JUDGMENT N. N. Mithal, J. - Defendants subsequent purchasers in a suit for specific performance of contract have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 17-9-1973. 2. One Raghubir Singh was the original owner of some land situate in village Naithla in district Bulandshahr. He died on 15-9-1973. Defendant No. 1 Sarni Mal claiming to be the owner of the land in question under the will of Raghubir Singh dated 6-7-1973 (Est. 1) initiated mutation proceedings in the revenue courts. This was opposed by one Ram Swarup who happened to be the elder brother of the father of defendant No. 2 Ram Saran. An objection was also filed by the Gaon Sabha. Another mutation proceeding was initiated at the instance of defendant No. 2 Ram Saran, Suresh Chandra, Gopali, Damodar, Pitambar and Ishwari Prasad claiming to be the owners of the land under a will executed by the deceased. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 set up an agreement in their favour dated 16-9-1973 and ultimately obtained a sale deed from defendant No. 1 on 15-7-1974. It may be stated that after the agreement dated 17-9-1973 in favour of the plaintiffs, it was got registered on 1-1-1974. The mutation order was also passed in plaintiffs' favour in May 1974. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed a suit for specific performance of the contract dated 17-9-1973 impleading Sarni Mal as defendant No. 1 and the subsequent purchasers who are appellants herein, as defendants 2 and 3. 3. The suit was resisted only by defendants 2 and 3. Defendant No. 1 preferred not to file any written statement and he also did not appear as a witness from either side. The main line of defence was that there was a previous unregistered agreement dated 16-9-1973 executed by Sarni Mal in favour of Mahabir Prasad in pursuance of which the sale deed dated 15-7-1974 was executed in favour of both defendants 2 and 3. It was also pleaded that the defendants had no notice of the plaintiffs' agreement and that they were bona fide purchasers for value paid and thus they were protected under S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the court below framed 6 Issues, the English translation of which is being given below : 1. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the court below framed 6 Issues, the English translation of which is being given below : 1. Whether the defendant No. 1 had executed any agreement of sale dated 17-9-1973 in favour of the plaintiffs? 2. Whether the said agreement was on the payment of Rs. 14.000/- as advance consideration? 3. Whether the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to have the sale deed executed? 4. Whether defendants 2 and 3 are transferees for value without notice of the plaintiffs' agreement? 5. Whether defendant No. 1 had executed any agreement of sale on 16-9-1973 in favour of defendants 2 and 3? 6. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 5. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were disposed of together by the trial court and it was held that the defendant No. 1 had executed the agreement in question in favour of the plaintiffs against payment of a sum of Rs. 14,000/-. On issue No. 5 the trial court has recorded a finding that no agreement dated 16-9-1973 was proved to have been executed in favour of defendants 2 and 3. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the defendants while Issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. In the result, the suit was decreed for specific performance. 6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the defendants appellants have filed this appeal and in substance three questions have been raised. It is firstly urged that the finding of the trial court on Issue No. 5 was erroneous. Secondly the defendants were entitled to the benefit of S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and finally the court has not recorded any clear finding on Issue No. 3 and, therefore, the decree is liable to be set aside. 7. The first question that needs determination is whether there was a valid agreement in favour of the plaintiffs which may be specifically enforced against the defendants. It is not disputed that both the plaintiffs are closely related, their fathers Shanker Lal and Chiranji Lal being real brothers. The agreement dated 17-9-1973 has 'been proved by the plaintiff Ratan Lal with the help of the scribe P.W. 3 and one original witness P.W. 2. The only criticisms against this document was that it was scribed on a stamp paper sold on 1-9-73 while Raghubir Singh was still alive. The agreement dated 17-9-1973 has 'been proved by the plaintiff Ratan Lal with the help of the scribe P.W. 3 and one original witness P.W. 2. The only criticisms against this document was that it was scribed on a stamp paper sold on 1-9-73 while Raghubir Singh was still alive. It is true that this may be an important circumstance in judging whether this agreement had really been executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs on 17-9-1973. However, the controversy is set at rest by the fact that Sarani Mal