Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff is the appellant. Appellant was lecturer in Hindi in T. K. Madhava Memorial College, Naggiarkulangara. He was appointed lecturer with effect from 26-6-1964. It was alleged that the appellant along with some others committed certain irregularities in the conduct of Pre-Degree Examination held in March-April, 1966, which led to the suspension of the appellant on 19-7-1966. It seems that the University of Kerala conducted some enquiry and passed an order dated 5-8-1967 to the effect that the appellant and others be relieved from service forthwith, and thereafter the appellant was dismissed from service. The appellant challenged this order before this Court in O.P.No.1946 of 1976. This Court quashed the order passed by the University by judgment dated 17-6-1969 However, the appellant was not reinstated. Therefore, he filed O.P. 3992 of 1974 and this Court on 26-11-1975 directed the first respondent, the Manager of Sree Narayana College and Secretary S.N. Trust, Quilon, to reinstate the appellant. The appellant was allowed to join duty on 17-12-1975. However, the arrears of salary due to the appellant was not paid. He again filed O.P. 4750 of 1976. This Court directed the first respondent-Manager to fix the service benefits of the appellant within three months from the date of judgment. The arrears of salary from 1-9-1972 was paid by the Government as the scheme of direct payment to private college teachers came into existence from that date. However, the salary due to the appellant from 19-7-1966 to 1-9-1972 remains unpaid. The appellant filed the present suit for arrears of salary. The suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation and the appeal is directed against that judgment. 2. This being a suit for arrears of salary Art.7 of the schedule of the Limitation Act is applicable. In Art.7 the term "wages" has been used and it is not disputed chat this would also include salary. The question is as to what should be the starting point of limitation. As per Art.7 the period of limitation would be three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. When an employee had been dismissed or removed from service, his pay and allowances would cease from the date of such dismissal or removal. In a case where the dismissal of the employee is set aside, the right to recover arrears of salary would revive. When an employee had been dismissed or removed from service, his pay and allowances would cease from the date of such dismissal or removal. In a case where the dismissal of the employee is set aside, the right to recover arrears of salary would revive. The employee could not have claimed any arrears of salary until he has been ordered to be reinstated. The right to emoluments accrued an the date when the suit was decreed and the starting point of limitation is the date of the decree of the civil court, because prior to the decree the employee would have no right to receive any salary. The Madras High Gouri in State of Madras v A.N. Anantharaman (A.I. R.1963 Madras 425) held that the terminus a quo for the suit under Art.102 (corresponds to Art.7) is the accrual of the salary which by reason of the dismissal had ceased and until a decree holding the order of dismissal or removal to be void is passed by the court, it is not open to the employee to take any steps to recover his salary. Therefore, the right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only after an order of dismissal has been set aside either in a departmental appeal or by a decree in a civil court. 3. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Malmoona Khatun v. State of U.P. (AIR. 1980 S.C.1773). The Supreme Court interpreting Art.102 held as follows: "In cases where an employee is dismissed or removed from service and is reinstated either by the appointing authority or by virtue of the order of dismissal or removal being set aside by a Civil Court, the starling point of limitation under Art.102 of the Limitation Ad of 1908 would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say, the date of the reinstatement by the appointing authority where no suit is filed or the date of decree where a suit is filed and decreed. If the Court takes the view that the right to sue for the arrears of salary accrues from the date when the salary would have been payable but for the order of dismissal and not from the date when the order of dismissal is set aside by the civil court, it will cause gross and substantial Injustice to the employee concerned who having been found by a court of law to have been wrongly dismissed and who in the eye of law would have been deemed to be in service would still be deprived for no fault of his, of the arrears of his salary beyond three years of the suit which, in spite of his best efforts he could not have claimed, until the order of dismissal was declared to be void. Such a course would in fact place the Government employees In a strange predicament and give an undeserving benefit to the employers who by wrongfully dismissing the employees would be left only with responsibility of paying them for a period of three years prior to the suit and swallow the entire arrears beyond this period without any legal or moral justification." 4. Therefore it is clear that the right to sue for arrears of salary accrues from the date when the salary would have become payable i. e, from the date when the order of dismissal is set aside by the court. The judgment in the first Original Petition filed by the appellant was pronounced on 17-6-1969. The operative portion of the judgment in O. P. 1946 of 1967 is as fellows: "In the result, I quash the orders passed by the University and Its Syndicate against the petitioners debarring them from being appointed as teachers in the Kerala University or any Institution affiliated to this University for different terms mentioned therein. I also quash the orders passed by the College terminating the service of the petitioners. I make it clear that this will not stand in the way of the management of the College taking any necessary action against the petitioners according to law." The first respondent Manager neither reinstated the appellant nor did he initiate any disciplinary proceedings against him. The appellant along with others filed O.P. 3992 of 1974 and the same was allowed by judgment dated 26-11-1975. The appellant along with others filed O.P. 3992 of 1974 and the same was allowed by judgment dated 26-11-1975. It is in pursuance of the judgment in O.P. 3992 of 1974, the appellant was reinstated in service. Even if it is assumed that the date of the judgment in O. P. 3992 of 1974 is the starting point of limitation, the suit filed on 17-12-1978 is time barred. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended before us that the appellant had again filed another O.P. for fixation of the service benefits and the period spent on prosecuting that O.P. (O.P. 4750 of 1976) should be excluded from the period of limitation invoking S.14 of the Limitation Act. The plea of the appellant cannot be allowed. It is true that inappropriate casts a suitor, under S.14 of the Limitative Act, is entitled to exclude the period when he perused unsuccessfully the remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution. (See Nachimuthu Gounder v. State of Kerala 1980 K L.T. SN. Page 21 Case No. 53 As 3/76). Here the appellant is act entitled to avail the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act for the reason that the proceedings initiated by the appellant ended in an effective order. If the petition presetted by the appellant under Art.226 had been rejected for want of jurisdiction or other causes of like nature, or the same was not entertained by this Court, the appellant could perhaps have claimed exclusion of period spent on that litigation. So in any view of the matter the suit filed by the plaintiff on 17-12-1978 is to be treated as time barred. The appeal is without any substance and the same is dismissed, however we make no order as to costs. Dismissed.