JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, the petitioner Ishaq Mohd, has prayed for issuance of a writ, order or direction to quash and set-aside the impugned termination order whereby his services were terminated by M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., Jaipur. The services of some other employees were also terminated by M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. They have also challenged their order of termination in separate writ petitions, the details of which are given in Annexure/1 to this order. 2. In all the writ petitions, a common question of law is raised, whether M/s. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. Jaipur (for short 'the Company') is an "authority" falling within the definition of State in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Is it an instrumentality or agency of the Government ? 3. In this group of writ petitions, the respondent Company has contended that M/s. Jaipur Metals and Electricals is a Company registered under the Companies Act is therefore, not an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and no writ petition can be maintained against it. Since a common question of law is raised in all the cases, it was thought desirable, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties in all the writ petitions to decide the said question in this writ petition and the order passed in it in this regard will govern all the other writ petitions. Therefore, we propose to decide the preliminary issue in Part-I of this order and the merit of the order of termination would he decided in Part-it of the order. The order passed in Part-I shall be placed on the file of each writ petition referred in Annexure-I. PART:I4. A few facts may briefly be stated:- M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals is a public limited company registered under the Companies Act. The Company was set up by the Kamani Group in 1943. It is said that the Company was a pioneer in the field of non-ferros metals and alloys. The Company diversified in 1953 and commenced manufacturing house service and energy meters. It is further said that the Company continued to enjoy good reputation for quality products as well as substantial profits till 1971-72. It is said that the Company was a pioneer in the field of non-ferros metals and alloys. The Company diversified in 1953 and commenced manufacturing house service and energy meters. It is further said that the Company continued to enjoy good reputation for quality products as well as substantial profits till 1971-72. However, thereafter the process of degeneration set in mainly due to internal strife in the Kamani family and cut throat competition in the market, non-availability of adequate raw-materials and abnormal increase in the cost of production. By the end of 1976-77, not only the accumulated profits were wiped out but losses accumulated to the extent of Rs. 74 lacs began to wipe out the share-holders' capital. On account of the said situation coupled with the bleak future prospects, the then private management headed by Shri R.R. Kamani proposed voluntary liquidation of the Company However, the proposal could not get through as the share-holders in their extra-ordinary general meeting held on 17th June, 1977, rejected the same and simultaneously directed for constituting a management committee with two nominees of the State Government and one each of IFCI and RFC, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and the Central Bank of India. The Government of Rajasthan declared the Company as 'relief undertaking' under the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provision) Act, 1961 with a view to protect it from legal proceedings and also to enable its working properly. 'The declaration as Relief Undertaking also gave its special protection in various ways; such as provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended by the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1956; the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 were made in applicable to the Relief Undertaking The Company was declared as a Relief Undertaking vide Notification No. F. (2) (111) IHD/l/77 dated 17th December, 1977. Initially, it remained a relief undertaking upto 12th August, 1978, but this period was extended from time to time and the Company is still a relief undertaking In 1977, the State Government issued a notification asking the Company to go for recognition of a single Union. It was contemplated in the Notification that where more than one union existed, the Union having secured the support of at least 51% membership was to be recognised by the Company. It was contemplated in the Notification that where more than one union existed, the Union having secured the support of at least 51% membership was to be recognised by the Company. The management of the Company called for holding an election to decide the majority union. In the election, AITUC and INTUC supported BM and a joint front between these three unions was formed. In the election, BMS got 51% votes with the support of AITUC and INTUC and CITU lost by 44 votes. Thus, BMS emerged to be the recognised union. However, within a short while both the AITUC and INTUC withdrew their support for BMS and as a result the CITU challenged the recognition given to BMS. The net impact of such a situation produced inter union rivalry and its attendant consequences. 5. On 12th August, 1977, an agreement was entered into between the State Government and the Company, whereby the Government at the request of the Company and with a view to assist and promote industrial development in the State agreed to furnish an unconditional guarantee for a sum of Rs. 53.55 lacs to the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and the Central Bank of India on behalf of the Company for repayment of the loan together with interest thereon and other money which may be due from the Company in respect of the said loan on the terms and conditions set forth in the agreement. In consideration of the Government furnishing the unconditional guarantee as stated above, on behalf of the Company to the said State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and Central Bank of India for repayment of the loan of Rs. 53.55 lacs ( Rs. 26.75 lacs SBBJ and Rs. 26.80 lacs CBI). the Company agreed to mortgage and create second charge in respect of existing fixed assets and asserts that may be added in future by way of simple mortgage the first charge, of course, was in favour of the industrial Finance Corporation of India for a sum of Rs. 82 lacs pari pasu second charge in favour of the Rajasthan Financial Corporation, and the Government for a sum of Rs. 20 lacs. 82 lacs pari pasu second charge in favour of the Rajasthan Financial Corporation, and the Government for a sum of Rs. 20 lacs. It was also stipulated that during the continuance of the aforesaid guarantees the Company shall not incur any new liability or create new incumberances in respect of its present and future assets without obtaining the previous consent in writing of the Government. There was also stipulation that the Company shall not further hypothecate or otherwise alienate property during the continuation of the agreement and shall not declare or distribute divident without obtaining previous concurrence in writing of the Government The Company also agreed that during the continuation of the agreement it will not make any investment elsewhere or amalgamate the company with any other concern without obtaining the previous approval of the Government in writing. It was one of the terms stipulated in the agreement that during the continuation of the agreement the Government shall have a right to appoint not exceeding three of their nominees as Directors on the Board of the Company. It was also stipulated that the nominees so appointed shall not be liable to retirement by rotation nor they would be liable to obtain qualification shares, if any. As per 34th Annual Report 1977-78 of the Company it would appear that on the Board there were 7 Directors. Out of the seven Directors two Shri N.R. Kamani and Shri N. Kamani were from the Kamani Group and the rest were the nominees of the Government of Rajasthan or the Financial Corporations or institutions. Shri Anim Chowdhary nominee of the Government was the Managing Director.6. In the year 1978-79, as per the annual report and accounts it is evident that there were 9 Directors Out of 9 Directors two were of Kamani Group and others were either the nominee of the Government of Rajasthan or the nominees of IFCI and RFI . In the year 1979-80, there were ten Directors and out of them two were of Kamani Group and the remaining were either nominees of the Government of Rajasthan of the nominees of the Financial institutions. The same position remained in the year 1980-81. In that year, Shri Vijai Singh, a nominee of the Government of Rajasthan was appointed as Managing Director. The same position remained in the year 1980-81. In that year, Shri Vijai Singh, a nominee of the Government of Rajasthan was appointed as Managing Director. In the dear 1981-82, Shri N.R. Kamani continued as a Director, but Shri N. Kamani retired and, thus, out of two Directors of the Kamani Group there remained only one N.R. Kamani of the Kamani Group on the Board of Directors as Director. The rest Directors were the nominees of either the Government of Rajasthan or the Financial Institutions. In the year 1982-83, Shri N.R. Kamani of the Kamani Group continued and I.S. Kavdia was appointed as Managing Director. He was the nominee of the Government of Rajasthan. The remaining Directors were either the nominees of the Government of Rajasthan or the nominees of the financial institutions. In the year 1985-84, Shri I.S. Kavdia continued as Managing Director and N.R. Kamani as Director & others were the nominees of the Government of Rajasthan or the financial institutions. Almost he same position continued in the year 1984-85. In the year 1985-86, Shri I.S. Kavdia continued as Managing Director as nominee of the Government and the remaining 14 Directors were the nominees of the Rajasthan Financial Corporation Government of Rajasthan, RSEB and the employees' Co-operative Society. It may be noted here that Shri N.R. Kamani retired and in the year 1985-86. There was no Director of the Kamani Group. The tenure of the appointment of the Managing Director Shri I.S. Kavdia was further extended for a period of two years with effect from 25th July, 1985, by the Government of Rajasthan he still continues to be the Managing Director. After the appointment of Shri I.S. Kavdia as Managing Director in the year 1983, the management started retrenching the workers in a big way. The Union signed an agreement with the management in January 1984, which is said to have been entered into the management and the Unions to seek Co-operation of each other in an effort to put the company on a firm footing and to save it from being closed. Some 500 workers were retrenched by 31st March, 1985. The Union signed an agreement with the management in January 1984, which is said to have been entered into the management and the Unions to seek Co-operation of each other in an effort to put the company on a firm footing and to save it from being closed. Some 500 workers were retrenched by 31st March, 1985. The agreement provided new production norms and working hours from 8 to more than 10 in each shift, linked salary and wages with new production norms stopping of over timing, deferred annual increment for a period of one year, introduced wage freeze at the level of December 1983 for the next five years, imposed ban on strike and go-slow for a period of five years and it offered workers 20% share in the profit earned in a particular year in the form of equity shares. It is said that the agreement aimed at inculcating in the workers a sense of identification with and belongingness, to the organisation through participation and profit-sharing and ownership in the form of equity participation. The workers' shares are being held by their co- operative namely Jaipur Metals Industries Employees Credit and thrift Society Ltd.7. It is stated that to provide further acquisition of certain shares of the Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. with a view to securing the proper management of the affairs of the company and the continuity and development of the production of goods which are vital to the needs of the country of metal connected with or incidental thereto, an ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of Rajasthan on 23rd June, 1986 styling as the Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. (Acquisition of Shares) Ordinance, 1986. which was later on replaced by the Act. which was later on replaced by the Act. Under what circumstances, the Ordinance was promulgated would be clear from the preamble of the Ordinance, which is reproduced below : "Whereas Messrs Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. Jaipur are engaged in the manufacture and production of House Service Electricity Meters and others Metals Products which are vital to the needs of the general public; And Whereas the Government of Rajasthan and a public financial institution had also invested considerable funds in the share capital of the Company; And Whereas the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and the Central Bank of India have advance considerable s tens to the Company and the same have been guaranteed by the Government of Rajasthan; And Whereas further investment of large sums of money is necessary for the maintenance and development of the production of the under-taking of the Company and for securing the proper management of the affairs of the Company; And Whereas Acquisition by the Government of Rajasthan of an effective control over the affairs of the Company is necessary to secure the proper management of the affairs of the Company." 8. Section 3 of the Ordinance laid down that the appointed date (means the first day of January 1986) all the shares of the Company shall by virtue of the Ordinance be deemed to have been transferred to, and vested in, the State Government. The following provisions made in the Ordinance are relevant and are reproduced below: "4. Management of the Company - For the purpose of enabling the Company to function effectively, the State Government may, by notification, make such provisions (including changes in the Board of Directors and amendments in the memorandum and articles of association of the Company) as it may consider necessary and the provisions so made shall have effect so long as they are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the Companies Act, l956. 16. Ordinance to have over-riding effect:- The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law." 9. 16. Ordinance to have over-riding effect:- The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent there with contained in any law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law." 9. M/s. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. issued a brochure under the title, "Rescue Operation Revival Looking Ahead" in December 1965, in which it is mentioned that the Government of Rajasthan took oven the management of the Company in the middle of 1977 after the share-holders rejected the proposal of Shri R.R. Kamani, the then Managing Director for voluntary liquidation. In another brochure "Salvation through Employees' Participation in Managment Profit Sharing and ownership" published by Shri I.S. Kavdia. Managing Director of the Company on July 1, 1936. There is a declaration in the following words: 'On account of the situation mentioned above, coupled with bleak future prospects the then private management headed by Shri R.R. Kamani proposed voluntary liquidation of the Company. However, the proposal could not get through as the share-holders, in their Extra ordinary General Meeting dated 17th June, 1977, rejected the same and simultaneously directed for constituting a Management Committee with two nominees of the State Government and one each of IFCI, RFC State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and the Central Bank of India, as all these agencies had substantial financial stakes in the JMEL, with the above, the Management of the Company effectively passed on to the hands of the State Government. assisted by the above financial institutions and the Banks." 10. The position of financial involvement of the Government of Rajasthan in the management of M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals also requires to be mentions here. Since June 1977, it appears that the Government of Rajasthan took over the management of the Company (as per the press statement issued by Shri I.S. Kavdia on 1st June, 1986) with the consent of the majority of the share-holders. During the years 1980-81 to 1985-86, the Government of Rajasthan along with IFCI and other financial institutions and banks had a share-holding, which is exhibited by the following chart:-The position of the share-holding in the total paid up capital is as follow:- Amount Rs. During the years 1980-81 to 1985-86, the Government of Rajasthan along with IFCI and other financial institutions and banks had a share-holding, which is exhibited by the following chart:-The position of the share-holding in the total paid up capital is as follow:- Amount Rs. in lacs Year 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 Paid up share capital 120 120 120 120 120 1.56 Share holding (i) Govt of Raj 21 21 21 21 21 58.51 (ii) Public Financial Institutions 33.96 33.96 33.96 33.96 33.96 12.88 (iii) Unit Trust of India 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 Total of (i) (ii) (iii) of % of total Paid up Captial 51.31% 51.31% 51.31% 51.31% (iv) Others 48.69% 48.69% 48.69% 48.69% 48.69% 50.00% The amount of loan guaranteed by the Government of Rajasthan is Rs. 1,86,57,629/-11. The case of the petitioner employee is that after the Company was declared as Relief Undertaking a regular process of dispensing with the services of the workmen of the Company was undertaken and, in he process, the services of the petitioners were terminated and they were thrown out of employment arbitrarily without any domestic inquiry and without observing the principles of natural justice and the case of the management is that the services of the petitioners were not terminated arbitrarily and that M/s. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. being a company which does not fall within the definition of State and is such the writ petition is not maintainable. Thus in these circumstances it is necessary to determine and decide is to whether the Company falls within the category of "other authority" as would be comprehended in the expression "other authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.12. For better understanding of the problem it would be necessary to trace out the history of the development of law as to "other authority". which falls within the definition of State in Article 12. Article 12 of the Constitution of India provides : "In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India," 13. It is not possible to formulate an all inclusive and exhaustive test that would adequately answer the said power. It is not possible to formulate an all inclusive and exhaustive test that would adequately answer the said power. The development of law as to 'other authorities", which may be comprehended within the definition of State in Article 12 may be traced through the following cases : 1. Electricity Board Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1957 SC 1857) - decided by a Bench of five judges. 2. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) -decided by a bench of five judges) 3. Ramana D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) decided by a bench of three judges). 4. U.P. Warehobsing Corporation v. Vijay Narain, ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ) decided by a bench of two judges) 5. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujid, ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) -decided by a bench of five judges 6. Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) decided by a bench of three judges. 7. B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, ( AIR 1984 SC 363 ) decided by a bench of two Judges). 8. P.K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, ( AIR 1984 SC 541 ) decided by a bench of two Judges. 9. Central Inland Transport Ltd. v. Bhojamal, ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 ) decided by a bench of two judges 10. M.C. Mebta & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1986 1V SVLR (C) 504) , decided by a bench of five judges 14. It is through the study of these cases that we will try to trace out the development of law as to 'other authorities' which fall within the definition of State in Article 12. The study of the development of the law would disclose a very interesting story as to how and in what manner and circumstances the Judges have contributed to the change in the concept of the meaning of the 'other authorities'. Undoubtedly, it is an old saying that the Judges do not make or alter the law but they simply expound it. It is also asserted by some that the law is certain. Sir Alfred Denning in his book "The Changing Law" has shown that both the above assertions are far from truth. Undoubtedly, it is an old saying that the Judges do not make or alter the law but they simply expound it. It is also asserted by some that the law is certain. Sir Alfred Denning in his book "The Changing Law" has shown that both the above assertions are far from truth. Judges are constantly altering the law in trying to adjust it to the growing needs of the time to meet every growing complicity of the society and that the law is not only not certain but that it can never be made certain. Sir Alfred Denning has further ventured to suggest that a great factor to contribute this change is a change in the philosophy of life itself, from laissez fair to the welfare State. Looking backward 50 years, what are the main changes in the wore politics. The most momentous transformation in the right of Welfare State 50 years ago, people thought that Government is best which governs the least. Now that Government is best which governs most We are the most governed nation. Our constitution makers extended the doctrine of rule of law not only to the State but also to its agents and instrumentalities. The concept of 'other authorities' given in the definition of the State was enlarged to protect the individual from injustice. The old technically rigid conceptions of contract and equity have given place in modern time to a more just appreciation of justice and the fusion of law and equity in one jurisdiction has resulted in the emergence of a new equity more suited to modern ideas of human needs, human values. For appreciating the need to alter the law the observations made by Madon J. in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojomal (Supra) are useful and they are quoted as follows : "Should then our courts not advance with the time should they still continue to cling to out moded concepts and outwarn ideologies ? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the day ? Should all jurisprudential development pass by us, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of 19th century theories ? Should the strong be permitted to push the week to the wall should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the week ? Should the Courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample underfoot the rights of the weak ? Should all jurisprudential development pass by us, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of 19th century theories ? Should the strong be permitted to push the week to the wall should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the week ? Should the Courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample underfoot the rights of the weak ? 15. Mr. Justice M.C. Roynolds insisted that a Judge should not be ''an amorphous dummy, unspotted by human emotions." "Judges are men, not disembodied spirits." Once remarked Mr. Justice Frankfutter "as men they respond to human situations. They do not reside in vacuum. Justice Warren wrote "Our judges are not monks or scientists, but participants in the living stream of our national life, steering the law between the dangers of rigidity on the one hand and firm lessness on the other." Our study will disclose that the Judges in their process of interpretation have interpreted the expression 'other authorities' in trying to adjust it to the growing need of the time, to suit new conditions, ideals and ideals The concept of the Supreme Court has undergone a remarkable change with respect to Article 12 to keep pace with the changing ideals and altered circumstances. And in the words of the Supreme Court. This Court has throughout the last few years expended the horizon of Article 12 to inject respect for human rights and social conscience in our corporate structure.16. The concept of State has undergone drastic changes. Today, the State has to be viewed as a service corporation. The Government is the biggest trader, builder, employer and manages a large number of industries. It appears that the Government is creating corporations and transferring its economic activities through the agencies of Government companies, societies, co-operative bodies etc. with the view to deny the benefit of equality clause of the Constitution to their employees when in fact these agencies or instrumentalities are all incarnation of state or extension of is arms. They should therefore, be subject to the Rule of Law. It will be seen that the Courts have not permitted the corporate device to be utilised as a barrier ousting the constitutional control of the fundamental rights.17. They should therefore, be subject to the Rule of Law. It will be seen that the Courts have not permitted the corporate device to be utilised as a barrier ousting the constitutional control of the fundamental rights.17. In Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (Supra), there was a difference of opinion between the majority judgment delivered by Bhargava J. and the concurring judgment of Shah J. in holding that the State Electricity Board fell within the definition of State in Article 12 of the Constitution The majority adopted the test that the expression 'other authorities' in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. The State is comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting educational and economic interest of the people. The ratio of the decision may be stated that a constitutional or statutory authority would be within the expression 'other authorities' if it has been vested with statutory power to issue binding directions to third party, disobedience of which would entail penal consequences or it has the sovereign power to make rules and regulations having the force of law. The test laid down in Electricity Board, Rajasthan's case was followed by Raj CJ in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram (Supra) Ray CJ delivered the majority judgment for himself and Chandrachud and Gupta JJ, while Mathew J. delivered the concurring judgment and Alagiriswami J. delivered a dissenting judgment. In that case, it was held that rules and regulations framed by the Oil & Natural Gas Commission Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance Corporations have the force of law and the employees of the statutory body have a statutory status and they are rentitled to a declaration being in the employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of the statutory provisions. In the concurring judgment Mathew J adopted a new line of approach. Mathew J. observed that the concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years. The State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. It has to be viewed as a service corporation. He has also observed that the governing power wherever located must be subject to fundamental constitutional limitations.18. Mathew J. observed that the concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years. The State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. It has to be viewed as a service corporation. He has also observed that the governing power wherever located must be subject to fundamental constitutional limitations.18. The following observations made by Mathew J. are of great importance : "Generally speaking, large corporations have power and this power does not merely come from the statutes creating them. They acquire power because they produce goods or services upon which the community comes to rely. The methods by which these corporation; produce and the distribution made in the course of their production by way of wages dividends and interest, as also the profits withheld and used for further capital progress and the manner in which and the conditions under which they employ their workmen and staff are vital both to the lives of many people and to the continued supply tine of the country. Certain imperatives follow from this. Both big business and big labour unions exercise much quasi-public authority. The problem posed by the big corporations is the protection of the individual rights of the employees. Suggestions are being made that the corporate organisations of big business and labour are no longer private phenomena; that they are public organisms and that constitutional and common law restrictions imposed upon State agencies must be imposed upon them." In the very judgment, Mathew J. also made the following observations:- "Therefore, it may be stated generally that State Finance aid alone does not render the institution receiving such aid a state agency. Financial aid plus some additional factor might lead to a different conclusion." The other relevant observations made by Mathew J. are as follows:- "Another factor which might be considered is whether the operation is an important public function. The combination of state aid and the furnishing of an important public service may result in a conclusion that the operation should be classified as a state agency. The combination of state aid and the furnishing of an important public service may result in a conclusion that the operation should be classified as a state agency. Mathes J. in the said judgment said : "Institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing public functions are by virtue of the nature of the function performed by the Government agencies." It is worthwhile to quote a portion from the judgment of Mathew J., which reads thus : "The fact that these corporations have independent personality in the eve of law does not mean that they are not subject to the control of Government or that they are not instrumentalities of the government. These corporations are instrumentalities or agencies of the State for carrying on business which otherwise would have been run by the State departmentally. If the State had chosen to carry on these businesses through the medium of Government departments, there would have been no question that actions of these departments would be "state actions". Why then should actions of these corporations be not state actions;" 19. In R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others (Supra), the Supreme Court accepted and adopted the rationale of instrumentality and agency of the State put forth by Mathew J. and spelt out certain criteria with whose aid such an inference could be made. In that case, discussions were rounded on' by the Court by enumerating certain factors for determining when the 'other authorities' would fall within the definition of State. Based on the case of Airport Authority (Supra), the Supreme Court in Som Prakash v. Union of India and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib , has culled out the tests as follows : 1. "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government." 2. Existence of "deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality." 3. It may also be a relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. 4. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and, closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 5. It may also be a relevant factor whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. 4. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and, closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 5. Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." It was also observed that finale is reached when the cumulative effect of all the relevant factors above set out is assessed and once the body is found to be an instrument or agency of Government, the further conclusion emerges that it is 'State' and is subject to the same constitutional limitations as Government.20. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (Supra), the Supreme Court endorsed the view which was echoed by Mathew J in Sukhdev Singh's case (Supra). In that case the Supreme Court also accorded its approval to the relevant tests laid down in the International Airport Authority's case (Supra). The Supreme Court also reinforced the view which it took in the case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijai Narain ( AIR 1980 SC 840 ) . The Supreme Court observed that it is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether in is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry his to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act. 1955 or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other similar statute. Whatever may de its general original, it would be an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. Whatever may de its general original, it would be an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "other authority" in Article 12.21. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Ganguly (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, which was a Government company is a State on the ground that it was the Government which was operating behind the corporate veil carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public public importance through the instrumentality of a Government Company. In that case, the previous authorities of the Supreme Court viz Sukhdeo Singh's case, (11) Proga Tooks Corpn. V C.A. Imanual ( AIR 1969 SC 1306 ) , Electricity Board, Rajasthan's case R. D. Shetty's case, Ajay Hasia's case Somnath Rekhi's case and several other cases were considered. The Supreme Court endorsed the view taken Ajay Hasia's case and held that Central Inland Water Transport Corporation a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986 (4) SVLR (C) 504) , the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider as to whether Sriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries which is owned by Delhi both Mills Ltd. a public limited company limited be shares and it is engaged in an industry of vital public interest and potential to affect the life and health of the people is a State or not. In that case, again, the Supreme Court considered the above referred cases and observed that why should a private corporation under the functional control of the State engaged in an activity which is hazardous to the health and safety of the community and is imbued with public interest and which the State ultimately proposes to exclusively run under its industrial policy, not be subject to the same limitations. In that case, the Supreme Court considered that Shriram is required to obtain licence under the Factories Act and is subject to directions and orders of the authority under the Act. It is also required to obtain licence from the Municipal authorities. It is subject to extensive environment regulation under the Water (Prevention and Control) of Pollution Act, 1971 and it is also regulated by the provisions of the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act 1981. Undoubtedly, it was observed by the supreme Court that such a control is not exercised by the Government in relation to the internal management policies of the Company. However, the control is exercised on all such activities of Shriram which can jeopardise public interest. It was further observed that functional control is of special significance as it is the potentiality of the fertilizer Industry to adversely of the health and safety of the community and its being impregnated with public interest which perhaps dictated the policy decision of the Government to ultimately operate this industry exclusively and invited functional control". The Supreme Court also noticed that Shriram also receives sizable assistance in the shape of loans and over drafts running into several crores of rupees from the Government through various agencies. However, the Supreme Court did nit decide the question as to whether Shriram is an authority with in the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution22. Shri C.N. Sharma learned counsel for the respondent Company his cited the cases of Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A. Imanual ( AIR 1969 SC 1306 ) (12) S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., ( AIR 1970 SC 1150 ) and (13) Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) , to support his contention that the respondent Company is not an authority within the meaning of Art 12. We have not discussed these authorities, as the Supreme Court has taken note of them and distinguished them on their own facts in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation's case.23. A crimical review of the various authorities referred to above leads to decoct the following tests and/or circumstances for determining whether a corporation/society/company is a State : 1. The entire or a massive majority of the share capital in the hands of the Government is a penetrating index indicating that it is an instrumentality or agent of the Government. 