subsequently got this agreement registered on 1-1-74. Sarni Mal has not appeared in the witness box to deny this. The Sub-Registrars endorsements, therefore, assume importance. According to the endorsements, Sarni Mal had acknowledged having executed the documents in favour of the plaintiffs and also the receipt of Rs. 14,000/- from them. In these circumstances the mere fact that the document is scribed on a stamp paper sold on 1-9-73 cannot be of much importance particularly when it is also admitted by the defendants that Raghubir Singh was ailing for almost a month before 16-9-93. It is not improbable that in view of the dark shadows of death cast on him, he may be interested in transferring the property and for that purpose Sarni Mal may have purchased the necessary stamp paper on 1-9-93. Raghubir Singh had already executed a will in favour of Sarni Mal on 6-7-73 and he was therefore, very much in picture from then onwards. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants was not able to point out any illegality in the findings recorded by the trial court in this behalf. In agreement with the findings of the trial court, therefore, it is held that Sarni Mal had executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiffs on 17-9-73. 9. This leads us to the next question as to whether any agreement had been executed by Sarni Mal in favour of defendants 2 and 3 on 16-9-71? This agreement has been executed on a stamp worth Rs. 2.50 purchased on 12-9-73. This too is of a date prior to the death of Raghubir Singh. The original register for the sale of this stamp has been summoned by the plaintiffs and is on the record. This agreement has been executed on a stamp worth Rs. 2.50 purchased on 12-9-73. This too is of a date prior to the death of Raghubir Singh. The original register for the sale of this stamp has been summoned by the plaintiffs and is on the record. According to the witness Prakash Chand (P.W.4) who brought the register summoned stated that the entry at Serial No. 674 shows the sale of the stamp worth Rs. 2.50 in the name of Sarnai Mal. The defendant has not cared to summon the Stamp Vendor. The original register is still on the record and the relevant entry at page 25 of the register shows that a stamp has been sold to Sarni Mal s/o Prabhu Dayal. As rightly observed by the trial court, Columns Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of page No. 25 starting from Serial No. 646 up to 674 have all been written by the same ink and pen and all of them are in the same handwriting. The remaining columns have also been written by the same ink and pen except the entry against Serial No. 674 which is obviously made in a different ink and pen and appears to have been written by a different person. It is the last entry of that page and it is quite possible that the Stamp Vendor may have left the last entry blank and kept the unsold stamp with him to be made use of on a later date. If and when the stamp of back date is needed the entries in the last column can be conveniently made and the unsold stamp used for the purpose. 10. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiffs had filed a replication in which the execution of the agreement dated 16-9-1973 set up by the defendants was disputed. The payment of Rs. 8,000/- at the time of execution of that agreement was also denied and it was alleged that this document had been concocted in collusion in order to cause loss to the plaintiffs. It was also alleged in the replication that the defendants had full knowledge of the plaintiffs' agreement and the defendants have colluded in preparing a fictitious agreement of an earlier date. In the light of this specific case of the plaintiffs, a heavier burden lay on the defendants to establish due execution of their agreement. It was also alleged in the replication that the defendants had full knowledge of the plaintiffs' agreement and the defendants have colluded in preparing a fictitious agreement of an earlier date. In the light of this specific case of the plaintiffs, a heavier burden lay on the defendants to establish due execution of their agreement. In order to prove it they have relied on the statement of defendant No. 3 as D.W. 1 and two marginal witnesses Bhajan Lal and Jagdish Prasad as D.Ws. 2 and 3. The evidence has been discussed in detail by the trial court which clearly belies the defendants' case. In the agreement dated 16-9-73 it is mentioned that Rs. 8000/- was paid as earnest money at the time of executing the agreement while in his statement he alleged that only Rs. 6000/- was paid at the time of executing the agreement and the remaining Rs. 2000/- had already been paid by them to Sarni Mal during the illness of Raghubir Singh. The original agreement is said to have been scribed by Basdeo Sahai but he has not been examined as a witness. As already stated, the stamp vendor has also not been examined. There is also material contradiction in the statements of D.Ws. He specifically denied to have paid Rs. 8000/- at the time of executing the agreement and when he was confronted with