Judgment :- 1. Appellant is the plaintiff in O.S. 449 of 1973 of the Munsiff Court, Chavakkad. His suit for injunction though decreed by the trial Court was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. 2. Plaint A schedule property lies in between items 1 and 2 of B schedule. Plaintiff claims to be in exclusive possession of it. Plaintiff contends that A schedule property is the only way to his property from the main road and sought injunction against the defendants from obstructing his user of the property and taking income from it Defendants denied the plaintiff's possession over the plaint A schedule property. They also denied the existence of any pathway as alleged in the plaint. First defendant contended that A schedule property is in his actual possession and it is included in the documents in his favour. Second defendant also denied the existence of the pathway and further stated that be has not threatened to trespass upon the property in the possession of the plaintiff 3. The trial Court on a consideration of the entire evidence upheld the existence of the pathway leading to the plaintiff's property. In Ext. C-6 plan the pathway leading to the property of the plaintiff is demarcated. Plot BEHC in Ext. C-6 in the plaint A schedule property. Plot EFGH is admittedly the property in the possession of the first defendant. This is described as item No.1 in B schedule to the plaint. Plot ABCD is the property in the possession of Lonappan This is described as item No. 2 in the B schedule. Property belonging to the plaintiff lies on the western side. Several documents produced in the case sufficiently clearly proved the existence of A schedule pathway. Exts. A-4 to A-12 and A-14 unequivocally established the existence of the pathway in between the first defendant's property situated in R. S.91/4 and the property in the possession of Lonappan in R. S.91/5. The commissioner's report and plan lend considerable support to the plaintiff's case regarding the pathway (A. schedule property) from Guruvayur-Enamavu road to his property. In view of the above overwhelming evidence denial of the pathway is only an exercise in futility. 4. The commissioner's report and plan lend considerable support to the plaintiff's case regarding the pathway (A. schedule property) from Guruvayur-Enamavu road to his property. In view of the above overwhelming evidence denial of the pathway is only an exercise in futility. 4. Counsel submitted that even if the plaintiff does not have any title to A schedule property the injunction grafted by the trial Court should not have been refused as A schedule property is his only way of access to his properly from Guruvayur-Eaamavu road. Plaintiff's contention that he is entitled to exclusive right over that pathway is not tenable. Nevertheless, in view of the evidence that A schedule property is the only way for plaintiff to reach his property the question to be considered is whether injunction can be granted as he apprehends trespass and interference by the defendants. It is in evidence that for the first time as per Ext. A-10 date 14-8-1973 an attempt was made to show that the property on the south of the property in the possession of the first defendant is not a pathway. In all other documents the southern property of the 1st defendant's property is described as a pathway. Hence plaintiff's apprehension of annexation of A schedule property by the first defendant cannot be stated to be baseless. 5. A person having access to his compound from a public pathway or road is entitled to certain basic rights and amenities. He has certainly the right of ingress and egress through the road or pathway. No person can meddle with that right or is any manner diminish it by any sort of interference. The right of way through a public pathway or road is not dependent upon any prescriptive right or long user. It stems from the very existence of the read abutting or leading to one's property. The owner of a property having read access can definitely seek the intervention of the court for redressal of his grievance whenever he apprehends obstruction or nuisance or any sort of interference to his just and peaceful user of the road. If any such highhanded action occurs special damage to the owner of the property can definitely be inferred. Legal presumption to that effect will not be out of place. In such a case consent in writing of the Advocate General as contemplated under S.91 of the C. P C. is not necessary. If any such highhanded action occurs special damage to the owner of the property can definitely be inferred. Legal presumption to that effect will not be out of place. In such a case consent in writing of the Advocate General as contemplated under S.91 of the C. P C. is not necessary. In the decision reported in Shankar Dayal v. State (AIR 1973 Allahabad 310 at Page 312) it is held thus: "A person having a house or property abutting a public highway is entitled to some basic rights and amenities, such as access to the road, ingress or egress and no person or authority can be permitted to diminish or destroy such rights. Moreover, it is a right which does not depend on prescription or long user but stems from the very fact that a property abuts a public highway. In short, the owner of a properly abutting a highway has a right of access to it, and in the event of public nuisance on such highway obstructing his ingress and egress special damage to the owner of the properly is so self-evident that it must in law be presumed. For instituting such suit, therefore, the consent in writing of the Advocate General is not necessary." The indubitable position is that if an obstruction is made by any person to the right of the user of a public highway or lane affecting the ingress and egress, special damage to the owner of the property can necessarily be presumed. In Bhagwanti v. Jiuil (AIR 1975 Allahabad 341) it is held as follows: "Any person who has a house abutting on a public road or lane is entitled to access to the road or lane from the house and no person or authority can destroy that right. This right does not emanate from prescription or long user but from the fact that the house abuts on the public way. This right does not emanate from prescription or long user but from the fact that the house abuts on the public way. Hence, if an obstruction is made by any person or authority, of such public way which affects the ingress and egress, special damage to the owner of the property must be presumed." It is also useful to refer to the decision in Bhagwat Prasad v. Sudenan Bhagwat (AIR 1937 Patna 620) where it is held as follows: "A person in the immediate neighbourhood and entitled to use a local public thoroughfare has a special cause of action in respect of any encroachment upon it, irrespective of whether he has proved special damage or not". 6. There is plethora of evidence with regard to the existence of the pathway. From any interference to the right of the plaintiff to the user of the pathway special damage to the plaintiff can certainly be presumed. Merely because the lower appellate court held that A schedule property is a public road, it cannot be held that the suit is barred in view of S.91 C P. C. S.91 (1) of C. P C. provides that is the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit far a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be instituted by the Advocate General or with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. A private person cannot maintain a suit in respect of public nuisance unless he satisfactorily shows that he has suffered special damages S.91 does not apply to breach of individual rights of a person. S.91 (2) makes the position abundantly clear. S.91 (2) states that nothing in the Section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of the Section. 7. As it is the definite case of the plaintiff that his right of way is obstructed and as the Courts below have found on evidence that A schedule is the only way to the property of the plaintiff, any obstruction by any person can be thwarted by the plaintiff by seeking the assistance of the Court. 7. As it is the definite case of the plaintiff that his right of way is obstructed and as the Courts below have found on evidence that A schedule is the only way to the property of the plaintiff, any obstruction by any person can be thwarted by the plaintiff by seeking the assistance of the Court. Though plaintiff has no exclusive title or possession over A schedule pathway he is still entitled to an order of injunction against any obstruction of his right of way even if no special damage is established by him. Whenever plaintiff is obstructed from using the pathway, the result is that he is prevented from using his property in the best manner he likes. In such a contingency special damage can really be presumed. The trial Court was justified in granting injunction to the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are hereby set aside and that of the trial Court are confirmed. Second Appeal is allowed win costs. Allowed.