Hansaria, J. — The petitioner, M/s Sonapur Tea Company Pvt. Ltd., is engaged in the production, cultivation and manufacture of tea at its tea estate at Sonapur in the district of Kamrup. A ceiling case under the provisions of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1956, hereinafter the Act, was initiated against it in 1973 pursuant to the amendment of the Act by Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1971 which brought within the fold of the Act land held for special cultiva­tion beyond that which was used for the purpose of tea cultivation and purposes ancillary thereto. After the initiation of the aforesaid case numbered as Ceiling Case No.41/73, a draft statement was prepared inviting objection of the petitioner, if any. The petitioner submitted its objection. The Additional Deputy Commissioner vide his order dated 28.2.75 rejected most of the objections and fixed an area of 7650B 4K 16L for acquisition under the Act. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Government under section 7(3) of the Act which was allowed and the case was remanded to the Director of Land Requisition, Acquisition and Reforms, Assam, Guwahati who was asked to act as Collector in the case. Two points raised before the Director were relating to exclusion of (1) requisitioned area from the total holding of the tea garden; and (2) exemption of lands covered by forests. The Director disallowed these exclusions. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Shri Sarma appearing for the State has raised an objection to the approach to this Court by the petitioner without exhausting the alternative remedy provided by the Act. In this connection he has referred to Than Singh vs. Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 where it was stated that ordinarily a High Court should not entertain h petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which is equally efficacious. It would be apposite to point out in this connection that by the time the impugned order was passed on 13.8.76, the provision of appeal to the Government had been done away with, and instead a revisional power had been conferred on the State Government by section 7(6) of the Act which could be exercised by the Government on its own motion. Shri Bhattacharjee has, therefore, referred to Collector of Customs vs. A. S. Bava, AIR 1968 SC 13 wherein it was held that existence of remedy by way of revision did not bar approach to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This being the position, we do not think if there is any bar in the way of the petitioner to get its case examined by us on merit. 3. To do so we should first note the relevant provisions of the Act which would help us to appreciate the submissions advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee. The Act which is a piece of important land reform measure imposed, when it was first enacted, a ceiling of 150 bighas of land which could be held by a family. This ceiling has gradually been reduced to 50 bighas. The expression "land" as it stood at the relevant time has been defined in section 3 (f) of the Act to mean- "land which is or may be utilised for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes the sites- of buildings appurtenant to such land and also includes land which is or may be utilised for quarrying stones". The definition of 'agriculture' as given in section 3 (a) has also to be noted. In the Act as originally enacted agriculture was defined to include horticulture; but then by Assam Act IX of 1975 0iis term was defined as below: “'Agriculture' includes horticulture, arboriculture, pisciculture, piggery, animal husbandry, poultry and other allied pursuits”. 4. Section 2 is important for our purpose and its relevant para reads as below: "2. Exception : The provisions of this Act shall not apply to- (1) Land held by the State Government or by Union Government or ...... (2) (a) Lands held and utilised for special cultivation of tea and purposes ancillary thereto." 5. Section 4 of the Act provided for the ceiling which, as already noted, was 150 bighas to start but got reduced to 50 bighas subsequently. (2) (a) Lands held and utilised for special cultivation of tea and purposes ancillary thereto." 5. Section 4 of the Act provided for the ceiling which, as already noted, was 150 bighas to start but got reduced to 50 bighas subsequently. Section 4 as originally stood was amended by Assam Act VII of 1971 which substituted the following provision for the existing sub-section (2): (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, custom or agreement, no person shall be entitled to hold, as owner, tenant, or mortgagee in possession lands, for special cultivation of tea in excess of such land as has been used for special cultivation of tea and purposes ancillary thereto on the day on which the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, (Assam Act VII of 1971) came into force. Provided that the State Government may allow more lands to be held for ancillary purposes and for increase in area under special cultivation of tea in accordance with the rules as may be prescribed. An Explanation appended to this section defined "purposes ancillary to special cultivation" with which Explanation however we are not concerned in the present case. 6. Section 7 deals with the submission of statement to Govern­ment. Sub-section (1) of this section requires the Collector to prepare a draft statement on the basis of the information given in the return by the land-owner which is required to be duly verified and/or on the basis of the information obtained by the Collector under section 6 of the Act. This draft statement has to include particulars as mentioned in sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) requires publication of the draft statement whose copy is required to be served on the person or persons concerned. Any objection received within 15 days is required to be duly considered by the Collector after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard. The draft statement is then to be made final by the Collector. Sub-section (2) requires publication of the draft statement whose copy is required to be served on the person or persons concerned. Any objection received within 15 days is required to be duly considered by the Collector after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard. The draft statement is then