JUDGMENT U. C. Srivastava, J. 1. The controversy regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Court and Revenue Court in entertaining a suit regarding agricultural land seems to have not ended during the past more than 40 years and the same has engaged the attention of several Division Benches. The entertainability of the suit regarding cancellation of void instrument and documents has engaged the attention of various Benches in the past. This reference to the Full Bench has been made by a learned Single Judge of this Court who earlier after taking into consideration various decisions had taken the view in Indra Dev v. Smt. Ram Piari, 1982 (8) ALR 517, that such suits are cognizable by the civil court. The reference in question was made on the ground that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad, 1981 AWC 469 , holding the contrary view that such suits are cognizable by the revenue court was not taken notice of. 2. In the case under reference relief of the cancellation of the sale-deed and permanent injunction was claimed on the ground that the same was executed by some one personating for the plaintiff who still continued to be tenure-holder in possession of the land in question. Few other cases involving the question of jurisdiction of civil court and revenue court regarding agricultural land have also been grasped alongwith this writ petition involving the ambit and interpretation of Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, as such this aspect which was also argued has been considered in this judgment. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties canvassing one view or the other. 4. Suit for cancellation of a sale-deed or other instruments and documents are essentially suits of civil nature. Every suit of civil nature is cognizable by a civil court except cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 , it was observed : "It is settled principle that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of civil court to establish his contention. It is also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed." Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act makes specific provision for cancellation of void as well as voidable instrument. It is also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed." Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act makes specific provision for cancellation of void as well as voidable instrument. Suits for cancellation of such documents being of civil nature are cognizable by a civil court and even otherwise suits claiming relief provided under Specific Relief Act are entertainable only by a civil court and no revenue court or any other court can entertain such a suit including for cancellation of an instrument or document. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under : "Section 31. When cancellation may be ordered- (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the facts of its cancellation." Thus one who has reasonable apprehension that any instrument if left outstanding may cause him serious injury can approach a competent court of law to get it cancelled. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 casts a mandatory duty upon the court passing a decree to send a copy of the same to the registering officer, who is enjoined by law to make a note on the copy of such document regarding the order of its cancellation passed by a particular court and after such an endorsement is made, the document becomes legally ineffective and no benefit of the same can be derived by any one. If a certified copy of such a document is issued it would obviously contain the note regarding its cancellation by a court of law. 5. So far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence etc., are concerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. 5. So far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence etc., are concerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect if any can be put to an end to by declaring it to be void and granting some other relief instead of cancelling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority being of no legal effect or consequence. A document executed without free consent or one which is without consideration or the object of which is unlawful or executed by a person not competent to contract like a minor or in excess of authority would be a void document. In case it is in excess of authority it would be void to that extent only. There is presumption of due registration of a document and correctness of the facts mentioned in the same, but the said presumption is not conclusive and be dislodged. 6. On the finding that a particular instrument or document was void because of any reason, it will be of no legal consequence and binding on any one without even its cancellation. But existence of such a document or instrument, more particularly for a substantial period may cause injury to the person whose rights are effected by it and place his right and title over any property in doubt and dispute and may create complications and give rise to unnecessary litigations. But for those who are aware of any judgment holding a particular document or instrument to be void or supposed to be aware of it, others can be misled by its existence if it does not contain any endorsement of its cancellation subsequent to its execution by any competent court of law. Reasonable apprehension of serious injury from a void document provides a cause of action to a person to approach the competent court of law, that is, civil court for its cancellation. But this entitlement goes into background or becomes restricted if because of certain statutory constraints, restraints and prescription some other relief can be claimed or is to be granted by adjudging the document or instrument void and thereby declaring it to be legally ineffective and of no consequence. But this entitlement goes into background or becomes restricted if because of certain statutory constraints, restraints and prescription some other relief can be claimed or is to be granted by adjudging the document or instrument void and thereby declaring it to be legally ineffective and of no