Mohd. Qaisar v. State of U. P. Others — 1988 DIGILAW 904 (ALL)

JUDGMENT G. B. Singh, J. - This is a petition for issuing a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing Annexures no. 3 and 4 and issuing a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties to allow the petitioner to realise toll tax over Aira bridge, 2. A bridge on river Sharda on PilibhitBasti road was constructed by the Public Works Department of U.P. It is known as Aira bridge. It is within the territorial area of district Lakhimpur Kheri, The Executive Engineer, opposite party no. 3, issued an advertisement on 16111987, for the auction of the right of realisation of toll tax on the said bridge. The auction was to take place on 28121987. The petitioner was the highest bidder in that auction and his bid was Rs. 6,57,000 for one year. The final authority to approve the bid and the auction and to confirm the auction is the Commissioner of Division. According to the petitioner his highest bid was approved and confirmed by the Commissioner of the Division, Oppositeparty no. 2 and the opposite party no. 3 through his letter dated 2431988 communicated the said approval. In compliance of that letter the petitioner deposited onefourth of the Theka money in the Post Office and pledged the pass book to the opposite party no. 3. The petitioner in accordance with the directions given through the aforesaid letter purchased the stamp of Rs. 62,415 for the execution of the lease and the draft was prepared in accordance with the terms of the auction. The petitioner further alleges that the deed was signed by the petitioner as well as the Executive Engineer and it was submitted to the Commissioner. The petitioner in connection with the aforesaid contract engaged staff and constructed temporary residential accommodation and thereby spent about Rs. 20.000 Inspite of all this the petitioner was not issued work start order and the charge of the Aira bridge was not transferred to him. On 24.6.1988 the Executive Engineer informed the petitioner that the deed executed earlier has been cancelled as Ranjitganj Dhawar bridge has been exempted from toll tax. This letter is Annexure no. 3. After the aforesaid letter the opposite parties have advertised again for the auction of the rights of realisation of toll tax of Aira bridge in the newspaper 'Amar Ujala' of Bareillv on 261988 and the auction is to take place on 981988. This letter is Annexure no. 3. After the aforesaid letter the opposite parties have advertised again for the auction of the rights of realisation of toll tax of Aira bridge in the newspaper 'Amar Ujala' of Bareillv on 261988 and the auction is to take place on 981988. The notice for auction is Annexure no, 4 The petitioner alleges, that he is being ousted from the contract illegally and arbitrarily as there) has been no breach of the condition of the auction by the petitioner and once the bid has been accepted it cannot be cancelled. It has, also been pleaded that on the principle of promissory estoppel also the opposite parties, are estopped from cancelling the auction in favour of the petitioner. 3, A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties pleading that there are two bridges one Aira bridge on Sharda river and the other Ranjitganj Dhawar bridge on Dhawar river on PilibhitBasti road. The distance between the two bridges is about 17 Kilometres. Both the bridges are under toll tax within the provisions of the Indian Toll Tax Act, 1851. According to rules, traffic coming beyond Ranjitganj Dhawar was to pay toll tax at Ranjitganj Dhawar bridge and was exempt from payment of toll tax on Aira bridge and vice versa because these two bridges were within a distance of 30 Kilometres on the same road and in such a case the toll tax is payable at one point only. The bridge at Ranjitganj Dhawar was declared toll tax free with effect from 571988 so toll tax on Aira bridge became payable by the traffic coming from both the sides. The acceptance of the auction bid of the petitioner was cancelled by the Executive Engineer because the income from realisation of toll tax was to go up substantially which was not anticipated at the time of inviting auction bid and acceptance thereof. The Pass Book deposited by the petitioner has already been released from the pledge and sent to the petitioner. The stamp papers purchased were returned to the petitioner by registered post but they could not be delivered and he can take them from the office and get refund of the cost of the stamp paper as per rules. It has been further pleaded that the petitioner has not incurred any expenses towards the engagement of staff and construction of any structure. It has been further pleaded that the petitioner has not incurred any expenses towards the engagement of staff and construction of any structure. The auction was cancelled after reconsideration of the matter and cancellation is not arbitrary and illegal. 4. In the rejoinder affidavit it was reiterated that the auction and acceptance of the bid could not be cancelled on the ground pleaded by the opposite parties. According to the provisions of the Indian Tolls Act, realisation of toll tax is permissible to the extent of cost of the bridge and the cost may be realised within 6 or 8 years, and, thus, there can be no financial loss to the Government. The opposite parties are estopped from reauctioning the rights of toll tax on Aira bridge. 5. The auction which was to take place on 981988, according to the notice Annexure no. 4, was stayed by the Court on 881988, by an ad interim order which is as follows: Learned counsel for the opposite parties wants time to seek instructions. List this case for orders as regards admission in the third week of August, 1988. Till the next listing of the case the auction vide auction notice Annexure4 shall remain stayed. A copy of this order shall be issued to the learned counsel for the petitioner by tomorrow on payment of usual charges. The Department itself shall continue to realise the toll tax in the meantime. 6. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the cancellation of the acceptance of the highest bid of the petitioner and the order for reauction is arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was further argued by him that there was a concluded contract between the parties, the opposite parties could not repudiate that contract and in any view of the matter the opposite parties are estoppel from resiling from the contract on the basis of the rule of promissory estopped and the petitioner is entitled to grant of lease for realisation of toll tax on the Aira bridge. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, argued that there was no concluded contract between the parties because no formal deed of contract came in existence in accordance with Article 299 of the Constitution and there was justification for the opposite parties to cancel the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner. He further argued that after abolition of toll tax on Ranjitganj Dhawar bridge there was possibility of increase in realisation of toll tax at Aira bridge which was not anticipated at the time of the notice of the auction. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the matter relates to breach of contract and in such a case the remedy of the petitioner is for damages by filing a suit and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for specific performance of the contract. The parties' counsel cited some cases in support of their respective contentions. After having carefully considered the causes cited by the learned counsel for the parties and the facts of the case we are of the clear opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner must be accepted. 7. The facts of the case are not much in dispute. There is Aira bridge on river Sharda on PilibhitBasti road. It was constructed by the Public Works Department and right of realisation of toll tax on this bridge is auctioned from time to time under the Indian Tolls Act, 1851 and the Uttar Pradesh Tolls Regulations, Levy and Collection Rules, 1980. The auction the rights of realisation of toll tax on the aforesaid bridge took place on 29121987 and in it the petitioner was the highest bidder. His highest bid of Rs. 1,64,250 was accepted by the Commissioner and the acceptance was communicated by the Executive Engineer P.W.D. through his letter dated 2431988. This acceptance was cancelled by the Commissioner on 961988 and it was communicated by the Executive Engineer on 2461988. 8. The public auction of the right to collect tolls was held in accordance with Section 2C of the Indian Tolls Act. This section reads as follows: 2C. This acceptance was cancelled by the Commissioner on 961988 and it was communicated by the Executive Engineer on 2461988. 8. The public auction of the right to collect tolls was held in accordance with Section 2C of the Indian Tolls Act. This section reads as follows: 2C. Power of the State Government and the Corporation to lease and levy of tolls : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, section 2A or section 2B the State Government or the Corporation as the case may be, may lease the right to collect the tolls levied under the said sections upon any road or bridge to any person by public auction or by private negotiations for a period not exceeding five years at any one time, on such terms and conditions as the State Government or the Corporation, as the case may be, may deem fit: Provided that the lessee shall be required to furnish such security for due fulfilment of the terms and conditions of the lease as the State Government or the Corporation, as the case may be, may direct. (2) Where any sum payable by a lessee under a lease granted under subsection(1) is due, then, in the case of State Government, such officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Govt. by general or special order, and in the case of the Corporation, the Managing Director thereof, may send a certificate to the Collector, mentioning the sum due from such lessee and requesting that such sum together with costs of the proceedings be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (3) The Collector on receiving the certificate shall proceed to recover the amount stated therein as an arrear of land revenue. (4) No suit for the recovery of any sum due aforesaid shall lit in the civil court against such lessee. 9. Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Tolls Regulations, Levy and Collection, Rules lays down that the Governor or his nominee shall exercise the p6wers in accordance with the provision of Section 2C of the Act. Rule 7 further lays down that the powers of accepting auction and entering into agreement on behalf of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh shall be vested in the Commissioner of the Division concerned or any officer as may be authorised by the Governor to do so in this behalf. Rule 7 further lays down that the powers of accepting auction and entering into agreement on behalf of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh shall be vested in the Commissioner of the Division concerned or any officer as may be authorised by the Governor to do so in this behalf. Rule 4 lays down procedure for auction and grant of lease in favour of the person whose bid is accepted. It reads as follows: 4. Procedure for grant of lease: In accordance with the provisions of Section 2C of the Act : (i) The Governor or his nominee may invite auction bids from the persons desirous of taking lease for the collection of the tolls levied on the bridge specified in the notification issued by the Government. (ii) The Governor or his nominee shall scrutinise the auction bids and verify the status and other particulars submitted by the applicants and after examining the documents or papers submitted by the applicants shall prepare a list of the suitable candidates to whom the lease contract may be granted. (iii) If it is considered necessary the Governor or his nominee call any bidders for negotiations. (iv) The Governor or his nominee presently the Divisional Commissioner, will select any person out of the list of the bidders and may order that the said person/contractor shall be granted lease in respect of the right to collect tolls on the specified read