to be made final by the Collector. Sub-section {4) of this section states that : "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the next sub­section, with effect from the date on which the final state­ment is signed by the Collector under the preceding sub-section, all rights, title and interest of the person or persons whose lands are shown as excess in such statement shall stand transferred and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances created by such person or persons and no person shall then be entitled to question it in any Court". Chapter III of the Act deals with disposal of excess land. For our-purpose. sections, 15, 16 and 17 are material, whose relevant parts read as below: "15. Disposal of excess land-Subject to the provisions of this Act and of this chapter in particular the excess land transferred to and vested in the State Government under sub-section (4) of section 7 of this Act shall be at the disposal of the State Government. 16. The manner of disposal of excess land-(1) If there is any cultivating tenant in occupation of the land acquired from an owner then he shall be given settlement of such land within a prescribed period on the following conditions, namely- * * * * 17. Manner of disposal of land which is not settled under section 16-(1) The State Government or any officer empowered by it in this behalf shall be entitled to settle any land which has not been disposed of under section 16 in the same manner as any other land which is at the disposal of the Government under section 12 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. (2) The State Government or the officer empowered in this behalf may, for the purpose of settling any land under sub-section (I) above, eject, if necessary any person in unautho­rised possession. (2) The State Government or the officer empowered in this behalf may, for the purpose of settling any land under sub-section (I) above, eject, if necessary any person in unautho­rised possession. (3) In making settlement under sub section (1) of this-section preference shall be given as far as practicable to the following categories of persons in the order of narration stated below: (a) Landless cultivator who has been rendered homeless due to flood, erosion or earthquake. (b) Landless cultivator. (c) Agricultural Farming Corporation as defined in the Assam Agricultural Farming Corporation Act, 1973 (Assam Act VIII of 1973). 7. With the aforesaid legal provisions in mind, we may examine the submissions advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee. According to the petitioner, the Collector, while preparing the draft statement, was under legal obligation to exclude two types of land belonging to the petitionen(l) requisitioned land and (2) land covered by forests. 7A. The exclusion of requisitioned land is demanded on two grounds in the present case:(l) after requisition the land came to be “held" by the State Government or by the Union Government, as the case may be ; and (2) the same ceased to be ''land" because of raising of permanent structures over a large area of requisitioned plots. These submissions have been advanced because what had happened in the present case was that an area measuring 1434B 4K 8L was requisitioned for the purpose of Air Force stationed at Digaru. This was sometime in 1963. The requisition was under the provisions of Defence of India Act, 1962 and the Rules framed thereunder on 'expiry of which the requisition under that Act was deemed to have been mad6 under the provisions of Requisitioning1 and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968. About 1000 bighas of land had been requisitioned by the Collector under the provisions of the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The total requisitioned area stands at 2418B 3K. 8L. The exclusion of land requisitioned for the purpose of Air Force stationed at Digaru is claimed on the ground that the Defence Department have constructed permanent structures over the land because of which it has ceased to be "land'' within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act. The total requisitioned area stands at 2418B 3K. 8L. The exclusion of land requisitioned for the purpose of Air Force stationed at Digaru is claimed on the ground that the Defence Department have constructed permanent structures over the land because of which it has ceased to be "land'' within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act. So far as requisition under the Assam Act is concerned, exclusion has been demanded only for 65B3K11L of land on the ground that over about 45 bighas permanent building of a Project Office has been constructed, about 9 bighas have been used for the purpose of setting up a school and on the remaining land a bazar has been set up. Because of these structural alterations in the topography of the land, it is contended by Shri Bhattacharjee that 65 bighas and odd land have also been ceased to be 'land' within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act. 8. The argument that after requisition the land must be deemed to have been held by the State Government or the Union Government, as the case may be, has been advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee by commanding that the word 'held' in section 2(1) of the Act has to mean possession under any legal title ; for this purpose it is not necessary that the land must be held by the concerned Government as owner. In support of this submission, we have been first referred to Budhan Singh vs. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 , In this case the Apex Court was called upon to decipher the meaning of the word 'held' as used in section 9 of the concerned Act. An argument was advanced in that case that the word 'held' would mean holding of the land even by a trespasser. The concerned section read as below : “All wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situated within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an interm­ediary or tenant or other person............ shall continue to belong or be held by such intermediary or tenant or person”. The Court however opined that though the legislature had not used the word "lawfully held", it was pointed out that the definition of the word held as given in the dictionary is "lawfully held”. shall continue to belong or be held by such intermediary or tenant or person”. The Court however opined that though the legislature had not used the word "lawfully held", it was pointed out that the definition of the word held as given in the dictionary is "lawfully held”. It was therefore pointed out that even in the absence of the word " 'lawful' in the section, the word 'held' has to mean 'lawfully held.' We have been then referred to B. Bapi Raja vs. A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1073 in which the decision rendered in State of A.P. ts Md. Ashrafuddin AIR 1982 SC 913 was quoted with approval. In that decision it was pointed out that the word 'held' connotes both ownership as well as possession and in the context of the definition it was observed that it was not possible to interprete the term 'held' only in the sense of possession. To illustrate this it was pointed out that if a land is held by a owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of all such persons. It was made clear that an owner who is not in actual possession would also be taken to be a holder of the land. Sbri Sarma submits that what has been held in Ashrafuddin would indicate that the word 'held' cannot be understood only in the sense of possession. 9. From what has been stated above, it cannot be held that the owner of the land, namely, the petitioner in the present case had ceased to hold the land merely because the same had been requisi­tioned by the Collector- The various provisions of the Act make it abundantly clear that what has been stated above in Ashrafuddin, which was cited with approval in Bapi Raja, would clearly show that to hold the land under the Act would include not only the owner but also other legal possessor of the land like tenant or mortgagee in possession. We have said so because in section 4 (I) of the Act it has been clearly stated that no person shall be entitled to hold "as owner, tenant or mortgagee in possession "land which exceeds the limit of 50 bighas in aggregate. 10. We have said so because in section 4 (I) of the Act it has been clearly stated that no person shall be entitled to hold "as owner, tenant or mortgagee in possession "land which exceeds the limit of 50 bighas in aggregate. 10. We cannot therefore hold on the ratio of the aforesaid decisions that by virtue of requisition of the land the petitioner had ceased to hold the land or that the State Government or the Union Gover­nment alone had started to hold the land after requisition. According to us, the word 'held' as used in section 2(1) of the Act has to mean not only possessor of the land but also owner of the same. Unless the State Government or for that matter the Union Government be also the owner of the land, it cannot be said that the petitioner had ceased to hold the land or that the same is being held only by the concerned Government. This conclusion of ours get fortified by section 15 of the Act which has stated that the land ''transferred to and vested in the State Government under sub-section (4) of section 7” shall be at the disposal of the State Government. This clearly indicates that only transfer of land by way of requisition would not do bat the same has to vest in the Government also as contemplated by section 7(4) of the Act, before the same can be disposed of for the purposes visualised by the Act. This interpretation alone would advance the aim and object of the Act. Shri Sarma contends, and rightly, that an interpretation which advances the object of the Act should alone be accepted by us. He has referred in this connection toSUteof Gujarat ts. Chaturbhaj, AIR 1976 SC 1697 (para 14) and Kameshwar Singh vs. Additional District Judge, AIR 1987 SC 138 (para4). 11. This takes us to another limb of argument advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee which is that because of the long possession of the requisitioned land in some cases since 1951 and some other cases since 1963 the act of requisition should be taken as acquisition of the land. To bring home this submission, strong reliance has been placed by Shrj Bhattacharjee on C. J. Ghanashamdas vs. Collector of Madras, (1986) 4 SCC 305 . To bring home this submission, strong reliance has been placed by Shrj Bhattacharjee on C. J. Ghanashamdas vs. Collector of Madras, (1986) 4 SCC 305 . In this case the Court dealt with the question whether court fee is required to be paid on the requisitioned land also though the relevant section of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 had required payment of court fees on "acquisition of property". The Supreme Court speaking through Venkataramiah, J. pointed out, after noting the decisions in State of West Bengal vs. Subodh Gopal, AIR 1954 SC91, Dwarkadas Shrinivas vs. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 and decision of the High Court of Australia in Minister of State for the Army vs. Dalziel (1943-44) 68 CLR 261 and the commentary by Pollock and Wright on "Possession in the Common Law", that: "(n) of only is a right to possession a right of property, but where the object of proprietary right is a tangible thing, it is the most characteristic and essential of those rights. Possession, it is said, is nine points in law. An owner without possession has only a mere shell while the person in possession enjoys the property in many ways. In this situation, it is difficult to say that there cannot be deprivation of property without deprivation of title also. Deprivation of property for an inde­finite period is acquisition of property during that period though the title may continue to rest with the owner." ( Emphasis supplied ) This decision falls short of saying that requisition has to be treated as acquisition for all purposes and at all times. The distinction between acquisition and requisition had not reached a vanishing point as per this decision. It states that where then) is deprivation of possession for an 'indefinite period the same has to be treated as acquisition Of property "during that period" though the . title may continue to rest With the owner. The distinction between-requisition and acquisition therefore continues despite what has been stated in the aforesaid case. It states that where then) is deprivation of possession for an 'indefinite period the same has to be treated as acquisition Of property "during that period" though the . title may continue to rest With the owner. The distinction between-requisition and acquisition therefore continues despite what has