JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - The issues in the present 'writ petition have been a graceful solution largely upon the circumstance that counsel on both sides were willing to find a solution. 2. The petitioner Mrs. Meera Khanna is a widow. Her husband was a Colonel with the Indian Army. After her husband's death she received employment, as a Kitchen Incharge, at a School in Dehradun known as Cambrian Hall. The school is run by the Cambrian Hall Educational Trust. Her salary was Rs. 40/-. per month and she received certain amenities like residence, concessional electricity, a furnished accommodation and certain other basic amenities. She moved into this accommodation with her three children. Apparently all was not well between the school as an employer and the petitioner as an employee. The petitioner was served with a notice intimating her that the school does not intend to retain her as an employee. She received the notice dated December 16, 1983 terminating her services with effect from the next day. This notice mentions, in effect, that her period of probation was virtually not being extended. She was required to vacate the accommodation she occupied by January 2, 1984. It appears that the petitioner did not vacate the accommodation and thus she received a notice served on her on May 11, 1984 requiring her to deliver vacant possession of the accommodation upon the expiry of 30 days. She had been required to pay certain arrears amounting to Rs. 111.36 and thereafter mesne profits at the rate of Rs 300/- per month. 3. The petitioner did not vacate the accommodation and this led the management of the school i.e. Cambrian Hall Educational Trust to file a suit before the Judge, Small Causes, seeking a decree of eviction and for consequential reliefs in the nature of mesne profits and arrears which the plaint alleged, were due. The petitioner answered the plaint by a written statement. But, when the matter was taken up for hearing by the Judge, Small Causes i.e. 2nd Additional Civil Judge, Dehradun, neither she nor her counsel appeared to contest the suit. The trial court examined the matter on merits. 4. In brief, merits of the decision of the Trial Court was that regard being had to the fact that the petitioner received a salary of Rs. 400/- and the amenities provided in monetary terms could be worth Rs. The trial court examined the matter on merits. 4. In brief, merits of the decision of the Trial Court was that regard being had to the fact that the petitioner received a salary of Rs. 400/- and the amenities provided in monetary terms could be worth Rs. 400/- per month, the figure of rent was arrived at on the basis of 12% of the salary and the quantum of the amenities in terms of money. The Trial Court thought that it would be appropriate to fix rent at the rate of 12% on Rs. 800/-. Rs. 400/- as rent and Rs 400/- as an approximated value of the amenities. This would be Rs. 96/-. Thus, the figure of Rs. 100/- was arrived at as damages payable by the petitioner. The arrears of amenities utilised and as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint Rs. 111.36 was accepted by the Trial Court. This is the consumption of electricity of specific units. 5. Against an ex parte decision of the Trial Court the petitioner sought a revision before the District Judge, Debradun being Small Cause Court Revision No. 22 of 1985. The learned District Judge declined to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court by repelling the plea of the petitioner that being an ex parte decision it was not a suit order. Learned District Judge observed that the Trial Court's decision was ex parte, did not imply that the judgment was bad. Learned District Judge dismissed the revision implying thereby that the order of the Trial Court stood. 6. Against the impugned order of the Trial Court dated 22.11.1985 and the order in revision dated December 1, 1986 the present writ petition has been filed. While this writ petition was pending the petitioner was evicted from the accommodation on July 22, 1987. Thus damages for the use and occupation of the accommodation in question ceases effective from that day. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the decision of the Trial Court is perverse as there is no evidence upon which it could fix the rate of rent at Rs. 100/- and submitted that the decision of the Trial Court as also of the District Judge in revision be quashed and the matter be remanded for decision to the Trial Court for arriving at a correct figure of rent payable, after evidence is produced by the parties. 