the pleas in the written statement, he stated that it was wrongly mentioned in the written statement. According to D.W. 1, Raghubir Singh was taken to the Hospital at Bulandshahr on 12-9- 73 and his son had accompanied him. Although the son was present in court but he was not examined. The witness also stated that Raghubir Singh died in the Hospital on 15-9-73 and he came to know about the death next day when Sarni Mal came to their village Naithala. According to him Sarni Mal had met him at about 12.30 P.M. on 16-9-73 and from there they proceeded to Bulandshahr reaching the house of Basdeo Sahai at about 2.00 P.M. According to him he made enquiries about his house from certain Clerks who were sitting in the Registration Office. The Stamp Paper was brought by Sarni Mal himself and up to the time of his statement he did not care to know from whom the stamp had been purchased. 11. The Stamp Paper was brought by Sarni Mal himself and up to the time of his statement he did not care to know from whom the stamp had been purchased. 11. On this point, D. W. 2 has a different story to tell. According to him, he had gone to Bulandshahr at about 11.30 a.m. and by 1.00 p.m. he had returned after getting the agreement executed. According to him, 16-9-1973 was a Sunday and the Court was closed. They had proceeded to the house of Basdeo Sahai straight from the Bus Stand. 12. Apart from the above, according to D.W. 1 he had sent his son to call Bhajan Lal D.W. 2 for the purposes of witnessing the deed. This, however, is denied by D.W. 2. According to him, he had come to the defendants' village suo motu to fetch his engine which he had purchased from D.W. 1. Besides this, D.W. 2, stated that in his presence Mahabir Prasad D.W.1 had purchased the stamp on which the agreement was executed but he was not aware from whom he had purchased it. According to him, the agreement was executed on several stamps but he was not sure as to whether the number was 2, 4, 6 or 8. The original agreement is scribed only on a single sheet of stamp. 13. Apart from the above contradictions, the witnesses also contradicted each other on the question of possession over of the land and the remaining half was in his possession, the documents filed by the defendants show that the land was being cultivated by Gopali to whom a receipt was also issued for payment of irrigation charges. The documentary as well as oral evidence has been discussed in detail by the court below and there is nothing which may dissuade me not to agree with the finding recorded by the trial court. The fact that Sarni Mal had got the agreement dated 17-9- 73 registered after a lapse of about 6 months clearly goes to show that by that time no agreement in favour of defendants 2 and 3 had come into existence otherwise there was no occasion for Sarni Mal to have agreed to get the plaintiffs' agreement registered. All this evidence establishes that the alleged agreement dated 16-9-73 as set up by the defendants was not executed in the manner and at the time pleaded by them. All this evidence establishes that the alleged agreement dated 16-9-73 as set up by the defendants was not executed in the manner and at the time pleaded by them. The evidence also shows that the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff has first come into existence. 14. The next submission of the defendants was that a mere agreement does not create any vested right and the sale deed in their favour should prevail against plaintiffs' alleged rights in view of S. 19 of the Specific Relief Act. It was emphasised that the defendants were transferees in good faith for value and without any notice of any agreement in plaintiffs' favour. 15. In order to appreciate the argument, it will be better to first have the relevant provision of S. 19 of the Specific Relief Act which reads as under : "19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against. (a) either party thereto : (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the company; Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract." 16. As to the benefit of S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, three questions of fact arise in the case of the later transferee, namely, as to the payment of money, as to his good faith and as to the absence of notice to him of the original contract. All these three preconditions must invariably be satisfied before a subsequent transferee can claim benefit of this section. All these three preconditions must invariably be satisfied before a subsequent transferee can claim benefit of this section. All these must co-exist and failure to prove any one of them would be enough to disentitle him to the benefit of this section. 