been stated in the aforesaid case. It is of course true that recourse to acquisition should not be taken where the property is needed for a permanent purpose ; and if it is so done the same would be an abuse of the power and a colourable exercise of the same In Jiwani Kumar vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1984 SC 1707 it was pointed out that where- "one is repository of two powers that is power of requisition as well as the power of acquisition qua the same property and if the purpose can equally be served by one which causes lesser inconvenience and damage to the citizen concerned unless the repository of both the powers suffers from any insurmountable disability user of one which is disadvantageous to the citizen without exploring the use of the other would be a bad not on the ground that the Government has no power but on the ground that it will be a misuse of the power in law." 12. From what has been stated above, we cannot say that the land was held only by the State Government or the Union Government, as the case may be, after it had remained in its possession for a Very long time on the ground that such requisition must be regarded as acquisition which would result in vesting of the land in the concerned Government, divesting the landowner from all his right, title and interest over the requisitioned land. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Shri Bhattacharjee that the 4and in question must be deemed to have been held only by the State Government or the Union Government, as the case may be, after the same had been requisitioned since 1951 or 1963. Bs that as it may, this point may not detain us, as we propose to exempt the requisitioned land from the purview of the Act, on the ground being mentioned. subsequently. 13. Bs that as it may, this point may not detain us, as we propose to exempt the requisitioned land from the purview of the Act, on the ground being mentioned. subsequently. 13. Another argument advanced by Shri Bhattacharjee is that in view of the permanent structures which have been raised on the land requisitioned for the Air Force stationed at Digaru, which position has been accepted in the impugned order, the land ceased to be "land” within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act inasmuch as the land is not being utilised for agriculture nor .can the same be utilised for that purpose. Though the definition of agriculture is quite wide, as has been noted above, we are of the view that if the land has been converted to such a use that the same cannot reasonably be used or utilised for the purpose of agriculture, the same would cease to be land within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act. Shri Sarma has however contended that even if there be structure on the land, the same would not take it out of the mischief of the Act inasmuch as the definition of the land given in section 3 (f) includes the sites of building appurtenant to such land. We are not impressed by this argument because the definition of the land as given in the Act would show that for "land" to include the "sites of buildings", of which reference has been made in section 3 (f) of the Act, there must first be land which is or may be utilised for agriculture and if there be such land then the sites of the building appurtenant to it would also be land. The definition cannot take within its fold buildings or permanent structures raised on land, even, if these be not appurtenant to land which is or may be utilised for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto. 14. To reinforce his submission, Shri Sarma has however drawn our attention to section 12 (b) of the Act which has stated that if the e be any building or structure on the land, the owner thereof shall be given the option of removing it within the prescribed time and if he fails to do so, it shall be sold in auction and the sale proceeds after deduction of the cost of auction, if any, shall be paid to him. For this provision to apply there has to be first land as understood by the Act and then a building or structure over it. If there be only building and there be no such parcel of land which is or may be utilised for agriculture, we do not think that because of what has been slated in section 12(b) of the Act sites which are mostly covered by permanent structures would become "land" within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act. Though the land covered by structure or building can also be utilised for agriculture after demolishing the same, we do not think if the definition of land can be reasonably read to include those parcels of land which have been used predominantly for the purpose of raising permanent structure or building. 15. The above conclusion of ours receives reinforcement from what has been stated in Chapter III of the Act dealing with disposal of excess land. A reading of this chapter which includes sections 15 to U shows that the legislature had visualised that there may be a Cultivating tenant in occupation of the land. Apparently this can be so only in case of-land used for agriculture. In case there be no cultivating tenant as visualised by section 16 of the Act, section 17 permits or requires to settle the excess land in favour of landless cultivator or Agricultural Fanning Corporation. This further shows that in the scheme of the Act there is no place for those types of land which have been used primarily or predominantly for raising structures or building over them. Shri Sarma would not however leave the matter at that. He contends that agriculture as defined in section 3(a) of the Act includes piggery, animal husbandry, poultry and other allied pursuits. The land over which structure has been raised can be used for these purposes, contends Shri Sarma, and so the same can be regarded as agricultural land. We have found it difficult to accept this submission because it would indeed be too much to hold that the types of structures raised by Air Force over the land requisitioned for them can be used for the purpose of piggery, animal husbandry or any other allied pursuits. 16. We have found it difficult to accept this submission because it would indeed be too much to hold that the types of structures raised by Air Force over the land requisitioned for them can be used for the purpose of piggery, animal husbandry or any other allied pursuits. 