2. Financial resources of the State being the chief funding source as it gives flavour of Government agency or instrumentality. 3. Its monopoly status either conferred or protected by the State. 4. Domination in the composition of society or company by the representative or nominee of the Government may afford an indication that it is a state agency or instrumentality. 5. Functional character being governmental in essence, and planery control residing in Government. 6. Prior history of the same activity having been carried on by Government and made over to the new body. 7. Sole element of authority or command. 8. The State, as defined in Article 12 may comprehend to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interest of the people. 9. The combination of the State aid and the furnishing of an important public source may result in a conclusion that the operation should be classified as a State agency. 10. The various controls which are exercised by the State under the provisions of the different enactments such as Factories Act, Municipalities Act, Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, Industries (Development and Regulation) Act are of special significance. 11. The expression other authorities' in Article 12 must be given a broad and liberal interpretation where constitutional fundamentals vital to maintenance of human rights are at stake and functional realism and not financial cosmatic must be diagnastic tool. 12. It is almost settled that for determining whether a juridical person is the authority, it is immaterial whether the same was created by statute or under statute. 13. The public nature of function, if impregnated with governmental character tied or entwined with Government or fortified by some additional factor may render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. 14. It is almost settled that for determining whether a juridical person is the authority, it is immaterial whether the same was created by statute or under statute. 13. The public nature of function, if impregnated with governmental character tied or entwined with Government or fortified by some additional factor may render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. 14. The definition of the expression 'the State' in Art 12 is however for the purposes of Part III and IV of the Constitution. 24. A review of the various authorities of the Supreme Court go to prove that the ratio of the decision in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) , was examined by the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia' case & other cases and it was held that the decision in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (Supra) is not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In Ajay Hasia's case, the Supreme Court after taking note of the decisions of Airport Authority and the U.P. Warehousing cases observed that a society can be an instrumentality or agency of State. In Central Inland Water Board's case, the Supreme Court even held that a Government company may be a State within the meaning of Article 12. In M C. Mehta's case the Supreme Court considered the case of a private company registered under the Companies Act and prima facie embanked on to examine a private company may be an agent or instrumentality of the State. The resultant ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court is that if State power resides corporation or statutory body, or a registered society or company registered under the Indian Companies Act, its action is really in the nature of the State action Form of an authority can be protean. It can be Government company or company incorporated under the Companies Act it can be a society under the Societies Registration Act. It can be a creature of the State i.e. a statutory corporation. It can be Government company or company incorporated under the Companies Act it can be a society under the Societies Registration Act. It can be a creature of the State i.e. a statutory corporation. Another inference which can be carved out from the decisions of the Supreme Court is that if the Government is bound to observe the equality clause of the Constitution, there is every reason to consider that the corporation set up, own or managed by it are also bound by the equality bound. From the discussions enumerated above, it is, thus clear that Ajay Hasia's case marks a culmination of the process which Mathew J. started in Sukhdeo Singh's case as to the meaning of 'other authorities' Bhagwati J. in Ajay Hasia's case followed Mathew J. In Som Prakash Rekhi's case the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by it in U.P. Warehousing Corporation's case. The view expressed by Mathew J. was preferred by three Judges in Airport Authority's case and later on followed in Central Inland Water Board's case and M.C. Mehta's case Thus, the dictum laid down by Mathew J. has now become the established doctrine and his views stand approved by a unanimous judgment of five judges in Ajay Hasia's case.25. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that in view of the declaration of the respondent company as a relief undertaking the Company has been vested with a statutory status, as such it comes within the meaning of 'other authority'. Such an argument was advanced in (14) Tayub Khan v. State, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 36 of 1980, decided on 25th March, 1980) and it was held therein that the mere fact that the company had been declared to be a relief undertaking does not mean that it is enjoying status and is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. We fully agree with the view taken in that case.26. Learned counsel also made reference to Section 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 to draw analogy between the provisions of the said Act and the provisions of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act. We fully agree with the view taken in that case.26. Learned counsel also made reference to Section 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 to draw analogy between the provisions of the said Act and the provisions of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act. 1961 to contend that both enactments provide deep and pervasive state control as to constitute an undertaking whose control and management has been taken over, an instrumentality of the State but in our opinion this is not correct as under Section 18-A, control and management is taken over for a limited period and for a specific purpose.27. It is in this back-ground now, we are request to examine the position of the respondent company and make a search to find out the centre of gravity for discovering as to where does the central control abide for arriving at a definite conclusion We would be required to "lift the veil" and to ''crack the shell" to see who is behind it; whose voice and hands are there, whether it is the extended arm of the Government or alter ego i.e. its second self. The following are some of the circumstances, which are of considerable importance: (l) The Company is managed by the Directors nominated by the Government or financial institutions etc. which are the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government. In 1977-78 out of seven directors were the nominees of the Government of Financial Corporations in 1981-82. There was one director of the Kamari Group and rest were the nominees of the Government or the financial institutions. The same position continued upto 19.3.85. In l985-86, all the Directors were either nominees of the Government or its agents or instruments, excepting two Directors who were the nominees of employees co-operative society. Thus, the composition of the Board of Directors affords indication that it is State agency or instrumentality. (2) The Company is financed by the various financial institutions, which are the agency or instrumentalities of the Government. The amount of loan has been guaranteed by the State Government. Thus, the composition of the Board of Directors affords indication that it is State agency or instrumentality. (2) The Company is financed by the various financial institutions, which are the agency or instrumentalities of the Government. The amount of loan has been guaranteed by the State Government. The guarantee fee is however changed by the Government in the preamble of the Jaipur Metal and Electricals Ltd. (Acquisition of Shares) Ordinance, 1986 it is state: The Government of Rajasthan and or public financial institution had also invested considerable funds in the share capital of the Company." The Government and its agencies and/or instrumentalities had about 50% shares as per chart given above. It may thus, be said that the financial resources of the State are the chief funding source of the Company. (3) Plenary control of the respondent Company resides in State Government as Chairman and Managing Directors are of the Government. In the 42nd Annual Report it has been described that : "To save the Company in the interest of the employees in particular and the public in general the State Government and the public financial institutions agreed to shoulder the responsibility of management of JMEL and accordingly the management got transferred to the State Government/Public Financial Institutions nominees in 1971." This plenary control is also evident from the term of the Agreement dated 12th August, 1977. (4) The employee-employer relations are not governed by the labour laws because the Company is a "Relief Undertaking" and is governed by the bye-laws of the Board of Directors of the Company which is nothing but a committee constituted by the Government of its functionaries. The Company is to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the Government as per Agreement dated 12th August, 1977. The Company cannot dispose of immovable property without the previous approval of the Government. In view of the objects and reasons of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provision) Act 1961, the Company is discharging public duties as in declaring the Company as a relief undertaking there was public interest behind it. The intention of the legislation was to prevent unemployment or to provide relief against unemployment. In view of the Company being a relief undertaking, the employment under the company partakes quality of public employment It is, thus, clear that the functional character of the Company is governmental in essence. The intention of the legislation was to prevent unemployment or to provide relief against unemployment. In view of the Company being a relief undertaking, the employment under the company partakes quality of public employment It is, thus, clear that the functional character of the Company is governmental in essence. It may be stated that through the agency of respondent company the State is implementing socio-economic progresses. (5) From a perusal of the Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. (Acquisition of Shares) Ordinance. 1986, it is undeniable that the respondent company is an instrumentality of the State comprehended in the expression 'other authority' in Article 12 as the State control is "sufficiently deep and pervasive" to support an inference that the respondent Company is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Even prior to the promulgation of the said Ordinance the Government in June 1977 took over the management of the Company as per admission of the Company made in 42nd Annual Report and declared it a Relief Undertaking to provide relief against employment. Since June 1977, it is being managed by high powered board consisting of mostly the senior officers of the Government. (6) It is also on record and further proved by the preamble, objects and reasons of the Jaipur Metals and Electricals (Acquisition of Shares) Ordinance, 1986. That the Company is engaged in the manufacture and production of house service electricity meters and other metals products, which are vital to the needs of general public. (7) The Company is a relief undertaking and is governed by the provisions of the Factories Act. Municipalities Act and is subject to extensive environment regulations is also a circumstance which should be taken into consideration in view of the proposition of law laid down in M.C. Mehta's case. Non-applicability of the industrial laws i.e Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act etc. to the Company the obey taking away the rights of the employees under the said enactments to challenge their illegal, unjust and unfair discharge and/or dismissal in another circumstance, which should be taken into consideration, to determine if the Company is `an authority" under Article 12. to the Company the obey taking away the rights of the employees under the said enactments to challenge their illegal, unjust and unfair discharge and/or dismissal in another circumstance, which should be taken into consideration, to determine if the Company is `an authority" under Article 12. (8) There is clear admission of the Company in the above referred brochures and 42nd Annual Report that the management of the Company passed on to the hands of the State Government in the year 1977 assisted by the Financial Institutions, which affords an indication of unusual degree of control to that the Company is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. In Phool Chand v. State of Rajasthan, ( 1986 (1) SLR 222 ) a Division Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider whether the Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Bharatpur is an authority of the State within the purview of Article 12 and on the basis of the facts and circumstances, it was discovered that the Co-operative Bank was under the control of the Government and its financial resources were also controlled and contributed by the Government. It was held that the Bank is an authority under Article 12. Similarly, in the instant case, the circumstances show brooding presence of the State behind the respondent company. 28. In view of the above circumstances and applying the constellation of criteria collected by us from the various authorities of the Supreme Court. we are of the opinion that chemistry of the respondent Company answers the test of 'State'. We, therefore, hold that M/s. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. is an instrumentality or agency of Government and thus, an authority' and therefore 'State' within the enlarged meaning of the expression in Article 12 of the Constitution. PART:II 29. Having disposed of the preliminary issued we may now deal with each case as under : Nathu Lal v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1339/1985 30. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to quash the impugned order dated 5th February, 1984, whereby his services were terminated by the respondents. The petitioner has further prayed that he be directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits.31. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to quash the impugned order dated 5th February, 1984, whereby his services were terminated by the respondents. The petitioner has further prayed that he be directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits.31. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed on 26th July, 1961 on the post of Operator against permanent vacancy.On 6th February, 1964 and 15th February, 1984, the petitioner was served with warning letters for giving less production alleging that the production given by the petitioner was not in accordance with the norms prescribed for the same. It is further the case of the petitioner that on 6th April, 1984, his services were terminated by affixing the order on the notice Board, without serving the order personally upon him The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order of termination is illegal, unjustified and arbitrary as the petitioner's services were terminated without giving any charge-sheet and without taking recourse to domestic inquiry and without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. It is also contended that the impugned order is arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and against the principles of equity and equality before law as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as similarly situated persons who had been giving the same production have been retained in service, while the services of the petitioner were terminated. In the reply, the respondents have contended that the petitioner was not giving normal production but was giving low production contrary to the norms settled under the settlement dated 6th November, 1984 entered into between the company and the four trade unions who represented the workmen of the Company. As per the terms of the settlement the petitioner was required to give production of 2.50 voltage coil winding. but he was giving less than that. The petitioner was given warning letters on 6th February, 1984 an 15th February, 1984. Inspite of serving of warning letters upon the petitioner, the petitioner did not care and continued to give less production. Consequently his services were terminated by order dated 5th April, 1984. The letter of termination was sent by registered post but the same came back with the postal remarks that the addressee refused to take the delivery of the same. Inspite of serving of warning letters upon the petitioner, the petitioner did not care and continued to give less production. Consequently his services were terminated by order dated 5th April, 1984. The letter of termination was sent by registered post but the same came back with the postal remarks that the addressee refused to take the delivery of the same. It is further pleaded by the respondents that they had received a letter from the counsel for the petitioner on 18th August, 1984, through which the order of termination was challenged by the petitioner. The respondents have further stated that along with the petitioner 10 more persons' services had been terminated earlier on the charge of giving less production and a settlement was entered into on 7th May, 1985, between the respondent company and the four unions of the establishment vide which it was stipulated that in case an employee gives an undertaking for giving full production as per the agreed norms, he would be reinstated It is further submitted by the respondent company that the petitioner was offered re-employment vide letter dated 17th December, 1985. The respondent company has also categorically pleaded that it is prepared to take back the petitioner in service if he complies with the terms of the settlement dated 7th April, 1985. The respondent Company has also contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case no opportunity was warranted as the petitioner had already been served with two warning letters, referred to above before his services were terminated.32. It is true that before the services of the petitioner were terminated, the petitioner was given two warning letters on 6th February, 1984 and 15th February, 1984 Equally it is true and not disputed by the parties that neither any charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner nor any domestic inquiry in the matter of allegations against him with regard to the alleged less production, was held. Consequently, it may be inferred that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner of being heard.33. Now in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we would like to examine the legal position.34. In (15) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) , the Supreme Court observed that natural justice, simply stated, is fair play in action.35. Now in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we would like to examine the legal position.34. In (15) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) , the Supreme Court observed that natural justice, simply stated, is fair play in action.35. In (16) Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) , Krishna Iyer J. observed as follows: "Subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more-but nothing less." 36. In (17) Calvia v. Carr, (1990 AC 574 PC) , it was observed that a failure to hear renders the decision void. Similar view has been stated in (18) O 'Reilly v. Mackman, (1982) 3 WLR 1096 , 1101 ), that a breach of the rules of natural justice would render the decision void, -37. In (19) National Textile Workers' Union V. Rama Krishna, 1983 (53) Com. Cases 184 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "It is first a universal principle and therefore a rule of administrative law. It is that part of the judicial procedure which is imparted into the administrative process because of its universality. It is of the essence of most system of justice-certainly of the Anglo Saxon System-that in litigation both ides of a dispute must be heard before decision-"Audi Alterm Partem" was the aphorism of St. Augustine which was adopted by the Courts at a tine when Latin maxims were fashionable" ''Audi alterem partem" is a much in principle of African, as it is of English legal procedure; a popular Yoruba saying is : 'wicked and iniquitous is he who decides a case upon the testimony of only one party to it." 38. In (20) Board of Trustees v. D.P. Nandkarni, ( 1983 (1) SCC 124 ) , the Supreme Court has held that life includes livelihood of a person and dismissal from service without fair procedure is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution39. In (21) Jai Bhagwan v. Management, A.C. Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1983 (3) SLR 544) , the Supreme Court hold the order of termination wholly unsustainable on finding that there was infraction of the principles of natural justice.40. In (21) Jai Bhagwan v. Management, A.C. Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1983 (3) SLR 544) , the Supreme Court hold the order of termination wholly unsustainable on finding that there was infraction of the principles of natural justice.40. The respondent Company thus, exercised its power of termination of the services of the petitioner in an arbitrary manner and in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. Arbitrariness is the very antithesis of the equality clauses of the Constitution. We have already held that the Company is an instrumentality of the State and the employment under the Company partakes the quality of public employment. Thus there has been clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. In this view of the matter, petitioner's ouster is illegal and the order of termination cannot he sustained and, therefore, it is quashed.41. Normally, when the services are held to be illegally terminated, an employee is entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. In this case, after the services of the petitioner were terminated, the petitioner was offered re- employment in the same way the re-employment was allowed to other employees whose services were terminated along with the petitioner. On record, it is proved that a settlement was entered into on 7th May, 1985, between the respondent company and four unions of the establishment which provided giving of an undertaking for giving production as per settlement. An offer of re-employment was sent to the petitioner vide letter dated 17th December 1985. In its reply to the writ petition, the respondent Company also offered re-employment. From a registered letter sent by Shri Prem Krishna Sharma, counsel for the petitioner, to the Personnel Officer (Works). Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., Jaipur dated 28th February, 1986, it is evident that letter of re-employment was received by the petitioner and the petitioner in pursuance of the said offer approached the authorities of the respondent company, but as per his contention, he was not taken on duty. On the other hand, there is reply to this letter in which the said allegations have been denied. Whatever may be the position it is amply proved that an offer for re-employment was given to the petitioner, but the petitioner did not avail the same. There also appears to be serious dispute between the parties about the norms of production. On the other hand, there is reply to this letter in which the said allegations have been denied. Whatever may be the position it is amply proved that an offer for re-employment was given to the petitioner, but the petitioner did not avail the same. There also appears to be serious dispute between the parties about the norms of production. The petitioner belongs to a trade union working in the factory of the respondent which is affiliated to CITU and the settlement dated 7th May, 1985 was with different unions.42. As we have held that the termination was in violation of the principles of natural justice and was arbitrary also, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated. However, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is not entitled to full back wages, as other employees whose services were similarly terminated by the respondent Company after accepting the offer of re-employment were reinstated, but the petitioner did not accept the re-employment when offered vide letter dated 7th December, 1985. However, in the facts and circumstances. the ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is paid wages from 6th February, 1984 and 7th December, 1985 at the monthly rate which the petitioner was getting when his services were terminated. After reinstatement the petitioner will give production as other employees similarly situated are giving. The petitioner may be reinstated when he reports for duty.43. The parties are left to bear their own costs, Ishaq Mohd. v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1369/1984) .44. In this writ petition, petitioner Ishaq Mohd. has assailed orders of termination dated 6th October, 1983 (Annx. 1) and order dated 9th May, 1984, whereby his services were terminated.45. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner was employed by the respondent Company on 12th January, 1964, as Toxman. He was a permanent employee at the time of termination. The petitioner was drawing a total emolument of Rs. 825.25. The petitioner was granted 14 days' medical leave duly approved by the ESI Doctor. On completion of his sick leave he reported on duty with fitness certificate. He was orally instructed to appear before the company's Doctor for thorough examination He produced himself for medical examination before the Doctor appointed by the Company. 825.25. The petitioner was granted 14 days' medical leave duly approved by the ESI Doctor. On completion of his sick leave he reported on duty with fitness certificate. He was orally instructed to appear before the company's Doctor for thorough examination He produced himself for medical examination before the Doctor appointed by the Company. The petitioner's services were terminated on 8th October, 1993, on the ground that he was medically unfit for the job. The complaint of the petitioner is that he was not supplied with the copy of the medical report. Even on demand made by petitioner, the same was not supplied. The petitioner made representation on 25th January, 1984, with the request that he may be again got examined by the Doctor, but no attention was paid to his representation. However, the petitioner was taken on duty on 6th April 1984, appointing him as instructor in the rolling mill of the respondent company Verbally, he was assured that he will be taken initially for six months and thereafter he would be made permanent. For doing the job of instructor, he was offered a reduced salary of Rs. 790/-. On 9th May, 1984, he was asked not to come on duty and his card was removed from Punching Section. Thus, the petitioner has challenged the order of termination dated 8th October, 1984, on the ground that, though he was medically fit, but his services were wrongfully terminated and also the order of termination dated 9th May, 1984, whereby his card was removed from the Punching Section without any reason for doing so. It may be stated that the petitioner placed on record the medical opinion of Dr. Gupta, wherein he opined that the petitioner is medically fit to serve any job. Since there was a conflict in the opinions of the two Doctors this Court considered it fit and proper to get the petitioner examined by the Board of two Doctors for the purpose of assessing the fitness of the petitioner to work. It was, therefore, directed that the Superintendent, SMS Hospital Jaipur would constitute a Bard of two Doctors to examine the petitioner and to submit its report with regard to the fitness of the petitioner to do work. The Medical Board was constituted in pursuance of the order dated 19th May, 1987. The Medical Board opined that the petitioner was medically fit to do the job. The Medical Board was constituted in pursuance of the order dated 19th May, 1987. The Medical Board opined that the petitioner was medically fit to do the job. Taking into consideration the report obtained from the Medical Board, it was directed by this Court that the petitioner will be paid pay and allowance @ Rs. 825/- per much with effect from 1st June, 190. The respondent company contested the claim of the petitioner on merits contending that the opinion expressed by the company's Doctor was just and proper and was not a pretext to terminate the service of the petitioner as contended by the petitioner as the Doctor who examined the petitioner also examined a number of workmen of the respondent company and only those who were not found medically fit were discharged from service. The respondent company contended that the work of the petitioner was not satisfactory. There were certain complaints from the Department against some workmen including the petitioner about their physical fitness to do the job satisfactorily. It was in those circumstances that the petitioner along with other workmen were directed for medical examination by the Company's Doctor.46. As regards termination effected vide verbal order dated 9th May, 1984, it was contended by the respondent company that as there was no work for him as such, his services were terminated.47. We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the sub-missions made by the learned counsel for the parties.48. Shri V.L. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of termination dated 8th Oct, 1933 was without any justification it was passed on the opinion of the Company's Doctor and the report of the Company's Doctor was never sups lied to the petitioner even after he represented for giving the report to him. Shri Mathur also submitted that from the report of the Medical Board constituted by the Company, and from the report of Doctor Gupta it was evident that the order of termination on the ground of the petitioner's being found medically unfit for the job was arbitrary and without any justification. Shri Mathur also submitted that from the report of the Medical Board constituted by the Company, and from the report of Doctor Gupta it was evident that the order of termination on the ground of the petitioner's being found medically unfit for the job was arbitrary and without any justification. As regards termination of services by verbal order dated 9th May, 1984, on the ground that there was no work to be provided to the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the termination on that ground was not justified as prior to the termination of the petitioner 26 persons were re-appointed in rolling mill those (sic whose) were terminated in the month of March 1984. We may observe that in the written statement, the petitioner (sic non-petitioner) has simply stated that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that there was no work for him. In support of this contention, no record or evidence has been produced, prove the same, and further no proper reasons have been assigned as to why the services of the petitioner who was a permanent employee were terminated in such a manner.49. It is true that an employer can appoint and dismiss the employees, but the power to dismiss an employee is (sic in) an organisation which partakes the quality of public employment, cannot be exercised by a process which in substance amounts to dismissal without a charge and without a hearing or for no reason and for no good cause. In U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. V.N. Vajpayee, ( 1980 (3) SCC 459 ) , the supreme Court has observed that employees of a Corporation, which is an agency or instrumentality of the Government and is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, have a status and their relationship with the Corporation is not purely that of master and servant, founded on contract and in his regard there is hardly any distinction on principle between a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Government services of such employees cannot be terminated without complying with the principles of natural justice. This rule of natural justice requires that an employee should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This rule of natural justice requires that an employee should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In that case O. Chinnappa Reddy J., in his concurring judgment observed as follows : "In a country like ours which deems with population. Here the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities and its corporations are the biggest employers and where millions seek employment and security, to confine the applicability of the equality clauses of the Constitution, in relation to matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people. Some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a court to enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." 50. In this view of the matter, public employment, has now become for all purposes a subject of Administrative Law. The employer is required to observe the principles of natural justice. The employer being an instrumentality of the State in the instant case must be fair, just and reasonable. In Board of Trustees v. D.P. Nand-karani, ( 1983 (1) SCC 124 ) the Apex Court observed that life includes livelihood of a person and dismissal from services without fair procedure is violative of Article 12 of the Constitution.51. On the bedrock of the fairness and reasonableness, if it man is asked to go away, he should be told what it is that has led to his dismissal as he is entitled to stay : "You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I live." (Shakespeare-The Merchant of Venice) 52. We are of the opinion that failure to hear or a breach of the rule, of natural justice would render the decision void and if no opportunity was given and no reasons were assigned for terminating the service, the order would be liable to be struck down being contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.53. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the termination order dated 8th October, 1983 and 9th May, 1984, being arbitrary and violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and of the principles of natural justice, cannot be substained. The orders of termination must, therefore, be quashed. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the termination order dated 8th October, 1983 and 9th May, 1984, being arbitrary and violative of Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and of the principles of natural justice, cannot be substained. The orders of termination must, therefore, be quashed. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated.54. In this writ petition, the respondent Company has raised a plea of res judicata contending that Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. Karmachari Sangh, Jaipur of which the petitioner was a member, filed a writ petition bearing No. 2017/1983, which was dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 6th March, 1984, wherein the termination of the services of the employees was challenged on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The contention is that the order of dismissal of the writ petition operates as res judicata and the petition is, therefore, not maintainable We have gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 017/1983. We are of the opinion that in that case, the order of termination which was challenged was of a prior date than the orders of termination which are the subject matter of dispute in this case. Further in that writ petition, the termination was challenged on the ground of invalid retrenchment and the same was not decided by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the respondent Company being a relief undertaking, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were not attracted. There is no dispute that the rule of res judicata applies to proceedings relating to industrial adjudication. as a decision once rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on a matter in issue between the parties after a full enquiry should not be permitted to be re-agitated as observed by the Supreme Court in (22) B.B. Company Pvt. Ltd. v. B.B. Employees Union, 1987 (55) FLR 21) . However in the said case even the question of termination as retrenchment was not decided on merit. In the premisses aforesaid, the plea of res judicata is not sustainable.55. From the record, it is evident that after the termination of the services, the petitioner did not remain idle but he pulled rickshaw for the livelihood and thereby he remained gainfully employed to some extent.56. In the premisses aforesaid, the plea of res judicata is not sustainable.55. From the record, it is evident that after the termination of the services, the petitioner did not remain idle but he pulled rickshaw for the livelihood and thereby he remained gainfully employed to some extent.56. In the premises aforesaid, we allow the writ petition, set aside the orders of termination dated 8th October, 1983 and 9th May, 1984 and direct the petitioner to be reinstated as Toxman. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to 500 back wages, from 9th May 1984 to 30th may, 1987.57. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Suraj Narain v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 591/1986) . Mohan Lal v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 228/1985) . Ramesh Chandra v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 590/ 1986) . Chhagan Lal Pareek v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 58/19) . Phool Chand Yadav v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 587/1987) .58. Since the above mentioned five writ petitions involve similar question of law and facts, they are being disposed of by this single order. In fact, on the application of the petitioners in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 591/l986. Suraj Narain v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals, this Court on 21st July, 1987 , directed that the aforesaid identical cases will be disposed of together by one common order.59. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Mohan Lal the petitioner in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 285/1985 is the General Secretary of the Metals Mazdoor Sangh. which is a registered Union and affiliated to Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh. The Union is recognised by Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. The petitioner, Ram Chandra in Writ Petition No. 590/1986 is the Secretary of the said Union. Jagan Singh, Suraj Narain and Phool Chand Yadav are members of the Executive Committee of the said Union. Shri I.S. Kavadiya was appointed as Managing Director of the Company in 1983. The petitioners of the above-mentioned writ petitions had criticised the policy pursued by Shri Kavadiya and at many times, they had told that his policies were anti-workmen. Jagan Singh, Suraj Narain and Phool Chand Yadav are members of the Executive Committee of the said Union. Shri I.S. Kavadiya was appointed as Managing Director of the Company in 1983. The petitioners of the above-mentioned writ petitions had criticised the policy pursued by Shri Kavadiya and at many times, they had told that his policies were anti-workmen. However, on 6th January, 1984, an agreement was signed between the management of the company and the trade Union. Mohan Lal Sharma was one of the signatories on the unanimous decision of the petitioners' Union. It is further stated in the writ petition that though the workmen always tried their best to increase the production and to implement the said agreement dared 6th January, 1984 faithfully, but Shri Kavadiya, for the reasons best known to him, did not discharge the obligations under the agreement dated 6th January, 1984 and subsequent agreement dated 14th November, 1984. The respondent Company, though started gaining profit, but the management did not give due share to the workmen. On 6th May, 1985, Shri Kavadiya prepared a draft agreement which was given to Mohan Lal Sharma and his colleagues for signing the same, but the Union refused to sign the draft agreement dated 10th May, 1985. This was not liked by Shri Kavadiya who felt insulted and offended by the refusal of the petitioners to sign the agreement. The petitioners on 13th May, 1985, demanded annual increment, variable DA ane equity shares as per the agreement dated 6th January, 1984. On behalf of the Union the petitioners, representations were sent to the Prime Minister on 5th June, 1985, and complaints were made against Shri Kavadiya and the Chairman of the Company in this regard. In this connection, the General Secretary of the Union also addressed a press conference on 27th June, 1985. The petitioners and other office bearers of the Union were, suspended The petitioners demanded immediate transfer of Shri Kavadiya from the post of Managing Director On 28th June, 1985, the services of the petitioners were terminated.60. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the petitioners have filed the above writ petitioners. The services of the petitioners were terminated by the following order: "As per the record of the time office you have remained absent from 17th June, 1985 to 28th June, 1985 without any information whatsoever. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the petitioners have filed the above writ petitioners. The services of the petitioners were terminated by the following order: "As per the record of the time office you have remained absent from 17th June, 1985 to 28th June, 1985 without any information whatsoever. Since this amounts to absence of more than 8 working days, you have been treated by the Company as having left the service of the Company with effect from 27th June, 1985." 61. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid termination order on the ground that the order is arbitrary, capricious and violates the rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have also assailed the impugned order on the ground of breach of principles of natural Justice The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have also challenged the order of termination on the basis of deemed absence contending that it amounts to retrenchment in the eye of law and since to notice was given to them and no compensation was paid the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The respondent company filed reply to the writ petition and contested the claim of the petitioners. It was contended that Shri Kavadiya never made any attempt to interfere in the activities of the petitioners. It was submitted that before Shri Kavadiya took over the management of the Company, it was running in huge losses and as a result of just and equitable policies adopted by the Company under the leadership of Shri Kavadiya, the Company came in to profit in the year 1984-85. As regards the termination, it was contented that the order was perfectly justified.62. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of termination of the petitioner cannot be sustained on any ground. The principal contention of the learned counsel is that to remain absent is a misconduct and as such, the petitioners' services could only be terminated by giving a charge-sheet and after conducting a fair inquiry into the charges of misconduct of absence, where the petitioners could explain, if they remained absent or not.63. The above facts and circumstances of the case reveal that the relations between the petitioners and the management were not cordial. The above facts and circumstances of the case reveal that the relations between the petitioners and the management were not cordial. It is also evident that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to make a representation against the alleged absence.64. It is well settled rule of law that the principle of audi alterem partem is a basic concept of principle of natural justice. No one should be condemned without hearing is the essence of justice. It is also true that if no opportunity is given and no reasons are assigned for terminating the services, the order is liable to be struck down being contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Since the employment under the respondent Company patakes the quality of public employment, there has been clear violation of Article 14 and 16(i) of the Constitution and principles of natural justice, consequently, the order of termination of service must be quashed, and the petitioners are entitled to be reinstated with full back wages.65. The petitioners have also challenged the order of suspension in the writ petitions. Since the period of suspension is short one, we do not want to decide the propriety and validity of the order of suspension as Shri Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent has assured that 50% of the wages of subsistence allowance shall be paid to the petitioners for the period of suspension.66. In the premises aforesaid all the writ petitions are allowed. The petitioners are directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. The parties are left to bear their own costs. I M. Qureshi v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1318-1984 .)67. In this writ petition, the petitioner. I.M. Qureshi is seeking to challenge the impugned order dated 12th May, 1984, whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated.68. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent served a charge-sheet dated 2nd February, 1981, upon the petitioner, which is of the following description : 1. On 30.1.1984, you left your working place without permission of your superior and found reading newspaper near the main gate of the company at about 10.30 A. M., whereas your duty hours were from 8.00 a m. to 5.00 p.m. with lunch break 1 hour from 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. and your place of work is inside the factory i.e. gate No. 9. Thus, you have contravened the rules and procedure followed by the employees of the Company. 2. When Shri D.P. Pareek was returning from the Staff Canteen, he found the staff canteen contractor near the main gate on 30.1.1984 at about 10.30 A.M in the varandah of the Security Department and complained him about the supply of cold tea, you unauthorisedly intervened in the matter and started abusing Shri D. P. Pareek and created rough scene inside the company premises. Had the security staff and other staff members not intervened in the matter you would have assaulted Shri D.P. Pareek in the company premises. Thus, you had exchanged hot words and abused your colleagues in presence of others and created indecent atmosphere in the company premises creating indiscipline. 3. Again, on 31.1.1984, you did not follow the instructions given to you by your superior in writing and refused to carry out his instructions as per your written reply on the note. Thus, disobeyed the orders of your superior." 69. The petitioner replied to the charge-sheet vide his letter dated 15th March, 1984, denying all the charges levelled against him As the management was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner. In enquiry was instituted in the matter of charge-sheet against the petitioner appointing Shri R.D. Purohit Advocate as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and held that the charges levelled against the petitioner were amply proved. Respondent No. 2 after going through the finding of the Enquiry Officer and concurring with his finding dismissed the petitioner from the service of the respondent Company vide order dated 12th May, 1984. The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the order of dismissal dated 12th August, 1984, on the ground that the order is unjustified and contrary to the principles of natural justice. It is contended by the petitioner that the enquiry was instituted to take vengeance against the petitioner as he received the complaint of Shri Radhey Shy am contractor and forwarded the same to the higher authorities for necessary action. The other objections regarding the enquiry are that the charges were vague and the punishment is disproportionate and further the petitioner was not afforded ample opportunity to defend himself inasmuch the petitioner was not allowed to engage his representative in the enquiry while the management was represented by a law knowing person.70. The other objections regarding the enquiry are that the charges were vague and the punishment is disproportionate and further the petitioner was not afforded ample opportunity to defend himself inasmuch the petitioner was not allowed to engage his representative in the enquiry while the management was represented by a law knowing person.70. On merit, it is also the case of the petitioner that his services were terminated on the ground that the petitioner refused to prepare false voucher. it is also contended that the order of termination is bad in law as the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the enquiry report. In the reply, the respondent has submitted that the enquiry was conducted by observing the principles of natural justice. In the enquiry. the petitioner engaged Ramesh Sharma for representing his case in the domestic enquiry vide his application dated 10th March, 1984. The Enquiry Officer allowed Shri Ramesh Sharma to represent the case of the petitioner. All the witnesses produced by the management were cross-examined and in the enquiry the management appointed Shri R.D. Purohit, Advocate to conduct the enquiry in order to avoid usual allegations of bias against the officers of the Company in conducting the domestic enquiry The petitioner, though, was not supplied with the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, but he was allowed to inspect the same. But, the petitioner himself did not inspect it and, as such, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner for not supplying the copy of the enquiry report.71. Shri P.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted before us the same objections which he had taken in the writ petition and Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent, contended and defended the case of the respondent on the same grounds which he had pleaded in written statement.72. We have carefully gone through the record of the case and considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any infirmity in the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer. In the enquiry, the respondent Company examined five witnesses namely S/Shri Madhukar Sharma MW/ 1, Jai Singh MW/2, Sardar Singh MW/3, D.P. Pareek MW/4 and Bhanwar Singh MW/5 and the charge-sheeted employee examined himself as DW/l and Gyarsi Lal DW/2. It is also evident on record that the witnesses were cross-examined. In the enquiry, the respondent Company examined five witnesses namely S/Shri Madhukar Sharma MW/ 1, Jai Singh MW/2, Sardar Singh MW/3, D.P. Pareek MW/4 and Bhanwar Singh MW/5 and the charge-sheeted employee examined himself as DW/l and Gyarsi Lal DW/2. It is also evident on record that the witnesses were cross-examined. The petitioner was allowed to produce his defence. We have also considered the report of the Enquiry Officer and we have no hesitation in observing that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence. The petitioner was allowed to defend himself by appointing his representative. Though the enquiry report was not given to the petitioner, but he has allowed to inspect the same in the office of respondent No. 2 and, thus no prejudice can be said to have occurred to the petitioner for the simple reason that the copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. However, looking to the charges, we are of the opinion that the charges are not very serious and grave meriting the passing of the order of dismissal, which is the extreme penalty. The order of punishment imposed by respondent No. 2 is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner and as such, the punishment of dismissal cannot be maintained. We are of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if instead of punishment of dismissal from service, the petitioner is punished with stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect.73. In the premises aforesaid, we partly allow the writ petition and set aside the order of termination dated 12th May, 1984 However, we substitute the order of punishment of dismissal by the punishment of imposition of stop-page of one grade increment with cumulative effect. In the facts and circumstance, of the case, we further direct that the petitioner will be entitled to 50% back wages The respondents are further directei to reinstate the petitioner within one month of the passing of this order. Gopal Singh v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1105/1987) Vipin Singh v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 980/1986) 74. Since the facts of these two writ petitions filed by Gopal Singh and Vipin Singh are similar, the same are being disposed of by this common order. 