bridge. (v) The Governor, if it considers necessary, in pubic Interest may put to public auction the lease of the right to collect tolls on any specified Toad bridge. Such public auction shall be held after giving prior notice in important newspapers by the authorised officer by giving a minimum notice of one month in the first instance. If such occasion arises which makes the tenders/auction to be reinvited redone, a similar notice of one month for the public auction may be issued. (vi) The Governor or his nominee presently the Divisional Commissioner shall have the power to accept or reject any bid/ tender and his decision in that respect shall be final. (vii) No lease/contract of the right to collect the tolls under the Act on any road bridge shall be made for a period exceeding 5 (five) years at a time. (vi) The Governor or his nominee presently the Divisional Commissioner shall have the power to accept or reject any bid/ tender and his decision in that respect shall be final. (vii) No lease/contract of the right to collect the tolls under the Act on any road bridge shall be made for a period exceeding 5 (five) years at a time. (viii) The Governor or his nominee shall require the lessee to furnish security equal to three months installment of auction money (including earnest money). (ix) The lease/contract shall be executed on the standard form. (x) The cost of execution and registration of the lease be borne by the lessee. 10. In the present case there is no dispute that auction took place in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the Commissioner nominee of the Governor accepted the bid of the petitioner. There is nothing in the aforesaid Act and the Rules specifying the circumstances under which such an acceptance can be cancelled by the Governor or the nominee. Part (iv) of Rule 4, however, provides that the acceptance with the decision of the Governor or his nominee i.e. the Commissioner is final. Parts (viii), (ix) and (x) of Rule 4 further make it clear that after acceptance the Governor or his nominee shall require the lessee to furnish security equal to three months installments of auction money and shall execute the lease/contract on the standard form and the cost of execution and registration of the lease shall be borne by lessee. In pursuance of these provisions the Executive Engineer through his letter dated 2431988 while communicating the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner directed him to deposit an amount equal to three installments and stamp papers for obtaining lease and get it registered soon so that he may be given charge for realisation of tolls on the bridge. In pursuance of this letter it is undisputed that the petitioner deposited the amount by way of security and purchased the stamp paper for getting the lease executed and registered. The contract/lease however, could not be executed on the standard form because the opposite parties postponed it and ultimately refused to execute the contract/lease in favour of the petitioner through letter dated 2461988. 11. The point to be seen now is if any contract by correspondence came in existence. The contract/lease however, could not be executed on the standard form because the opposite parties postponed it and ultimately refused to execute the contract/lease in favour of the petitioner through letter dated 2461988. 11. The point to be seen now is if any contract by correspondence came in existence. Article 298 of the Constitution shows that the State Government can enter into a contract for any purpose in exercise of its executive power. Article 299 of the Constitution further requires that the contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of a State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor of the State and all such contracts shall be executed on behalf of the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. There was a similar provision in Section 175(3) in Government of India Act. 12. In Union of India v. A.L. Ralia Ram, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1685, it was held that the requirements of Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act are mandatory but it does not in terms require that a formal document executed on behalf of the Dominion of India and the other contracting party alone is effective. It was further held in this case that a valid contract may result from correspondence if the requisite conditions laid down in Section 175 (3) are fulfilled. In this case a tender notice was issued by the Government of India, Department of Food in the name of Chief Director of Purchases who had authority of contract for sale of 'War disposal' goods and sign the contract. In the letter submitting tender the respondent Offered to purchase the goods on certain rates and conditions. The acceptance note was signed by the Chief Director of Purchases in his official designation without stating in the description that the contract was executed on behalf of the Governor General. It was held that the correspondence between the parties ultimately resulting in the acceptance note, amounted to a contract expressed to be made by the Government and, therefore, by the Governor General, because it was the Governor General who had invited the tender through the Director of Purchases, and it was the Governor General who through the Chief Director of Purchases accepted the tender of the respondent subject to the conditions prescribed therein. It was also held in this case that two essential requirements are enjoined by Section 175. They are that the acceptance must be in writing and that it must be in the name of the Governor General. In Sardar Sucha Singh v. Union of India and others, 1987 (Supplement) Supreme Court Cases 127 the plaintiff had submitted a tender which he withdrew subsequent to the acceptance by the defendant, Union of India. The suit was for the return of Rs. 16,000 which the plaintiff had deposited alongwith the tender and which was accepted by the Chief Engineer, Eastern Command expressly on behalf of the President of India by his letter dated April 1, 1958. The contention of the plaintiffappellant was that no legal