T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER came before us on 7-4-1988 complaining that as per Annexure-P-6 she had been denied the opportunity of appearing in B. A. Part II Examination of Jiwaji University, Gwalior, commencing on 9th April, 1988. We immediately took cognizance of her grievance and asked her to serve Registrar (Exams.), Jiwaji University, personally so that we could hear him and give her the necessary relief, she was found entitled to, on the next date itself. We heard Shri Madhu Sudan Dubey, Registrar (Exams.) of the University, who appeared personally on 8-4-1988 and drew our attention to the material disclosed in the return which he filed on the same date on behalf of the University. We then took the view tentatively that the petitioner had no case for any interim relief. But, to clinch the issue and to decide the matter finally, we deferred hearing till today to make further investigation on facts and law, lest the petitioner continues to have a nagging grievance. So attuned have litigants become to slow-motion justice that swift justice is sometimes misunderstood as injustice : ( 2 ) TODAY, the University has filed copies of relevant documents to set at rest any doubt that could be entertained on facts as to the validity of the impugned action manifested in Annexure-P-6. Indeed, a rejoinder has come from the petitioner to the return of the respondent/university and therein issues of law challenging the action taken against her have been raised. We have accordingly heard her counsel today on facts as also on law and are finally disposing of the petition, though we are unable to grant her any relief in this matter. ( 3 ) WE would first refer to the material furnished by the petitioner as annexures to the petition on which she has founded her cause of action. By Annexure-P-1, dated 23-11-1987, she was asked to show cause by 29-11-1987 why B. A. Part I examination taken by her on 24-3-1987 should not be cancelled for adopting unfair means in that examination and why she should not be debarred from appearing in 1987 supplementary examinations and 1988 main examinations. Annexure-P-2 is her reply dated 27-11-1987 in which she admitted that some material was recovered from her possession but contended that she did not intend to use that and she be therefore excused for the lapse. Annexure-P-2 is her reply dated 27-11-1987 in which she admitted that some material was recovered from her possession but contended that she did not intend to use that and she be therefore excused for the lapse. Annexure-P3 is the Mark-sheet dated 24-12-1987 in which she was shown to have passed the examination. Annexures P-4 and P-5 show that she was allowed on 28-12-1987 to appear in 1988, B. A. Part II examination. However, by Annexure-P-6, dated 23-3-1988, she was informed that the permission granted to her was cancelled as she had used unfair means in B. A. Part I examination and that the examination fees would be refunded to her. ( 4 ) SHRI Madhukar Rao, appearing for the petitioner has drawn our attention to Cl. 21 of Ordinance No. 5 of the University to submit that the action of the Kulpati of the University, manifested in Annexure-P-2, filed today, is ultra vires the provision cited. It is his contention that only the Committee contemplated under Cl. 21, which is referred in these proceedings in the record as Unfair Means Committee, had the jurisdiction to decide whether the petitioner had committed any unfair means in the B. A. Part I examination that she had taken and that in the instant case, the position which is admitted on facts in the return is that the Unfair Means Committee took the decision that result of examination be declared. ( 5 ) SHRI Madhukar Rao has submitted that it should be taken as if the decision of the Committee on the allegation of use of unfair means by the petitioner was taken in favour of the petitioner. We are unable to appreciate the argument advanced for the short reason that no affirmative decision, either positive or negative, was at all rendered by the Unfair Means Committee on the question on which the Committee had to submit report to the Executive Council as per sub-clauses (v), (vi) and (vii) of Cl. 21, extracted below in material parts :" (V) The material so collected from the examinee together with both the answer books, viz. , the answer-book collected while using unfair means and the other supplied afterward, will be sent to the Examiner by the Registrar for assessing both the answer-books separately and to report if the examinee has actually, used unfair means in view of the material collected. , the answer-book collected while using unfair means and the other supplied afterward, will be sent to the Examiner by the Registrar for assessing both the answer-books separately and to report if the examinee has actually, used unfair means in view of the material collected. (vi) The cases of the use of unfair means at the examination as reported by the Centre Suprientendent along with the report of the Examiner shall be examined by a Committee to be appointed by the Executive Council every year. (vii) The Committee shall after examining the cases, decide the action to be taken in each case and report to the Executive Council all cases of use of unfair means together with the decision of the Committee in each case. ''unfortunately, the Committee exceeded the bonds of its jurisdiction and proceeded to make declaration of result of the examination without deciding any case of use of unfair means. ( 6 ) WE are indeed in complete agreement with the view canvassed by council for the University