V.S. DAVE, J.—This is an application under S. 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing the order passed by Shri Om Prakash Sharma, Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Officers), Jaipur dated December 14, 1987, by which he directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct investigation into the allegations levelled in a complaint filed by one Shri Manibhadra Bagra, former General Secretary, Rajasthan N.S.U.I, Jaipur the non-petitioner No. 2 2. Brief facts leading to this petition are that one Shri Manibhadra Bagra filed a complaint in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Rajasthan Jaipur, alleging that the accused persons named therein committed offences under Ss. 420, 467, 468, 409 and read with S. 120B IPC and also under Official Secrets Act (O.S. Act), Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) Prevention of Corruption Act (P.C. Act), Import and Export Act (( & E). Act) and Customs Act. The complainant arrayed besides the two petitioners as accused, six others who have been joined as respondents in this application, and they are Shri V.P. Singh, former Defence Minister. Shri Bherulal, former Director of Enforcement, Government of India, Shri Nasli Wadia, Chairman, Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company, Shri Vinod Pandey, former Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Shri Ram Nath Goyanka of Express Group and Mr. Micheal Harshman, President, Fairfax, U.S.A. The complainants allegations are mainly based on the report of Justices Thakkar-Natrajan Commission of Inquiry which was submitted to the Government of India on December 10, 1987. The complainant has alleged that after going through this report and recommendations made therein coupled with the day to day activities of Shri Vishwanath Pratap Singh, he was convinced that the accused persons have entered into a criminal conspiracy and are engaged in the task of defaming the Central Government. It is alleged that Shri V.P Singh, former Finance and Defence Minister in the Government of India was bound by the oath of allegiance and secrecy which he had taken while entering the office. Sarva Shri Vinod Pandey and Bhurelal both were civil servants being I AS. Officer were also obliged to maintain secrecy and allegiance to the country as they were holding important posts in the Government of India. Sarva Shri Vinod Pandey and Bhurelal both were civil servants being I AS. Officer were also obliged to maintain secrecy and allegiance to the country as they were holding important posts in the Government of India. It was further alleged that Sarva Shri Nasli Wadia, Bhurelal and Vinod Pandey, in conspiracy with the two petitioners Arun Shourie and S. Gurumurthy agreed to promote the claim of Shri V.P. Singh for Prime Ministership of this country and in pursuance of that conspiracy, they wanted to defame the present Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajeev Gandhi. It was further alleged that with this view in mind, services of Mr. Micheal Harshman, President of Fairfax a detective agency in United States of America were solicited to investigate into certain matters. It was therefore, alleged that the engagement of Mr. Harshman was not only in violation of law but it threatened the security of the country as important information had been passed over to him. It was alleged that Mr. Nasli Wadia played an important role in securing the services of Harshman and there is possibility that somebody else might have said for the engagement of this agency as no money had been paid by the Government of India. It was also alleged that the engagement of the company and payment to it were kept secret and no record was maintained at the behest of Shri V. P. Singh, Shri Bhurelal, Shri Gurumurthy and Shri Vinod Pandey. It was alleged that all the accused used to meet in hotels and private organisations and used to transmit secrets out side the country and thus they were administering slow poison to the whole country. It was alleged that accused persons also fabricated and forged documents and thereby fraudulently obtained public funds and property for their selfish motives. It was alleged that in this task accused No. 1 mis-used foreign exchange in conspiracy with other accused persons for this purpose and thus, committed offences which are punishable under FERA. It was further alleged that the accused Shri V.P. Singh along with Sarva Shri Bhurelal and Vinod Pandey gave illegal concessions to Mr. Nasli Wadia for importing polyester yarn etc. and there by committed offences punishable under import and Export Control Act. It was further alleged that the accused Shri V.P. Singh along with Sarva Shri Bhurelal and Vinod Pandey gave illegal concessions to Mr. Nasli Wadia for importing polyester yarn etc. and there by committed offences punishable under import and Export Control Act. It was further alleged that the accused persons particularly the petitioners along with Shri Ram Nath Goyanka imported printing machinery without payment of any customs duty and, therefore, violated the provisions of Customs Act and the Import and Export Control Act. The complainant further alleged that the accu-sed persons entered into the criminal conspiracy by holding regular meeting at Mohangarh, Devgarh, Jaisalmer,. Bikaner and Jaipur in many prestigious hotels and it was at these places that final shape to the criminal conspiracy was given and the plans prepared. It was also alleged that Mr. Harshman also met Shri Bhurelal, Shri Ramnath Goyanka and others. Hence, the court at Jaipur had jurisdiction to take cognizance. This complaint was filed on December 14, 1987 by the complainant himself as per the order-sheet. He also filed power of Shri Mahesh Chandra Sharma (Dausawala) whose arguments were heard on the same day and the learned C.J.M. (E.O.), Jaipur sent the complaint for investigation to the Superintendent of Police,C.B.I, Jaipur by a detailed order. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his order not only directed the C.B.I. to investigate in accordance with the law but also directed it to consult the competent officers of the State and fulfil the legal requirements, if any. A further direction was issued to contact the Directorate of Enforcement, Customs Import and Export Authorities and all such other persons who are concerned in respect of whom various offences are committed. He further directed the Superin-tendent of Police (CB1) to get in touch with the concerned departments for com-pleting the necessary formalities required e.g. consent, sanction etc. The Superin-tendent of Police, C.B.I. was further directed to hand over the investigation papers to officers of the various departments in case the complaints were required to be filed by them and further to obtain prior sanction if required under different statutes. He also directed that the investigation should be given top priority and monthly progress report should be submitted before him. If there comes any legal or technical hurdle in investigation the case, it was directed that he may seek the clarification from the court. He also directed that the investigation should be given top priority and monthly progress report should be submitted before him. If there comes any legal or technical hurdle in investigation the case, it was directed that he may seek the clarification from the court. It was also directed that the copy of the order should be sent for information and necessary action to the Home Secretary Government of India, Director General of Police (C. B. I.), Delhi, Director General of Police, Rajasthan and Home Secretary, Government of Rajasthan. It is this order which has been challenged before this court. 4. Notice of the petition was issued to the learned counsel for the complainant and after hearing him the court issued notice to the Superintendent of Police (CBI. Learned Advocated General also offer red to interfere in the case. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complaint is baseless and vexatious and so the impugned order of the Magistrate is an abuse of the judicial process and hence be quashed, rescinded and be declared illegal and void. It is submitted that even if the whole complaint is properly analysed no offence worth the name is disclosed and the court should not embark upon such a waste paper. It is submitted that the only basis of the complaint is Hob-ble Justices Thakkar-Natrajan Report but the same cannot be made use of as no notice under S. 83 of the Commissions of Inquiries Act was issued to the accused-petitioners. It is submitted that the learned Magistrate had acted without jurisdic-tion in directing Central Bureau of Investigation to carry out investigation on vague allegations. It is submitted that Central Bureau of Investigation does not have a police station at Jaipur and ho direction could be issued by the learned Magistrate to do rowing and fishing inquiry by asking the C.B.I to go to various departments mentioned therein and investigate into what has been pointed out in Justices Thakkar-Natrajan Report It is further submitted that there is legal bar under the various Acts and the authorities mentioned therein alone had the jurisdiction to collect informations. It was contended that this court has wide jurisdiction to quash the investigation under S. 482 Cr. P. C. in such cases. It was contended that this court has wide jurisdiction to quash the investigation under S. 482 Cr. P. C. in such cases. Reliance has been placed on Emperor Vs Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, (1) wherein it has been held:— "No doubt if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam J. may well have decided rightly in AIR 1938 Mad. 129". R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, (2) wherein it has been held as under: "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or, continu-ance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned pro-ceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in ques-tion, is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under, this category the allegations made against the accused do not constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence or facts in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction, and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point". State of West Bengal Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha (3) wherein it has been held as under :— "It seems to me impossible to hold on the basis of these allegations that any offence can be said to be made out prima facie under S. 3 of the Act. State of West Bengal Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha (3) wherein it has been held as under :— "It seems to me impossible to hold on the basis of these allegations that any offence can be said to