75. Gopal Singh v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1105/1987) Vipin Singh v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 980/1986) 74. Since the facts of these two writ petitions filed by Gopal Singh and Vipin Singh are similar, the same are being disposed of by this common order. 75. Both the petitioners have challenged the order dated 21st December, 1985 (Annx. 4). In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 28th November, 1985, the respondent, vide order dated 21st December, 1985 (Annx. 4) rescinded the order of dismissal dated 19th September, 1984 passed against the petitioners. While rescinding the order of dismissal, the respondents directed that the petitioners shall be placed under suspension till further orders and that fresh enquiry shall be held against them in the matter of the charge-sheet dated 18th April, 1984.76. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioners were placed under suspension with effect from 18th April, 1984, on the charges of slogan- shouting etc. After holding enquiry into the said charges of misconduct, the petitioners were dismissed from service on 19th September, 1984. The petitioner had challenged the dismissal order dated 19th September, 1984, on the ground that the enquiry was not fair. The learned counsel for the respondent made a statement that the respondent company would rescind the impugned order of termination dated 19th September, 1984 and would hold fresh inquiry into the charges. Accordingly, the writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 28th November, 1985. In pursuance of the order dated 28th November, 1985, the petitioners were reinstated by the respondent by order dated 21st December, 1985. After reinstatement the petitioners were placed under suspension and an enquiry was ordered into the charges levelled against them. Shri R.D. Purohit was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The enquiry is still continuing. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 21st December, 1995 contending that the order of suspension is unjustified and it illegal. The further contention of the petitioner is that he power of suspension has been exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Shri R.D. Purohit was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The enquiry is still continuing. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 21st December, 1995 contending that the order of suspension is unjustified and it illegal. The further contention of the petitioner is that he power of suspension has been exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The petitioners have also contended that in the order of suspension, the respondents have imposed a condition that during the period of suspension the petitioners should regularly attend the office at 3.30 p m. The submission of the petitioners is that such a condition is unwarranted and unjustified. Another grievance of the petitioner is that the order oi suspension is being unduly prolonged and further during the period of suspension the petitioners have not been favoured with the benefit of increment falling due from 1st April, 1984 and the petitioners have been denied profit sharing amount in accordance with the settlement dated 6th January, 1984. Yet another complaint is that they have not been paid bonus and dividends for the last three years. In reply to the writ petitions, the respondent company has contended that the demestic enquiry is proceeding normally and for the delay, if any, the management is not responsible. The respondent has further pleaded that the order of suspension was passed in the bona fide exercise of power and in the interest of the company and also taking into consideration the gravity of the charges of misconduct levelled against the petitioners. The respondent company denied the allegations of arbitrariness. The respondent has also contended that the petitioners are not entitled to any increment and other benefits as claimed by them.77. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. There is no doubt that the enquiry is still continuing in the enquiry, the management has closed evidence on 23rd July, 1987, and since then the enquiry is proceeding for recording the petitioners' evidence in defence Learned counsel for the respondent Company has assured the Court by making a statement at the Bar that the respondent company will not delay the domestic enquiry and as soon as the evidence of the petitioners in closed, an appropriate order shall be passed after receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer without any delay. We have no reason to disbelieve the bona fides of the assurance given by Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents.78. We are of the opinion that in the event no case is made out against the petitioners in the enquiry, the petitioners will be entitled to full back wages and other benefits to which they are legally entitled in case, any adverse order is passed the same may be challenged in accordance with law in such circumstances, we are not deciding the various questions raised by the petitioners in these writ petitions as we feel that the dispute is premature.79. In the premises aforesaid, we dismiss the writ petitions. However, the petitioner will be at liberty to challenge any adverse order, if passed by the management after the close of the enquiry. We have no doubt that the enquiry will be completed expeditiously without any delay.80. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Ram Prasad v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1281/1986) Moti Lal v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (D.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 1275/1986) 81. In these two writ petitions the question of law and facts raised are similar, therefore they are being disposed of by this common order.82. The petitioners in their writ petitions have challenged the order dated 7th July, 1986, whereby their services were terminated.83. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that when the petitioners reported for duty at midnight between 7th July, and 8th July, 1986, a letter dated 7th July, 1986 was served upon them on the gate. They were not allowed to enter the gate, on the ground that their services had been terminated. It was stated in the letter that the services of the petitioners were no longer require) with effect from closing of work on 7th July, 1986. The contention of the petitioners is that the discharge of the petitioner from service was involation of the principles of last come first go and that the termination order was without a domestic enquiry and the order was arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. It was also contended that the order of termination was violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as no retrenchment compensation was paid to the petitioner in accordance with law. It was also contended that the order of termination was violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as no retrenchment compensation was paid to the petitioner in accordance with law. In the reply submitted by the respondent Company, it is submitted that the petitioners were not pound suitable on the over all assessment in appraisal made in an effort to increase the efficiency of the security department. The petitioners were given warnings and they were not found dependable for the post of watchman. While supporting the order of termination, it is contended that the management of the respondent had lost faith in the petitioners and having left with no other alternative, the petitioners were discharged from service in the bona fide interest of the Company and also for security of the service. The respondent Company denied that the petitioners were retrenched from service, but emphatically asserted that the petitioners were discharged from service for loss of faith in the petitioners. However, the respondent Company denied the various allegations levelled by the petitioners regarding taking of manual and odd domestic jobs from the petitioners by the Security Officer.84. Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the order of termination passed against the petitioners on the ground that the order of termination is stigmatic and the same was passed without giving opportunity to the petitioners to defend themselves. Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent Company his, however, submitted that looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent Company was well within its right to terminate the services of the petitioners.85. We have given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is an admitted position, which is reflected from the pleadings of the parties, that the services of the petitioners were terminated by passing an order of discharge simplicitor against the petitioners on the ground that their services were no longer required by the Company, but the persons who were junior to the petitioners were retained in the service as would be evident from the facts narrated by the petitioner in para 11 of the writ petition, which have not been satisfactorily denied by the respondent company in the written statement. It is also proved from the record and admitted by the respondent Company that their services were dispensed with as the respondents lost faith in the petitioners and in the interest of the respondent Company, the petitioners were not dependable for the post of watchman. Thus the very short question requires to be decided in this writ petition is, whether the respondent company was within its right to terminate the services of the petitioner on the ground of loss of faith in the petitioners without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In (23) Kamal Kishore Lakshman Vs The Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc and Ors., (1986 (IV) SVLR (L) 88) , the same question was involved. In that race, Kamal Kishore Lakshman's services were terminated by the respondents who maintained that the termination was contrary to the principles of natural justice and demanded reinstatement with full back wages. The management took the stand that it hid lost confidence in the employee and termination was bona fide. In that case also, admittedly, no domestic inquiry was held, but before the Labour Court both the parties led evidence. In that case, the Supreme Courts considered:- (24) the case of Chandulal (CA No. 10667 of 1983 ) decided by the Supreme Court on 19th April 1985 ( 1985 (2) SCC 727 ), wherein the Supreme Court held that the plea of loss of confidence in the employee casts a stigma. In Kamal Kishore's case (Supra), The Supreme Court observed as under : "Loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and therefore this Court correctly held in Chandulal's case that allegation of loss of confidence amounted to stigma. The ratio in Jagdish Mitter's case also supports this conclusion." 86. In Chandulal's case (Supra), the Supreme Court held that want of confidence in an employee did point out an adverse facet in his character and if termination is grounded on such facet of the employee it amounted to stigma.87. There is no dispute about the proposition of law that if the order is stigmatic no order of termination can be passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the workman. The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of principles of natural justice. There is no dispute about the proposition of law that if the order is stigmatic no order of termination can be passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the workman. The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of principles of natural justice. No one should be condemned without bearing is the essence of justice. The rule is that 'hear the other side ' There is also no dispute about the principle that if an order of termination is passed in violation of principles of natural justice then such an order is certainly bad in law and is void. There seems to be also no dispute that in case the services are terminated without holding any domestic inquiry, the action is not bona fide one and as such, the termination order cannot be sustained.88. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the impugned order was not bona fide inasmuch as it was stigmatic and as the same was passed without holding any domestic enquiry. Such an order of termination cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The order is void and consequently, the petitioners are entitled to be reinstated.89. Shri C.N. Sharma has contended that there is enough material on record to come to the conclusion that the action of the management was bona fide and as such, the order passed by the management should be sustained Shri Sharma pointed out that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not applicable because the respondent is a relief undertaking. His submission is that under the industrial law an employer has a right to substantiate the charges of misconduct before the Industrial Tribunal. But this right has been denied to the management as the petitioners have directly come to this Court in view of the fact that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted. In the circumstances, the submission of Shri Sharma is that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should record a finding on the basis of the material available on record and allow the respondent company to substantiate the charges on the basis of which the services of the petitioners were terminated.90. It is true that under the Industrial Law, an employer has a right to substantiate the charges before the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court by adducing independent evidence. It is true that under the Industrial Law, an employer has a right to substantiate the charges before the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court by adducing independent evidence. In case, no inquiry was held or the enquiry held is found to be defective, but the procedural safeguard is different in case the employee is not governed by the industrial law. If disciplinary enquiry has not preceded the prejudicial order in case of employees other than the industrial employee action would be bad while in the case of a workman, the order could be justified even in the course of adjudication before the appropriate tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act even though no inquiry had been undertaken earlier. This view gets support from the case of Kamal Kishore Laxman referred to above.91. There is another aspect of the matter. The submission of Shri C.N. Sharma learned for the respondent is that the order of termination is fully supported by the material on record and because of the bona fide action taken by the respondent company. Thus, even if no opportunity of being heard is given to the petitioner, the order of termination can be justified. In (25) Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 ) , the Supreme Court has observed as follows : X X X X X 92. In view of the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the contention of Shri Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent that no notice is required to be given cannot be sustained. The decision to dispense with the notice before proceeding with an inquiry in the matter of misconduct cannot be founded upon a presumed impregnability of the proposed action. As the principles of natural justice requires the, justice should not only be done but it should manifestly be seen to be done. Thus, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the submission of Shri Sharma.93. As the order of termination passed by the respondent Company is grounded on the loss of confidence and amounts to stigma and the order having been passed without an opportunity having been given to the employees, the termination of the services of the petitioners cannot be upheld and must be set aside.94. As the order of termination passed by the respondent Company is grounded on the loss of confidence and amounts to stigma and the order having been passed without an opportunity having been given to the employees, the termination of the services of the petitioners cannot be upheld and must be set aside.94. The writ petitions are therefore accepted and the order dated 7th July, 1986 whereby the services of the petitioners were terminated is set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioners within a period of one month.95. In this case, this Court vide its order dated 11th July, 1986 stayed the operation of the order of termination of the services of the petitioners dated 7th July, 1986 and by its order dated 10th February, 1987, the said order was modified to the extent that the respondent shall pay salary to the petitioners which was last drawn by them on the date of passing of the termination order till the disposal of the writ petitions Since the petitioners have drawn the wages in pursuance of the order dated 10th February, 1987, no order is required to be passed for back wages. Sushil Kumar v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 698/1987). 96. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 21st June, 1984 (Annx 11), whereby the services of the petitioner were terminal. 97. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as workman with effect from 10th March, 1969 as Assembly Operator in the Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. The petitioner contended that on 17th August, 1983, he submitted an application to the Manager (Personnel of respondent Company stating therein that, when he approached Shri N.K. Sharm and asked him to assign work, he instead of assigning any work abused the petitioner. The said complaint was signed by more than 25 persons. In the complaint the petitioner made a request for taking action against the wrong doers the petitioner's case is that of after sub-reason of the aforesaid application/ complaint. the management by an order dated 17th August, 1983 placed him under suspension and he was asked to explain as to why disciplinary proceeding be not initiated against him. In the complaint the petitioner made a request for taking action against the wrong doers the petitioner's case is that of after sub-reason of the aforesaid application/ complaint. the management by an order dated 17th August, 1983 placed him under suspension and he was asked to explain as to why disciplinary proceeding be not initiated against him. The petitioner submitted his reply on the same day denying the allegations made in the order dated 17th August, 1983, stating therein that he had not misbehaved with Shri Sharma, rather Shri Sharma misbehaved with him. It is further stated by the petitioner that vide order dated 8th December, 1983. one Shri P.N. Bhargava informed the petitioner that he should appear before him on 16th December, 1983. Later on, Shri R.D. Purohit was appointed as Enquiry Officer in place of Shri P.N. Bhargava. The petitioner has submitted that he was informed by the Enquiry Officer to appear before him. In the enquiry, Bhagwan Sahai and N. K. Sharma were examined on behalf of the management. The case of the petitioner further is that he was not given opportunity to call his witnesses He has further alleged that the Enquiry officer and the Presenting Officer were hand in glow and they have proceeded on a pre-determined course. The petitioner has further stated that vide order dated 21st June, 1984, he was dismissed from service. The respondent Company has filed their return and in the return the respondent company has submitted that the Company had issued a charge-sheet to Shri Sushil Kumar for the allegation of mis-behaviour. manhandling of the company's officers. In the enquiry, Sushil Kumar was given full opportunity and he was found guilty of the allegations of serious misconduct and that the petitioner, Sushil Kumar, failed to prove the contents of his application/complaint dated 17th August 1983, in the enquiry.98. Before us Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following objections regarding the enquiry: 1. Shri Joshi has contended that no charge-sheet was served and in fact, the alleged charge-sheet is nothing but an order vide which an explanation was sought from the petitioner. His submission is that after submission of the explanation to the order dated 17th August, 1983, the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to submit his reply. 2. Shri Joshi has contended that no charge-sheet was served and in fact, the alleged charge-sheet is nothing but an order vide which an explanation was sought from the petitioner. His submission is that after submission of the explanation to the order dated 17th August, 1983, the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity to submit his reply. 2. Shri Joshi has also submitted that Shri Madhukar Sharma, the presenting officer in the inquiry, was a law graduate and he was dealing with the labour problems of the office. In the circumstances, the petitioner desired that he should be permitted to engage a defence counsel who is also expert and law knowing person; but the request of the petitioner was turned down. His application to that effect was not kept on record. 3. Shri Joshi also submitted that the petitioner was r of given ample opportunity to call eyewitnesses. Prahiad Narain and Dana Ram who were present in the factory. He has also submitted that even the workmen who had affixed their signatures on the complaint were not called by the Enquiry Officer. 4. Shri Joshi has submitted that before passing the order of dismissal, no notice or opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner. 5. Shri Joshi has also submitted that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse and that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate. 6. Shri Joshi also submitted that the petitioner was not given a copy of the enquiry report, the non-supply of which violates the principle of natural justice. 99. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent-company, submitted that the order dated 17th August, 1983, was nothing but a charge-sheet vide which the allegations of misconduct were levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet and the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory. Consequently, an enquiry was ordered, in which Shri P.N. Bhargave was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Later on, Shri R.U. Purohit was appointed as Enquiry Officer as Shri P.N. Bhargave had expressed his inability to come to be factory for conducting the Enquiry for his personal reasons. The respondent emphatically denied that the petitioner had ever raised any objection against the management representative. Later on, Shri R.U. Purohit was appointed as Enquiry Officer as Shri P.N. Bhargave had expressed his inability to come to be factory for conducting the Enquiry for his personal reasons. The respondent emphatically denied that the petitioner had ever raised any objection against the management representative. It was submitted by the respondent company that no objection or request was made in relation to providing him defence counsel as alleged by the petitioner. It was pointed out by the respondent company that on 3rd April, 1984, the petitioner had appointed Shri Bal Krishna as defence representative. The respondent Company also submitted that the petitioner was afforded full and fair opportunity to put up his defence and also to examine his witnesses in the domestic enquiry but the petitioner did not prefer to examine any person except himself.100. As regards non supply of the enquiry report, the respondent company pointed out that there was no rule or practice which required giving of the report of the enquiry to the petitioner and further that the petitioner never demanded the copy of the enquiry report after the enquiry was closed and before he was dismissed or even immediately thereafter. Shri C.N. Sharma also submitted that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and that the punishment is in no way disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner.101. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the respective submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the enquiry report and other relevant documents filed by the parties.102. In our opinion, the alleged order of calling explanation of the petitioner, dated 17th August, 1983, was a charge-sheet through which the allegations of misconduct were levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation which was not found satisfactory by the management and thereafter an enquiry was ordered. In the enquiry, witnesses were examined by the management in the presence of the petitioner and his representative. The statement of the petitioner was also recorded. From the record of the enquiry, it is also evident that the petitioner did not desire to produce any other witnesses. In the enquiry, witnesses were examined by the management in the presence of the petitioner and his representative. The statement of the petitioner was also recorded. From the record of the enquiry, it is also evident that the petitioner did not desire to produce any other witnesses. There is nothing on the record to prove that the petitioner ever desired to produce any of the signatories of his complaint From the record, it is also evident that no request was made to appoint defence counsel as is alleged by the petitioner, rather the petitioner was satisfied with the appointment of his representative Shri Bal Krishna. We have also critically examined the statements of the witnesses and we are of the view that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence on record, and it cannot be said to be a perverse finding. Bhagwan Sahai MW/1 corroborated the testimony of Shri N.K. Sharma. The Enquiry Officer after analysing the evidence of the petitioner came to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to prove his allegations against Shri Sharma and we feel that there is no reason to disagree with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in this regard.103. We are also of the opinion that no prejudice has been caused in any manner for the non-supply of the report of the Enquiry Officer. In the enquiry, witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner and his representative and the petitioner examined himself. The petitioner at no stage either before the order of dismissal was passed against him or thereafter, did not demand copy of the enquiry report from the management.104. Shri Joshi has submitted that the allegations of misconduct levelled against the petitioner are not of serious nature and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment awarded against the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate and is arbitrary. The allegations against the petitioner were that he misbehaved with Shri Sharma From the evidence on record, though, it is proved that the petitioner misbehaved with the company's officers, but there is no evidence that he assaulted or man-handled them. The misbehaviour as proved in the case is not of such a nature that may merit dismissal and the Enquiry Officer in his report has observed that the petitioner did not deny the occurrence. The misbehaviour as proved in the case is not of such a nature that may merit dismissal and the Enquiry Officer in his report has observed that the petitioner did not deny the occurrence. It was an admitted case of the management and the workman that some occurrence did take place between Shri N.K. Sharma and the workman, Sushil Kumar. The only difference is that both the parties put their version in different ways. It is also on record that Shri N.K. Sharma was working as supervisor and Sushil Kumar, the petitioner after furnishing his 'Type-wetting went to Sharma's office and requested him for further work, and upto this stage both the parties have agreed that the occurrence had taken place in this manner. But from the evidence as discussed above, it is proved that the petitioner misbehaved with the supervisor, but he has not assaulted. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that penalty of dismissal awarded against the petitioner for a minor misconduct of the nature of misbehaviour with the supervisor was arbitrary and excessive and disproportionate to the charges levelled against him.105. We, therefore, set aside the punishment of dismissal and substitute the same by punishment of imposition of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect and direct that the petitioner be reinstated with continuity of service. As regards back wages, it may be stated that the order of dismissal was passed on 21st June, 1984, but the petitioner has filed the writ petition on 12th March, 1987. The petitioner is, thus, guilty of laches. In the circumstances, we do not award any back wages to the petitioner.106. In the premises aforesaid, the writ petition is partly allowed. The punishment of dismissal awarded against the petitioner vide order dated 21st June, 1984, is set aside. However, we substitute the order of punishment of dismissal, by punishment of imposition of stoppage of one grade increment with cumulative effect. The respondent company is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of one month of the passing of this order. However, the petitioner will not be entitled to any back wages but be will be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service.107. The respondent company is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of one month of the passing of this order. However, the petitioner will not be entitled to any back wages but be will be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service.107. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs Hari Narain v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2012/1983). 108. In this writ petition, petitioner Hari Narain has challenged the order dated 2nd September, 1983 (Annex 22), whereby his services were terminated by M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., respondent No. 2.109. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner lodged a written complaint against one Fateh Singh, Ticket No. 1281 on 29th August, 1981 with the Section Officer of the Company, in which it was alleged that on 29th August, 1981 Fateh Singh who was working in the Pressure Testing (Assembly Shop) came to Final Meter Inspection Section and started quarrelling with every body there. The petitioner advised him to see his job and Fateh Singh, on bearing his advice flared up and started abusing and beating him. The petitioner lodged a complaint on 29th August, 1981. It is also stated by the petitioner that Fateh Singh also loged a complaint against the petitioner. On the complaint of Fateh Singh, the petitioner was suspended vide order dated 9th August, 1981. The petitioner was also served with a charge-sheet vide order dated 1st September, 1981. After receipt of the charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply. As the reply submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory by the management, an enquiry was ordered against Fateh Singh and petitioner Hari Naratn, by appointing Shri P.N. Bhargava as Enquiry Officer. It the enquiry, the statements of Rajendra Singh, A.K. Ghosh, Chauthmal, Mohan Lal Verma. Om Prakash Sharma. B. Mukherjee and Fateh Singh were recorded. The petitioner examined himself and produced Vipin Singh, Rajan Mal, Mumtaz Ahmed. Abdul Latif and Pramod Singh in his defence the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer also held that the complaint of Hari Narain against Fateh Singh that Fateh Singh assaulted Hari Narain was false.110. The petitioner examined himself and produced Vipin Singh, Rajan Mal, Mumtaz Ahmed. Abdul Latif and Pramod Singh in his defence the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer also held that the complaint of Hari Narain against Fateh Singh that Fateh Singh assaulted Hari Narain was false.110. In the writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order of dismissal on the ground that the petitioner was not afforded fair and proper opportunity to meet his case. It is further contended that the petitioner was neither supplied with the copies of the statements made against him nor was he supplied with the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is also contended that the punishment awarded against the petitioner was grossly disproportionate to the charges levelled against him.111. In the reply submitted by the Company, it is submitted that the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to defend himself and produced his defence. As regards non-supply of copy of the statements and the enquiry report, it is contended by the respondent Company that the petitioner never demanded copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer. The respondent Company has also denied the allegations of mala fides levelled by the petitioner. As regards the punishment, the respondent company submitted that looking to the gravity of misconduct proved against the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal was proper and reasonable, as the punishment was commensurate with tie gravity of the misconduct.112. Shri M.R. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised the following objections for challenging the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner : 1. That the petitioner was not supplied with the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer which has caused prejudice to the petitioner inasmuch as he could not challenge the order dismissal properly. 2. That the punishment awarded is excessive and shockingly disproportionate and being arbitrary is liable to be quashed. 3. That the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is perverse. 113. Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent Company, submitted that the enquiry is fair and all reasonable opportunities were afforded to the petitioner. The finding is based on the evidence on record and the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct.114. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the enquiry report. The finding is based on the evidence on record and the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct.114. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the enquiry report. We do not find any reason to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as the finding recorded by him is based on evidence on record. We have also examined the evidence and we have found that the petitioner was given proper opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. He was also given an opportunity to produce his defence evidence. There is sufficient evidence to support the allegations levelled against the petitioner. We are thus of the opinion that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is proper and the contention of the petitioner that the finding is perverse, is not sustainable.115. As regards the quantum of punishment we are of the opinion that looking to the gravity of the misconduct, the punishment cannot be said to be excessive or disproportionate to the charge of mis-conduct levelled against the petitioner, or arbitrary in any way. The petitioner assaulted a senior officer of the company. The petitioner also created rowdy scene in the factory where the work was going on in these circumstances, we hold that the punishment awarded against the petitioner is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct. As the charges of misconduct have been established, the allegations of victimisation have no legs to stand.116. The grievance of the petitioner is that he has not been furnished with copy of the enquiry report and as such he has been deprived of his right to challenge the findings of the enquiry officer in an effective manner. Shri Calla has submitted that in the absence of copy of enquiry report, the petitioner was unable to know as to what has been found against him and to discover as to what is the actual finding and in what manner the finding has been arrived at. In short, the submission of Shri Calla is that non-supply of the report of enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice and that by itself is enough to set aside the order of punishment passed against the petitioner. Shri Calla has placed reliance on (26) Ram Singh Rathor RSRTC (1986(1) Judicial Surveyor 129) . In short, the submission of Shri Calla is that non-supply of the report of enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice and that by itself is enough to set aside the order of punishment passed against the petitioner. Shri Calla has placed reliance on (26) Ram Singh Rathor RSRTC (1986(1) Judicial Surveyor 129) . In that case, this Court has pointed out that none supply of enquiry report amounts to breach of principles of natural justice.117. We have gone through the case of Ram Singh Rathore carefully and we are of the opinion that the case is distinguishable. It was a case where the petitioner who was appointed as Conductor in the Corporation, was charge-sheeted and after enquiry, he was found guilty of some charges and as a result of which his services were terminated Aggrieved by the order of termination, the petitioner conductor preferred an appeal to the appellate authority and the appellate authority rejected the appeal of the petitioner. In that case, it was submitted that the report was laconic and the order of termination was not a speaking order so as to show that there was application of mind at all, it was argued in that case that in the absence of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner could not prefer the appeal effectively as he, could not know what has been found against him. In the instant case, no appeal is provided and further the petitioner did not demand the report of the enquiry at any time. The enquiry report has been placed on record by the management. The petitioner has failed to make out any case that in the absence of availability of the enquiry report, his case has been prejudiced in any manner. It would have been a different case if the petitioner had asked for the copy enquiry report and the management failed to supply the same. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner for the non-supply of the enquiry report. Consequently, this ground of attack is not sustainable.118. In the premises aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs. Mahesh Chandra v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1145/85) .119. Consequently, this ground of attack is not sustainable.118. In the premises aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs. Mahesh Chandra v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1145/85) .119. In this writ petition, petitioner Mahesh Chandra has prayed for issuance of a writ, order or direction quashing the impugned order dated 24th September, 1983, Ex.3, whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated.120. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as workman in Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company') with effect from 24th September, 1963. The petitioner worked continuously upto 24th September, 1983. It is contended by the petitioner that when he reported for work on 25th September, 1993. he was not allowed by the security stall to enter into the company and he was told that he had been discharged from service The petitioner has admitted the receipt of discharge order along with a cheque of Rs. 1666/-. The case of the petitioner is that he was retrenched on the sole ground that the business has been reduced and there was financial crisis. It is also stated by the petitioner that he was not paid retrenchment compensation at the time of termination of his service. Consequently, the retrenchment is illegal and in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act., 1947. In the reply filed by the respondent Company, it is contended that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of the report of senior officers of the Company. It is stated that the Managing Director has constituted a committee of five senior officers to make an in depth study, assessing and finalising the department wise bare minimum requirement of man-power in all categories in order to revive the Company from severe sickness. It was in pursuance of that order that the Committee had studied the minimum bare requirement of workmen in each department and the Committee submitted its report on 20th Sept., 1983 and found the petitioner along with 8 store Assistants as surplus to the requirement of the Company. It is on the basis of this report that the petitioner was discharged in an effort to revive the Company from sickness and financial crisis due to reduction in business and finances.121. It is on the basis of this report that the petitioner was discharged in an effort to revive the Company from sickness and financial crisis due to reduction in business and finances.121. Shri R.C. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order of termination is arbitrary unreasonable and contrary to the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inasmuch as the services of the petitioner were terminated without payment of retrenchment compensation and without following the principle of last come first go. It is also contended that the order is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India Shri Joshi has also submitted that the persons who were junior to the petitioner were retained while the petitioner was retrenched. He has pointed out that Shri R.D. Gupta and Mohan Lal were junior to the petitioner, but still they were retained in the service and one Shri Bhanwar Singh who is clerk Gr P/3 and was junior to the petitioner, is still continuing on the pretext of the order of the Court.122. Controverting the submission of Shri Joshi Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent (company) has submitted that the respondent Company has fairly acted upon the report of the aforesaid committee and that the allegations made by the petitioner regarding violation of the principle of last come first go are without any merit. Shri Sharma pointed out that Shri R.D. Gupta and Shri Mohan Lal were retained as the committee found them suitable for the job. As regards Bhanwar Singh, it was pointed out that Bhanwar Singh is working in Grade W/2' and his Writ Petition No. 1405/1983 is pending before this Court. Shri Sharma, thus, submitted that since his matter was pending decision before this Court, his case was not referred to the committee.123. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. There is no dispute between the parties as regards the constitution of the committee and the report submitted by the Committee on 20th September, l981, which found the petition, along with 8 Store Assistants as surplus. There is no dispute that the services of the petitioner were terminated in pursuance of the report dated 20th September, 1981 and the Committee was constituted by the Managing Director. There is no dispute that the services of the petitioner were terminated in pursuance of the report dated 20th September, 1981 and the Committee was constituted by the Managing Director. There are no allegations of malafides against the members of the committee and no other illegality has been pointed out in any manner in which the committee worked and submitted its report Further the purpose for which the committee was constituted cannot be said to be illegal or unlawful. The Management had decided to discharge surplus staff. it is true that discharge of surplus labour amounts to retrenchment as per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where certain formalities are required to be observed before retrenchment is effected. However, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted in the instant case as the respondent Company is a relief undertaking under the provisions of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provision) Act, 1961. Thus the only question available to the petitioner for challenge is that the order of termination is arbitrary. After carefully considering the record of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that no case has been pointed out to impute any charge of discrimination and the order being arbitrary against the respondent Company. Thus, we have no hesitation in observing that the order of termination dated 24th Sept., 1983, passed by the Management acting on the report of the committee is fair and reasonable, and in no way it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.124. During the course of arguments, Shri Joshi pointed out that there are vacancies available with the respondent Company and as such the petitioner can now be taken back in service Shri Joshi further pointed out that one Shri Ram Prasad Card No. 44, who was a Store Assistant Gr. W/3 has submitted his resignation and the same has been accepted vide order dated 10th August, 1987. Thus, a clear vacancy is available, on which the petitioner can be accommodated. Reacting on the submission of Shri Joshi, Shri C.N. Sharma submitted that in case any vacancy is available, the respondent Company has no objection in accommodating the petitioner on the job of Store Assistant Gr. W/3.125. Thus, a clear vacancy is available, on which the petitioner can be accommodated. Reacting on the submission of Shri Joshi, Shri C.N. Sharma submitted that in case any vacancy is available, the respondent Company has no objection in accommodating the petitioner on the job of Store Assistant Gr. W/3.125. In the premises aforesaid, we hold that the discharge of the petitioner from service of the respondent Company was fair and reasonable and in no way it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, we direct that in case there is any vacancy available with the respondent Company or falls vacant in future, the petitioner may be accommodated on the post of Store Assistant Gr. W/3. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Bhagwat Singh Yadav v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals., (D.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2474/1983) .126. In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ order or direction to quash the impugned order dated 8th November, 1983 (Annx 4), whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of attaining the superannuation age.127. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner is an ex-serviceman. The petitioner entered into Ministry Service on 15th November, 1945 and was discharged from service on 16th December, 1973 After retirement from military service. the petitioner applied for the post of security inspector vide his application dated 16th May, 1977. After interview, the petitioner was selected for the post of Security Officer and an appointment letter was issued in his favour. As per clause 20 of the appointment letter, the age of superannuation is 58 years, which reads as follows : "20. You will entire (sic retire) from the company's service on attaining the age of 58 years or any period thereafter which the company may choose in its absolute discretion." 128. The petitioner was confirmed on the post with effect from 6th December, 1977. The petitioner was informed vide letter No. D.M. (P & A) 1063 dated 8th Nov., 1983 informing him that "from 30th November, 1983, you will be retiring automatically on account of your attaining superannuation age."The submission of the petitioner in this writ petition is that he has wrongly been retired from service as he had still three year; to remain in the service. The submission of the petitioner is that as per the matriculation certificate. his date of birth is 15th November, 1928. The further case of the petitioner is that after retirement he immediately submitted a written representation along with a copy of the matriculation certificate but the respondent Company did not review its order. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8th November, 1983, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.129. Shri V.L. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the date of birth entered in the matriculation certificate of the petitioner is 15th November, 1928 As such, the petitioner's services should have been continued for three years more and his retirement on reaching the age of superannuation is patently illegal. Shri Mathur has further submitted that the impugned order of retirement is violative of principle of natural justice inasmuch as before re-fixation or alteration of the date of birth no opportunity was given to the petitioner nor any enquiry was made and the petitioner was served with the impugned order abruptly.130. In reply to the writ petition, the respondent Company submitted that the petitioner at the time of applying for the job with the respondent Company had submitted army discharge certificate which records the date of birth of the petitioner as 15th November, 1925. The respondent Company therefore admitted the age of the petitioner as recorded in the army discharge certificate, as proof of age The respondent Company denied the allegations of the petitioner about the submission of the matriculation certificate at the time of employment. It is also pointed out that at no time the petitioner disputed the age as mentioned in the army discharge certificate and did not produce matriculation certificate for correcting the date of birth. It is also averred in the written statement that if the date of birth of the petitioner is taken to be 15th November, 1928, as contended by the petitioner, as per his matriculation certificate he could not have been enrolled in the military as according to the army rules, every recruit should have attained the age of 18 years at the time of recruitment. It is thus, contended by the respondent Company that either the petitioner has withheld the correct date of birth at the time of recruitment in the army or the date of birth given to the school authorities is false. It is thus, contended by the respondent Company that either the petitioner has withheld the correct date of birth at the time of recruitment in the army or the date of birth given to the school authorities is false. It is also submitted by the respondent Company that the petitioner had clearly acted in a dishonest manner by not revealing either to the army authorities or to the respondent company the discrepency in the date of birth and, as such he is not or titled to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 220 of the Constitution of India.131. Shri V.L. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contended that as per the matriculation. certificate the date of birth of the petitioner is 15th November, 1928. As such, his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation by the impugned order dated 8th November 1983, is illegal132. On the other hand, Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent Company submitted that the respondent Company has acted in bona fide manner and terminated the services of the petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation on the basis of the date of birth cantered in the service record. Shri C. N. Sharma also submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ petition as he has concealed the true facts either to the authorities when he entered the services of the military, or when he entered the services of the respondent Company.133. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. It is true that an employee may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and may apply for correction of the record. It is also well settled that such alteration in the date of birth must be made within a reasonable time after attaining service. From the record it is clear that while entering the service of the respondent Company, the petitioner did not produce the matriculation certificate, but was contented to file the army discharge certificate which recorded his date of birth as l5th November, 1925. There is no proof on record that the petitioner ever submitted the matriculation certificate at the time of employment with the respondent company. There is no proof on record that the petitioner ever submitted the matriculation certificate at the time of employment with the respondent company. These is no averment in the writ petition that the petitioner, at any time, while he remained in the service of the respondent Company, made an attempt for getting the date of birth altered on the basis of the matriculation certificate before his retirement. On the basis of date of birth recorded in the service record, an employee is liable to be compulsorily retired on the date on which he attains the age of superannuation. In the instant case, the age of superannuation was 5, years and if the respondent Company retired the petitioner on his maintaining the age of superannuation on the basis of the date of birth entered in the service record, evidenced by army discharge certificate produced by the petitioner himself, the action of the respondent cannot he said to be unreasonable or unfair. In a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the matter of retirement, we are required to see the bona fides of the authority who is competent to retire the petitioner. We are of the opinion that no case of arbitrariness on the part of the respondent Company has been made out by the petitioner. The action of the respondent company, in our opinion, is fair and bona fide.134. In the premises aforesaid, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition Decided. *******