JUDGMENT : 1. The question that arises for consideration is if the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act can be invoked by a workman in a, proceeding initiated by the employer challenging the order of the Labour Court refusing to approve u/s 33 (2) (b) of the Act the action taken against the workman. 2. Opposite Party No. 1 who was working as a Senior Operator (Blender) in the production department of the Petitioner was dismissed from service after an enquiry. The Petitioner made an application u/s 33 (2) (b) seeking approval from the Industrial Tribunal of the action taken by it. By order dated 31-1-1987 as per Annexuie-2 in I. D. Misc. Case No. 10/83 the Tribunal refused to accord approval. The Petitioner filed this writ application for judicial review of the said decision as per Annexure-2 by the quashing thereof. By order dated 15-5-1987 this Court gave the following direction: In the mean time no coercive measure shall be taken against the Petitioner for compliance of the impugned order in Annexure-2. Upon appearance opposite party No. 1 filed an application u/s 17-B for grant of wages during the pendency of the writ application. The Petitioner opposed the said motion on the ground that Section 17-B had no application to the case on hand. Mr. S. B. Nanda, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contended that having regard to the clear language of Section 17-B: an order u/s 33 (2) (b) did not come within the purview thereof. Hence, the motion for payment of wages u/s 17-B was misconceived and was liable to be rejected. Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1, however, urged that having regard to the purpose for which Section 17-B was enacted the provisions contained therein should be liberally interpreted and should not be denied to a workman similarly circumstanced as one in whose favour declaration has been made by way of an award. 3. Section 17-B was enacted as remedial measure, as a piece of beneficial social welfare legislation aiming at alleviating the hardship of the 'workman who despite of the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal was kept out of employment and deprived of earning pursuant to the employer obtaining an order of restraint or stay from the higher Court. 3. Section 17-B was enacted as remedial measure, as a piece of beneficial social welfare legislation aiming at alleviating the hardship of the 'workman who despite of the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal was kept out of employment and deprived of earning pursuant to the employer obtaining an order of restraint or stay from the higher Court. The legislature, therefore, intervened and declared that where the workman has obtained an award for reinstatement and the employer has preferred proceedings before the High Court or Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay the workman during the pendency of the proceeding full wages etc. last drawn by him if he has not been employed in any establishment during such period, the benefit to the aforesaid effect is availed by the workman. 4. Mr. S.-B. Nanda, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has argued that Section 17-8 applied where there is an award in favour of the workman directing reinstatement and against such a ward the employer has initiated proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as here the impugned order is not an award passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, the application is misconceived, Reliance has been placed by him on a decision of the Madras High Court in Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. v. M. Muthuchezian and Anr. 1986 L.1.C. 1541. Mr. Mohanty on the other hand," has referred us to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Samser Ali v. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. and Anr. 1988 (1) L. L. J. 1. 5. The Division Bench was of the view that having regard to the purpose for which Section 17-B was enacted, it would be difficult to hold that it had application only to rein statement arising out of awards and not to cases where orders were passed u/s 33 (2) (b). Having regard to the plain language used, the meaning is clear. "Award has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as "an interim or a final determination of an industrial dispute of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made u/s 10-A". Having regard to the plain language used, the meaning is clear. "Award has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as "an interim or a final determination of an industrial dispute of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made u/s 10-A". 'Industrial dispute' has been defined in Section 2 (k) to mean any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the condition of labour, of any person'. Section 17 provides that an award passed by the Labour Court or Tribunal shall be published by the appropriate Government within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt. Section 17-A says that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication u/s 17. Section 19 (3) deals with the period of operation of certain awards. Section 33 (2) (b) on the other band uses the word 'order'. If the provisions, of Section 33 are contravened then a complaint in writing by the employee aggrieved is contemplated u/s 33-A 6. Whereas Mr. R. K. Mohanty counsel for the opposite party No. 1 submitted that the expression 'a ward' would include within its sweep the order passed u/s 33 (2) (b), Mr. Nanda for the Petitioner contended that the award should receive a strict interpretation that is to say an award passed under the provisions of the Act. 7. The Legislature were aware of the distinction between an award and an order passed u/s 33. Therefore, when it used the expression 'award' in Section 17-B, it is reasonable to infer that the provision was intended only to apply to awards. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 17-B has no application to orders passed under, Section 33 (2) (b). The language of Section 17-B further lends support to our aforesaid interpretation. Section 17-B begins with the following words: "Where in any case, a Labour Court,' Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman...". Reinstatement is 'not directed specifically by an order passed u/s 33 (2) (b) though reinstatement is the ordinary consequence. The Supreme Court observed in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Vs. Gobind, as follows: .... Section 17-B begins with the following words: "Where in any case, a Labour Court,' Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman...". Reinstatement is 'not directed specifically by an order passed u/s 33 (2) (b) though reinstatement is the ordinary consequence. The Supreme Court observed in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Vs. Gobind, as follows: .... If the Tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the Tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense, the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the Tribunal u/s 33 (2). We, therefore, sustain the objection raised by Mr. Nanda to the application made u/s 17-B. 8. But the workman in such a situation is not without remedy. Even before Section 17-B was incorporated with effect from 21-8-1984. the Courts were in their discretion awarding wages to workman whenever they found that the facts and circumstances justified grant of wages. While granting stay of reinstatement under the award, they were modulating the relief by directing payment of wages to the workman who but for the order of stay would have been reinstated and received wages. Section 17-B was enacted with a view to mitigating the hardship of the workman. We are of the view that even if Section 17-B did not have application, the Court is not denuded of discretion which it had prior to its incorporation. The enactment of Section 17-B strengthened the case in favour of Court possessing such discretion, Therefore, even if Section 17-B does not apply, the Court can in its discretion while granting stay of operation of the order passed u/s 33 (2) (b) in appropriate cases direct payment of wages. The enactment of Section 17-B strengthened the case in favour of Court possessing such discretion, Therefore, even if Section 17-B does not apply, the Court can in its discretion while granting stay of operation of the order passed u/s 33 (2) (b) in appropriate cases direct payment of wages. So far as the consequences are concerned the order passed u/s 33 (2) (b) stands on par with an award directing reinstatement of a workman. Hence even though having regard to the language in Section 17-B, the provision did not apply to an order passed u/s 33 (2) (b), its beneficial spirit shall apply to an order passed u/s 33 (2) (b). 9. We are, therefore, of the view that a workman in whose favour an order u/s 33 (2) (b) has been stayed by the High Court can make a motion for payment of wages to the High Court and the High Court may grant him wages in accordance with the principles embodied u/s 17-B. accordingly we allow the prayer of the workman and direct that he shall be paid wages since 2-4-1987 in accordance with the last wages drawn by him on his furnishing an affidavit to the employer that he had not been gainfully employed elsewhere. The miscellaneous case is accordingly disposed of. R.C. Patnaik, J. 10. I agree. V. Gopalaswamy, J. 11. I agree.