987. It has further been stated that as the petitioner had not put in appearance in response to those notices, the case proceeded ex parte against the petitioner. As regards the proceedings when the revision was pending before the District Judge, the respondent no. 3 in his order dated 21-3-1988 observed as under :- "The service was effected personally on 8th April, 1987 by registered post. Moreover, notice was also received by Sri Lava Kush Sharma brother of Sri K. K. Sharma for 18th May, 1987. As regards the proceedings when the revision was pending before the District Judge, the respondent no. 3 in his order dated 21-3-1988 observed as under :- "The service was effected personally on 8th April, 1987 by registered post. Moreover, notice was also received by Sri Lava Kush Sharma brother of Sri K. K. Sharma for 18th May, 1987. The service was held sufficient on 18th May, 1987. But O. P. No. 1 remained absent on 18th May, 1987 inspite of personal service. On 19th May, 1987 case was adjourned for 24th July,, 1987 for hearing. But on that date, case could not be taken up due to the strike. And the case was adjourned to 20th August, 1987. And on 20th August 1987 the case was transferred to this Court. Order was passed for steps for the respondent-applicant. But on 21st August, 1987, order was recalled on the application of revisionist. As service was effected personally on the applicant hence there was no need to issue fresh summons to the respondents. " The entire justification for deciding the case ex-parte against the petitioner and for rejecting the application for restoration, is the service of initial notice when the case was pending before the District Judge. So far the service on his brother is concerned, that was of no avail. Clause (b) of Rule 28 of the Rules framed under the Act provides interalia that a notice by the revising authority under the provisions of the Act may be served on the person concerned by giving or tendering jt to any adult member of his family. There is nothing to indicate in the impugned order that the brother of the petitioner on whom the notice was alleged to have been served was the member of the petitioner's family or he was residing with the petitioner. There is also no finding that the notice which is alleged to have been served on the brother was, in fact handed over to the petitioner or he had knowledge of service of that notice on his brother. 7. There is also no finding that the notice which is alleged to have been served on the brother was, in fact handed over to the petitioner or he had knowledge of service of that notice on his brother. 7. Regarding the notice alleged to have been served by registered post, the petitioner has categorically denied the receipt of any registered cover and he has further stated that he had not signed the registered Acknowledgment receipt which was found on record about which he came to know after the inspection of the records when the case had already been decided ex-parte against him. He also filed his personal affidavit in the Court of respondent no. 3 in which he reiterated the assertions made in the applications aforesaid and further stated that his signatures on the Acknowledgment receipt had bees forged and those were not his signatures. 8. The service of notice by registered post only raises a rebuttable presumption shifting the burden to the addressee to establish that he had not received any such notice. At this stage it may be observed that the petitioner's application for recalling the order was rejected summarily without issuing a notice to the other side. An uncontroverted statement of the petitioner which was contained in the affidavit, in my opinion was sufficient to rebut the presumption that may have been available against the petitioner from the fact that the notice was sent by registered post. It was duty of the Court to ensure that the petitioner was served with the notice in accordance with law. If necessary, the petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity to adduce further evidence if the affidavit given by the petitioner was not sufficient to discharge the burden that lay on the petitioner. The importance of service of notice cannot be minimized as a valid service of notice and failure in its compliance may result in serious consequences. It was the duty of the Court to see that the service of notice was made on the person concerned or some body authorised by him in that behalf. There is even no finding that the registered cover was properly addressed. For the reasons indicated above, the revisional Court was entirely wrong in taking the view that the notice sent by registered post had validly been served on the petitioner or he had any knowledge of that notice. 9. There is even no finding that the registered cover was properly addressed. For the reasons indicated above, the revisional Court was entirely wrong in taking the view that the notice sent by registered post had validly been served on the petitioner or he had any knowledge of that notice. 9. There are other reasons also for which the impugned order rejecting the restoration application cannot be upheld. Where the case is transferred to another Court, the principles of justice require that before proceeding ex-parte the transferee Court must give notice. 10. It is unfair for the transferee court to penalize a party for nonappearance without issuing a notice bringing the fact of transfer to the knowledge of the affected party. It is always usual to issue notice to the parties informing them that a case has been transferred from one court to another. In absence of such a notice a party may well plead that it did not appear on the date when the ex-parte decree was passed against it as it was not aware of the case having been transferred to the court making the ex-parte order. In Ram Sukh Pathak v. Keshav Prasad, Singh, AIR 1918 Patna 341 a Special Bench of three Judges pointed out where an order of transfer of an appeal from one court to another is made it is desirable that the notice should be given in every case to the parties or their representatives. An important order such as the transfer of the case from one court to another should invariably be communicated to the persons concerned and in token of such communication the signatures of the parties or their pleaders should be obtained and when the signature is not obtained the ordersheet should show that the information has been communicated. In that case an appeal was transferred from one court to another and no notice was given to the parties and the appeal was dismissed for default. It was held that the want of notice of transfer to the parties constitute a sufficient cause for the re-admission of the appeal. 