JUDGMENT G.B. Singh, J. - This petition has been filed to declare the provisions of Para 493(c) of the Police Regulations unreasonable as it given arbitrary powers to the administrative authorities and to quash the order dated 19-7-1988 (Annexure-1) whereby the petitioner has be'. removed from service. 2. The petitioner was initially recruited as Constable in the year 1962. He was promoted to the post of Head Constable in the year 1982. After his promotion he was working as Head Constable at P.S. Tandiawan, District Hardoi. He was prosecuted for an offence under Section 161, I.P.C. for accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 300/- from one Paras Ram on 5-2-1982 at about 6.05 p.m. at P.S. Tandiawan. There was a charge under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act also against him The case was investigated and charge-sheet was submitted against him on 6-4-1982. Thereafter he was tried for the aforesaid offence in the court of Special Judge, Hardoi. The learned Special Judge making the following observation in the concluding paragraph of the judgment dated 24-5-1985 acquitted the petitioner : "In view of the above discussion of evidence on record, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to make out a case against the accused Dhani Ram and he at least deserves to be given the benefit of doubt." After his acquittal departmental proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act and Para 490 of the Police Regulations were started against him by virtue of an order dated 15-4-86 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Hardoi. The Circle Officer who made the enquiry, recommended petitioners removal from service in his report dated 7-5-1988. On receipt of the enquiry report the Superintendent of Police, Hardoi, served notice of how cause upon the petitioner and on receipt of his reply passed the impugned order of removal from service on 19-7-1988 (Annexure-1). The petitioner feeling aggrieved with that order has filed the present writ petition. The main allegations against the impugned order are that Para 493 gives unreasonable power for interference with the judicial findings and its makes judicial decision in respect of an act subject to administrative decision. It has been further alleged that after acquittal by criminal court no action could be taken against him on the basis of the same charge and the order of removal from service is illegal and liable to be quashed. 3. It has been further alleged that after acquittal by criminal court no action could be taken against him on the basis of the same charge and the order of removal from service is illegal and liable to be quashed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge validity oi Para 493(c) of Police Regulations. He argued that departmental proceedings could not be initiated against him on the basis of the same charge which could not be proved before the criminal court and the petitioner was honourably acquitted. It was further argued by him in this connection n that by virtue of are 493(c) of the Police Regulations departmental proceedings could not be initiated against him. We find much force in this argument. 4. Section 7 of Police Act provides that subject to provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Inspectors General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think fit remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same. The Regulations contained in Chaplet XXXII of the Police Regulations are the rules which have been framed by the State Government under Section 7 of the Police Act. Para 478 gives a detailed list of the punishments which can be awarded to the police officers in the disciplinary proceedings. The initial portion of Para 493 which finds place in the aforesaid chapter of the Police Regulations reads as follows : "It will not be permissible for the Superintendent of police in the course of a departmental proceeding against a police officer who has been tried judicially to re-examine the truth of any facts in issue at his judicial trial, and the finding of the court on these facts must be taken as final." 5. Clause (c) of this Para is also relevant for purposes of the case and so it has been reproduced below : "(c) If the accused has been judicially acquitted or discharged, and the period for filing an appeal has elapsed and/or no appeal has been filed the Superintendent of Police must at once reinstate him if he has been suspended ; but should the findings of the court not be inconsistent with the view that the accused has been guilty of negligence in or unfitness for, the discharge, of his duty within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act. The Superintendent of Police may refer the matter to the Deputy Inspector General and ask for permission to try the accused departmentally for such negligence or unfitness." It shows that in departmental proceedings against a police officer, the Superintendent of Police cannot re-examine the truth of any fact in issue at the judicial trial and the finding of the criminal court on that point must be taken as final. It further shows that in case an accused is judicially acquitted or discharged and the judgment of the criminal court has become final, the Superintendent of Police must reinstate the delinquent police officer if he had been suspended. If the finding of the criminal court is not inconsistent with the view that the accused has been guilty of negligence in or unfitness in the discharge of his duty departmental proceedings can be initiated against that police officer with the permission of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. 