JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second (Sic First) appeal by the plaintiff Man Mohan Dayal against the decree passed by the District Judge, Jodhpur on April 21, 1976 in Civil Suit of No. 9 of 1973 dismissing his suit for specific performance. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this first appeal are that on February 2, 1973 against Man Mohan Dayal instituted Civil Suit No. 9 of 1973 against the respondents with the averments that on December 6, 1955, he had made an application to the Municipal Council, Jodhpur for purchase of a plot of land measuring 10781 square yards, situated in Hakimon Ka Bagh, Jodhpur and shown in red colour by marks v c l n in the site plan enclosed to the plaint under the provisions of the Marwar Patta Ordinance. Upon the application of the plaintiff, this plot of land was auctioned on June 12 and 13, 1956 between 5.30 P.M. and 6.30 P. M. and the highest bid of Rs. 7101 /- was of the plaintiff in that auction. The plaintiff deposited an amount of Rs. 2000/- representing more than 1/4th amount of the auction money with the Municipal Council, Jodhpur in part payment of the sale price by a cheque dated June 13, 1956 drawn on the State Bank of Jodhpur. This cheque was got encashed by Municipal Council and a receipt dated June 28, 1956 was issued in favour of the plaintiff. 3. After the auction of this plot and before issuing a patta in favour of the plaintiff in respect thereof, a proclamation dated December 7, 1956 was issued inviting objections and thereafter on May 6, 1957, the Administrator of the Municipal Council, Jodhpur passed an order that this plot of land may be given to the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder, at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard and the Administrator also sanctioned the issue of a patta in favour of the plaintiff for this land after expiry of the period of appeal. As against the order of the Administrator dated March 6, 1957. Sardar High School. Jodhpur filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner which was accepted on June 10, 1957. 2/- per square yard and the Administrator also sanctioned the issue of a patta in favour of the plaintiff for this land after expiry of the period of appeal. As against the order of the Administrator dated March 6, 1957. Sardar High School. Jodhpur filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner which was accepted on June 10, 1957. The plaintiff filed a revision before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan against the order of the Additional Commissioner which was accepted by the Board on December 27, 1960 and the order of the Additional Commissioner dated June 10. 1957 was set aside. Sardar High School, Jodhpur then filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan against the order of the Administrator of the Municipal Council, Jodhpur dated May 6, 1957 which was dismissed by the Board on February 22 1965. Thus the order of the Administrator dated May 6, 1957 for sale of this plot to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard and the grant of patta in his favour became final. 4. During the pendency of the appeal of Sardar High School, Jodhpur, the State of Rajasthan had constituted Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur and the Khalsa (Government) land of Jodhpur city came within the jurisdiction of the Urban Improvement Trust. Since this plot of land had been sold to the plaintiff on May 6, 1957 and the Municipal Council, Jodhpur had also accepted an amount of Rs. 2000/- as against the sale price from the plaintiff this land did not fall within the category of khalsa land. The plaintiff even then made applications both to Municipal Council, Jodhpur and Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur to grant a patta in favour of the plaintiff in respect of this land after accepting the balance of the price amount and to deliver its possession to the plaintiff, but both these defendants Nos. 2 and 3 neither granted a patta not other title dead in favour of the plaintiff nor delivered its possession to him. The plaintiff served notices dated July 29, 1967 upon the State of Rajasthan and Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur and also upon the Municipal Council. Jodhpur on June 29, 1970 but with no effect. 2 and 3 neither granted a patta not other title dead in favour of the plaintiff nor delivered its possession to him. The plaintiff served notices dated July 29, 1967 upon the State of Rajasthan and Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur and also upon the Municipal Council. Jodhpur on June 29, 1970 but with no effect. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the present suit against the respondents praying that a decree for specific performance may be passed against the respondent to the effect that after accepting the balance sale price of Rs. 19,562/-, they should execute a patta or other title deed in plaintiffs favour in respect of the suit plot of land and also a decree for possession over it. 5. The suit was contested by all the three defendants. So far as the State of Rajasthan is concerned, it pleaded that on December 6, 1955, the plaintiff had made no application for purchase of the plot of land as described and detailed in para No. I of the plaint. It was pleaded that the Patta Officer, Jodhpur did not have absolute rights to auction this plot. It was also denied that the Administrator of the Municipal Council, Jodhpur passed any order on May 6, 1957 regarding sale of this land to the plaintiff at Rs. 2/- per square yard and the plaintiff was also not communicated by any such order. According to the State of Rajasthan, the area where this land is situated vested in Urban Improvement Trust. Jodhpur on its constitution on November 1, 1960 As the land had not been sold to the plaintiff, there was no question of executing a patta in his favour or to deliver its possession. According to the State. on December 1, 1953 this plot of land and the land of the adjoining areas were within the jurisdiction of Development Department. By a notification published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated January 9, 194. this land was transferred to the Municipal Council, Jodhpur and it was expressly provided in this notification that all sales will be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. The Municipal Council, Jodhpur did not obtain any previous approval of the State Government for the sale of this plot of land. this land was transferred to the Municipal Council, Jodhpur and it was expressly provided in this notification that all sales will be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. The Municipal Council, Jodhpur did not obtain any previous approval of the State Government for the sale of this plot of land. Apart from that, under section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipality Act, 1943, the Administrator had no right to sell the land without obtaining the sanction of the Minister Incharge. Moreover, until an agreement was executed in accordance with the provisions of the Jodhpur Municipality Act. the Municipality could not transfer any land. The State Government by its communication dated June 7, 1957 had specifically refused permission to sell this land. The suit was also stated to be barred by limitation. 6. So far as Municipal Council, Jodhpur is concerned, it pleaded that even if the plaintiff had made any application, the Municipal Council had no jurisdiction to take any proceedings under the Marwar Patta Ordinance and it was not bound by any unauthorised auction held of the suit land. On the appointment of Administrator of the Municipal Council, the land vested in the State Government and the order of the Administrator was not binding on the Municipal Council, Jodhpur. It was also pleaded that merely by order,it of an amount of Rs. 2000/-, no right could accrue in the land in favour of plaintiff until a registered sale deed as executed in his favour. The land now did not vest in the Municipal Council, Jodhpur. The suit was also stated to be barred by limitation. 7. The Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur (defendant No. 3) has pleaded that on November 24, 1955, the plaintiff had made an application to the City Patta Officer, Jodhpur for sale to him of a plot of land measuring 1700 square yards (yard was equivalent to 2 feet x 2 feet). It was admitted that the plot of land was auctioned on 12th and 13th June, 1956. The plaintiff's highest bid of Rs. 7101/- as neither accepted nor the Patta Officer, Jodhpur had authority to accept it. It was admitted that the plaintiff had deposited an amount of Rs. 2000/- on June 28, 1956. However, the auction of the plot of land was held under section 17(5) of the Marwar Patta Act only to pertains the prise of the land in the locality. 