consequence. Such a situation can arise if apart from cancellation, some other relief is claimed which is real relief and the claim for which provides the proximate ground or reason for approaching the court of law or when any other relief can be claimed or involved in the matter cropping up because of the evidence of void document or instrument. There can be other situation also, all of which can be created by statutory provisions as the jurisdiction of civil court can be ousted only by some specific provisions of law or by necessary implication sprouting out of statutory provisions. Such a situation arises when more than one reliefs are claimed in any action pertaining to agricultural land. If the relief claimed or the real and the main relief is one which is mentioned in Schedule II to U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the same can be granted by the revenue court only and the jurisdiction of civil court to grant such a relief or reliefs is ousted by Section 331 of the said Act. The law relating to right, title and interest over the agricultural land is contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hereinafter known as the 'Act', which is a complete Code by itself and is wider than the earlier Act, i.e., U.P. Tenancy Act which too was replaced by it. The said Act more particularly the Schedule to it enumerates the suits etc., the cognizance of which is to be taken of by the revenue court specified therein. The said Act being special Act, its provisions would prevail over the general law. The jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted if the relief can be granted by the special court conferred with jurisdiction to grant such reliefs. In Section 331 of the Act which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of other courts in respect of all suits, applications etc., enumerated in Schedule II the main emphasis is on the words 'cause of action and any relief. The said section reads as under : "Section 331. In Section 331 of the Act which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of other courts in respect of all suits, applications etc., enumerated in Schedule II the main emphasis is on the words 'cause of action and any relief. The said section reads as under : "Section 331. Cognizance of suits etc., under this Act-(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof ; the provisions of Schedule II in so far as they relate to suits, applications, or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation-If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (i) an objection that a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suits, application or proceedings, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been consequent failure of justice." Section 331 of the Act which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of suits etc., enumerated in Schedule II makes the phrase 'cause of action' as pivotal point for determining the jurisdiction of civil or revenue court. The expression 'cause of action' means that every fact would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right of judgment. 7. The expression 'cause of action' means that every fact would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right of judgment. 7. In the leading case of Reed and Brown, (1899) 22 Q.B.D. 128, it was said, "The Division Bench consisting of Pollock and Mistry, JJ., had come to the conclusion that the expression 'cause of action' and part of 'cause of action' bad long been judicially defined as meaning respectively of facts and any material fact in the case for the plaintiff. Lord Eshor M. R. in his judgment quoted with approval the definition of that expression given in the earlier case in Cook v. Gill, 1873 B. C. P. 107, as every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court, but it does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved". 8. It is the real 'cause of action' which determines the jurisdiction of the court to entertain particular action notwithstanding the language used in the plaint or the relief claimed. The strength on which the plaintiff comes to the court does not depend upon the defence or relief claimed which could determine the forum for the entertainment of claim and grant of relief. It is the pith and substance which is to be seen and not the language used which may even have been so used to oust the jurisdiction of a particular court. The expression 'any relief used in Section 331 of the 'Act' is of too wide import and would not only mean the relief claimed but would also include any relief arising out of the cause of action which led the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of law. The word 'relief is not part of cause of action nor the same is related to the defence set up in the case. The relief is a remedy which the court grants from the facts asserted and proved in an action. 9. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sarsuti and Company v. Kunj Behari Lal, ILR 5 All. The relief is a remedy which the court grants from the facts asserted and proved in an action. 9. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sarsuti and Company v. Kunj Behari Lal, ILR 5 All. 345, held that the word 'relief at least used in this country is not a term of exact or precise technicality, but simply means the remedy which a court of justice may afford in regard to such actual or apprehended wrong or injury. Such remedy being large or small, as the case may be, but it is not synonymous with 'cause of action'. 