16. We may point out here that S.k. Chand Mohammad, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, appearing for the Union of India submits that the land requisitioned for Air Force is permanently needed and it is because this that acquisition procee­dings have already been started following which a sum of Rs. 3.60 lakhs has been given to the Collector which has been made available to the petitioner which it has accepted under protest. , 17. In view of what has been stated above, we would hold that those parcels of land over which permanent structures have been made either by the Central Government or by the State Government and those parcels of land which have been converted to some other use, namely, school building or holding of bazar have to be excluded from the purview of the Act. 18. This takes us to the other category of land which the petitioner would like to get excluded-the same being land covered by forests. The area of this type of land is 3382B 4K 12L. The contention of Shri Bhattacharjee in this regard is that since the aforesaid area is covered by deep forests because of which the same cannot be utilised for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto, the aforesaid area has also to be excluded on the short ground 'that the same does not satisfy the requirement of definition of 'land' as mentioned in section 3 (f) of the Act. In support of his submission he has referred to Bardnar Tea and Timber Co. vs. The Sub-Division Officer, AIR 1973 Gau. 131 . In that case a point was raised that , if there be a Sal plantation and deep forests over the land the same could not be subject matter of acquisition under the Act. The State Government, however, disposed of the appeal without applying its mind to this aspect of the case and therefore the appeal was remitted to the State Government for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in the judgment. The State Government, however, disposed of the appeal without applying its mind to this aspect of the case and therefore the appeal was remitted to the State Government for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in the judgment. The observations which are sought to be relied are these: "The foundation for jurisdiction to acquire land under the Ceiling Act is that the land is covered by the definition in section 3 (f) ...... It will be therefore necessary for the appellate authority to consider whether this land which after being acquired will have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of sections 16 and 17 of the Act for settlement for cultivation, will be suited for cultivation. The object under the Act is no doubt to acquire excess land but with the sole object of settling the same with persons for cultivation after it is available under section 15 for disposal by the Government. Since that object will not be achieved in case the land is covered by deep forests and Sal plantation etc., section 3 (f) introduces a restrictive definition of "land”. We are clearly of opinion that the appeal has not been disposed of by the State Govern­ment in accordance with law by applying its mind to all the relevant provisions of the Act”.. 19. A significant observation was, however, made in the last sentence of para 3 which is that "We will not be understood as pronouncing any opinion on the merits of the claim made by the petitioner". This would show that this Court had not finally held in the aforesaid case that if the land is covered by deep forests and Sal plantation etc. the same could not be subject matter of acquisition under the Act. We have given our deep thought to this aspect of the case and we are of the view that land covered by deep forests can well be utilised for agricultural purposes. In these days of growing pressure on land, it is common knowledge that even reserved forests are being utilised for agricultural purposes. The transformation of land covered by forests for utilisation for agricultural purposes has become & common feature of the day. In these days of growing pressure on land, it is common knowledge that even reserved forests are being utilised for agricultural purposes. The transformation of land covered by forests for utilisation for agricultural purposes has become & common feature of the day. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot rightly and justly claim the exclusion of the forest land from the purview of the Act. 20. Shri Bhattacharjee has drawn our attention to reinforce his submissions to certain provisions contained in the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Section 2 of this Act is relevant for our purpose and the same reads as below : 2. Restriction on the dereservation of forests or use of forests land for non forest purpose-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing- (i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the exp­ression "reserved forest" in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved; (ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose. Explanation-For the purpose of this section "non-forest purpose" means breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for any purpose other than reforestation". 21. This section itself visualises that forest land may be used for non-forest purposes. It has however put a fetter on the power of the State Government to do so except with the approval of the Central Government. Because of this provision it cannot be held that forest land cannot at all be utilised for agricultural purposes. This apart, the ceiling case at hand being of 1973, the provisions of the aforesaid Act which came into force on the 25th day of October, 1980 could not have stood in the way of the authorities at the relevant time to include the land over which forests exist within the purview of the Act. 22. In view of all that has been stated above, we are not satisfied if the petitioner can rightly and justly claim for exclusion of the land covered by deep forests form the operation of the Act. 22. In view of all that has been stated above, we are not satisfied if the petitioner can rightly and justly claim for exclusion of the land covered by deep forests form the operation of the Act. In the result, the petition is allowed by ordering exclusioa of the requisitioned land as indicated above. Claim for exemption of land covered by forests is however rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. N. Phnkan, J. — l agree.