7101/- as neither accepted nor the Patta Officer, Jodhpur had authority to accept it. It was admitted that the plaintiff had deposited an amount of Rs. 2000/- on June 28, 1956. However, the auction of the plot of land was held under section 17(5) of the Marwar Patta Act only to pertains the prise of the land in the locality. The Urban Improvement Trust further pleaded that no proclamation was issued for inviting objections. However, there was a proposal made by the Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur on the file to offer the land at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard to the plaintiff but this offer was never communicated to him. It was admitted that there was appeal and revision by Sardar High School, Jodhpur and the plaintiff but no sale was confirmed in the plaintiff's favour and none was affected. According to it, go order for confirmation of sale or sale of the land to the plaintiff was passed on May 6.1957. On the other hand, the Administrator did not accept the auction and ordered for the return of Rs. 2010/- deposited by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed an appeal against that order before the Additional Commissioner but the same was dismissed on July 25, 1956. The State Government had constituted the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur on November 1, 1960 and all landlords vested in it including the suit plot of land. It was further pleaded that upto December 1, 1953, the suit plot of land and the adjoining area was within the jurisdiction of the City Development Committee. It was on December 2, 1953 that this area was transferred by the State Government to the Municipal Council, Jodhpur with the express condition that the Municipal Council will have no right to sell any land situated within this area without the sanction of the State Government and therefore, the Administrator, Municipal Council Jodhpur had no authority to sell the suit plot of land to the plaintiff as he had not obtained any sanction of the State Government in this regard. Apart from that, sanction of the Minister Incharge as required by section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipality Act, 1943 was also not obtained. No agreement to sell was executed in favour of the plaintiff in accordance with section 80 of the said Act. Apart from that, sanction of the Minister Incharge as required by section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipality Act, 1943 was also not obtained. No agreement to sell was executed in favour of the plaintiff in accordance with section 80 of the said Act. As no contract for sale of the land came into existence, there was no question of granting any decree in favour of the plaintiff for specific performance. The State Government had reserved this land and the land adjoining to it for the purpose of hospital and it could not be sold to the plaintiff Apart from that, the Urban Improvement Trust had also framed a scheme for development of this area and for this reason also, its sale cannot be made in favour of the plaintiff. The receipt of the notice dated July 29, 1967 was denied and the notice dated October 3, 1961 was said to be invalid. The suit was also pleaded to be barred by limitation. 8. The trial court framed as many as 11 issues in the case. The trial court held that the plaintiff had made an application Ex. A/1 on November 24, 1955 for the grant of patta of khalsa land measuring about 1700 square yards to the City Patta Officer, Jodhpur. The City Patta Officer got the plot of land auctioned in order to ascertain the local rate giving the plaintiff preference to purchase it for the highest bid amount. The plaintiff's bid was highest of Rs. 7101 in respect of the plot of land measuring 10781/1/4 square yards. The plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 2000/- on May 6, 1957 The Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur passed an order that if the plaintiff wanted to purchase 10781/1-4 square yards land, he will have to pay Rs. 2/-. per square yard, otherwise the auction proceedings be cancelled and the deposited amount be returned to the plaintiff. Instructions were given to the Patta officer that in case the plaintiff agreed to pay and get the land at the above rate, no patta will be issued to him so long as the period of appeal was over. The trial court held that no document had been placed on record by either of the parties to establish that this order dated May 6, 1957 was communicated to the plaintiff and that the offer made therein was accepted by the plaintiff. The trial court held that no document had been placed on record by either of the parties to establish that this order dated May 6, 1957 was communicated to the plaintiff and that the offer made therein was accepted by the plaintiff. However, on the basis of plaintiff's statement and his conduct, it was found that the order dated May 6, 1957 was within the knowledge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was willing and agreeable to the proposed rate mentioned in the order. The District Judge further held that the suit plot of land was situated beyond the city walls of Jodhpur and prior to December 2, 1953 it fell within the jurisdiction of the Development Department The Rajasthan State Government by notification dated December 2, 1953 (Ex. A/10) placed this area along with other areas at there disposal of the Jodhpur Municipality. The notification laid down that all sales shall he effected with the previous sanction of the State Government. It was held that the Administrator could only pass order for sale of the suit plot of land with the sanction of the State Government. It was the duty of the plaintiff to have produced the necessary sanction but no such sanction had been produced On the other hand there were communications on the record which go to show that the State Government had required the land in question to be reserved for other specific purpose. Thus according, to the trial court the order dated May 6, 1957 was not legal and was not power of the Administrator without the previous sanction of the State Government. Moreover, according to the trial court, the order dated May 6, 1957 neither amounted to sale nor an agreement to sell for the reason that there was no compliance of the provisions contained in section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipality Act. The trial court while deciding issue Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff, decided issue Nos. 1 and 4 against him. The trial court was further of the view that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied to the case. The plaintiff had served 15 days' notice in 1961 and thereafter be served notice on November 15,1966 under section 98 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act. 1 and 4 against him. The trial court was further of the view that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied to the case. The plaintiff had served 15 days' notice in 1961 and thereafter be served notice on November 15,1966 under section 98 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act. After this notice, the plaintiff could not put off his claim considering that there had been no refusal on the part of the defendants to accede to his relief. The plaintiff' further gave a notice on June 29, 1967 and even thereafter the suit was not instituted within three years but was instituted on February 2, 1973. According to the trial court, inaction and silence on the part of the defendants, even when demands had been made, an effective cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff. The suit was held to be barred by limitation. The trial court further held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that notice dated July 29, 1967 was served on the Urban Improvement Trust and the State of Rajasthan. It was further held that notice dated November 15, 1956 had been waived by the plaintiff and he cannot rely upon this notice even as against Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur. This notice could not be availed of even against the State of Rajasthan as it was not a notice under section 80 C.P.C. Issue No. 7 (c) was thus decided against the plaintiff. In view of the above findings the trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for specific performance. The trial court proceeded further observed that even if the issues would have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, he was not entitled to the grant of discretionary relief for specific performance. The reason given was that the Urban Improvement Trust has published a scheme under section 32 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act by a notification Ex. A/1. The plaintiff himself had represented for an alternative site. In these circumstances also, the plaintiff had not been able to make out a case for the grant of specific relief. On the basis of these findings, the trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the decree of dismissal of his suit, the plaintiff has preferred this civil first appeal. 