be made out prima facie under S. 3 of the Act. In the first place, the F.I.R. does not allege, directly or indirectly, that the firm was promoting or conducting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme. Secondly, the F.I.R. does not contain any allegation whatsoever that persons who advanced or deposited their monies with the firm were participants of a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, dependent upon any such event or contingency. The F.I.R, bears on its face the stamp of hurry and want of care. It seems to assume what was argued before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee on behalf of the prosecution that it is enough for the purposes of S.2. (c) to show that the accused is promoting or conducting a scheme for the making of quick or easy money, an assumption which I have shown to be fallacious. An essential ingredient of S. 2 (c) is that the scheme for making quick or easy money must be dependent on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme. First Information Report which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision arc prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation." 6. On the strength of the aforesaid case it is submitted that since complaint does not allege or disclose an offence it should be quashed. Specific reliance was made on paras 16; 20, 21 and 64. It was then submitted that under S. 156(3) Cr.P.C, the learned Magistrate ought not to have sent the matter for investigation as no cognizable offence was disclosed in the complaint. The learned Magistrate neither had the satisfaction nor had reason to believe that some cognizable offence was made out which required investigation. It is submitted that order of the learned Magistrate does not fall within the preview of a proper legal order. The learned Magistrate neither had the satisfaction nor had reason to believe that some cognizable offence was made out which required investigation. It is submitted that order of the learned Magistrate does not fall within the preview of a proper legal order. It is submitted that order contains all what it ought not to and though it is quite a lengthy order directing police under S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. but there is not a word in the entire order which shows that learned Magistrate was satisfied that there is any offence alleged to have been committed by the accused persons which required investigation. On the contrary the order discloses that even the complainant did not argue for proceeding with the enquiry by the learned Magistrate. He only made a prayer for sending the case to the CBI for investigation and to further direct the CBI to contact various authorities for that purposes It is further submitted that the provisions of Secs. 4 and 5 of the Act have not been , taken note of and so also the basic principles of interpretation of statutes have been ignored. It has not been taken note of that it is only the provisions under the special enactments which have to. be given effect to while dealing the accused under the Special Acts. Such as under the provisions of FERA only agency which can seek information is provided under S. 32 of the Act and the officers of the CBI have no jurisdiction express or implied to investigate. Reference is also made to Ss. 34 to 40 and S. 45 of the said Act. Similarly a reference was made to various provisions under the Customs Act, Export and Import Act, P.C. Act, Official Secret Act and S.6 of the Delhi Special Establishment Act where under the CBI is created. 7. Mr. Mahesh Chand Dausawala submitted that basis of the complaint is Justices Thakkar Natrajan Commissions Report. He has made reference to observations made in the report at various places. 7. Mr. Mahesh Chand Dausawala submitted that basis of the complaint is Justices Thakkar Natrajan Commissions Report. He has made reference to observations made in the report at various places. His submission is that application filed by the accused is pre mature inasmuch as the CBI has not yet even registered the case and the order passed by the Magistrate cannot be interfered with it is submitted that if the Magistrate has power to take cognizance under S. 190 Cr.P.C he has also power to direct investigation under S. 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that under S. 155 Cr.P.C . if the Magistrate has to be informed and his sanction is obtained by CBI for investigating the non-cogni-zable case under S. 355 Cr.P.C; then it is equally permissible that he can direct the CBI under S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to investigate a cognizable offence. In this respect reference was made to Gopal Das Sindhi vs. State of Assam (4). Refer ence was also made to S. 460 (c) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also submitted that the word Court read with S.3 of the Indian Evidence Act with reference to State of West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal (5). It is then submitted that it is distinct offence under S 27(1) of the FERA is made out. Similarly an offence under S 5(l)(d) read with S. 5(2) of the Prosecution of Corruption Act is also made out. It is submitted that for each of the offence a specific allegation has been made in the complaint and this court cannot substitute its satisfaction for the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that this is a matter of public