on the facts of this case. The relevant provisions which have a material bearing on the question mooted in this petition are to be read in Cl. 23 of Ordinance No. 6 which is captioned "examinations (General)" and deal comprehensively with different aspect of the conduct of examinations by the University. Our attention is drawn in particular to sub-clause (f) of Cl. 23 to submit that it is not the Committee constituted under Cl. 21 of Ordinance No. 5 that has exclusive power to decide the question of cancellation of any examination inasmuch as the power to do so is vested in the Executive Council also and the Committee rather exercises delegated authority. Support for this view is indeed to be read in afore-extracted sub-clause (vii) of Cl. 21 which contemplates that the Committee has to submit its report to the Executive Council after examining the cases, in which unfair means are alleged to have been used. We extract, therefore, sub-cl. (f) (ii) of Cl. Support for this view is indeed to be read in afore-extracted sub-clause (vii) of Cl. 21 which contemplates that the Committee has to submit its report to the Executive Council after examining the cases, in which unfair means are alleged to have been used. We extract, therefore, sub-cl. (f) (ii) of Cl. 23 also as we are satisfied that thereunder the Executive Council may act independently and we have accordingly emphasised in the extract below the word "afterwards", following the words "if it is discovered'' :" (II) The Executive Council may cancel the examination of a candidate and/ or debar him from appearing at an examination of the Vishwavidyalaya for one or more years, if it is discovered afterwards that the candidate was in any manner guilty of misconduct in connection with his examination and/or was instrumental in or has abetted the tampering of Vishwavidalaya records including the answer books, marks-sheets, result charts, diplomas and the like. " ( 7 ) UNIVERSITY's Council Shri Gupta has further submitted that in the instant case, the Kulpati having exercised his powers under S. 15 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, for short, the 'adhiniyam', to cancel 1987 Bachelor's Degree (Part I) examination of some candidates, including the petitioner, exercising the power of the Executive Council, the action taken against the petitioner is not impugnable. True, to rebut this argument Shri Madhukar Rao has complained that it was not the case of "emergency" that the Kulpati could act under S. 15 (4) to cancel the examination without awaiting the decision of the Executive Council. But, this contention is met by a two-fold answer. Firstly, the action by the Kulpati was taken in the month of March, 1988 when the programme for the next examination to be held early next month had to be finalised and it was, therefore, a case of real "emergency" to prevent such candidates, as were not eligible, to appear in that examination. Their cases had to be screened and sifted on an emergency basis and they had to be disabled from appearing in that examination to maintain the credibility of the examination system. Their cases had to be screened and sifted on an emergency basis and they had to be disabled from appearing in that examination to maintain the credibility of the examination system. Secondly, the "emergency' in any case had also to be determined with reference to the mandate of S. 15 (2) inasmuch as the Unfair Means Committee failed to discharge its duty of rendering a decision on the question of unfair means and exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring results of all candidates sitting in that examination in which the petitioner and some other candidates were found using unfair means. In this connection, reliance was placed on Annexure-R-1 of the return and reference was made to the facts averred in para 1 of the return that the petitioner was found to have made verbatim copy from a "paper" she carried unauthorisedly, in violation of the relevant Regulations (as per R-1), in the answer script, in respect of Question No. 4 of Paper II of the subject of Psychology. Admittedly, the "paper" and the answer script were seized from her. ( 8 ) WE consider it appropriate to extract sub-sec. (2) and material parts of subsection (4) of S. 15 :" (2) It shall be the duty of the Kulpati to ensure that this Act, the Estates the Ordinance and the Regulations are faithfully observed and he shall have all powers necessary for this purpose. (4) If in the opinion of the Kulpati any emergency has arisen which required immediate action to be taken, the Kulpati shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall at the earliest opportunity thereafter report his action to such officer, authority committee or other body as would have in the ordinary course dealt with the matter :"the provisions afore-extracted are mutually exclusive and have different purports. The provisions of sub-sec. (4) have nothing to do with the general scope of authority of the Kulpati envisaged under sub-sec. (2) inasmuch as the Kulpati is empowered to act as a substituted authority in situations of "emergency" under sub-s. (4 ). True, the Kulpati cannot assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matters exclusively within the province of the Executive Council except in the circumstances envisaged under, and to the extent contemplated by, sub-sec. (4 ). (2) inasmuch as the Kulpati is empowered to act as a substituted authority in situations of "emergency" under sub-s. (4 ). True, the Kulpati cannot assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matters exclusively