9. In these circumstances also, the plaintiff had not been able to make out a case for the grant of specific relief. On the basis of these findings, the trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the decree of dismissal of his suit, the plaintiff has preferred this civil first appeal. 9. The first question that arises for determination is whether a civil right had been created in favour of the plaintiff appellant by virtue of the order of the Administrator, Municipal Council. Jodhpur dated May 6, 1957 for conveyance of the suit plot of land measuring 10781 square yards which could be specifically enforced against the defendants and more particularly against the defendant No. 3. At the outset, I may mention the factual aspects of the case. Ex. A/7 is the file in which proceedings took place on the application of the appellant for the grant of a patta in respect of a plot of land. On November 24, 1955, the plaintiff Man Mohan Dayal made an application Ex. A/1 addressed to the City Patta Officer, Jodhpur City stating that the road behind Olympic Cinema, Jodhpur leads towards the ground of Sardar High School and on the right hand side of this road, there was lying khalsa (Government) land. One Shri Gaj Singh had applied for grant of land near this Khalsa land. Near that land there was approximately 1700 yards land which he wanted to take It was requested by the plaintiff in his application that the said land may be granted to him and patty may be issued in his favour according to the actual measurements of the land. Boundaries of this khalsa land were also mentioned in the application. The statement of the plaintiff was recorded on that very date and the plaintiff deposited a fee of Rs. 2/- for preparing of the site plan. It was ordered that the site plan may be produced and thereupon a proclamation may be published. On January 9, 1956, it was ordered that the file may be put up after the expiry of the period specified in the proclamation. On 17th January, 1956 the period specified in the proclamation had expired. It was mentioned that there was no further necessity of any evidence and the file be but up on site and decision. On January 9, 1956, it was ordered that the file may be put up after the expiry of the period specified in the proclamation. On 17th January, 1956 the period specified in the proclamation had expired. It was mentioned that there was no further necessity of any evidence and the file be but up on site and decision. On 13.4.1956 City Patta Officer, Jodhpur submitted proposal No. 7 before the Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur.In this proposal, it was mentioned that the plaintiff sought release of khalsa land in Bheroo Bagh. Total land comprised of 10781-1/4 square yards shown in khasra Nos. 1 and 2 in the plan dated 6.12.1955. It was further mentioned that the necessary proceedings had been taken. The land was open and in order to ascertain as to how may pattas were issued by the Development Department a letter had been addressed on 8-3-1956 to the Development officer, but no reply was received. The City Patta Officer personally went to the Development Officer o obtain necessary information but nothing could come out. The report of Incharge D.A. was that no patta was granted in this locality for the open land except one plot to Shri Gaj Singh. In view of these facts, the City Patta Officer, Jodhpur saw no objection in granting this land to the plaintiff but since the land was an open piece, it was desired to be auctioned under section 17 (5) of the Marwar Patta Ordinance, 1921 in order to ascertain the locality rate. It was proposed that the plaintiff shall have preference to purchase it for the price of last bid. The proposal was submitted for confirmation to the Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur. The Administrator called for some further report from the City Patta Officer, Jodhpur and after discussion he ordered on 23-5-1956 that he would like to take up all other cases simultaneously instead of piece-meal in the locality. However, it was felt that the case of the plaintiff had come upon a final form and, therefore, the land may be put to an auction as per rules. The City Patta Officer ordered for issue of a proclamation of sale to be held on 12th and 13th June, 1956. An auction was held of the plot and the highest bid of Rs. 7101/- was of the plaintiff The plaintiff gave a cheque of Rs. The City Patta Officer ordered for issue of a proclamation of sale to be held on 12th and 13th June, 1956. An auction was held of the plot and the highest bid of Rs. 7101/- was of the plaintiff The plaintiff gave a cheque of Rs. 2000/- on account of the sale of this land on that very date and a receipt was also issued to him on 28.6.1956. However, immediately after this auction was held, the Director, Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan wrote a letter to the Secretary, Medical and Health Department wherein he requested that these plots may be reserved for construction of quarters and further extension of hospital as had already been approved by the former Government of Jodhpur. This letter was forwarded by the Secretary to Government to the Commissioner, Jodhpur and the Commissioner forwarded the same to the Administrator, Municipal Board, Jodhpur on July 2, 1956. It also appears that the Collector, Jodhpur also wrote a letter to the Administrator, Municipal Council Jodhpur regarding auction of the playground attached to Sardar High School, Jodhpur with reference to some communication which had been received from Deputy Director, Education, Jodhpur (Bikaner Range). As the Commissioner and the Collector, Jodhpur had instructed that so long as the dispute of Sardar High School play ground and the doctors' quarters were not settled, the land should not be auctioned, the Administrator ordered on 27.6.1956 that the cheque of Rs. 2000/- given by the plaintiff should be returned to him and proceedings be stayed as long the Administrator, had not discussed the matter with the Commissioner and the Collector. The plaintiff filed an appeal No. 77 of 1956 against the order of the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality dated 28-6-1956 whereby he had referred to a separate order passed by him for return of the cheque to the plaintiff before the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur. The Additional Commissioner held that as long the sale was not confirmed nobody got any vested legal right to question any act done by the sanctioning authority and the latter was at liberty to consult anyone he liked before sanctioning the sale. The order of the Administrator for return of the deposited money of Rs. 2000/- was held to be justified. It was observed that it was wrong for the Patta Officer to have got the money deposited when he had no power to confirm the salt'. The order of the Administrator for return of the deposited money of Rs. 2000/- was held to be justified. It was observed that it was wrong for the Patta Officer to have got the money deposited when he had no power to confirm the salt'. The Administrator, was therefore right in ordering the return of the amount of Rs. 2000/- to the plaintiff and he dismissed the appeal referred by the plaintiff on 25th July, 1956. It appears that thereafter on 6th May 1957 the Administrator Jodhpur Municipality passed the crucial order upon which the plaintiff relies. In this order the Administrator referred to the past history of the case as already stated above. The Administrator mentioned in his order that he had not received final instructions from the Commissioner, Jodhpur who had advised him to wait for further communication from the Deputy Director of Education, Jodhpur and from the Director of Medical and Public Health Department, Rajasthan. He