JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in a suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendants/appellants to stop the furnace and generator in the shop and premises in dispute. 2. Plaintiff/respondents filed the suit with the allegations that they were owners of house No. 102 situate in Chauk Bazar, Meerut Cant and defendant/ appellant was a tenant in the shop situate in eastern side of the house at the rent of Rs. 23/- per month. The defendant was doing the business in the shop and started the work of casting of instruments of business and installed a big furnace in which steem coal was being used resulting into large quantity of smoke which spread in the residential portion of the house and made the life hazarduous. 3. Defendant/ appellant denied the plaint allegations. Trial Court dismissed the suit and lawer appellate Court decreed the suit by the impugned order against that order present second appeal has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of injunction in view of provisions of S. 41(h) of Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short the Act) as they could get equally efficacious relief by usual mode of proceedings, inasmuch as a suit for ejectment of the defendant appellant could have been filed. It was further urged that no nuisance as alleged was proved nor the act complained of was covered under the definition of "nuisance", hence suit has illegally been decreed. 5. Mr. Bhupeshwar Dayal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents urged that the relief for ejectment of defendant appellant as contemplated under S. 41(h) of the Act was not equally efficacious relief inasmuch as the plaintiff wanted only, removal of nuisance and not eviction of the defendant. It was further urged that the act complained of was fully covered under the definition of "private nuisance", and the second appeal was concluded by findings of fact hence the suit has correctly been decreed. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. In respect of first submission it is better to quote relevant portion of S. 41(h) of the Act as follows : "Injunction when refused : An injunction cannot be granted ........ (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode or proceeding except in the case of breach of trust". In respect of first submission it is better to quote relevant portion of S. 41(h) of the Act as follows : "Injunction when refused : An injunction cannot be granted ........ (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode or proceeding except in the case of breach of trust". A bare reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that the legislature has emphasised the expression "equally efficacious relief' which can certainly be obtained". The Legislature has very wisely used the expression 'equally efficacious relief. It is better to ascertain the import. In fact the word 'efficacious' is adjective according to grammar and its known is 'efficacy'. The word 'efficacy' is derived from latin word 'efficacie' which means capacity to produce results. The word 'efficacious' accordingly means able to produce the intended effect or result. In case the relief which can be obtained by other usual mode is equally efficacious meaning thereby equally able to produce the result which was intended by the plaintiff, then only injunction can be refused. Even there must be no doubt about the said relief being obtained because the legislature has used the word 'certainly'. 7. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chand Jaipuria, AIR 1976 SC 2621 , their Lordships of Supreme Court held that injunction cannot be granted when efficacious relief is obtainable in any other usual mode or proceedings. But in that case remedy to the plaintiff was available under Delhi Municipal Corporation Act whereas in the present case no equally efficacious remedy for removal of nuisance (not eviction of the defendant) was available tot he plaintiff, hence that case has no application in the present case. 8. As regards the second submission as to whether private nuisance was proved, it has to be taken into account that lower appellate Court has recorded finding that obnoxious gas and poisonous smoke was coming out of furnace which was entering and spreading in the residential portion of the house of the plaintiff. It has been further held that the continuous in hailing of smoke will prove fatal and injurious over the health of inmates and would certainly create substantial discomfort. It has been further held that the continuous in hailing of smoke will prove fatal and injurious over the health of inmates and would certainly create substantial discomfort. It has also been held that the smoke of the steam coal and gases produced by the use of furnace will not only cause substantial discomfort but it will also prove a hazard to the health of the plaintiff. 9. Winfield and Jolowicez on Torts (11th Edition, page 355) defines 'Private nuisance' as follows : "Private nuisance may be described as unlawful interference with a persons' use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it. The essence of a nuisance is a state of affairs that is either continuous or recurrent condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use or enjoyment of land.....Stenches, smoke, the escape of effluent and a multitude of different things may amount to a nuisance in fact but whether they constitute an actionable nuisance will depend on a variety of considerations". (See Read v. Lyons & Co. Ltd., (1945) KB 216, Hargrave v. Goldman, (1963) 37 ALJ 277 at page 283). Clerk and Lindsell on Tort (14th Edition on page 1383) defined public nuisance as follows : "A public nuisance is a criminal offence, and is an unlawful act or omission to discharge a legal duty, which act or omission endangers the lives, safety, health, property, or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all Her Majesty's subjects". Private nuisance has been defined as follows : "The acts which constitute public nuisances are all of them unlawful acts. In private nuisance on the other hand, the conduct of the defendant which results in the nuisance is of itself not necessarily or usually unlawful. A private nuisance may be and usually is caused by a person doing on his own land something which he is lawfully entitled to do. In private nuisance on the other hand, the conduct of the defendant which results in the nuisance is of itself not necessarily or usually unlawful. A private nuisance may be and usually is caused by a person doing on his own land something which he is lawfully entitled to do. His conduct only becomes nuisance when , the consequences of his acts are not confined to his own land but extend to the land of his neighbour by (1) causing an encroachment of his neighbours' land, when it closely resembles trespass, (2) causing physical damage to his neighbours' land or buildings or works or vegetation upon it, or unduly interfering with his neighbour in the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his land". 10. In view of the findings recorded by the lower appellate court that the smoke of the steam-coal and gases produced by the use of furnace, will not only cause substantial discomfort but it will also prove a hazard to the health of the plaintiff and considering facts and circumstances of present case I am of the view that the conduct of the defendant and the activities complained of are covered within the definition of private nuisance and, there was no equally efficacious relief obtainable by the plaintiff by any other usual mode or proceeding, hence the suit has correctly been decreed. 11. In view of the discussions made above the decision of the lower appellate Court cannot be said to be contrary to law and aforesaid questions of law have been correctly decided. I dont' find any merit in the second appeal. Second appeal fails and is dismissed. The inter stay dated 6-1-88 is vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.