JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - These two petitions raise common question of law and therefore they are being disposed by this common judgment. We will first take up writ petition No. 5840 of 1988. Writ Petition No. 5840 of 1988 2. The Principal, King George's Medical College, Lucknow refused to issue admit card to the petitioner for appearing at the M.D. (Radiology) Examination which was to commence on 2nd August, 1988 on the ground that he had not completed the requisite attendance and therefore he was not entitled to appear at the examination. This has landed the petitioner in this Court with the prayer that a writ of mandamus may be issued to command the King George Medical College, Lucknow and its Principal Dr. B.K. Khanna to issue admit card to the petitioner and not to interfere with his right of appearing at the examination. The petition in this Court was filed on 2nd August, 1988 when an interim order was passed providing that the petitioner shall be allowed to appear at the examination in question for which purpose he will be issued necessary admit card. It was stated in the order that his appearance at the examination shall be subject to further orders of the Court. 3. The petitioner applied for admission to the aforesaid M.D. (Radiology) course in King George Medical College in the academic session commencing in 1986. The admission was not afforded to him. He approached this Court through writ petition No. 4494 of 1986 which was allowed on 24th July, 1986 and the authorities of the King George Medical College were commanded to admit the petitioner to the course in question. In pursuance of the court's order the petitioner was actually admitted on 13th August, 1986. He pursued the course of study and underwent the necessary practical training and thereafter submitted his thesis in February, 1988. The examination schedule for the course in question was announced in May, 1988 according to which the examination was to commence on 2nd August, 1988 and end on 12th August, 1988. There is no dispute between the parties that the session to which the petitioner had been admitted had commenced on 1st June, 1986. From Annexure 1 to the writ petition, which is a letter from Dr. V.K. Tandon, Professor and Head of Department of Radiodiagnosis and Dr. There is no dispute between the parties that the session to which the petitioner had been admitted had commenced on 1st June, 1986. From Annexure 1 to the writ petition, which is a letter from Dr. V.K. Tandon, Professor and Head of Department of Radiodiagnosis and Dr. G.N. Agarwal, Professor and Head of Department, Radiotherapy, of the Principal, King George Medical College, it appears that the Heads of the concerned Departments recommended to the Principal that the petitioner may be allowed to take the examination. In this letter the date of joining to the course by the petitioner is mentioned as 13th August, 1986. In the remarks column it is stated that the petitioner attended classes during the period of strike (20th November, 1986 to 6th December, 1986). It is also stated in the remarks column that including the examination period the petitioner will complete 22 months of attendance in the department. According to this note of the Heads of the Departments the petitioner would be deficient in attendance by only two months. 4. The recommendation of the Heads of the Departments was not accepted by the Principal who refused to issue admit cards. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner approached this Court as stated hereinabove. 5. On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that the Principal had the jurisdiction to condone the petitioner's attendance upto two months and the Principal acted arbitrarily in not accepting the recommendation of the Heads of the Departments. The petitioner has also alleged personal prejudice against Dr. B.K. Khanna, the principal of the Medical College. 6. The learned Standing Counsel appeared on behalf of the opposite parties and opposed the writ petition. He passed on to us the parawise comments received by him from the Principal, King George Medical College, Lucknow, which have been placed on record. He however did not file any counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties despite specific order requiring him to file counter affidavit. 7. The argument of the learned Standing Counsel was that the petitioner was short of attendance by more than two months and the Principal had no jurisdiction to condone the attendance beyond two months and therefore the Principal cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily. 7. The argument of the learned Standing Counsel was that the petitioner was short of attendance by more than two months and the Principal had no jurisdiction to condone the attendance beyond two months and therefore the Principal cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily. He submitted that in view of the fact that the Principal had no jurisdiction to condone the attendance to the extent necessary for enabling the petitioner to appear at the examination, the charge of mala fide against the Principal is misconceived and irrelevant. 8. So far as the facts relating to petitioner's attendance are concerned there is no dispute between the parties. To recapitulate, the course in question which was a two year course, commenced on 1st June, 1986. The petitioner was actually admitted to the course on 13th August, 1986 i.e. after more than two months. During the Session in question there was strike by the students and the petitioner also participated therein to some extent. It appears that the strike lasted for 71 days. The petitioner did not participate in the strike for the entire period. From the letter of the Heads of the Departments dated 27th July, 1988 annexure No. 1, it appears that the petitioner attended the classes from 20th November, 1986 to 6th December, 1986. This covers the period of 17 days only. Thus out of 71 days, the petitioner remained on strike for a period of 54 days which is equivalent to one month 24 days. The petitioners admission to the course in question was itself delayed by two months and 12 days. Thus, the total period of shortage of petitioners' attendance comes to three months and thirty six days or four months and six days. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that the petitioner's admission to the course in question was delayed on account of the faults of the Medical College authorities and, therefore, he should be deemed to have been admitted on 1st June, 1986 when the session commenced. In view of the dictum laid down by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and others 1984, U.P. Local Bodies and Educational Cases, 284, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. In view of the dictum laid down by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and others 1984, U.P. Local Bodies and Educational Cases, 284, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. In paragraph 19 of this judgment their lordships have observed as follows: .......The condition regarding putting in two years work in department concerned could not have been dispensed with. The High Court should not have interfered with the decision of the academic body. The High Court cannot relax the rules or rewrite them. 10. The petitioner was to pursue the Post Graduate Course. This course primarily comprises of practical training to Post Graduate Students. If we do not insist upon the period of training prescribed by the academic authorities the consequence will be that the petitioner will not acquire requisite practical experience which the academic authorities want him to acquire before being eligible for M.D. Degree. 11. Since the petitioners failed to qualify for the examination on account of his delayed admission it is not necessary to consider the petitioner's argument relating to his absence during the strike period. However, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner may be noticed. 12. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that what has been described by the authorities of the Medical College as strike was not in fact strike but was merely an agitation. This argument is sought to be supported by the submission that most of the demands raised by the students were conceded by the government and an agreement was entered into. It is not necessary for us to go into the nicety of the distinction tried to be drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner between strike'' and agitation as whether it was strike Or it was agitation, the fact remains that the petitioner remained absent from classes for atleast 54 days. By treating the strike as agitation the petitioner cannot be treated as having attended the classes. 13. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the time the agitation was called off there was an agreement between the representative of the students and the state Government represented by the Health Minister in which it was specifically provided that no prejudice shall be caused to the students. 13. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the time the agitation was called off there was an agreement between the representative of the students and the state Government represented by the Health Minister in which it was specifically provided that no prejudice shall be caused to the students. It is pointed out that in compliance of this stipulation no deduction was made from the stipend or salary which the striking students were getting. The agreement does not specifically say anything regarding the attendance. Moreover, the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to enlighten us how the agreement will be binding upon the authorities of Lucknow University who conduct the examinations and upon the authorities of the King George Medical College. 14. It was also the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the examination did not commence immediately on the expiry of period of two years but they started from 2nd August, 1988 and the period of two years should be computed upto the last date of the examination. The submission of the learned counsel is that the last date of the examination being 12th August, 1988 the petitioner would in any case complete the period of two years. The provision regarding attendance has been reproduced in paragraph 5 of the parawise comments made by the principal and the same is as follows: He has subsequently (after obtaining admission in M.D./M.S. course) put in two years work in the subject in the department concerned in the College Provided also that a relaxation in the period of two years by a maximum of 2 months may be allowed by the Dean, Faculty of Medicine in consultation with the Principal of the College and Head of the Department concerned. (Emphasis supplied). From the emphasised portion it is apparent that the student is required to put in two years work. The work comprises of practical training and classes, if any. During the period of examination there is no practical training or classes. Accordingly, the period of two years will have to end by the date the examinations commence and the said period cannot be extended upto the date on which the examinations closed. The work comprises of practical training and classes, if any. During the period of examination there is no practical training or classes. Accordingly, the period of two years will have to end by the date the examinations commence and the said period cannot be extended upto the date on which the examinations closed. In State of U.P. and others v. D.K. Singh and others, (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 160, it was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that questions such as when an academic year should commence and when it should end are dependant upon various factors and ordinarily it should be a matter best left to the University. In the present case according to the Principal the academic session ended on the date the examinations commenced. On the dictum laiddown by their lordships of the Supreme Court it is not for this Court to interfere with the view taken by the principal. 