importance where persons highly placed in the society have committed serious offences and have endangered the safety and security of the entire country. It is submitted that High Court should not interfere at the investigation stage and that S 482 Cr.P.C. should not be invoked particularly when a revision was maintainable against the order. Reference was made to S.N. Sharma Vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari (6), Badaku Joti Swant Vs. State of Mysore (7), Balkishan Vs. State of Maha-rashtra, (8), State of U.P. Vs. Ballabh Das (9) and Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Sharda Vs. Shri Rajiv Poddar (l0). On the second proposition the learned counsel relied on Phoolchand Vs. State of Raj (11), Ashok Dev. Vs. Bishan Swarup (12) and Raj Kappor Vs. State of Mysore (7), Balkishan Vs. State of Maha-rashtra, (8), State of U.P. Vs. Ballabh Das (9) and Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Sharda Vs. Shri Rajiv Poddar (l0). On the second proposition the learned counsel relied on Phoolchand Vs. State of Raj (11), Ashok Dev. Vs. Bishan Swarup (12) and Raj Kappor Vs. State (Delhi Administration) (13). 8. Mr. Tyagi appearing on behalf of the CBI submitted that under S. 5 of Delhi Police Establishment Act the area has to be notified and specified by the Central Government and it is only after the State Governments approval that CBI has jurisdiction under S- 6 of the DPE Act.. It is further submitted that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction express or implied to direct investigation under S 156 (3) Cr.P.C, as such section has to be read with S. 156 (i) and S. 190 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that CBI has only one police station which is at Delhi. If the Magistrates are permitted to issue directions like the one issued in the instant case then it would be impossible for the CBI to function as small (sic such) organisation like CBI would be subject to the orders by various courts all over the country, 9. Shri D.C. Swami, the learned Advocate General, submits that the State Government is not inclined that any submission should be made in the case on its behalf. 10. On the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties following mainly three points arise for consideration— 1. Whether investigation order can be quashed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. 2. Whether the complaint as drafted discloses any cognizable offence which could satisfy the learned Magistrate to direct investigation under S. 156(3)Cr.P.C. 3. Whether this is one of the rarest of the rare case where jurisdiction under S. 482 Cr.P.C. should be invoked and investigation directed be quashed? 11. Coming to the first question I need not go into much details and have threadbare discussed this question in case of (14) Vimla Agarwal Vs. State of Raj. S B. Cr. Misc. Petition No 175/88 decided on 7-10-88, wherein all the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties in this case have been dealt with. 11. Coming to the first question I need not go into much details and have threadbare discussed this question in case of (14) Vimla Agarwal Vs. State of Raj. S B. Cr. Misc. Petition No 175/88 decided on 7-10-88, wherein all the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties in this case have been dealt with. After careful consideration in the aforesaid case I have held that it is in the rarest of the rare cases that investigation can be quashed and the same can be done in following circumstances - (i) where the FIR even if accepted as true, discloses no reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offences or that there is a legal bar in taking cognizance by court; (ii) where the materials subsequently collected in the course of investi-gation further disclose no such cognizable offence at all : (iii) where the continuation of such investigation would amount to an abuse of power by the police necessitating interference in the ends of , justice. (iv) Even if the FIR or its subsequent investigation purports to raise a suspicion of cognizable offence, the High Court can still quash if it is convicted that power of investigation has been exercised malafide. It is in the aforesaid parameters that I will be examining the case. 12. For appreciating the entire case it will be worth-while to consider the scheme of law. The word complaint is defined under S. 2(d) Cr. P.C., which means allegations made against some person orally or in writing to the Magistrate with a view to take action under the Code that some persons whether known or unknown have committed the offence.) Therefore, allegations must disclose that the offence has been committed by some known or unknown person. The word offence has been defined under S. 2(n) Cr. P.C. which means any act or omission punishable by any law for the time being in force. Therefore, to constitute an offence there must be a positive allegation that offence has been committed by the person accused of the offence and that such an offence is cause of an act or omission which is made punishable by law. The test laid down for deciding whether a particular document is a complaint or not is to see whether the allegations are made with a view to Magistrates taking action as provided under Ss. 200 to 204 Cr. The test laid down for deciding whether a particular document is a complaint or not is to see whether the allegations are made