10. Section 331 of the 'Act' itself has enlarged the jurisdiction of revenue court and has not confined it to the specified reliefs claimed which are mentioned in Schedule II to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but the Explanation to it has enlarged its scope further by using the word 'any relief. It is the cause of action alone which determines the forum and keeps the jurisdiction of revenue court intact in matters referred to in respect of suit, application or proceeding mentioned in Schedule II to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the exclusion of civil court. The jurisdiction of civil court is not concurrent with that of the revenue court by means of such suit, application or proceeding. The reliefs of the nature mentioned in Schedule II can be obtained from the revenue court which will take cognizance of such suit, application or proceeding notwithstanding the relief provided in a different language can also be granted by the civil court. A revenue court may grant a relief in present, but so far as relief for future is concerned the revenue court may not be in a position to grant such a relief as the same may travel beyond the relief which could be granted by it mentioned in Schedule II to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 11. A revenue court may grant a relief in present, but so far as relief for future is concerned the revenue court may not be in a position to grant such a relief as the same may travel beyond the relief which could be granted by it mentioned in Schedule II to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 11. It is the alleged injury or apprehended injury or cloud on the right and title of a person by some action on the part of any other person, or interference or attempt to interfere or encroach upon the right and title of a person over a particular property by any positive or negative act or declaration etc., which give a suitor cause of action to approach a court of law for relief or reliefs against the same. The dispute as to jurisdiction arises when more than one reliefs are claimed in an action on the same cause of action one of which can be granted by a civil court. If the principal or real relief can be granted by the revenue court, then the ancillary relief or the relief which flows out from the principal relief can also be granted by the revenue court notwithstanding that all the reliefs can be granted by the civil court and if things are in reverse direction then all the reliefs can be granted by the civil court, but if the so-called main relief is redundant or mere surplusage then it is the real relief involved in the matter which may or may not have been claimed as ancillary relief will determine the jurisdiction of the court which is to entertain a particular action. Even if a plaint or application is couched in such a language so as to oust jurisdiction of a particular court then it is the cause of action and relief flowing out of such cause of action which would determine the forum for entertaining the said action and not the so-called relief claimed. 12. Even if a plaint or application is couched in such a language so as to oust jurisdiction of a particular court then it is the cause of action and relief flowing out of such cause of action which would determine the forum for entertaining the said action and not the so-called relief claimed. 12. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Awalamb v Jata Shanker, 1968 AWR 731 (FB) which was constituted in view of conflict between two Bench decisions of this Court observed that "where in a suit, from a perusal only of the relief claimed, one or more of them are ostensibly cognizable only by civil court and atleast one relief is cognizable by the revenue court, further questions which arise are whether all the reliefs are based on the same cause of action and if so, (a) whether the main relief asked for on the basis of the cause of action is such as can be granted only by a revenue court or (b) whether any real or substantial relief, though it may not be identical with that claimed by the plaintiff could be granted by the revenue court. There can be no doubt that in all cases contemplated under (a) and (b) above, the jurisdiction shall vest in the revenue court and not in the civil court." If more than one reliefs are claimed by a particular person, no relief can granted to that person unless declaration of his tenancy rights is made and in that situation the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court as declaration can be granted by the revenue court. Similarly if a person claims relief of injunction and in the alternative for possession if he is found to be out of possession and his name is not on the record then without declaration that in fact he is the tenant or he is in possession of the tenancy rights no further relief can be granted and the suit is cognizable by the revenue court. In case the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding the relief for injunction is to be granted by the civil court. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 RD 498. In case the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding the relief for injunction is to be granted by the civil court. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 RD 498. The said case arose out of suit for injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of agricultural land. It was held that in view of Schedule II to the Act, the relief for possession could be granted by the revenue court only and Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act ousted the jurisdiction of civil court. In the said case though no observation in respect of relief for injunction has been specifically made out, but from the judgment the picture is very clear. The finding of the subordinate court was that the plaintiff was out of possession on the basis of allegations which were not true and which he failed to establish merely because relief for injunction was claimed. The Civil Court would have no jurisdiction as the case first involved declaration of right as tenure-holder which could be granted by the revenue court only and thereafter relief could have been granted only if he was held to be tenure-holder by succession. 