100/- and submitted that the decision of the Trial Court as also of the District Judge in revision be quashed and the matter be remanded for decision to the Trial Court for arriving at a correct figure of rent payable, after evidence is produced by the parties. This, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, was necessary as the amount has been fixed arbitrarily by the Trial Court and the petitioner is not in a position to pay the amount as fixed. Sending the matter back to the Trial Court so that parties may be at loggerheads only to find out what the rent ought to be would be more harassing to the petitioner and as she cannot plead a case that having utilised the accommodation she will not pay damages for use and occupation. Her use and occupation of the accommodation was in pursuance of her employment which she received from the school aforesaid. Thus, on what ought to be the reasonable rent the Court put the proposition to learned counsel for the respondent. The Court was wholly conscious of the fact that the petitioner is a young widow, but of employment and that the rent must be compatible with the salary she received when in employment. Further no rent had been fixed when the accommodation was given to her. Learned counsel for respondent left the matter entirely to the Court while accepting the proposition of the Court at the Bar that no useful purpose would arise if the suit were to remain pending upon a remand, just to refix the rent, when the petitioner had already been evicted. 8. Clearly the petitioner cannot escape her liability to pay damages for use and occupation of the premises. The Court has seen the order of the trial Court. Rent has been arrived at by adding the money value of the amenities granted to her to the salary. Thus, the quantum of the salary and the amenities was quantified in terms of money by the Trial Court. On the quantum of Rs. b00/- at the rate of 12%, the amount being Rs. 96/- the Trial Court rounded the figure to Rs. 100/-. Thus, the quantum of the salary and the amenities was quantified in terms of money by the Trial Court. On the quantum of Rs. b00/- at the rate of 12%, the amount being Rs. 96/- the Trial Court rounded the figure to Rs. 100/-. Partly the Trial Court was right and partly the order cannot be justified and could be open to further debate by the parties by leading evidence and then leaving the Trial Court to arrive at a finding on the exact rent. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the amenities provided to the petitioner ought not to have been quantified and added to the salary as there is no yardstick on which the Trial Court could measure the amenities in terms of money. This Court agrees with the Trial Court that it was not illogical for it to compute rent on the basis of 12%, but the computation should have been only upon salary. No issue has been made but it is a matter of record that upon the cessation of the petitioner's employment amenities were curtailed. It would be in the interest of the school to permit this chapter to close and it will also be in the interest of the petitioner not to get involved in further litigation so that she could find her peace and rehabilitate herself. 9. The Court put the following proposition to the learned counsel for the parties at the Bar and they have fairly responded by saying that let the order be as suggested by the Court. The electricity which the petitioner has consumed and as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint, she must pay. The damages for use and occupation of the premises after the termination of her services, in the facts and circumstances of the present case should be assessed by ignoring the amenities which had been provided while she was in service. The damages for use and occupation may be taken at 12% of the amount of the salary. This will be Rs. 48/- per month. Learned counsel for the parties agree that this would be a just solution. 10. The petitioner occupied the premises unauthorisedly between June 11, 1984 to July 22, 1987, there is no issue on this. This is approximately 36 months. This will be Rs. 48/- per month. Learned counsel for the parties agree that this would be a just solution. 10. The petitioner occupied the premises unauthorisedly between June 11, 1984 to July 22, 1987, there is no issue on this. This is approximately 36 months. Thus the damages for use and occupation which she has to pay for 36 months comes to an amount of Rs. 1728/- in addition she is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 111.36 as mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint towards electricity charges. This amount to be delivered by the petitioner to respondent No. 3 in six monthly instalments, the first being at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month. The first instalment is to take effect on or before December 10 and thereafter on or before the tenth day of subsequent month. The last instalment will clear the dues in totality. Should the petitioner adhere to the schedule of payment as set by this Court, the decree shall be in abeyance and upon payment having been delivered to respondent No. 3; it is agreed between the counsel for parties that the claim of the respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 upon the petitioner shall be treated as being satisfied. The suit will then be dismissed as the decree having been satisfied. 11. Costs in the suit will be upon parties. As this petition has been virtually decided by the grace of the learned counsel for the parties in finding a solution, it is decided in terms of the order which is made above. There will be no order on costs in this petition.