then mentioned that just after the auction, it was a general practice that the highest bidder deposits a part of his bid and accordingly the plaintiff had deposited the amount of Rs. 2000/-. He also referred to the appellate order of the Additional Commissioner. He heard the plaintiff and stated that no regular objections were received by him from any quarter as per Patta Ordinance. With regard to the objection of the Deputy Director or Education, he observed that he had inspected the site several times. In the field there were two game poles one on east side but he never found the students playing and further that Sardar High School authorities have got another play ground. As regards claim of the Director, Medical and Public Health, the Administrator observed that it was still to be known whether that Department was in position to construct quarters on this plot. He had, however, not received any communication if the Government was intending or any scheme was pending to construct hospital quarters on this plot. The Administrator then examined the merits of the case. He stated that the area of the plot was 107811/4 square yards (yard 2X2 feet) and the last bid offered was Rs. 7101/-. The average cost thus came to near-about 12 annas per square gaz. The Administrator then examined the merits of the case. He stated that the area of the plot was 107811/4 square yards (yard 2X2 feet) and the last bid offered was Rs. 7101/-. The average cost thus came to near-about 12 annas per square gaz. He mentioned that there were circumstances relating to nearby localities where the sale had been effected by providing parties and the Municipality at the rate ranging from Rs. 1/- to Rs. 5/- per square gaz. Keeping all the facts in view regarding the rate, the Administrator ordered that if the plaintiff liked to purchase this big area of land, he will have to pay at Rs. 2/- per square gaz, otherwise, the auction proceedings be cancelled and the deposited amount be returned to the plaintiff under section 28 of the Patta Ordinance. The Patta Officer, Municipal Board, Jodhpur was further instructed that in case the plaintiff agreed to pay and get the land at the above rate, no patta will be issued to him so long the period of appeal was over. The copies of this order were to be forwarded to the Commissioner, Jodhpur, Collector, Jodhpur. Director Medical & Health Services, Jodhpur and to the Deputy Director of Education for taking said auction as they deem fit. It appears that Sardar High School authorities filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur against the above order of the Administrator dated 6th May, 1957. The appeal of Sardar High School was accepted by the Additional Commissioner on 10th June, 1957. The plaintiff then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue against the appellate order of the Additional Commissioner Jodhpur. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff before the Board of Revenue that the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and his appellate decision should be held to be nullity. On the questions of jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner, the plaintiff relied upon a judgment of this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Case No. 128 of 1957 (Bar Singh v. Board of Revenue) decided on February 9, 1958. In that case it was held that an appeal from what is colloquially called Patta Committee lies to the Board of Revenue ups 30 of the Marwar Patta Ordinance. In that case it was held that an appeal from what is colloquially called Patta Committee lies to the Board of Revenue ups 30 of the Marwar Patta Ordinance. On the basis of this decision, the Board of Revenue on 27th December, 1960 allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs, set aside the order of the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur as being a nullity and remitted the case back to the Additional Commissioner with the direction that the memo of appeal filed before him be returned to the persons who presented it for presentation to the competent court. Thereafter Sardar High School, Jodhpur, on return of the memorandum of appeal by the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur presented appeal against the order of the Administrator, Municipality, Jodhpur dated 6th May, 1957 before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal of Sardar High School, Jodhpur on 22.2.1965 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Board of Revenue observed : "Since the appellant failed to present his appeal immediately after 18.9.1961, it should have been shown that the delay was for good and sufficient reasons which merited consideration, under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appellant has clearly been negligent in presenting the appeal, no reasons have not (?) been shown for the delay. We therefore, uphold the preliminary objection with regard to limitation and dismiss this appeal." The plaintiff states that he served the originals of notices Ex. 6 and Ex 7 on the defendants for executing title deed in his favour in respect of the suit plot of land on payment of Rs. 19562/- by him and further to pay him in possession of the said plot but with no effect and, therefore, he filed the present suit on February 6, 1973. 10. As already stated, the plaintiff had made application for grant to him of 1700 square yards unoccupied Government land and for issue of a patta in that respect in his favour to the City Patty Officer, Jodhpur. Section 6 (4) of the Marwar Patta Ordinance, 1921 provided that every person who after 31st December, 1925 desired to obtain possession of any unoccupied land shall, before occupying it, obtain, a patta or if he is entitled to it a parwana therefor. Section 6 (4) of the Marwar Patta Ordinance, 1921 provided that every person who after 31st December, 1925 desired to obtain possession of any unoccupied land shall, before occupying it, obtain, a patta or if he is entitled to it a parwana therefor. Section 17 (5) of the Ordinance provided that unoccupied land for a patta of which application is made shall, unless there is any local customer authoritative grant to the contrary, be put to public auction. The arrant shall be given the option of purchasing it at the price last bid, and if he is unwilling to do so, it shall, unless there are valid reasons to the contrary why this bid should not be accepted, which shall be recorded in writing, be knocked down to the person who made the highest bid. Then there is a proviso to section 17(5) of the Ordinance which interalia provides that if the price last bid is for any reason too high or too low, it shall be in the discretion of the 'Hakim' for reasons to be recorded n writing, to determine the fair price for the land and to offer it on the price so determined to the applicant, if he is unwilling to take it, at such price, to any other person who is prepared to take it. The expression 'Hakim' was defined as including the kotwal of the City of Jodhpur. Section 25 of the Ordinance provided that the proceedings shall in the case of the Patta Officer or officers, Jodhpur City shall be submitted to the City Kotwal or in the case of the 'Hakim', Jodhpur and Hawala Superintendent to the Mahakma Khas for final orders, and the parties informed that this is being done. Then section 26 stated that it was not incumbent on the parties to appear before the Superintendent, the City Kotwal or the Mahakma Khas, but if either parties aggrieved by the order passed by the Patta Officer, Jodhpur City, he should at once file an application in the Court of the Superintendent or the City Kotwal or the Mahakma Khas as the case may be, expressing his desire to be personally head. Then section 28 provided that on receiving the proceedings the authorities may, for reasons to be given, confirm, modify or alter them in any respect or call for further information or refuse to sanction them. Then section 28 provided that on receiving the proceedings the authorities may, for reasons to be given, confirm, modify or alter them in any respect or call for further information or refuse to sanction them. However, no refusal to sanction shall be made without hearing the person whose interests are affected. Section 29 provided that on receipt of the orders sanctioning the proceedings, the 'Hakim' shall issue a notice calling upon the person in whose name the patty has been sanctioned to deposit the sum including all other dues Any person aggrieved by any order of the Superintendent or City Kotwal could file an appeal to Mahakma