JUDGMENT 1. - In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. the petitioner prays for quashing the order Ex. 3 dated February 23, 1988 issued by respondent No. 2 viz. the Assistant Engineer, P.H.E.D. Ajmer terminating his service. 2. Briefly recalled, the case set up by the petitioner is that he was initially appointed as work charged employee by respondent No. 2 on 19.11.1980. He continued to work. On 1.1.1982 respondent No. 2 issued order Ex. 1 appointing the petitioner and 11 others as Beldars (work charged employee) on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 7/- Fee day. The petitioner continued to work on the said post. All of a sudden on 23.2.1988 he was served with notice Ex. 3 stating therein that his services stood terminated on the expiry of one month. The reason for terminating his service as stated in Ex. 3 is that when he was initially appointed on 1.1.1982, lie was over-age i. e. to say he had crossed the maximum age prescribed for employment. It is alleged that the petitioner worked nearly for five years. He had not concealed his date of birth when the initial appointment was given to him. Respondent No. 2 gave him the appointment knowing fully well as to what was his date of birth. Though compensation was given to him, it was not in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act'). The reason for the termination of his service relating to his being over-age is unsustainable and invalid. The impugned order Ex. 3 should. therefore, be quashed. 3. The petition was resisted by the respondents mainly on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to remain in service as his initial appointment was illegal on account of his being over-age. The petition is also resisted on the ground that the conditions precedent to retrenchment as mentioned in section 25-F of the Act were fully complied with. The petition is, therefore, not maintainable. 4. We have heard Mr. Samdaria-learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Government Advocate Mrs. Kamla Jain. 5. The first contention raised by Mr. Samdaria is that in calculating the amount of compensation, only the period from 1.1.1982 was taken into account. In fact he was first of all employed on 19.11.1980. The petition is, therefore, not maintainable. 4. We have heard Mr. Samdaria-learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Government Advocate Mrs. Kamla Jain. 5. The first contention raised by Mr. Samdaria is that in calculating the amount of compensation, only the period from 1.1.1982 was taken into account. In fact he was first of all employed on 19.11.1980. The period from 19.11.1980 to 1.1.82 has not been taken into account for the purpose of compensation. The contention is not ineffective. It has considerable force. 6. In para 1 of the petition, the petitioner has categorically stated that he was appointed as work charged employee on 19.11.1980 and since then he has been continuously working. Subsequently, on 1.1.1982 the regular appointment order Ex. 1 was issued by respondent No. 1. In the return filed by the respondents, these averments made in para 1 of the petition have not been specifically denied or refuted by respondent No. 1. It is, on the other hand, pleaded in para 1 of the reply that the petitioner was appointed only for some time on purely casual basis. It has not been stated in the reply that the petitioner did not work continuously from 19.11.1980 to 1.1.1982. The fact not specifically denied should be taken to have tacitly admitted The period from 19.11.1980 to 1.1.1982 has not been admitted taken into account for assessing compensation. 7. Section 25-F lays down the conditions precedent to retrenchment which must be followed by the employer. Section 25-F(b) which is relevant for our purpose reads as under : "25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman. No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until:- (a) ............. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months. 8. A plain reading of clause (b) makes it amply clear that compensation equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months shall be paid to the workman by the employer. 8. A plain reading of clause (b) makes it amply clear that compensation equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months shall be paid to the workman by the employer. The language employed in clause (b) does not make any distinction between a workman appointed on daily wages basis or on purely casual basis. What is material is the completion of one year's continuous service. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that the period from 19.11.1980 to 1.1.1982 should not be taken into account for assessing compensation because the petitioner was employed temporarily on purely casual basis. The impugned order Ex. 3 should, therefore, be quashed on this ground alone that full compensation payable to the petitioner under section 25-F(b) of the Act was not paid, offered or tendered to him by the employer. 9. Section 25-F(a) speaks that the order of retrenchment should indicate the reasons. Now the only reason indicated in the retrenchment order Ex. 3 is that the petitioner at the time of his initial appointment on 1.1.1982 was over age i. e. to say he had crossed the maximum age prescribed for initial appointment. Mr. Samdaria contends that the reasoning is wrong. The contention is not without substance. 10. The reason indicated in the impugned order Ex. 3 is bad for two reasons. The first is that the petitioner was initially appointed on 19.11.1980. It has not been stated in the reply that the petitioner was over age on 19.11.1980. He may be over age on 1.1.1982 when order Ex. 1 was issued. What is required is that he was over age on 19.11.1980 and not on 1.1.1982. 11. The second reason is that when order Ex. 1 was issued on 1.1.1982 by respondent No. 2, the date of birth of the petitioner was in his knowledge. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner has concealed his date of birth or had given a wrong date of birth. It was, therefore, in the knowledge of respondent No. 2 when he issued the appointment order Ex. 1 on 1.1.1982 as to what was the correct date of birth of the petitioner. Ex. 1 itself shows that the petitioner's date to of birth was 13-2-1946 and yet he was given the appointment. It was, therefore, in the knowledge of respondent No. 2 when he issued the appointment order Ex. 1 on 1.1.1982 as to what was the correct date of birth of the petitioner. Ex. 1 itself shows that the petitioner's date to of birth was 13-2-1946 and yet he was given the appointment. He worked for nearly five years when abruptly his services were terminated on 23-2-1988 by the impugned order Ex. 3. The date of birth of the petitioner was fully known to the Appointing Authority viz. the respondent No. 2. After the respondent No. 2 had chosen to appoint the petitioner knowing fully well his date of birth, it is not now open to him to turn round and say that the appointment was wrongly made. It was the duty of the Appointing Authority to satisfy itself about the competency of the candidate before his appointment. The termination of the petitioner's service on the ground of his being over age now after five years is not justified. In similar situations, the view which we are taking now in this writ petit on has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajeshwar Nath v. Union of India (1980 RLW 299) and Shivdas v. The State of J & K (AIR 1959 J & K 13) . 12. We are, therefore, constrained to quash the impugned order Ex. 3. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order Ex. 3 dated 23-2-1988 issued by the Assistant Engineer, P.H.E.D (Production) Sub-Division, Ajmer is quashed. The petitioner will he reinstated with full back wages. The petitioner wit have the continuity of service. 13. No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******