JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order passed by the learned Addl. Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Jodhpur, dated June 3, 1988. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this revision petition are that the plaintiff-Laxmi Narain filed a suit against Ladu Ram for redemption of mortgage. A preliminary decree for redemption of mortgage was passed on March 30, 1974 and it was ordered that a sum of Rs. 3,391.50 is to be paid by the decree-holder for return of the mortgage property. The amount in question was decreed on March 30.1974 and the same was deposited on May 27, 1974. The defendant Ladu Ram preferred a first appeal before the District Court and the same came to be disposed of by the Addl. District Judge No. 2, on November 9, 1978. Aggrieved against this, a second appeal was preferred by Ladu Ram before the High Court and the High Court decided the Second appeal after hearing both the parties, on July 25, 1985. The plaintiff applied for preparation of final decree on February 23, 1987. During the preparation of the final decree the objection was raised that the period of limitation i.e. three years was raised that the period of limitation Act, has already under article 137 of the Limitation Act, has already expired, therefore, the final decree cannot be prepared. 3. The learned Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate held that the period of three years is to be counted from the date of the appellate decree and accordingly application is within limitation. Aggrieved against this order the present revision has been filed by the defendant Ladu Ram. 4. Mr. Bhoot, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the period of three years should be counted from the date the amount was deposited by the decree-holder i.e. May 27, 1974. The learned submitted that there was no restrain from any court, either the first Appellate Court or by second Appellate Court, i.e. the High Court, staying the operation of the preliminary decree. Learned Counsel submit that since there was no restrain and under Article 137 the period of limitation started running from the date of the deposit of the amount, therefore, no final decree could be prepared after expiry of three years. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhoot has invited my attention to Bhagat Sit v. Balaram Sit, AIR 1963 Orissa 61. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhoot has invited my attention to Bhagat Sit v. Balaram Sit, AIR 1963 Orissa 61. As against this, Mr. Gopal Raj Singhvi, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the period of three years is to be counted from the date of the appellate decree as the Trial Court's judgment and decree merged in the Order of the Appellate Court. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has invited my attention to Pooranchand v. Shriram, 1963 R.L.W. 549 , Gjadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal & ors., AIR 1917 All. 163. Davoor Venkatarama Reddi and others v. Gomatam Deddachariar and ors., AIR 1930 Mad. 353 and Saiyid Jowas Hussain v. Gendan Singh, 1926 Privy Council 93. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for both the parties.I think the contention raised by Mr. Gopal Raj Singhvi deserves to be accepted. Once preliminary decree is granted it is subject to challenge at different stages i.e. before the first Appellate Court and then before second Appellate Court. The ultimate decree comes only when it is affirmed by the highest Appellate Court in the state. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court stand merged in Judgment & decree of first Appellate Court, when challenged and then again when it is challenged before the second Appellate Court, this decree stand merged in the second appellate order. Therefore, by virtue of the principle of merger the final decree will be decree passed by the last court of the appeal. 6. In the present case, the High Court has ultimately dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant Laduram, on July 25, 1985. Hence the final decree will have to be prepared in terms of the final order passed by the highest court in the state. 7. This view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Pooranchand's case (supra), wherein it was observed as under : "14. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised by learned Counsel for both the parties. 7. This view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Pooranchand's case (supra), wherein it was observed as under : "14. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised by learned Counsel for both the parties. It is common ground between them that there is no separate article in the Indian Limitation Act for an application for final decree in mortgage suits under Order 34, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code and that such an application comes with the ambit of Article 181 which covers all applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first Schedule of the Limitation Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. This article provides three years' limitation and that period is to be computed from the date when the right to apply accuses. The question for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the period of three years should be computed from 10th December, 1956, which is the date of the preliminary decree, or from 3rd July, 1961 when the defendants' appeals under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act were dismissed by this Court. 15. Now, it may be pointed out that in Saiyid Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh (supra), the mortgagees had brought a suit for the mortgage-money, a preliminary decree was passed by the Trial Court on 22nd February, 1915 and six months of grace for payment given thereby was to expire on 22nd August, 1915. The plaintiffs were not content with the preliminary decree and they filed an appeal. That appeal was dismissed on 21st May, 1917. On 21st February, 1919 the plaintiffs presented an application for a final decree. It was opposed by the defendants on the ground that it was time-barred under Article 181 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. Obviously, three years' period had expired from the date which was fixed by the preliminary decree for payment but not from the' date of the judgment of the Appellate Court. The point, which thus arose before their Lordship of the Privy Council, was whether the period of limitation was to run from the expiry of the time for payment fixed by the original preliminary decree or from the date when on appeal against that decree, the appeal was dismissed. The point, which thus arose before their Lordship of the Privy Council, was whether the period of limitation was to run from the expiry of the time for payment fixed by the original preliminary decree or from the date when on appeal against that decree, the appeal was dismissed. It was held by their Lordships, approving the view taken by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (supra), that: "Where an appeal was preferred against the final decree runs from the date of appellate preliminary decree, the time for applying for decree." We have not been referred to any later decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council or of their lordships of the Supreme Court in which an contrary view might have been expressed in similar circumstances. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment has followed Allahabad High Courts view in Gajadhar Singh's case (supra) and this judgment was affirmed by Privy Council in Saiyid Jowa Hussain's case (supra). It was observed in that privy Council's judgment that when an appeal has been preferred against a preliminary decree the time for applying for final decree runs from the date of appellate decree. 8. In view of the proposition of law which has been crystallised it is apparent that the period of limitation shall start from the final decree, i.e. the decree passed by the Appellate Court or the highest court in the State, or in the event of a Special Leave Petition being preferred before the Supreme Court, as the case may be. 9. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the learned Addl. Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate appears to be correct. 10. Mr. Bhoot invited my attention to Bhgagabat Sit's case (supra). In that case his Lordship observed that:- "The period of limitation for the mortgagee to file an application for granting a final decree is three years from the date of the deposit under Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The mortgagor can make the deposit at any time before the passing of a final decree for foreclosure or sale on good cause shown and upon the terms to be fixed by the Court from time to time. For an application for passing a final decree by a mortgagor the period of limitation is three years from the date he makes payment into court." Mr. For an application for passing a final decree by a mortgagor the period of limitation is three years from the date he makes payment into court." Mr. Bhoot submitted that the period of three years would start from the date he deposited the amount in terms of the decree. In my opinion, this is one way of looking at it. But if the decree is subject to appeal then the normal course is that the limitation shall start from the date of the final decree passed by the highest Appellate Court. Simply depositing of the amount in terms of the preliminary decree will not be conclusive of the fact. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in this on petition, the same is dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******