within the province of the Executive Council except in the circumstances envisaged under, and to the extent contemplated by, sub-sec. (4 ). The two provisos (not quoted) indicate the wide scope of Kulpati's powers to act in all types of cases of "emergency" because it specifies the twin limits of his powers, he shall not commit the University to any recurring expenditure for more than three months and when his action affects any person in service of the University, the latter shall have a right to appeal to the Executive Council. Indeed, the in-built safeguard in the main enactment of sub-sec. (4) against abuse of power by the Kulpati requiring him to report the action taken to E. C. "at the earliest opportunity" enables us to take the view that the provisions shall be rendered otiose if the Kulpati does not act thereunder in an emergent situation to enforce Cl. 23 (f) (ii) of Ord. No. 6 when the committee defaults and refuses to act under Cl. 21 (v) of Ord. No. 5. ( 9 ) RELIANCE by Shri Madhukar Rao on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of jogendra Singh, AIR 1982 Madh Pra 202 on the scope and ambit of the powers of the Kulpati under S. 15 (2), we have found unable to appreciate. We have perused the decision and we have no doubt in our mind that neither the provisions of the relevant Regulation (as Annexure-R-1) bearing on use of unfair means nor of the provisions afore-stated of Ordinances Nos. 5 and 6 of Jiwaji University had to be considered in that case. Besides, unlike in the instant case wherein Kulpati has exercised powers under S. 15 (2), resort was had in that case by Vikram University's Kulpati to S. 15 (2) as it then existed. Indeed, in that case examination was cancelled not for use of unfair means but for candidate's failure to attend the requisite number of lectures. ( 10 ) ANOTHER contention strongly pressed by Shri Madhukar Rao is that in any view of the matter, the action of the Kulpati must be held invalid as principles of natural justice have been violated. Indeed, in that case examination was cancelled not for use of unfair means but for candidate's failure to attend the requisite number of lectures. ( 10 ) ANOTHER contention strongly pressed by Shri Madhukar Rao is that in any view of the matter, the action of the Kulpati must be held invalid as principles of natural justice have been violated. It is contended that the petitioner should have been given a hearing before taking the decision against her as per Annexure-R-2. On the same date, it appears from Annexure-R-2, cases of two candidates appearing in last Bachelor's Examination Part I were considered by the Kulpati. He held that the Unfair Means Committee's action could not be upheld because the provisions of the relevant Ordinance, Regulations etc. bearing on conduct of examinations and use of unfair means have to be strictly observed. He endorsed the noting of the Registrar that the petitioner had herself admitted that she had committed unfair means and he approved Registrar's suggestion that as in other similar cases petitioner's examination also be cancelled and she be debarred from appearing in the 1987 Supplementary and 1988 regular examinations. According to Annexure-R-3, this decision was communicated on the same date, namely, 7th March, 1988 by the University to the concerned College from which the petitioner had taken the examination. As per Annexure-R-4, on 17-3-1988, a letter to the same effect was addressed by the Registrar of the University to the petitioner herself. We, therefore, are of the view that the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to make representation to University if she was minded to do so. We are not at all satisfied by the stand taken by her today, in this Court, in the affidavit filed by her, that she was not aware of the order passed by the University and that she had not received the letter dated 17-3-88, addressed to her by the University. ( 11 ) IN matters concerning academic standards of University, we cannot allow principles of natural justice to have a long rope so as to enable students to use the rope to make hoops and loops encouraging them to escape the consequences of using unfair means. ( 11 ) IN matters concerning academic standards of University, we cannot allow principles of natural justice to have a long rope so as to enable students to use the rope to make hoops and loops encouraging them to escape the consequences of using unfair means. We must draw the limit to which the rope can allow the petitioner to stake her claim as we are entitled to do so on the holding of the Apex Court in Liberty Mills' case, AIR 1984 SC 1271 that statutory procedure, when prescribed shall determine the extent and scope of the principle according to "facts, circumstances and exigencies of each case. " Indeed it is by now well settled that principles of natural justice have limits and limitations and it is not an unruly horse which must be allowed flights of fancies and fantasies. It is also sufficiently clear by now that principles of natural justice may be excluded in a statutory provision even by necessary implication as held unanimously by the Constitution Bench in Tulsiram Patel's case, AIR 1985 SC 1416 with the clear object of laying down that the unbriddled horse has to be constitutionally controlled to subserve the public policy underlying any statutory provision. In the instant case, Shri Madhukar Rao has failed to point out any relevant Ordinance or Statute of the University as mandate for the Judiciary to lay down that before the examination of a candidate for committing unfair practice is