6. In the present case, it was not disputed at the time of arguments that permission of the Deputy Inspector-General to proceed with the departmental proceedings was obtained. The impugned order (Annexure-1) also contains a clear recital to this effect, but this permission renders little assistance in holding departmental proceedings legally valid. The reason is that the charge in the departmental proceedings was the same which was the subject-matter of the original trial. The truth of that charge was enquired into by the criminal court and found not proved. The Superintendent of Police could not therefore, re examine the truth of that charge in the departmental proceedings and hold the petitioner guilty for taking illegal gratification and thus unfit for retention in the police force. The truth of that charge was enquired into by the criminal court and found not proved. The Superintendent of Police could not therefore, re examine the truth of that charge in the departmental proceedings and hold the petitioner guilty for taking illegal gratification and thus unfit for retention in the police force. In the present case there was no charge against the petitioner in departmental proceedings that he was negligent in the discharge of his duty. The charge was that on account of taking of illegal gratification he is unfit for the discharge of his duties. When taking of illegal gratification by the petitioner was not held proved by the criminal court the finding in the departmental proceedings that the petitioner is unfit because he took illegal gratification is clearly inconsistent with the finding of the criminal court on this subject. The petitioner has undoubtedly been acquitted by the criminal court of the aforesaid charge. Thus, from the language of Para 493 of Police Regulations it can be held that departmental proceedings against the petitioner for re-exacting the issue if he had taken illegal gratification on the relevant date was not permissible and the decision taken in such departmental proceedings cannot be allowed to stand. 7. Learned counsel for the State in order to show that departmental proceedings are valid argued that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted but given the benefit of doubt and as such the Superintendent of Police could proceed departmentally against the petitioner. The order (Annexure-1) mentions at various places that the petitioner has been proceeded departmentally because he was given the benefit of doubt by the criminal court. It seems that the learned counsel for the State advanced the aforesaid argument on the basis of such observations by the Superintendent of Police in his order. Learned counsel for the State in support of his argument placed reliance upon two cases. One of them is Brij Bhushan Dwivedi v. Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Khadi and Village Industries Com-mission, 1985 (3) LCD 402 : 1985 UPLBEC 1386 (LB) and V P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 . In Brij Bhushan Dwivedi v Dy. Learned counsel for the State in support of his argument placed reliance upon two cases. One of them is Brij Bhushan Dwivedi v. Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Khadi and Village Industries Com-mission, 1985 (3) LCD 402 : 1985 UPLBEC 1386 (LB) and V P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 . In Brij Bhushan Dwivedi v Dy. Chief Executive Officer, Khadi and Village Industries Commission (Supra), it has been held at pages 412-13 : "Normally on an honourable acquittal of the employee by the criminal court the departmental proceedings, in defence to the findings recorded by the court, are not initiated but if the acquittal is based on technical ground or the employee concerned is given a benefit, of doubt, the departmental proceedings on the same charges can still be initiated and if already pending can be concluded uninfluenced by the order of discharge or acquittal recorded in the criminal case on the said grounds." It seems that on the basis of the observations made in this case learned counsel for the State advanced the aforesaid argument of benefit of doubt and validity of the departmental proceedings. The other case, R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India (Supra) related to suspension of an IAS officer and it has nothing to do with the controversy involved in the present case. The case of Brij Bhushan Dwivedi v. Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Khadi and Village Industries Commission, (Supra) laid down a general principle applicable to all Government Servants. The petitioner belongs to Police Force and the special provisions contained in Police Regulations make the case distinguishable. Paragraph 493 does not provide for honourable acquittal or, acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. It simply lays down judicial acquittal. In the present case, there has been judicial acquittal. Not only this, a glance on the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge reveals that it was a case of honourable acquittal and not acquittal by giving the benefit of doubt. 8. The expression honourable acquittal means complete exoneration. The controversy if acquittal is honourable or no benefit of doubt has arisen because the learned Additional Sessions Judge made inconsistent observations in the judgment. 8. The expression honourable acquittal means complete exoneration. The controversy if acquittal is honourable or no benefit of doubt has arisen because the learned Additional Sessions Judge made inconsistent observations in the judgment. In the same sentence lie first held that "the prosecution has failed to make out a case against the accused Dhani Ram and subsequently without keeping the rule of consistency in view in the same sentence observed that "he at least deserves to be given the benefit of doubt." In the operative portion of the judgement he held that the accused Dhani Ram is held not guilty of the offence charged. Prior to the aforesaid observations he held that "1 do not think that the offence of accepting illegal gratification is made out against him.In my opinion, even the offence of abetment is not made out against the accused Dhani Ram." When these observations are considered with the aforesaid inconsistent observations it can be safely said that the petitioner was completely exonerated of the charge. Since the learned Additional Sessions Judge made inconsistent observations it appears necessary that some relevant facts may be mentioned here to section if he was completely exonerated or given the benefit of doubt. A glance on the judgment shows that according to the prosecution case them illegal gratification was given by Paras Ram because he had cut two trees and the police threatened to prosecute him for the same. To prove it three witnesses were examined and certain documents were produced. According to the prosecution case Constable Tejpal Singh, Village Chaukidar Chhanga Dhanuk and one unknown Constable demanded money from the complainant about cutting