contract which specified the requirements of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution of India had come into existence and, thus, appellant was entitled to the refund of Rs. 16,000 deposited by him alongwith the tender. In this reported case there was acceptance in writing by the Chief Engineer, Eastern Command who had signed the letter of acceptance expressly on behalf of the President of India. It was, therefore, held that there was acceptance in writing and it was in the name of the Governor General and, thus, the two requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution stand satisfied. The observations made in these cases are fully applicable to the present case. The acceptance of the Commissioner who was authorised to accept the bid of the petitioner on behalf of the Governor was communicated in writing through letter dated 2431988, Annexure no. 2. The same fact was reiterated in the letter dated 2461988, Annexure no. 3. It is true that these letters were written by the Executive Engineer but there is no dispute in the present case that such an acceptance in writing was not made by the Divisional Commissioner who was authorised to do it on behalf of the Governor and the two letters were written by the Executive Engineer without his instructions or against facts. It is, therefore, clear that a valid contract came in existence by correspondence between the parties and the fact that no formal deed was executed in pursuance of the aforesaid contract does not make any difference. It is, therefore, clear that a valid contract came in existence by correspondence between the parties and the fact that no formal deed was executed in pursuance of the aforesaid contract does not make any difference. A concluded and valid contract, therefore, came in existence as soon as acceptance was made in writing by the nominee of the Government on his behalf which must be taken to be in the name of the Governor. 13. The next point to be seen is, if the opposite parties were justified in repudiating the contract and cancelling the acceptance of the highest bid of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the opposite parties were not justified in doing it on facts as well as in view of the legal position. There is much force in this contention. The auction notice Annexure no. 1 shows that the term of previous Theka was to expire on 731988. Since the term of the previous contract was to expire on 731988 the formalities relating to the auction were to be completed before that date. The advertisement for the auction was, therefore, made on 16111987 and it was to take place on 28121987. It is significant to note that unnecessary delay on the part of the Divisional Commissioner and the authorities of Public Works Department occurred in the present case. The acceptance of the highest bid of the petitioner was communicated on 2431988 i.e., about three months after the auction. There is no dispute that on the receipt of this letter the petitioner deposited the amount of security and purchased the requisite stamp papers without any delay. The authorities further took three months in communicating the cancellation of the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner. The letter dated 2461988 through which such cancellation was communicated, reveals that the Commissioner took decision about the cancellation on 961988. Para (vi) of Rule 4 of the U.P. Tolls Regulations, Levy and Collection Rules provides that the acceptance of the Commissioner is final. It could not, therefore, be cancelled by the Commissioner subsequently unless it can be shown that the acceptance was vitiated in the eye of law. It is not the case of the opposite parties that the acceptance was not legally valid. It could not, therefore, be cancelled by the Commissioner subsequently unless it can be shown that the acceptance was vitiated in the eye of law. It is not the case of the opposite parties that the acceptance was not legally valid. They, however, justified the cancellation of the acceptance on the ground that the abolition of toll tax on Ranjitganj Dhawar bridge was likely to increase the income of the petitioner from the tolls on Aira bridge. It was an estimate based on imagination. The income mainly depends upon the number of vehicles, animals etc. which pass over the bridge. It cannot, therefore, be said to be a valid reason and, thus, the cancellation of acceptance of the highest bid of the petitioner was arbitrary and unreasonable. 14. The tolls is a compensatory tax. Levy of tolls is authorised only for recovering cost of construction and repairs of bridge built by the public revenue. Realisation of tolls on Ranjifganj Dhawar bridge was stopped because the cost of construction and repairs of the bridge had been recovered. It shows that the tolls on Aira bridge could be collected to the extent of cost of construction and repairs of the bridge. The auction of the right to realise tolls on Aira bridge shall, therefore, continue till the aforesaid amount is recovered. In view of this it cannot be inferred that loss of public revenue could occur if acceptance of the bid had not been cancelled. It may also be mentioned here that it is difficult to say at this stage that if reauction takes place the highest bid would exceed the bid of the petitioner in the present auction. It is, therefore, evident that there was no justification for cancelling the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner, and the decision of the Commissioner in this connection was arbitrary and invalid. 15. It is, therefore, evident that there was no justification for cancelling the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner, and the decision of the Commissioner in this connection was arbitrary and invalid. 15. It has been held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1628 at pages 163536 that : It is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them It may be noted that this rule, though supportable also as emanating from Article 14, does not rest merely on that article. It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of Administrative law which has been judicially evolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. 