with a view to Magistrates taking action as provided under Ss. 200 to 204 Cr. P.C. Bharat Kishore Lal Singh vs Judhister Modak, (14). Therefore, the complaint is one which is meant to put the machinery of law into motion, but where the object of the allegations is merely to inform the Magistrate or to request him to take such action as he may in his discretion consider necessary or to ask for his direction does not constitute a complaint in the eye of law. Reference may be made to Harnarain Singh vs Nawab Chand Lal (15), D. Raja Gopala Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (16),. Sheo Sampat Pandey vs. Emperor (17) and Durga Dutt vs. The State (18). The complaint must disclose that the offence has been committed and when no offence is disclosed upon the facts contained in the petition, there is no complaint. In Raja Ram vs. Ram Achal (19) it has been held that allegations in order to be treated as complaint must be such as to forma direct basis for starting a criminal trial. It is necessary to bear in mind that Legislature, while defining complaint has categorically mentioned that it does not include a police report. Nathuram Atmaram vs. State (20). Thus before, s, 156 (3) Cr. P.C. is pressed into service by a Magistrate he has to satisfy on the allegations made in the complaint than an offence has been committed and that he may take cognizance of an offence on such complaint, The words used in S. 156(3) Cr. P.C. that any Magistrate empowered under S. 190 Cr. P.C. may order an investigation, will have to be read along with S. 190 Cr. P.O. itself and for doing so the Magistrate must be empowered to take cognizance on receiving complaint all facts which constitute such offence, meaning thereby facts must be disclosed in the complaint which constitute the offence. It, therefore, implies that complaint should be made by a person who is aware of the facts of the case except in cases where there may be special provisions to the contrary. 13. It, therefore, implies that complaint should be made by a person who is aware of the facts of the case except in cases where there may be special provisions to the contrary. 13. There is yet another angle of looking at this and that is as soon as a complaint is filed the learned Magistrate can call upon the complainant to give a statement and produce evidence in support of the complaint which implies that when a complainant comes to court he must have evidence with him to substantiate the allegations constituting the offence. Repeatedly I have asked the learned counsel to disclose knowledge at the facts or evidence he has in support of allegations made and there is only one answer that the basis is Justices Thakkar-Natrajan Commissions Report. It is true that at various places obser-vations have been made by Justices Thakkar—Natrarjan Commission of enquiry but the question is whether the same can be made basis for complaint for a citizen who has no personal knowledge about any fact and circumstances which was the subject matter before the Commission. The complainant has rnentianed sounding phraseologies in his complaint but the entire complaint even if read does hot make out allegation disclosing commission of specific offences for which the complainant has any evidence with him. 14. There is no dispute with the submission of the learned counsel that the Magistrate may refer a matter for investigation to a Magistrate but the ques-tion is whether the Magistrate can issue directions to Central Bureau of Investigation for investigating a case in the manner done by the Magistrate and secondly, whether he ought to have satisfied himself as to whether there was a case for forwarding complaint under S. 156" (3) Cr.P.C. I have already said above that whatever allegations are made before a court they must fall within the definition of a complaint i.e. the allegations which are made orally or in writing to the Magistrate must disclose an act or omission which is punishable by law. It is also essential that while levelling the allegations the complainant should have the information/knowledge about the facts being alleged in the complaint. It will be necessary here to draw a distinction between a first information and a complaint. While lodging the F.I.R. as required under S. 154 Cr.P.C. the requirement is only an information relating to the......... (illegible) a non-cogni-zable offence. It will be necessary here to draw a distinction between a first information and a complaint. While lodging the F.I.R. as required under S. 154 Cr.P.C. the requirement is only an information relating to the......... (illegible) a non-cogni-zable offence. The word commission of a crime is preceded by the word information relating which shows that there need not be evidence or proof with the informant at this stage suffice it is if the information indicates commi-ssion of a crime if cognizable then under §. 