of the trees. Paras Ram complainant, therefore, gave application Ext. Ka. 1 to the Superintendent of Police Hardoi. It did not contain the name of Herd Constable Dhani Ram petitioner. After this statement of Paras Ram complainant was recorded by a Magistrate in support of his complaint. Even in that statement the name of Head Constable Dhani Ram was not mentioned. According to the recovery memo the money was oifered to Head Moharrir Asharfi Lal and not to Head Constable Dhani Ram. The currency notes of Ks. 300/- said to have been given by Paras Rant as bribe were not recovered from the possession of Head Constable Dhani Ram. Paras Ram(PW-l)did not slate that the gave the aforesaid bribe to Head Constable Dhani Ram. The currency notes of Ks. 300/- said to have been given by Paras Rant as bribe were not recovered from the possession of Head Constable Dhani Ram. Paras Ram(PW-l)did not slate that the gave the aforesaid bribe to Head Constable Dhani Ram. Deputy Superintendent of Police Sri V.P. Singh did not put chemical powder on the currency notes with the result that this meeting link was also missing in the case. According to the prosecution case Head Moharrir Asharfi Lal passed on the aforesaid currency notes to Head Constable Dhani Ram who threw them on the floor of the office from where the currency notes were recovered. It has also come in evidence that it was dark and the currency notes were recovered in the light of lantern. Dy. Superintendent of Police, Sri V.P. Singh and Chhatrapal (PW-3) were standing at sufficient distance from the place where the bribe was said to be given. They could not see from there because it was dark. Chhatrapal (PW-3) stated that when he reached the police station he told the Constable Standing at the gate that they had come to lay a trap in connection with bribe. If it was so, the bribe could not be taken by Dhani Ram petitioner. It is therefore, clear that there was no evidence connecting the accused with the crime and it was a clear case of honourable acquittal. Thus the use of sentence that Dhani Ram at least deserves to be given the benefit of doubt does not appear of any significance. When it was a clear case of honourable acquittal and complete exoneration in departmental proceedings there could not be any re-examination of the same fact and the view expressed in departmental proceedings is clearly inconsistent with tire finding of the criminal court. Thus, the departmental proceedings and the conclusion arrived at being in contravention of Para 493 are illegal and liable to be quashed. 9. It has been held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , that the regulations contained in Chapter XXXII of the U.P. Police Regulations having been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act have got statutory force and if any order is passed in contravention of these regulations it is illegal. 9. It has been held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , that the regulations contained in Chapter XXXII of the U.P. Police Regulations having been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act have got statutory force and if any order is passed in contravention of these regulations it is illegal. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed Qamarali, 1967 SLR 228 (SC), the order of dismissal passed against a Police Sub-inspector contrary to Para 241 of Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations was Held illegal. Paragraph 241 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations which is some what similar to Para 493 of U.P. Police Regulations relates to departmental enquiry against a police officer when he has been acquitted by a criminal court on the same charge. From these cases it appears that if the order in departmental proceedings infringes Para 493 of the U.P. Police Regulations it must be held illegal and be quashed. 10. From the above discussion it is clear that the petitioner was judicially acquitted in the criminal trial. The truth of the charge was thoroughly examined by the criminal court. The departmental proceedings were initiated in connection with the same charge. These proceedings were initiated because the Police authorities were under the impression that the petitioner had been given the benefit of doubt. Such a distinction has not been made in the aforesaid Police Regulation. It is general principle applicable to Government servants but the case of a police officer stands on a different footing in face of Para 493 of the U.P. Police Regulations. It is not less significant to mention that in the impugned order (Annexure-1) itself it is mentioned that the evidence which was led in the criminal trial was the only evidence in the departmental proceedings. When that evidence was not believed and did not prove the charge how it can be held that it was sufficient for the departmental proceedings to hold the petitioner guilty for the offence for the misconduct of taking illegal gratification. The finding of the criminal court is undoubtedly inconsistent with the Binding arrived at in the departmental proceedings. It can, therefore, be easily inferred that the impugned order violates Para 493 of the U.P. Police Regulations and deserves interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The finding of the criminal court is undoubtedly inconsistent with the Binding arrived at in the departmental proceedings. It can, therefore, be easily inferred that the impugned order violates Para 493 of the U.P. Police Regulations and deserves interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. So far as the declaratory relief about Para 493(c) of U.P. Police Regulations is concerned, it has been mentioned above that at the time of argument nothing was argued against its validity. A glance on it makes it clear that it imposes reasonable restrictions on the discretion of the administrative authority in proceeding against a police officer when he has been judicially acquitted and it does not confer unreasonable powers on him in such a case. This declaratory relief cannot, therefore, be granted to the petitioner. 12, The writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed and the impugned order dated 19-7-1988 removing the petitioner from service is quashed. In the special circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.