cancelled, he is to be personally heard. On the other hand, the relevant Ordinances cited before us make it clear that powers to do so without hearing are vested in the Executive Council and also in the Committee constituted for the same purpose. ( 12 ) ARTICLE 51-A of the Constitution speaks of citizens' duty "to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement". We asked ourselves in what sphere, if not of education, the relevance of this mandate must weigh with the court at a time when the nation can ill-afford to absorb mass turn-out of dummy degree-holders? We asked ourselves in what sphere, if not of education, the relevance of this mandate must weigh with the court at a time when the nation can ill-afford to absorb mass turn-out of dummy degree-holders? This Court has taken the view that Parliament's endeavour made in 1976 shall not waste and has ruled in many cases that when a citizen seeks assistance of any Court to enforce any fight against the State or any of its institutions and functionaries, the court is duty bound by the mandate of Art. 51-A to ensure that the citizen's claim is adjudged in the light of constitutional mandates that operate against him, because the Constitution binds equally the citizen, the court and other instrumentalities of the State. We hold therefore that University Ordinances, Regulations and other statutory provisions fulfilling the mandate of Art. 51a (j) are to be construed liberally and enforced strictly to subserve their purpose effectively. Unless University's decision is mala fide, or so arbitrary and discriminatory as is voided by Art. 14 of the Constitution, a candidate adopting unfair means may be rendered defenceless by the University's Ordinances by excluding expressly also the right of personal hearing. Non-compliance by the University of the provisions of the Ordinances would however be a valid plea to be decided by the Court in all cases. ( 13 ) IF we have to say anything more, relevant to the facts and circumstances of the case, we would not hesitate to refer to K. L. Tripathi, AIR 1984 SC 273 , wherein it was held that when there was no case of a "real prejudice" absence of any formal opportunity of hearing being given to a person would not per se invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at. In the instant case, as per Annexure-P-1, the petitioner was given an opportunity to meet the allegation of use of unfair means and she had shown cause as per Annexure-P-2, admitting recovery from her of the alleged prejudicial material. As the Kulpati considered that fact in rendering the decision, as per Annexure-R-2, the decision has become unasailable because the petitioner had not suffered any "real prejudice" to be purged by giving her a personal hearing. As the Kulpati considered that fact in rendering the decision, as per Annexure-R-2, the decision has become unasailable because the petitioner had not suffered any "real prejudice" to be purged by giving her a personal hearing. ( 14 ) NO other point is urged by counsel, but in the Rejoinder filed by the petitioner, reliance is placed on certain decisions to assail Kulpati's action taken against her on the basis of which permission granted to her to appear in the ensuing B. A. Part II examination is cancelled. We hold reliance on Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 to be apparently misconceived as that decision was based on Ordinances Nos. 19 and 48 of that University which that University had unsuccessfully invoked in that case. Similarly, the Full Bench decision of this Court in Balkrishna Tiwari, 1978 0 Jablj 182 being based on the principle of promissory estoppel, that has no relevance to the instant lis which we have decided in terms of S. 15 (4) of the Adhiniyam and the provisions of the Jiwaji University Ordinances, in particular to Cl. 23 (f) (ii) of Ordinance No. 6. Needless it is to stress the settled law that there can be no estoppel against a statutory provision and we do not think if the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception to this Rule. Indeed, the doctrine is to be used to fulfil a statutory mandate and it helps courts to fill up statutory gaps, but in no case, Courts can enforce the doctrine against any express statutory provisions. We are confident that the view taken by us is in accordance with the law laid down in the leading decisions of the Apex Court on the said doctrine. See Union of India v. Godfrey Philips, AIR 1986 SC 806 ; Lotus Hotel, AIR 1983 SC 848 . ( 15 ) IN the premises aforesaid, we are constrained to hold that no relief can be granted to the petitioner whose B. A. Part. I examination has been cancelled for adopting unfair means in that examination. It is for this reason that she has not been allowed to appear in the ensuing B. A. Part II examination and that has been validly done as she lost the eligibility to take that examination. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. It is for this reason that she has not been allowed to appear in the ensuing B. A. Part II examination and that has been validly done as she lost the eligibility to take that examination. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. ( 16 ) SHRI Madhukar Rao, appearing for the petitioner, stands up to pray that leave be granted under Art. 134a of the Constitution for preferring an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, we are of the view that no case for granting the leave in this matter is made out under any provision of the Constitution as the statutory provisions, and also the facts, are clear and clinching. Petition dismissed. .