13. The forum for action in relation to void documents or instruments regarding agricultural land depends on the real cause of action with reference to the facts averred. Void documents necessarily do not require cancellation like voidable documents. A simple suit for cancellation of a document or instrument if the same casts cloud on one's right and title or is likely to cast cloud over it or affects the same adversely in respect of agricultural property, that is, 'land' poses no difficulty provided further it does not necessitate any declaration as to the claimant's right and title over the land i.e. tenancy rights under the existing law. The difficulty arises when more than one reliefs are involved or claimed. The difficulty arises when more than one reliefs are involved or claimed. It may be that one may get effective relief in presenti without cancellation of the document, but if a document remains uncancelled for several years its existence may give rise to new trouble and litigation The decree of a court in which a document is declared to be void and is avoided is obviously a decree in personam and the same undoubtedly binds a party but it will not be binding to each and every person as no note of such a decree can be made in the Sub-Registrar's register as provided in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a document may mislead many and may give rise to various transactions and litigations. 14. At the Bar both the points of view regarding jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in respect of void documents were canvassed, and in this connection reference was also made to the cases under the (J. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act also. It was contended that notwithstanding void documents, the consolidation authorities can decide the right, and title of the parties and their decision would be final. The jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities is wider than civil and revenue courts. Section 5 (2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that any suit pending in the trial court or in appeal before any appellate court in which right, title and interest over land is involved will stand abated. In view of the said provision of any appeal, may it be a special appeal, pending before Hon'ble Supreme Court would abate. Adjudication of right, title and interest over 'land' by the consolidation authorities is final. Section 8 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides for revision of the village map after provisional consolidation Scheme for unit is prepared. Sec. 8-A of the said Act provides for preparation of Statement of Principles, while Sec. 9 provides for issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in Section 8 and Section 8-A and issue of notice for inviting objection. Section 9-A provides for disposal of cases relating to claim to land and partition of joint holding. The order passed by the consolidation officer is subject to appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Section 9-A provides for disposal of cases relating to claim to land and partition of joint holding. The order passed by the consolidation officer is subject to appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Even if rights are claimed on the basis of void sale-deed or questioned before the consolidation authorities, the consolidation authorities, after recording a finding on the same that it was void sale-deed can determine the rights, title and interest in the land in accordance with law ignoring the said deed on the ground that it was void. The entries are to be corrected by the consolidation authorities themselves and one has not to approach the authorities under U.P. Land Revenue Act after decision by civil or revenue court to correct the papers in accordance with their judgment and decree. If a document is cancelled by civil court then entry is to be made by the registering officer on the copy as provided in Section 31 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, which gives seal to the legal ineffectiveness of the said document. But after determination by consolidation authorities the right, title of the parties taking into consideration void document, the entries will be corrected. After consolidation operations are over, the question cannot, be raised or raked up before any civil or revenue court thereafter in view of Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which puts a bar on the jurisdiction of civil or revenue court not only to adjudicate such right and title or interest over land adjudicated by consolidation authorities or which could have been raised before them, but was not raised. The jurisdiction of consolidation authorities is thus wider than that of civil court and revenue court. 15. In the case of Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, 1973 RD 423 the distinction between void and voidable sale deed was pointed out and it was held that a void sale-deed is to be ignored by the consolidation authorities and as such the proceedings in which the same is. under question the suit will abate. 15. In the case of Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, 1973 RD 423 the distinction between void and voidable sale deed was pointed out and it was held that a void sale-deed is to be ignored by the consolidation authorities and as such the proceedings in which the same is. under question the suit will abate. The Court observed : ".........The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such right and interests in land to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed and therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it." A Full Bench of this Court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 AWC 412 took the same view relying on Gorakh Nath's case (supra). In Division Bench decision in Sheo Pal v. Lakhpata, 1979 AWC 524 , the question was of abatement of suit regarding void document and the same view was reiterated. 