15. In view of the above, petition is liable to be dismissed. Writ Petition No. 5821 of 1988. 16. This petition is by Dr. Bandana Meharay (Mehrotra) and Dr. Anju Kakkar who had been admitted to M.D. (Pathology and Bacteriology, now Pathology and Micro Biology) course in the year 1986. They were also refused admit card for the examination on the ground of shortage of attendance which landed them in this court with the instant petition. On admitted facts their shortage also goes beyond two months. Both of them had availed of maternity leave for three months and they remained absent from classes/training on account of strike for 71 days. Thus their total shortage of attendance comes to about five months. This shortage, as already noticed, the Principal was not competent to condone. Accordingly, this petition is also liable to be dismissed. However, an additional point raised in this petition may be noticed. 17. The petitioner alleges that Medical College authorites are practising discrimination between the M.D. Students simpliciter and M.D. Students who are simultaneously appointed Demonstrators in certain subjects like Anatomy, Physiology, Pharmacology etc. The alteration of discrimination has been made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition in the following terms: 8 That in the various departments of the K.G. Medical College like Anatomy, Physiology, Pharmacology etc. The alteration of discrimination has been made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition in the following terms: 8 That in the various departments of the K.G. Medical College like Anatomy, Physiology, Pharmacology etc. there are post of demonstrators to which the postgraduate (M.D. Students) are appointed they enjoy casual leave, earned leave, medical leave, six weeks summer vacation and 10 days winter vacation leave. Opposite party No. 2 has not in their case counted the period of leave as on absence in the two years course of study the said total period of leave of the demonstrators is more than 5 months. The above allegations are insufficient to uphold the petitioner's plea of discrimination. M.D. Students who are appointed demonstrators have two capacities. First, they are students and second, they are employees as demonstrators. As employees they are entitled to avail of the vacations or holidays allowed to other employees. As students they will have to conform to the discipline of attendance prescribed for other students. If the studentdemonstrators are not allowed leave and vacations which are allowed to other demonstrators, they may plead discrimination as the petitioners are pleading. The material question is whether as students of M.D. Course the studentdemonstrators and students simplicitor are being treated differently. The averments made in the petition are insufficient to hold that two categories of students are dealt with differently. Accordingly the petitioner's plea of discrimination cannot be accepted. 18. Further, in paragraph 8 of the petition the petitioners have stated that as demonstrators, M.D. students get casual leave, earned leave, medical leave, six weeks summer vacations and ten days winder vacations. In paragraph 9 of his comments placed on the record of the connected writ petition the principal has stated: This relaxation of two months is meant for all such contingencies. It may be noted that these two months are in addition' to 15 days earned leave, 15 days M.L. and 14 days C.L. From this it would appear that M.D. students are also entitled to earned leave, medical leave and casual leave, like the demonstrators. Of course, when a student is absent he will have to apply for particular type of leave. Without applying for any leave a student cannot say that his absence should be treated as leave of particular type. Of course, when a student is absent he will have to apply for particular type of leave. Without applying for any leave a student cannot say that his absence should be treated as leave of particular type. It is not the petitioner's case that they applied for a particular type of leave but the same was refused. From the Principal's comments it appears that M.D. Student is entitled to forty four days leave in all (15+15+14). Beyond forty four days no leave is available. Petitioner's three months' leave will be in excess of forty four days by about forty six days. These forty six days would fall within the condonable limit of two months. But then there is at least two months absence on account of strike. Thus even after allowing the petitioners all the leave available to them they would remain absent for two months and forty six days, or three months and sixteen days. This absence, the Principal has no jurisdiction to condone. 19. The petitioners have referred to summer and winter vacations. In determining the shortage of attendance obviously these periods are not counted. 20. In view of the above the petitioner's plea of discrimination is misconceived and is hereby rejected. 21. Accordingly, both the petitions are dismissed and the interim order are discharged. Since the petitioners appeared at the examination under the interim order of this Court, which have been discharged, the opposite parties need not announce the petitioner's result. (Petitions dismissed)