Khas. It may be mentioned that in pursuance of the orders of his Highness former State of Jodhpur No. 878 dated 13th June, 1928, certain rules were framed and published anr the guidance of persons desiring to obtain patta of any unoccupied land situated within any area administered by a Municipal Board and in the case of the Jodhpur City within the area comprised within the walls of circum vallation only in pursuance of section 36(7) of the Patta Ordinance. It was provided in these rules that any person, desiring to obtain patta for any land to which these rules applied shall, apply for the same in the first instance to the Municipal Board concerned. The Municipal Board should proceed to hear any objections that may be filed make such local enquiry as it deems necessary and determine with respect to the objections and the public interest whether a patta should be granted for the land in question If the Municipal Board refused to grant a patta, its refusal was to be final subject to appeal to the Mahakma Khas. If the Municipal Board decided to grant a patta, it was to record its decision to that effect and was to direct the applicant to file an application for patta in the Court of the Kotwal or Hakim, as the case may be, attaching thereto a copy of the report of the Board. Then the Kotsal or the 'Hakim' was to grant a patta in accordance with the decision of the Municipal Board. It is pertinent to note that these rules applied to cases where a person desired to obtain the possession of unoccupied land for building within the city walls of Jodhpur or within municipal areas elsewhere than at Jodhpur. Then the Kotsal or the 'Hakim' was to grant a patta in accordance with the decision of the Municipal Board. It is pertinent to note that these rules applied to cases where a person desired to obtain the possession of unoccupied land for building within the city walls of Jodhpur or within municipal areas elsewhere than at Jodhpur. In respect of area outside the city walls of Jodhpur, the procedure was to first obtain a patta for the land and then to apply to any authority that may be empowered to regulate buildings within the area in which the land was situated. Grant of Patta outside city walls of Jodhpur was governed by another notification dated April 16, 1930 and Development Department was proper authority. 11. The plot of land in dispute was clearly not situated within the area comprised within the walls of circumvallation of Jodhpur City. The suit plot of land was clearly situated outside the walls of circumvallation of 'Jodhpur City. On behalf of the plaintiff, no other rules were placed before this Court in order to show that the Municipal Council, Jodhpur has power to giant patta in respect of land lying outside the are a comprised within the walls of circumvallation of Jodhpur City. In its absence, it becomes very doubtful, if the Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur has power or jurisdiction to decide to grant patta of this land t, the plaintiff. This is only one aspect of the matter. Then there is a notification of the Rajasthan State Government No. F. l(ka) (8) (L.S.G.) dated December 2, 1953 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated January 9, 1954 and which is Ex. A/10 on the record. This notification mentions that the area of Jodhpur specified therein, which was within the jurisdiction of City Improvement Committee, is taken away from the jurisdiction of that committee and is transferred to Jodhpur Municipal Board. The suit plot of land falls within the area mentioned in this notification. The State Government by this notification transferred this area from City Improvement Committee of (to) Jodhpur Municipal Board. The State Government further ordered that the Jodhpur Municipal Board will have powers and rights to transfer the land falling within this area as were vested in the City Improvement Committee, but subject to the conditions mentioned in the notification. The State Government by this notification transferred this area from City Improvement Committee of (to) Jodhpur Municipal Board. The State Government further ordered that the Jodhpur Municipal Board will have powers and rights to transfer the land falling within this area as were vested in the City Improvement Committee, but subject to the conditions mentioned in the notification. The first condition imposed was that all sales will be subject to previous sanction or approval of the State Government. It appears that the place where the suit plot of land is situated immediately before December 2, 1953 vested in City Improvement Committee and it was for the first time by the notification Ex. A/10 that the area of land mentioned there which also included the area of the suit plot of the land. was transferred to the Municipal Board Jodhpur with all those rights and powers which previously vested in the City Improvement Committee including the right to sell lands falling within the said area but condition was imposed by the State Government that all sales of land will be subject to the previous approval of the State Government. It appears, therefore, that the Administrator, Municipal Council, Jodhpur could only act while disposing of this land under the provisions of the Jodhpur Municipal Act and subject to the conditions specified in the State Government notification dated December 2. 1953 by virtue of which the area of land mentioned therein was transferred to the Municipal Board, Jodhpur. 12. Section 92 (1) (d) of the Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943 provided that subject to any special reservation made or any special conditions imposed by the Government in this behalf. all property of the nature specified in that section and situated within the limits of the Municipality, shall be municipal property and shall vest in and be under the control of the Board. In Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 92, all and or other property transferred to the municipality by the Government or by gift. purchase or otherwise for local public purposes are specified. It is clear from this section that while transferring land to the municipality,the State Government could impose special conditions upon the municipality. The State Government could specify that while disposing of the land in question under the provisions of Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943, previous sanction or approval of the State Government will be obtained. It is clear from this section that while transferring land to the municipality,the State Government could impose special conditions upon the municipality. The State Government could specify that while disposing of the land in question under the provisions of Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943, previous sanction or approval of the State Government will be obtained. Entire file of the Municipal Board, Jodhpur Ex A/7 has been exhibited in the case. The file does not show the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality had obtained previous sanction or approval of the State Government before passing his order dated May 6, 1957. It also does not mention that the Administrator had obtained any previous sanction from the State Government for the transfer of this plot of land to the plaintiff. 'Aus the pre-requisite condition of obtaining previous sanction or approval of the State Government was not fulfilled in the present case. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial court should have drawn the presumption under section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that all official acts had been regularly performed. In the first place, drawing of presumption under section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act is discretionary. Secondly before any pre emption under section 114. Illustration (e) can arise it must be shown that the orders are on the face of them. regular and confirm to provisions of rule under which they purport to have been made. On the face of the order dated May 6, 1957, there is nothing to show that the Administrator had obtained the previous sanction or approval of the State Government. Had such a mention been made in his order of the Administrator, the fact of previous sanction could have been presumed without production of the sanction. The meaning of section 114 (e) of The Evidence Act is that if an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been regularly done. It does not raise any presumption that an act as done of which there was no evidence and the existence of which is essential to the plaintiff's case. The meaning of section 114 (e) of The Evidence Act is that if an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been regularly done. It does not raise any presumption that an act as done of which there was no evidence and the existence of which is essential to the plaintiff's case. Apart from the fact that file of the Jodhpur Municipality does nowhere show that the previous sanction of the State Government was obtained and the fact that the order of the Administrator dated May 6, 1957 does nowhere mention that the sanction was obtained, the plaintiff himself in his cross-examination stated that he does not know if the Administrator had obtained sanction of the State Government before passing the order Ex. 4 for the sale of the disputed plot of land to him. In such circumstances no question of drawing any presumption under section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act that sanction of the State Government was obtained. can arise. Reference may be made to the decision of Allahabad High Court in Raghunath and others v. The Municipal Board Mathura, (AIR 1952 Allahabad 465) . Rule 2 printed at page 260 of the Municipal Manual in that case provided that immovable property vested in the Board shall not except with the previous approval of the Commissioner, be transferred by the Board by way of sale, mortgage or otherwise. In that case, a previous approval was obtained of the Commissioner for the sales effected by the Municipal Board. Relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Anant Krishnaji (1934 All. L.J. 162) it was held that where the statute authorised particular authority to make an order only with the previous sanction of higher authority, the order, if made, without such previous sanction is utterly invalid. The sale deeds, in that case, where therefore, held to be void even though they had been approved by the Commissioner subsequently. Where enabling powers are conferred for public reasons on functionaries coupled with a duty to exercise them when the circumstances so demanded by Statute or statutory rules or regulations the functionaries have to exercise powers and to perform the duties in accordance with such statutory provision. Such powers and duties cannot be shirked or shelved nor could they be evaded. Where enabling powers are conferred for public reasons on functionaries coupled with a duty to exercise them when the circumstances so demanded by Statute or statutory rules or regulations the functionaries have to exercise powers and to perform the duties in accordance with such statutory provision. Such powers and duties cannot be shirked or shelved nor could they be evaded. Consequently, therefore, when the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality had passed the order dated May 6, 1957 regarding sale of the suit plot of land without the previous sanction or approval of the State Government, the order was in contravention of of the conditions imposed upon the Municipality by notification Ex. A/10 and as such it did not create any right in favour of the plaintiff to have this plot of land sold to him. 13. It may next be mentioned that section 233 of the Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943 made provision for supersession of Municipal Board and its clause (c) of sub-section (3) provided that where the Board is superseded and Administrator is appointed under clause (b), all property and rights vested in the Board shall, until the Board is reconstituted, vest in the Government. Thus when Administrator had been appointed in respect of Jodhpur Municipality, the property of the Municipality vested in the Government until the Board was reconstituted. In that view of the matter also, the Administrator had no power to transfer this land to the plaintiff. 14. There is still another hurdle in the way of the plaintiff. Section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943 provided that every contract made by or on behalf of the Board, whereof the value or amount exceeds Rs. 50/-, shall be written and shall be signed by the President and attested by the Secretary. Then sub-section (2) of Section 80 provided that every transfer of immovable property belonging to be Board shall be made by an instrument in writing executed by the President and attested by the Secretary and provided that no transfer of immovable property the value whereof exceeds Rs. 500/- or above shall be entered into until it has been sanctioned by the Minister incharge. Sub-sec.(3)of section 80 provided that no contract or transfer executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the Board. 500/- or above shall be entered into until it has been sanctioned by the Minister incharge. Sub-sec.(3)of section 80 provided that no contract or transfer executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the Board. In the instant case, no contract was executed on behalf of the Jodhpur Municipality in writing and signed by the Administrator and attested by the Secretary. Similarly no instrument of transfer of the suit plot was made in writing executed by the Administrator and attested by the Secretary and no sanction of the Minister Incharge or State Government was obtained. Clearly, therefore, no valid contract or transfer came into existence between the plaintiff and the Jodhpur Municipality. Reference may be made to he decision in the case of Dr. H. S. Rikhi v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (AIR 1961 SC 554) . In that case, the facts were that New Delhi Municipality had built in 1945 Central Municipal Market, Lodi Colony. This market had 32 shops with residential plots on 28 of them. In April. 1945, the Municipal Committee. in pursuance of a resolution passed by it, invited tenders from intending bidders for those shops and premises. On receipt of tenders, the highest bidders were allotted various shops on rents varying from Rs. 133.50 to Rs. 520/- per month. The allot tees occupied the shops and continued to pay the respective amounts characterised as rents. Later on 30 of the occupants filed applications under section 8 of the Rent Control Act for fixation of standard rent. The Municipal Committee raised preliminary objections that there was no relationship of land lord and tenant between the applicants and the Municipal Committee. Section 47 of the Municipal Act contained provisions more or less similar to the provisions contained in Section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipal Act of 1943. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that in order that the transfer of the property should be binding on the Municipal Committee, it was essential that it should have been made by an instrument in writing executed by the President or the Vice President and at least two other members of the Committee and the execution by them should have been attested by the Secretary. If these conditions were not fulfilled the contract of transfer shall not be binding on the Municipal Committee. If these conditions were not fulfilled the contract of transfer shall not be binding on the Municipal Committee. It was also held that the provisions like this are mandatory and not directory. In the instant case, neither any valid contract in accordance with section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipality Act of 1943 for a valid transfer in respect of the suit plot of land came into being so as to bind the Municipal Committee, Jodhpur and consequently to create any right in plaintiff's favour. On all these scores, there is neither a valid contract nor a valid statutory order of the Jodhpur Municipality creating any right in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit plot of land which he could get specifically performed by the suit which he filed. I uphold the findings of the trial court that the order dated May 6, 1957 made by the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality was illegal and void and also hold that the order dated May 6, 1957 neither amounted to sell nor an agreement to sell the suit plot of land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff cannot. therefore. either on the basis of any contract or of any statutory order get purported obligation specifically enforced against any of the respondents. 15. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant vehemently urged that the provisions contained in the Specific Relief Act are not exhaustive or all kinds of relief and the suit of the plaintiff will be governed by the general provisions contained in section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . In this connection, he has referred to some decisions which may be dealt with. Before doing so, it may be mentioned that practically it was conceded that there was no contract of sale of the suit plot between the plaintiff and the Jodhpur Municipality and there was only an order of the Administrator regarding sale of this plot of land. The learned counsel for the plaintiff urged that it was a statutory order which conferred rights on the plaintiff to get the suit plot of land transferred in his favour on payment of the balance of consideration amount. As regards contract of sale, reference may be made to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that except as is provided therein, where any relief is claimed under Chapter II in respect of a contract. As regards contract of sale, reference may be made to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that except as is provided therein, where any relief is claimed under Chapter II in respect of a contract. the persons against whom the relief is claimed may plead by way of defence any ground which is available to him under any law relating to contracts. Defence is, therefore, available to the respondents to plead that there was no valid contract in existence between the parties regarding the sale of the suit plot of land in accordance with Section 80 of the Jodhpur Municipalities Act of 1943. The law is well settled that where the law does not recognise a contract there can be no specific performance of it. 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raghunath's case (supra) and urged on its basis that the statutory order of the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality, cast a legal duty upon the Municipality to transfer the suit plot of land in favour of the plaintiff and invested corresponding legal right in the plaintiff which he can get enforced under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Facts in the above Allahabad case were that some land was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of Municipal Board of Mathura for laying a park to be called Dampier Park for the use of the public. The land belonged to the plaintiff and the same was acquired. The Municipal Board thereafter levelled the land and planted some trees but later on gave up the idea of laying out the park or using the land for that purpose. As the Municipal Board, Mathura no longer required the acquired land for the Park, it sold it to defendant Nos. 3 to 6 under four sale deeds. The trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for a declaration that The sale deeds made in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 6 by the Municipality were void but it did not grant any other relief to the plaintiff. Appeals were filed against the decree of the trial court. The first appellate court upheld the decree with some modifications about costs. Sons of one of the plaintiffs came in second appeal. 3 to 6 by the Municipality were void but it did not grant any other relief to the plaintiff. Appeals were filed against the decree of the trial court. The first appellate court upheld the decree with some modifications about costs. Sons of one of the plaintiffs came in second appeal. There was a proviso to Rule 2 of the Municipal Manual that when any land acquired ceased to be used or required for the purpose mention in the notification of acquisition, the Municipal Board shall relinquish such land to the Collector of the District who will dispose of it in accord trice with rules in Chapter XX. The relevant rule in Chapter XX was that the proprietary rights in the land should ordinarily, as an act of grace, be first offered to the persons from whom they were acquired, or to their heirs if discoverable. It was contended on behalf of the Municipality that the rules in Chapter XX were departmental rules and did not form part of the law of land and as such did not create any right in the plaintiff and secondly that even if the rules had been made under a statutory power, they refer to a matter beyond the scope of the purpose for which they could be made and are not of a binding character. Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court held that when departmental rules are framed or made part of the statutes either by Statute itself or by a rule framed thereunder, although they are initially framed for administrative purposes, they became statutory by such incorporation. It was further held that such rules could be made under section 296 (2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The discretion vested in the Collector in Rule 545 finding place in Chapter XX could not be exercised arbitrarily but reasonably and judicially. Dealing with section 55 of the Specific Relief Act, it was held that no doubt an obligation is co-related as to a legal right and normally one would expect that prevention of the breach of an obligation as reference to the obligation owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's right arises only when the obligation cast upon the Municipal Board is performed, that is to say, after the Municipal Board had relinquished the It in favour of the Collector. The plaintiff's right arises only when the obligation cast upon the Municipal Board is performed, that is to say, after the Municipal Board had relinquished the It in favour of the Collector. It was held that the plaintiff's right cannot be defeated because the Municipal Board chooses not to perform its obligation and the Courts have power to prevent the breach of an obligation in the circumstances of that case. It was pointed out that the house worth Rs. 25000/- was constructed by the purchaser before the suit. Dealing with this situation, their Lordships observed that the Collector may in the circumstances of the case justifiably refuse to offer the land sold by Municipal Board to Mangilal to the plaintiff. The Court, therefore, refused an injunction or declaration in respect of land sold to Mangilal. However, with regard to other land, the appeal was partly allowed and an injunction was granted against the Municipal Board Mathura to relinquish the land comprised in the sale deeds executed by Municipal Board in favour of defendants Nos. 4 and 6 to be disposed of by the Collector according to law. 17. With respect to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raghunath's case (supra), it may be mentioned that it was an admitted position that the Municipal Board ceased to use or require the land for the purpose for which it was acquired and, therefore, it was mandatory for the Municipal Board to relinquish such land to the Collector for disposal in accordance with Chapter XX. In the case before me, it has been found that the Administrator had neither obtained previous sanction of the State Government for transfer of the land to the plaintiff and nor he had jurisdiction to pass the order. When the order of the Administrator, Jodhpur Municipality itself was illegal and without jurisdiction, no question arises of passing a decree for enforcement of the order. 18. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff upon the decision in E. Achuthan Nair v. P. Narayanan Nair and another ( AIR 1987 SC 2137 ). In that case the question argued on behalf of the dependant-appellant was that a suit for demarcating the boundary of property was not maintainable when, the plaintiff himself was uncertain about the precise boundary. In that case the question argued on behalf of the dependant-appellant was that a suit for demarcating the boundary of property was not maintainable when, the plaintiff himself was uncertain about the precise boundary. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that it would not be justified in importing into our jurisprudence the technicalities of English Law and distinction made by English Courts between legal estates and equitable. In India, the question where a suit is cognizable by a Civil Court is to be decided with reference to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . If the suit is of a civil nature, the Court will have jurisdiction to try the suit unless it is either expressly or impliedly barred. A dispute regarding identification of boundary between two adjacent land owners was held to be a dispute of a civil nature and it was not barred either expressly or impliedly. A suit of civil nature is a suit, the object of which is the enforcement of a civil right or obligation. As I have held above that the order of the Administrator was itself void, it neither created any right in favour of the plaintiff nor an obligation against the Municipality. In the Supreme Court decision referred to above, persons were admittedly adjacent owners of land and, therefore, demarcation of boundaries of their respective lands was a suit for the enforcement of a civil right of holding and possessing their respective properties. 