16. The jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities or courts is wider than that of civil or revenue court and adjudication by them is final and cannot be responded by any civil or revenue court in view of bar for the same contained in Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which even bars, the case which should have been raised before the consolidation authorities, but not raised. The decisions given under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act even in respect of void documents do not throw light conclusively regarding jurisdiction of civil court and revenue court with reference to Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The provisions of Section 331 of the 'Act' cannot be interpreted with reference to the provisions of or language used in U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The provisions of Section 331 of the 'Act' cannot be interpreted with reference to the provisions of or language used in U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is sound principle of interpretation that provisions of another Act are not to be taken as guide for interpreting the provisions of another Act which are not in pari materia with the former Act. The cases under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities throw great light on the question of extent or exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of revenue and civil court but they do (not ?) decide or resolve this controversy fully. In support of the plea that relief for cancellation of void documents is uncalled for and the revenue court cannot grant the real and substantial relief, reference to certain decided cases was made. 17. The first case cited was of Rasool Ahmad v. Beni Prasad, 1965 RD 79. In the said case the plaintiff's suit claiming tenancy rights and for declaration that he was hereditary tenant was dismissed upto High Court. Subsequently, he filed a suit in revenue court that he was 'occupancy tenant', which too was dismissed. Thereafter he took third innings and filed a civil suit for cancellation of lease deed executed by the Zamindar which document also figured in the revenue court. In these circumstances it was held that the suit was not cognizable by the civil court. 18. In Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya, 1979 RD 212, the character of the document itself was challenged and the suit was essentially not for cancellation of sale-deed. The court found that the suit involved declaration of status of a Sirdar as well as possession over land. The challenge to the document was on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation as her thumb-impressions were obtained by telling her that it was for ration-card. The court found that the suit essentially was not for adjudication of sale-deed to be void, but involved declaration of sale-deed to be void, and involved declaration of status as Sirdar as well as possession. Strong reliance was also placed, on the decision of Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad, 1981 AWC 469 overruling the single Judge decision reported in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (supra). The Bench in deciding the case relied on the Supreme Court decision in Gorakh Nath's case (supra). Strong reliance was also placed, on the decision of Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad, 1981 AWC 469 overruling the single Judge decision reported in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (supra). The Bench in deciding the case relied on the Supreme Court decision in Gorakh Nath's case (supra). Full Bench decision in Ram Nath's case (supra) and Chandrika Misra*s case (supra) as well as Mewa's case (supra) which arise out of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Gorakh Nath's case (supra) and Pamdhari's case (supra) were with particular reference to the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities whose jurisdiction is much wider and unquestionable because of bar of Section 49 of U P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by any one including one who could have asserted some right or interest before the consolidation authorities. In Chandrika Misra's case (supra) relief of possession was claimed by an unrecorded person claiming tenancy rights and who was found to be out of possession and relief of injunction was found to be included and may have been added for filing the suit in civil court. 19. Mewa's case (supra) was a case regarding voidable sale-deed. It was held that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for cancellation of such a document and in that connection certain observations which were regarding void sale-deed were in the nature of obiter only. The observations were to the effect that it is not necessary to avoid a void sale-deed and can get a declaration of his title from revenue court to the property even without cancellation of the document holding it to be void. In Civil Revision Shaukat Ali v. Kamal alias Abdulla, 1980 LLJ 243, similar view was taken placing reliance on Gorakh Nath's case (supra). The said revision arose out of suit for cancellation of a sale-deed on the ground that the same was executed by fictitious person. 20. The other cases referred in support of the plea that revenue court had jurisdiction to entertain the suits in which void documents figure are those which were considered in the cases referred to above. In support of the plea that such suits are of civil nature and are cognizable by the civil court and its jurisdiction is not ousted by Section 331 of U, P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, reference to certain cases was also made. In support of the plea that such suits are of civil nature and are cognizable by the civil court and its jurisdiction is not ousted by Section 331 of U, P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, reference to certain cases was also made. Reference was first made to the observations made by the Full Bench in Ram Awalamb's case (supra) in which case earlier decisions were considered wherein it was observed l "A document which the plaintiff shows also purports to have been transferred by a person not authorised to do so can be cancelled through court to the extent of the plaintiff's share and after a decree has been passed in his favour, information of the same has to be sent to Registration Department for making a note in their register. To have a document adjudged void or voidable cannot be considered to be altogether necessary because after a lapse of several years the unchallenged existence of such document can cause serious difficulties to the plaintiff......In short the relief for declaration or partition cannot be said to be effective alternate relief for cancellation of sale-deed in respect of whole holding or part of holding." The Full Bench did not keep any distinction in this behalf in respect of void or voidable sale deeds and according to its observation if cause of action for cancellation of a deed arises, the effective relief of cancellation under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act would be in civil court and a suit in revenue court will not be an effective substitute. 