17. It was urged that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff and unless it was shown that the latter transferee had notice of the plaintiffs' agreement, the plaintiffs cannot succeed. However, it is difficult to agree to this proposition. In a suit for specific performance a decree shall ordinarily follow if the plaintiff establishes the existence of an agreement between himself and the vendor and he also proves his readiness and willingness to abide by the terms thereof. If the defendant wants to defeat his claim it is for him to satisfy the conditions as provided in S. 19 of the Specific Relief Act. It is the latter transferee who wants to retain the, benefit of transfer in his favour despite a pre-existing agreement in favour of the plaintiff which, prima facie, he had no right to retain. Apart from this, a subsequent transferee has special knowledge of the facts whether any consideration was paid or whether he had any notice of the original contract and also as to his good faith. The provisions of S. 106 of the Evidence Act also have a bearing on this question. The plaintiff does not necessarily have any knowledge of these matters and, therefore, he cannot be burdened with the liability of proving them either. It is, therefore, the latter transferee on whom the burden rests of establishing the three necessary conditions for the applicability of S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The view that I am taking finds support from two earlier decisions of this court in Durga Prasad v. Smt. Lilawati, AIR 1972 All 396 and Munna Lal v. Smt. Krishna Kumari, AIR 1983 All 5 . 18. The first and foremost condition which ought to be established by subsequent transferee is that he had acted in good faith. The phrase 'good faith' has not been defined in the Specific Relief Act. I Words and Phrases, permanent Edition, Volume 18-A, 'good faith' is described as 'an honest intention to abstain from taking any conscientious advantage of another'. 18. The first and foremost condition which ought to be established by subsequent transferee is that he had acted in good faith. The phrase 'good faith' has not been defined in the Specific Relief Act. I Words and Phrases, permanent Edition, Volume 18-A, 'good faith' is described as 'an honest intention to abstain from taking any conscientious advantage of another'. I includes not only the personal upright mental attitude and clear conscience but also the intention to observe legal duties. In fact the phrase 'good faith' generally imports that in any given case, the transaction involved was honestly conceived and consummate without collusion, fraud or knowledge p fraud, and without intent to assist in fraudulent or otherwise unlawful design. It also involves an honest effort to ascertain the facts before one would act on the basis thereof. To put it in a nutshell good faith is something which is free from design to defraud, dishonestly, without collusion, fraud or deceit and with lawful intent. However, under S. 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 'good faith' has been defined as under : "A thing shall be deemed to be done in 'good faith' where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not." Clearly emphasis in this definition is on the 'honesty and it is immaterial whether or not the act was performed deligently and efficiently. Earlier there was some controversy as to whether the definition of 'good faith' in the General Clauses Act, 1897 could at all be utilised for the purposes of the old Specific Relief Act of 1877. At that time the argument was that General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to those Acts only which were enacted after the coming into force of the said Act. Since the old Specific Relief Act was prior in time, being of the year 1877, in some decided cases it was held that the definition of 'good faith' as given in the General Clauses Act cannot be employed in considering the 'good faith' under the earlier Act. However, despite this, in several other decisions, advantage of this definition was taken while construing 'good faith' in S. 27 of the old Specific Relief Act. However, whatever may have been the position earlier, the said objection no longer survives, Specific Relief Act having been enacted anew in 1963. However, despite this, in several other decisions, advantage of this definition was taken while construing 'good faith' in S. 27 of the old Specific Relief Act. However, whatever may have been the position earlier, the said objection no longer survives, Specific Relief Act having been enacted anew in 1963. The provisions of the General Clauses Act would, therefore, be fully available for use in construing 'good faith' in S. 19 of the present Specific Relief Act. 19. The phrase 'good faith' it would be apparent, lays emphasis on honesty and fair play to the exclusion of any pretence, deceit and wanton or wilful negligence. To understand precisely the meaning and import of 'good faith' some assistance will also be available from a consideration of its opposite, in order to clarify what is not supposed to be included within the meaning of this term. The opposite of the term 'good faith' is the phrase 'mala fide' or bad faith or even 'malice'. These three are almost synonymous terms and do not admit of any precise definition. However, in 'malice' there is an element of a desire to injure the party rather than to indicate the law. It is indicative of an evil mind which is disdainful of duties, social or legal, and disregards the duties to others. In common parlance, 'malice' means ill will against a person but in legal acceptation, it means' a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse'. Thus, acts done with an evil disposition oran unlawful motive with a view to cause injury can be characterised as malicious. Such an act is not one which is done either accidentally, thoughtlessly or negligently but is one which is done designedly, wilfully and wantonly. 