19. Reliance was also placed upon the decision in Ramaraghava Reddy v. Sheshu Reddy ( AIR 1967 SC 436 ) . The decision has also no application to the present case because a worshipper of a Hindu temple was entitled, in certain circumstances, to bring a suit for declaration that the alienation of the temple properties by the deduce she bait was invalid and not binding upon the temple. Worshippers of the temples are in the position of beneficiaries in a spiritual sense. This decision has hardly any application to the facts of the present case. 20. Worshippers of the temples are in the position of beneficiaries in a spiritual sense. This decision has hardly any application to the facts of the present case. 20. So even if the order dated May 6, 1957 was in the knowledge of the plaintiff and he was agreeable to purchase the plot in suit there was no valid order of the Administrator Jodhpur Municipality for selling the plot to the plaintiff and there was also no sale or agreement to sell in that respect in favour of the plaintiff. Issue Nos. 1 and 4 were rightly decided by the trial court against the plaintiff. 21. I may next deal with issue No. 5 which relates to limitation. In view of my findings that there was neither any valid order nor any valid contract giving any right to the plaintiff, this issue becomes only of academic interest. On merits of the issue, however, it is clear that the Administrator had ordered that if the plaintiff liked to purchase 107811/4 square gazland, he will have to pay at Rs. 2/- per square gaz. It was further mentioned that no patta will be issued in favour of the plaintiff so long as the period of appeal was over. It is clear from the record that Sardar High School filed appeal and ultimately its appeal before the Revenue Board was dismissed on February 2, 1965 by the Board of Revenue. As that suit is not for specific performance of any contract, Article 54 of the Limitation Act will not apply and it is only Article 113 of the Limitation Act which would apply which corresponds to Article 120 of the old Limitation Act. It is well settled that right to sue under Article 113 of the Limitation Act accrues when there is an accrual of the rights asserted in the suit and an unequivocal threat by the defendant to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Where a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invaded or jeopardised the said right. Reference, in this connection, may be made to the decision in Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan ( AIR 1960 SC 335 ) Mohammad Yonus v. Syaduanissa ( AIR 1961 SC 808 ) , Mainkyala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami ( AIR 1966 SC 470 ) and Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Reference, in this connection, may be made to the decision in Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan ( AIR 1960 SC 335 ) Mohammad Yonus v. Syaduanissa ( AIR 1961 SC 808 ) , Mainkyala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami ( AIR 1966 SC 470 ) and Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 1333). It may be mentioned that the plaintiff had served a notice Ex. A/8 dated November 15, 1966 on the Chairman, Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur Collector, Jodhpur and Secretary to the Government. By this notice, the plaintiff had called upon the Urban Improvement Trust to issue a patta in his favour for the land in dispute and had mentioned that he has made repeated offers to pay the balance amount by several applications. The plaintiff had regarded that the cause of action had arisen to him as the Board of Revenue had dismissed the appeal of Sardar High School, Jodhpur on February 22, 1965. Having regarded the cause of action as complete and having given notice to file a suit in case compliance of the notice was not made, the plaintiff could not indefinitely postpone his suit simply by giving further notices. The suit was not instituted within three years of the expiry of the period given in notice Ex. A8. Right to sue had already accrued to the plaintiff and when the Urban improvement Trust did not comply with the notice, it has to be deemed in the circumstances of the case that it was not willing to issue patta of the land in dispute to the plaintiff. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to seek extension of limitation simply on the ground that the respondents did not reply to the notice stating that they would not execute a sale deed in his favour and will not deliver possession of the plot. In any event, the plaintiff himself having treated that the cause of action had accrued to him when he gave the notice dated November 15, 1966, the limitation will start from the expiry of the period given in the notice and non-compliance of the requirements of notice was itself a clear indication to the plaintiff that the respondents were not issuing the patta and delivering the plot. The suit was instituted as late as on February 3, 1973. It was rightly held to be barred by limitation. 22. The suit was instituted as late as on February 3, 1973. It was rightly held to be barred by limitation. 22. There is also controversy between the parties regarding service of a notice dated July 2, 1967 on the Urban Improvement Trust and the Government of Rajasthan. Issue No. 7(A) was framed in that regard. It is clear that no postal receipts or acknowledgement receipts of this alleged notice have been produced by plaintiff. The plaintiff has only deposed that the acknowledgement receipts were lost. There is no such notice on the file Ex. A/7 produced in the case. There is evidence of Mangilal DW 1 and Yatindra Nath D.W. 2. The former had brought the inward register of the Collectorate in respect of the period from 14-7-1967 to 3-8-1967 and he stated that no such notice was received and none is entered in the inward register. Yatindra Nath has also said that no notice was received by the Urban Improvement Trust and no such notice was entered in the receipt register Ex. A4. The plaintiff made no attempt to prove from the post office regarding the delivery of the notice when according to him, he had lost the postal receipts and acknowledgement receipts. The trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that notice dated July 29, 1967 was served on the Chairman of the Urban Improvement Trust and on the State of Rajasthan. 23. The learned counsel for the plaintiff urged that the trial court was wrong in deciding issue No. 7 (c) against the plaintiff. As has already been stated that notice Ex. A/8 was served on the Chairman, Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur and also on the Collector, Jodhpur and further on the Secretary to the Government. It is true that in this notice reference is made only to section 98 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 but the contents of the notice clearly enumerated the cause of action and was sufficient to bring to the notice of the State Government, the cause of action of the plaintiff. When service of notice dated July 29, 1967 is not proved, the plaintiff could fall back on the notice dated November 15, 1966. There is no question of waiver of this notice and it fulfils the requirements of a notice under section 80 C.P.C. as well. When service of notice dated July 29, 1967 is not proved, the plaintiff could fall back on the notice dated November 15, 1966. There is no question of waiver of this notice and it fulfils the requirements of a notice under section 80 C.P.C. as well. The purpose of notice is to inform the Government and the concerned public authority about the case of the plaintiff, his cause of action and the relief which he wants to claim. All these things find incorporated in the notice. I, therefore, do not agree with the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff cannot rely upon the notice dated November 15, 1966 or that it was not a valid notice. Issue No. 7 (c) is, therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff. 24. However, the crucial issues in the case were Nos. 1 and 4. Both these issues have been decided against the plaintiff and, therefore, his suit was rightly dismissed by the trial court. 25. This first appeal has no force in it and it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.Appeal dismissed. *******