38-Rep.-1989 In Purshottam v. Narottam, 1970 AWR 312, which in fact was not a case for void or voidable document, it was held that if plaintiff had no grievance against record maintained by State Government and Gaon Sabha, suit for permanent injunction would lie in revenue court and any other person who disputes plaintiffs right he shall also be impleaded as a defendant. But if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, suit would not lie under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but would lie in civil court if plaintiff's right is disputed by a third person. 21. But if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, suit would not lie under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but would lie in civil court if plaintiff's right is disputed by a third person. 21. In Batasr v. Udit Narain Upadhyaya, 1970 AWR 204, a suit for cancellation of sale-deed was filed on the ground that it was illusory transaction and no consideration passed to the transferor nor possession was delivered to the transferee. It was held that section 331 of the Act could not be so interpreted as to render nugatory the relief to be granted by the civil court. 22. In Ramdhari v. Jodhan, 1972 AWR 623, which was overruled by a Division Bench in Dr. Ayodhya Prasad's case (supra), it was held that if a plaintiff is entitled to pursue different kinds of remedies under the same set of circumstances and in case he chooses one kind of remedy which can be granted only by civil court, the plaint ought not to be returned by the civil court for the reason that he ought to have chosen second kind of remedy which could only be granted by the revenue court. In Jagdamba Prasad Singh v. Prahlad Singh, 1980 ALJ 1135, certain previous judgments of this Court were examined and the Court observed : "......Examining the validity of sale-deed in suit cognizable by revenue court is not the same thing as saying that a suit for cancellation of void documents is cognizable only in revenue court. If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted it shall mean that suit for cancellation of voidable document would lie in civil court, whereas of void documents in revenue court. This, however, is fallacious. Both the suits are cognizable in civil court." In the case of Mahabir Singh v. Smt. Ham Kaur, 1981 AWC 120 , delivered by one of us (K. C. Agarwal, J.) it was observed : "Where the suit was filed for cancellation of gift deed in respect of agricultural land which the defendants got fraudulently executed in their favour from the plaintiff, the suit for cancellation of gift deed could not be said to be barred by section 331 as after lapse of time the unchallenged existence of such documents could cause difficulty in establishing title to the land. In such a case, it could not be said that the relief of declaration being available, suit for cancellation should be considered to be barred." These cases in substance lay down that suit for cancellation of void deed is cognizable by civil court and Section 331 does not deprive a party from a right to approach competent court of law for getting a document cancelled and instead drives a party to revenue court claiming a different relief and that of cancellation which a revenue court cannot grant holding the deed to be void. 23. The provisions of a local Act receiving President's assent subsequently prevailed over the previously enacted Central Act. Specific Relief Act is an Act which is on the same subject than U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. There may be something in common here and there and as such it cannot be said that provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act prevail over that of Specific Relief Act. Both are to be read together and the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are to get precedence only in respect of the matter specifically covered by it. The provisions of Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act cannot be interpreted or stretched so as to exclude the provisions of Specific Relief Act. 24. Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act excludes the jurisdiction of civil court in respect of those matters for which relief can be had from the revenue court by means of a suit, application or proceedings mentioned in Schedule II to the 'Act'. Section 331 of the Act, if read without Explanation, does not create any difficulty. Dispute regarding jurisdiction arises when Explanation which is an integral part of the section is interpreted and applied to the facts of a particular case. The object of Explanation to any statutory provision is to understand the Act in the light of the Explanation which ordinarily does not enlarge scope of the original section which it explains, but only makes its meaning clear beyond dispute. The Explanation thus makes the things still more explicit and exists primarily removing doubts and dispute which may crop up in its absence. The Explanation thus makes the things still more explicit and exists primarily removing doubts and dispute which may crop up in its absence. Section 331 of the 'Act' along with Explanation cannot be read so as to oust the jurisdiction of civil court if the primary relief on the same cause of action can be granted by the civil court notwithstanding the fact that consequential relief or ancillary relief flowing out of the main relief the grant of which also becomes necessary can be granted by revenue court alone. In the case of void document said to have been executed by a plaintiff during his disability or by some one impersonating him or said to have been executed by his predecessor whom he succeeds, the relief of cancellation of the document is more appropriate relief for clearing the deck of title and burying deep any dispute or controversy on its basis in presenti or which may take place in future. The document after its cancellation would bear such an endorsement in Sub-Registrar's register and would be the basis for correction of any paper and revenue record including record of register. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act itself prescribes as to who can seek relief of cancellation. A third person cannot file a suit for cancellation of a void document. If in fact no decree for cancellation was needed and real and effective relief could be granted by the revenue court only, the civil court decree would even then be valid and not void if no objection to the same was taken before the trial court. If such an objection was taken before the trial court before framing of issues and objection continued to be taken before appellate and revisional court and there has been failure of justice because of change of forum then the civil court decree could be said to be without jurisdiction. 25. Sec. 331 (1-A) of the 'Act' provides that objection to the jurisdiction of court is to be taken before framing of issue, otherwise its notice will not be taken by appellate or revisional court also with a further rider that unless there is failure of justice, notice of such objection will not be taken by the superior court. 25. Sec. 331 (1-A) of the 'Act' provides that objection to the jurisdiction of court is to be taken before framing of issue, otherwise its notice will not be taken by appellate or revisional court also with a further rider that unless there is failure of justice, notice of such objection will not be taken by the superior court. As frivolous and technical pleas of jurisdiction every now and then were being taken which resulted in lingering on proceedings and delay or defeat of justice, the U.P. Legislature by U.P. Act No. IV of 1969 inserted Section 331 (1-A) extracted earlier in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The statement of objects and reasons for U.P. Act No. IV of 1969 itself provides that the said amendment was being made as it was considered necessary in order to curtail frivolous and technical pleas in litigation. The statements and the reasons of a statute cannot be ignored and are to be given due importance and are the safest guide for interpreting a particular statute. 26. In Utkal Contractors and Joiner (P.) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 2310 , it was observed : "The reason for a statute is the safest guide for its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reasons for it. The reasons can be discarded from the external and internal aids. No provision in the statute and no word of a statute may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. Further Parliament is neither expected to use unnecessary expression nor is expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something. Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Again while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no ' less important. The general words should be read in context and not in isolation. The context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning. But the rules of construction, are mere aid to construction, presumption and pointers, having no binding force. In each case the court must look at all relevant circumstances and decide the weight to be attached to any rule of construction. The context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning. But the rules of construction, are mere aid to construction, presumption and pointers, having no binding force. In each case the court must look at all relevant circumstances and decide the weight to be attached to any rule of construction. " The reasons which led the State Legislature to insert section 331 (1-A) in the Act show that the legislature intended to put an end to frivolous and technical pleas of jurisdiction. The reasons of the amendment rather discourage plea of jurisdiction unless it is really nut substantial plea. In doubtful cases the civil court's jurisdiction can easily be not ousted and a person is not to be deprived from real relief desired and made to remain satisfied with some relief in the present only. Section 331 (1-A) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is analogous to section 21 of Civil Procedure Code. Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code is also in similar language. Section 331 (1-A) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, like section 21 Civil Procedure Code, requires that all the three conditions must co-exist i.e., objection is raised before the trial court before framing of the issues and that there has been no failure of justice and the appellate court or revisional court cannot entertain such an objection except when it is established that there has been failure of justice in trial of the proceedings in that court. 27. The Supreme Court interpreting section 21, CPC in Koapilan Umeen's daughter Pathumman v. Koopilan Umen's son Kuntalan Kutty dead by LRs, AIR 1981 SC 1983 observed that all the three conditions mentioned in section 21 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code must co-exist and the failure of justice can be inferred only from the material and record. This indicates that unless it is not established that because the case was taken cognizance of by a particular court and a party was deprived from tendering evidence or because of procedural defect or difficulty he could not get full opportunity to substantiate his case or things of like nature and the same resulted in failure of justice, the plea of jurisdiction can be entertained only in such circumstances. 28. 28. We are of the view that the case of Indra Deo v. Smt. Ram Piari, 1982 (8) ALR 517 has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the Division Bench case, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri, 1981 AWC 469 is regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities, but so far as it holds that suit in respect of void document will lie in the revenue court it does not lay down a good law. Suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the civil court and a party cannot be deprived of his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status of a tenure-holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the revenue court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the revenue court.