16. It has been further held in this case at pages 163738 that It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in confirmity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant Of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. must be confirmed and structured by rational, relevant and nondiscriminatory standard or norm and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. 17. As observed above, the opposite parties have not been able to show that the cancellation of the bid of the petitioner was based on any reasonable principle. The decision of the opposite parties, on the other hand, appears arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, liable to be struck down, as observed in the aforesaid cases. 17. As observed above, the opposite parties have not been able to show that the cancellation of the bid of the petitioner was based on any reasonable principle. The decision of the opposite parties, on the other hand, appears arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, liable to be struck down, as observed in the aforesaid cases. 18. It may be mentioned here that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked because it has been observed that a concluded contract by correspondence came in existence between the parties and it fulfilled the requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution. As observed in The Union of India and others v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. AIR 1968 Supreme Court, 718 if, the promise had not been recorded in the form of formal contract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel arises. The observations made in the Union of India and others v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies (supra), M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1979 Supreme Court, 621, Express News Papers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 872 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2114 show that in cases where there is representation, assurance or promise by the State and the promisee acting upon it has changed or altered his position, he can claim benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel by filing a writ petition. It is an equitable doctrine and the various equitable consideration weigh while enforcing the terms on the basis of this doctrine. Since in the present case there has been a valid contract under a Statute, the doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be applied to the present case. 19. The point which remains for consideration is if the relief's claimed cannot be granted and the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable as contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. Learned Standing counsel appearing for the opposite parties relied upon two cases in support of his arguments. One of them is Har Shankar and others v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner end others AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1121. It has been held in this case that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching validity of contractual obligations. One of them is Har Shankar and others v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner end others AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1121. It has been held in this case that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching validity of contractual obligations. In the present case the writ petition has not been filed for impeaching the validity of contractual obligations. The petitioner through it wants enforcement of the contract. The rule of law enunciated in this case does not, therefore, appear applicable to the present one and on its basis the writ petition cannot be thrown out. The second case referred to is Teja Singh Vastu Engineering Consultant, New Delhi and another v. State of U.P. and others 1985 Lucknow Civil Decisions 54 (Lucknow Bench). In this case the petitioner had entered into a contract for execution of certain work. During the execution of the work there was dispute about its due performance and it was in that context the petitioner's contract was cancelled. It was held in this case that the remedy of the petitioner was by way of suit and the writ petition was not maintainable. This case is also distinguishable on facts from the present case. Here the contract has not been cancelled because there was a dispute about its due performance by the petitioner. It was cancelled on some expected higher bid after acceptance of the highest bid. The dictum laid down in this case also does not, therefore, appear applicable to the present case. In Teja Singh Vastu Engineering Consultant, New Delhi and another v. State of U.P. and others (supra) there is a reference of Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 1496 ). The observations made in the Supreme Court case clearly show that the petitioner can seek the relief's prayed for by filing the writ petition. The relevant observations made in this case and the cases referred to show that there can be three types of cases and in first two of them the writ petition lies whereas the cases which fall under third category no writ petition can be entertained. Para 12 to 15 read as follows: The Patna High Court had, very rightly, divided the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up into three types. Para 12 to 15 read as follows: The Patna High Court had, very rightly, divided the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up into three types. These were stated as follows: (i) Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State he has acted to his prejudice and predicament, but the agreement is short of a contract within the meaning of Art. 299 of the Constitution. (ii) Where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State; and (iii) Where the contract entered into between the State find the person aggrieved is nonstatutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State. 