'Bad faith', however, is a term which is much milder than malice and implies wilful failure to respond to one's own duty or obligation. A bad judgment or negligence may not be bad faith implicit wherein is the dishonest purpose and conscious doing of a wrong. To this extent, it is much more than a mere mistake of judgment and may be deemed to he synonymous with or equivalent t dishonesty. 20. A bad judgment or negligence may not be bad faith implicit wherein is the dishonest purpose and conscious doing of a wrong. To this extent, it is much more than a mere mistake of judgment and may be deemed to he synonymous with or equivalent t dishonesty. 20. Viewed in this light, we find Ram Saran's hidden hand throughout the earlier litigation and also his clever manoeuvring in getting the agreement of sale and making a subsequent sale deed by joining his own name along with that of Mahabir Prasad. Sarni Mal had initiated mutation proceedings on the basis of the will executed by Raghubir in his favour on 6-7-73.Objection in this proceeding was taken by none other than by Ram Swarup who is the elder brother of Ram Saran's father. The proceeding was contested mainly on the ground that the will set up by Sarni Mal was not valid and that Ram Saran and Ram Swarup etc. were themselves the owners of the property in question. When they lost in this litigation a revision was filed and a stay was obtained just a few days before the sale deed in question was executed by Sarni Mal in favour of defendants 2 and 3. It is strange that earlier these persons were seriously contesting the very title of Sarni Mal under the will set up by him, yet from the very same person they obtained the sale taking a complete somersault without any obvious reason. No person normally likes to derive title from a person whose very title was being challenged by him. 21. It is also strange that although the agreement of sale dated 16-9-73 stood only in favour of Mahabir Prasad, but at the time of executing the sale deed, the name of Ram Saran was also entered as vendee. The agreement of sale makes no provision that the vendor will be bound to execute the sale deed in favour of some one other than that in whose favour the agreement of sale deed had been executed. How and why the name of Ram Saran was added has remained unexplained. Even the sale deed is silent on this question. Admittedly Mahabir Prasad is a Teacher in a local school and he admits that they never had been associated in any work, business or any other transaction jointly. How and why the name of Ram Saran was added has remained unexplained. Even the sale deed is silent on this question. Admittedly Mahabir Prasad is a Teacher in a local school and he admits that they never had been associated in any work, business or any other transaction jointly. He claims that the land in question was being jointly cultivated by them and was also being irrigated from his tube-well. This part of the statement however, stands belied from the recitals in the sale deed Ext. A-2 where it is mentioned that the land was in actual cultivation of Sarni Mal up to the date of the sale deed. It is, therefore, unbelievable that the land was being cultivated jointly by the vendees. Apart from this a receipt pertaining to payment of irrigation charges has been filed by the defdts, according to which certain irrigation charges were paid in respect of the land in question. It has been issued by the own son of Ram Saran. When confronted with this receipt he flatly denied it saying that it may have been given by his son under some mistake. He was totally ignorant as to who remained in possession over the land during the period intervening the date of agreement and the sale deed. Mahabir Prasad also appears to be a pocket man of Ram Saran. It is admitted that Ram Saran was a moneyed man and he had money dealing with him. He admits having taken loan from Ram Saran and the relationship of debtor and creditor continues between them for the last about 20 years. He also admits party faction in the village regarding the property of Ram Saran and that he belonged to the faction led by Ram Saran. 