Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. In these two writ petitions, the question of law involved being similar, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. In both the writ petitions, the vires of Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1984 (the Act) has been challenged. At the time of hearing of the writ petitions, Dr. Debi Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that at this stage it was not necessary to challenge the vires of the Act and he submitted that the only point which was necessary to be urged was that in view of the absence of notification under Sec.1 (c) of the Act, it does not apply either to the whole of the State of Bihar or par: of it and, consequently, no action could have been taken by the respondents under the provisions of the Act. Learned counsel for the parties were heard on this question alone and we are confining our judgment to this question. 3. The Bihar Legislature enacted the Act to provide for regulating in the public interest, the trade and other related matters of certain forest produce by creation of a State monopoly in such trade in the State of Bihar. Sec.1 (c) provides that it shall come into force in such area or areas, and on such date or dates, as the Government may by notification in the official Gazette specify, and they may specify different dates for different areas. Sec.1 (d) provides that it shall apply to such forest produce and on such date or dates as the Government, by notification, may specify in that behalf. 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that although the State Government has published a notification in exercise of the power under Sec.1 (d) of the Act on 8th February, 1985, enumerating the forest produce covered by the Act, but no notification under Sec.1 (c) applying the Act to any area in Bihar has yet been published. Consequently, it was submitted that since the Act has not come into force in any area, no State monopoly has been created with regard to the trade in forest produce. Our attention was drawn to Annexure-1 in CWJC No. 442 of 1987 (R) which corresponds to Annexure-6 in C.W.J.C. No. 336 of 1986 (R). Consequently, it was submitted that since the Act has not come into force in any area, no State monopoly has been created with regard to the trade in forest produce. Our attention was drawn to Annexure-1 in CWJC No. 442 of 1987 (R) which corresponds to Annexure-6 in C.W.J.C. No. 336 of 1986 (R). By these annexures, the State Government issued notification under Sec.1 (d) of the Act enumerating the forest produce within the meaning of the Act. Our attention was also drawn to the statement made in paragraph 26 of C.W.J.C. No. 442 of 1987 (R) in which it has been asserted that the State Government has not issued any notification under Sec.1 (c) of the Act specifying the area to which provisions of the Act shall apply. This has been asserted in the other case in paragraph 5 of the supplementary affidavit filed on 13.4.1987. No counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 442 of 1987 (R). Although the respondents filed supplementary counter-affidavit on 6.7.1987, they did not traverse paragraph-5 of the supplementary affidavit filed on 13.4.1987. The assertion made on behalf of the petitioners is that there has been no notification under Sec.1 (c) of the Act and that has not been denied on behalf of the respondents. 5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the notification as contained in Annexure-1 was issued both under Sec.1 (c) and 1 (d) of the Act. Learned Standing Counsel could not reply why Clause (c) was not mentioned in; he notification when Clause (d) was mentioned. According to him, a reading of the whole of the notification will show that in fact notification is both under Clauses (c) and (d) of Sec.1 of the Act. In support of his submission, he drew our attention to page 2 of the notification which reads as follows :- Provided that this Act shall not apply to the following Forest Produce in Tirhut, Saran Darbhanga and Koshi Divisions and Khagaria district of Bhagalpur Division. 6. Learned Standing Counsel stated that since some of the Divisions/ Districts were mentioned therein with reference to specified forest produce, the Court should infer that the notification as contained in Annexure-1 was a composite one under both the Clauses. 6. Learned Standing Counsel stated that since some of the Divisions/ Districts were mentioned therein with reference to specified forest produce, the Court should infer that the notification as contained in Annexure-1 was a composite one under both the Clauses. By virtue of the provisions of Sec.1 (c) of the Act, the Legislature laid down that the Act shall come into force in such areas to which the Government may by notification make it applicable. It was, therefore, incumbent for the State Government to notify by publishing such notification in the Bihar Gazette notifying whether the Act applies to the whole of the State of Bihar or to particular areas of the State. Notification under Clause (d) has nothing to do with Clause (c) because Clause (c) contemplates applicability of the Act with regard to particular areas, whereas Clause (c) contemplates applicability to the various forest produce to which the Act shall apply. In Annexure 1 at page 1, various forest produce has been named, at page 2, two such forest produce, namely, sisan (Dalbergie Sisoo) and Dhup (Pinus noxhburghii) have been excluded so far the area covered by Tirhut, Saran, Darbhanga and Koshi Divisions and Khagaria district of Bhagalpur Division, although those are forest produce within the meaning of the Act in rest of the Divisions/Districts. The mere mentioning of some of the districts or divisions in Annexure-1 which has been published under Section l(d) of the Act is of no assistance to the respondent for holding that that was a composite notification under Clauses (c) and (d) of Sec.1. When he Act provides that the applicability of the Act will depend upon the issuance of the notification in the manner provided in the Act, in the absence of any such notification in the manner prescribed, no inference can be drawn merely because notifications were issued under Section l(d) or other sections of the Act. Learned Standing Counsel in support of this proposition relied upon in the cases of M/s. Titagarh Paper Mills Limited V/s. Orissa Stale Electricity Board and Anr. [1975(2) SCC 438] and Ambica Quarry Works V/s. Stale of Gujarat and Ors. -- in which it was observed by the Supreme Court that a wrong description of the source of power cannot invalidate the action. It is not the case of the respondents that the law laid down has no application in this case. [1975(2) SCC 438] and Ambica Quarry Works V/s. Stale of Gujarat and Ors. -- in which it was observed by the Supreme Court that a wrong description of the source of power cannot invalidate the action. It is not the case of the respondents that the law laid down has no application in this case. In Ambica Quarry Works (Supra) and the others case referring to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the Supreme Court observed that all interpretation must subserve and help implementation of the intention of the Act. In this case, we have not been called upon to interpret the provisions of the Act. What is in dispute is whether any notification under Sec.1 (c) of the Act is published. The law laid down in M/s. Titagarh Paper Mills (Supra) also has no application in this case. 7. We have already noticed that the Act provides for State monopoly in the trade of forest produce. If the Act is made applicable to any area and if the forest produce is enumerated, the monopoly of purchasing such forest produce in that area is of the State Government; and for that, the State Government may under Section 4 appoint agents, Sec. 5 of the Act provides that on issuance of a notification under Clauses (c) and (d) of Sec.1 with respect to any area, no person other than those mentioned in that section shall purchase or transport, import or export these specified forest produce in such area. Sec.20 provides for penalty for violation of the provisions of the Act including Section 5. A person found contravening any of the provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder : . . . . shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to one year or fine which may extent to two thousand rupees, or both. Since the violation of the provisions of the Act has been made penal, a citizen is entitled to know whether any notification under Section l(c) has been made in terms of the Act, and it cannot be urged that Court should infer that in view of the notification as contained in Annexure-1 issued under Section l(d) of the Act, a notification under Section l(c) has also impliedly been issued. 8 For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held that there is no material on record to show that notification under Section l(c) of the Act has been published applying the Act to any area of Bihar, Consequently, the respondents cannot claim that there was bar or restriction on purchase, transport, import or export of specified forest produce in Bihar. The respondents are restrained from interferring with the trade in forest produce by the petitioners till notification under Section l(c) is issued. 9. It appears from the perusal of the averments made in C.W.J.C. No. 336 of 1986(R) that forest produce of all the petitioners were seized in purported exercise of the power under the Act. In view of the finding recorded above, the respondents are directed to release the forest produce so seized from the petitioners as evidenced by Annexures-4, 5 and 6. Both the writ applications are disposed of without cost.