13. It rightly held that the cases such as Union of India v. M/S AngloAfgan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 and Century: Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR 1971 SC 1021 and Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, (1949) 1 KB 227 belong to the first category where it could be held that public bodies or the State are as much bound as private individuals are to carry out obligations incurred by them because parties seeking to bind the authorities have altered their position to their disadvantage or have acted to their detriment on the strength of the representations made by these authorities. The High Court thought that in such cases the obligation could sometime be appropriately enforced on a Writ Petition even though the obligation was equitable only. We do not propose to express art opinion here on the question whether such an obligation could be enforced in proceedings under Art, 226 of the Constitution now. It is enough to observe that the cases before us do not belong to this category. 14. We do not propose to express art opinion here on the question whether such an obligation could be enforced in proceedings under Art, 226 of the Constitution now. It is enough to observe that the cases before us do not belong to this category. 14. The Patna High Court also distinguished cases which belong to the second category, such as K.N. Guruswamy v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 ; D. F.O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 and M/S Shree Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 Patna 123, where the breach complained of was of a statutory obligation. It correctly pointed out that the cases before us do not belong to this class either. 15. It then, very rightly, held that the cases now before us should be placed in the third category where questions of pure alleged breaches of contract are involved. It held, upon the strength of Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar AIR 1973 SC 964 and Lekhraj Sathram Das v. N.M. Shah, AIR 1966 SC 334 and B.K. Sinha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 Patna 230 that no writ or order can issue under Art. 226 of the Constitution in such cases to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 20. The present case falls within the second category. The contract has been entered into between the parties in exercise of a statutory power under Indian Tolls Act and the rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges breach on the part of the State and its nominee the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, in the present case the alleged breach of contract is mixed up with breach of statutory obligations and in such a case writ petition can lie. 21. There are some other cases which also go to show that writ petition lies in such a case. In Ram Chandra Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & others AIR 1971 Supreme Court 128 the petition was for issuing a writ of Mandamus directing the Excise Department not to recover licence fee for the period for which no liquor was supplied. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine on ground that contractual remedies were open. It was held by their Lordships that the dismissal was improper. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine on ground that contractual remedies were open. It was held by their Lordships that the dismissal was improper. It could not without further investigation be said that the rights and obligations arising under a licence issued under a statutory authority are purely contractual. In Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/S Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. (1983) Supreme Court Cases 379 it has been held at page 387 that : Now if appellant entered into the solemn contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty and the respondent acted upon it, the statutory corporation cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct, to the respondent. In such a situation, the Court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus directing it to perform its statutory duty. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly lie to direct performance of a statutory duty by fother authority' as envisaged by Article 12. 22. These observations clearly go to show that the Commissioner; who accepted the highest bid of the petitioner in discharge of statutory duty can be directed to perform its further statutory duty to execute lease in favour of the petitioner by issuing a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. 23. From the above, it is clear that it is not a simple case of enforcement of contractual obligations but it is for the enforcement of a contract which came in existence under a statute in performance of the statutory duties and the petitioner wants to enforce the statutory obligations. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the writ petition does not lie cannot, therefore, be accepted. 24. In view of the above discussion it is clear that the action of the opposite parties in cancelling the contract is arbitrary and is liable to be quashed. They are not entitled to reauction the right to realise toll tax and the notice for reauction is also, therefore, liable to be quashed. The opposite parties are clearly liable to execute lease to collect tolls in favour of the petitioner. 25. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The letter dated 2461988 Annexure no. They are not entitled to reauction the right to realise toll tax and the notice for reauction is also, therefore, liable to be quashed. The opposite parties are clearly liable to execute lease to collect tolls in favour of the petitioner. 25. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The letter dated 2461988 Annexure no. 3 cancelling the acceptance of the bid of the petitioner and the notice for reauction Annexure no. 4 are quashed. The opposite parties are directed by issuing a writ in the nature of Mandamus to execute lease of the right to collect the tolls on Aira bridge for a period of one year on the standard form. The costs of execution and registration of the lease shall be borne by the lessee. In the special circumstances we make no order as to costs.