11. In that case an appeal was transferred from one court to another and no notice was given to the parties and the appeal was dismissed for default. It was held that the want of notice of transfer to the parties constitute a sufficient cause for the re-admission of the appeal. 11. The above decision was followed by the same Court in other case reported as Hira Lal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 Patna 439 where it was observed that in all cases of transfer made by the court sou-moto, notice of transfer must be given to the parties or their lawyers, where the information about transfer was not communicated to the parties or their pleader it was a good cause for a party not appearing before the transferee court. Such a cause was a sufficient cause for restoration of the case. 17. Similar view has been expressed by Gauhati High Court in Surendra Kumar Sarkar v. Smt. Champala Sundari Bhowmik 1980 Gauhati 6. 12. In this connection, it would be useful to refer to sub-rules (1), (2) and (4) of Rule 89-A of the General Rules (Civil), which read as under :- "89-A. Procedure to be followed on transfer or withdrawal of cases : (1) When a case i.e. a suit, appeal or other proceedings in which a date for attendance of a party or the parties in a particular court has been fixed, is transferred from that court to another, the former court shall record the order of transfer in the ordersheet and get it signed by counsel of the party or parties ; if any party is unrepresented information shall be sent to his registered address. The case shall be called out by the other court on the date already fixed by the transferring court and the presence of the parties noted. (2) A note to the effect that a party or the parties have been informed in accordance with sub-rule (1) shall be made on the record by the transferring court. (4) The court to which cases are transferred shall not proceed, without satisfying itself that the parties or their counsel as the case may be, have been informed of the transfer. In the instant case, admittedly, no notice was given to the petitioner when the case was transferred by the District Judge to the Court of respondent no. 3. (4) The court to which cases are transferred shall not proceed, without satisfying itself that the parties or their counsel as the case may be, have been informed of the transfer. In the instant case, admittedly, no notice was given to the petitioner when the case was transferred by the District Judge to the Court of respondent no. 3. Initially, the transferee court had passed an order for steps but subsequently, it was withdrawn on the application of respondent no. 1 on the ground that the petitioner had already been served personally. That order was passed forgetting that the earlier alleged service did not relate to the transfer of the case from one court to another. From the ordersheet of the transferee court which has been annexed along with this writ petition, it appears that the case was fixed on a number of dates but no notice for any of those dates including the dates fixed for final hearing was ever sent to the petitioner. The case itself was decided after the lapse of nearly 10 months of the initial notice alleged to have been sent to the petitioner when the case was pending in the court of District Judge. 13. It is not a case where any misconduct or gross negligence can be attributed to the petitioner. The petitioner had been diligently prosecuting his case in the earlier proceedings 'which had taken place before the trial court and other courts of which a mention has been made earlier. 14. The provisions for restoration of a case dismissed in default require ; a generous construction, as such provisions are meant to mitigate the hardship of the aggrieved person. Any party to the proceeding should not be deprived of a hearing unless there is something which establishes gross negligence or misconduct on its part nor a party should be punished on account of its previous negligence by rejecting the application for restoration. The findings recorded in the order rejecting the restoration application that there was a wilful neglect of the petitioner in not appearing in the court on the date fixed after the service of initial notice are wholly unwarranted. Likewise the findings that the restoration application was filed with a malafide intention to harass respondent no. 1 are not based on any cogent evidence brought on record. 15. Likewise the findings that the restoration application was filed with a malafide intention to harass respondent no. 1 are not based on any cogent evidence brought on record. 15. For the reasons given above the order rejecting the restoration application dated 21-3-1988 cannot be sustained and the same is quashed. 16. In view of my above findings Sri R. V. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1 urged that the second order dated 4-2-88 deciding the revision ex-parte may also be vacated and the revisional court may be directed to decide the revision afresh within a specified period to be fixed by this Court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner stated that he has no objection to the aforesaid course being adopted. Accordingly the order dated 4-2-88 is also quashed. The case is sent back to the court of respondent no. 3, IX Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr for deciding the revision giving rise to this writ petition afresh. The petitioner and the contesting respondent no. 1 have agreed that they will appear on 26-10-88 before the IXth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr to enable him to fix a date for final hearing of the revision restored to that Court. The IXth Additional District Judge is further directed to decide the said revision in accordance with law as far as possible before 31-12-88. 17. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.