22. All the above circumstances clearly indicate that the agreement dated 16-9-73 had been set up only with a view to defeat the plaintiffs claim. After the mutation proceedings ended in plaintiffs' favour, Ram Saran immediately got the sale deed executed by prevailing upon Sarni Mal and in order to keep his control over the land and not to let go his interest therein, he also joined as a vendee. After the mutation proceedings ended in plaintiffs' favour, Ram Saran immediately got the sale deed executed by prevailing upon Sarni Mal and in order to keep his control over the land and not to let go his interest therein, he also joined as a vendee. As already discussed above, the agreement dated 16-9-73 was not a genuine document and the sale deed too for the reasons aforesaid is not a bona fide transaction but appears to have been obtained at the behest and expense of Ram Saran, Mahabir Prasad being only a pawn in his hands. I find no hesitation, therefore, in Pining to the conclusion that the appellants had not acted in good faith or in a bona fide manner. 23. Much has been argued on the question of notice. It is, however, not necessary to enter into this question after having found that the defendant had not acted in good faith. It may, however, he pointed out that the plaintiff had given notice prior to the sale soon after coming to know that a sale deed was about to be executed by Sarni Mal in favour of defendants 2 and 3. Despite service on Sarni Mal, the transaction went through. Sarni Mal has kept away from the witness box and he did not even file a written statement. A copy of the notice was also sent to defendant No. 3. As a precaution it was sent both to his residential address and at his school address but both of them were returned with the remark not met'. The endorsement on the envelope shows that the postman continued to keep this notice with him up to 26th July, 1974. The word 'notice' also has not been defined in the Specific Relief Act but S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines it thus : "A person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it." 24. This definition includes both actual and constructive notice. A bona fide contract, whether oral or written, prevails against a subsequent registered conveyance if the transferee had notice of the prior contract. The legal presumption of knowledge or notice arises from : 1. Wilful abstention from an enquiry or search; 2. This definition includes both actual and constructive notice. A bona fide contract, whether oral or written, prevails against a subsequent registered conveyance if the transferee had notice of the prior contract. The legal presumption of knowledge or notice arises from : 1. Wilful abstention from an enquiry or search; 2. gross negligence; 3. registration, omission to search the register kept under the Registration Act, may amount to gross negligence so as to attract the consequences which result from notice; 4. actual possession; and 5. notice to an agent. 25. The onus of proof lies upon the party seeking to defeat the prior contract, to adduce prima facie evidence that he is a bona fide transferee for value without notice. This burden may be light and he may discharge it by merely denying the factum of notice on oath. Very little evidence is required when a negative fact has to be proved. However, each case will have to be examined on its own facts and circumstances in order to find out whether the onus has been satisfactorily discharged or not. 26. In the instant case, the parties were seriously litigating in mutation proceedings about the title to the property. Ram Saran himself had claimed the land in cuestion under an alleged will by Raghubir Saran in his favour. He had claimed that although the will set up by Sarni Mal was unregistered there was a registered will in favour of himself and his other relations (see Ext. 7). How wer, for reasons best known to the appellants, the alleged registered will was never filed in this case. In these circumstances, it is unbelievable that the defendant would not be aware about the agreement in favour of the plaintiffs. The manner in which the service of a registered notice was avoided by defendant No. 3 coupled with the fact that a similar notice had been served upon Sarni Mal before the execution of the sale deed goesa long way to establish that defendants had knowledge of the previous agreement and the sale deed was got executed by them in a hurried and surreptitious manner in order to defeat the plaintiffs' claim. It is difficult to believe that in the background of these facts and circumstances, the defendant should have been totally unaware about the plaintiffs' agreement. It is difficult to believe that in the background of these facts and circumstances, the defendant should have been totally unaware about the plaintiffs' agreement. The conduct of the defendants particularly of Ram Saran shows that they were all along aware about the earlier agreement and it was only by clever manoeuvring that they wanted to bypass it. Such manipulation cannot go unnoticed. What the defendants seek is an equitable relief to which they will not be entitled unless they prove to have acted in an honest and bona fide manner. I have already held above that the defendants did not act in good faith and as such they are not entitled to claim any benefit under S. 19(h) of the Specific Relief Act. 27. In view of what has been said above, the appeal is liable to fail. 28. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs- respondents.