JUDGMENT A.N. Varma and N.N. Mithal, JJ. - Two points have been urged in support of this petition. The first is that over the disputed land, admittedly the petitioners factory (Dal Mill) was standing. The factory also had some appurtenant land for drying the pulses. The Pashas was, therefore, wholly unjustified in not excluding the entire area which was being used by the Petitioners for drying pulses. The second ground is that the petitioners afforded no opportunity against the proposal to enquire the land under Section 28. 2. So far as the first ground is concerned, we find that upon an objection filed by the petitioner claiming that the factory should be left out of acquisition, the Niyojan Samiti made a recommendation after in selecting the site that the factory should be exempted. That recommendation was accepted by the Parishad whereupon a notification under Section 32 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam was issued. The contention of the learned Counsel that the entire appurtenant land measuring 0.46 acre of Plot No. 125 and 0.38 acre of plot No. 124, ought to have been exempted. The area which has been left out is so small that it will be impossible for the petitioner to run the factory effectively, 3. We arc unable to agree. The question as to how much appurtenant land should have been left with the petitioners along with the factory is essentially one which was for the Parishad to consider. The matter was examined first by the Niyojan Samiti, the members of which upon an inspection of the spot, made certain recommendation with regard to the exemption of the factory. That the recommendation was considered by the Parishad and it accepted it. Thereupon the notification under Section 32 was issued with the approval of the State Government, as mentioned above, the issue raised by the learned Counsel under this head is essentially one of fact and this Court cannot go into the same in these proceedings. 4. The second grounds is equally devoid of any merit. The allegation made in the petitioner that after the petitioner filed his objection under Section 29 of the aforesaid Act he was not intimated the date of hearing has been denied in the counter-affidavit. 4. The second grounds is equally devoid of any merit. The allegation made in the petitioner that after the petitioner filed his objection under Section 29 of the aforesaid Act he was not intimated the date of hearing has been denied in the counter-affidavit. No doubt in the rejoinder-affidavit, then petitioner has reiterated his assertions in the petition with regard to the alleged failure of the respondents to give the notice of the date of hearing of the objection filed by the petitioner. 5. We have examined the affidavits exchanged between the parties and are of the opinion that the version of facts given in counter-affidavit ought to be accepted. In Paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, it has been categorically asserted that the petitioner was given notice for hearing of the objection by the Niyojan Samiti and that the Niyojan Samiti actually heard the petitioners and recommended the exclusion of the constructions existing on the dale of the notification issued under Section 28. It has been further asserted that the recommendation of the Niyojan Samiti made upon the objection of the petitioner was approved by the Housing Board as well as by the State Government. From the assertions made in the counter-affidavit, it docs appear to us that the petitioner was duly heard in support of his objection. As mentioned above, part of the petitioners objection has also been accepted by the respondents. 6. In view of what has been said above, this petition fails and is dismissed. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on Payment of usual charges within a week.