154 Cr.P.C. and if non-cognizable, under S. 155 Cr.P.C. as mentioned above Neither any evidence nor proof is required to be with the information in support of the information supplied as that it has to be investigated after taking down the report in the manner provi-ded thereafter, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Police Officer derives power of investigation into cognizable offence under S, 156 Cr.P.C. and one of the modes by which powers can be conferred on him is S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. where a Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance under S. 190 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance of the offence deems it proper to get an investigation done by, the police. Thus, S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is only an enabling power which empowers the police officer to investigate an offence on the basis of anything other than F.I.R. It is, at this stage, when the complaint is received by him and the police feels that the complaint sent under S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. by the learned Magistrate discloses a prima facie offence that will be reduced into writing as it shall be come FIR. and the investigating officer proceeds in accordance with law having derived the powers under the orders of the Magistrate but the order for investigating to be conducted under S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. has only to be passed after the proper perusal of the complaint by the Magistrate. 1 have already mentioned above the meaning of the words complaint and offence as mentio-ted in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Now, as soon as the complaint is filed before a Magistrate in normal course he should forthwith examine the complaint under S 200 Cr.P.C. If that is not done then he may postpone the issue of process under S. 202 Cr.P.C. It would be worthwhile to reproduce Ss. 200 and 202 Cr.PC. Now, as soon as the complaint is filed before a Magistrate in normal course he should forthwith examine the complaint under S 200 Cr.P.C. If that is not done then he may postpone the issue of process under S. 202 Cr.P.C. It would be worthwhile to reproduce Ss. 200 and 202 Cr.PC. and the same read as under: S. 200 - Examination of complaint—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate. Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses". S. 202 -Postponement of issue of process—(1) Any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under S. 192, may, if he thinks fit postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made— (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the court of Session or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under S. 200". 15. A bare perusal of the aforesaid two sections makes it clear that the legislature has framed a scheme where two types of cases, namely, the complaint cases and the cases on police report have to be treated differently from the very beginning. under S. 200 Cr P.C. as soon as the complaint is made to the Magistrate he is obliged to examine the complainant and the witnesses if present. under S. 200 Cr P.C. as soon as the complaint is made to the Magistrate he is obliged to examine the complainant and the witnesses if present. However, an exception has been made that recording of the statement of the com-plainant is not essential under S. 200 Cr.P.C. provided the complaint is in writing/Therefore, distinction has been made between oral complaint and a com-plaint in writing, hence so far as S.200 Cr.P.C is concerned it is not the question of deferring of the statement of the complainant or making over a case to police under S. 156(3) Cr.PC. It is thereafter that in S. 202 Cr.P.C. an inquiry is contemplated. Options have been given to the Magistrate before the complaint is dismissed or process is issued. In S. 202 Cr.P.C. the legislature has not used the word complaint or offence in isolation but the entire sentence has to be read together which reads, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take the cognizance. This phrase has been put in alternative to the cases which are made over to the Magistrate under S. 192 Cr.P.C. and if S. 192 Cr.P.C. is read, then Chief Judicial Magistrate can make over the case to a competent Magistrate for inquiry only after taking cognizance. When the above two types of situations arise then the Magistrate after applying his mind considers whether it is a case for issuing process or postponing the process contemplating an inquiry and it is this inquiry which can be done either by himself or he can make over the aforesaid complaint for investigation to a police officer or by such other persons as he deems fit, therefore, a complaint constituting an offence contemplates to be sent to the Magistrate under S. 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be made equivalent or at par with an information to be given to the Police under S. 154 or 155 Cr.P.C. This is made further clear by a perusal of S. 20! Cr.P.C. Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. if read along with S. 210 Cr.P.C. then too it is clear that an inquiry by the Court cannot be made equivalent to an investigation by the police. Cr.P.C. Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. if read along with S. 210 Cr.P.C. then too it is clear that an inquiry by the Court cannot be made equivalent to an investigation by the police. When the Magistrate, therefore/acts under S. 202 Cr.P.C. directing for an investigation by the police he does so for his assistance only to come to a conclusion whether a process should straight of be issued or that he should wait for the investigation, of the result of which he is not bound hence a complaint cannot be reduced to a level of an information on which the police investigates and it is obligatory for the Magistrate that when he receives the complaint, the peruses the same carefully and scrutinises to the extent of satisfying himself as to whether the contents of the same constitute offence as defined under S. 2 (n) Cr.P.C. If this is not done, then sub-clause (b) of the proviso to S. 200 Cr.P.C. would become redundant. A perusal of the aforesaid sections also make it clear-that it is not at all essential for the Magistrate to send the case to the police for investigation. It is only when he feels that it may require an investigation of the type where it will be difficult for himself together the evidence for proceeding further, then only he should direct the investigation and that too only when he thinks fit that it is sound judicial discretion which he has to use whether to enquire himself or to send the case to police under S. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. but so far as the complainant is concerned it is essential that he must have evidence with himself either at the stage of S. 200 Cr.P.C. or not if at that stage then atleast at the stage of an inquiry under S. 202 Cr.P.C. Complainant cannot mechanically ask for investigation by the police as the Magistrate cannot be reduced to the level of an In-charge of a police station where on an information as investigation is contemplated. In this view of the matter i am clearly of the opinion that a distinction has to be made between an information and a complaint and the complaint must ipso facto contain the allegations constituting an offence and further that complaint should be in a position to place such evidence before the court. In this view of the matter i am clearly of the opinion that a distinction has to be made between an information and a complaint and the complaint must ipso facto contain the allegations constituting an offence and further that complaint should be in a position to place such evidence before the court. I have already mentioned above that the only evidence available in the present case with the complainant is Honble Justices Thakkar and Natrajan Commissions report. The complainant has only referred to certain paragraphs from the Commissions report and regarding other offences also he has only prayed for the investigation without levelling positive allegations constituting particular offences. 16. As to how far the report of Honble Justices Thakkar and Natrajan Commission can be considered the basis of the complaint one has to look into the nature of it. 17. I have gone through the entire report submitted by Honble Justices Thakkar and Natrajan Commission of Inquiry. Firstly, it is clear from the report that their Lordships did not think it proper to issue notices to various parties under S. 8B of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952. They only bemouned and felt sorry at the attitude of some of the persons made accused in this complaint. Their Lordships in Chapter-Ill reproduced averments made in a statement which was filed before it by some members of the Parliament and then observed that the statement does not contain any material throwing light on the circumstances and the manner in which a foreign agency as M/s Fairfax Group. Ins. came to be engaged by the Directorate of Enforcement for conducting investigation against Indian citizens and Indian based company in foreign countries on matters pertaining to alleged foreign exchange violation. Their Lordships also discussed the risk involved in engagement or utilisation of Foreign private detective agency in general and M/s Fairfax Group Insurance in particular. Their Lordships also gave a post script to the entire report and cautioned that nation should not be exposed to the risk it has been exposed to. Neither it is required nor I am legally entitled to comment upon any thing observed in their Lordships report because this is a report by a Commission which was appointed under the Commission of Inquiries Act, l952, and the procedure of submission of the report and acceptance by the Government is mentioned in the Act. Neither it is required nor I am legally entitled to comment upon any thing observed in their Lordships report because this is a report by a Commission which was appointed under the Commission of Inquiries Act, l952, and the procedure of submission of the report and acceptance by the Government is mentioned in the Act. It will be relevant to mention S. 6 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 which reads as under:— S. 6-Statement made by persons to the Commission-No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: Provided that the statement— (a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or (b) is relevant to the subject matter of inquiry". Thus, any statement given by the person or evidence tendered otherwise can be used against the person giving evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings in the manner provided therein. The question is whether a person against whom the inquiry is ordered or on the point of reference same evidence can be used elsewhere or findings of the Commission can be used for the purpose of prosecution is a debatable question. A question was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Dr. Balirarh Waman Hiray Vs. Mr. Justice B. Lantin (21) and their Lordships answered the question as to whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under S- 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act is a court for the purpose of S. 195 (1) (b) Cr.P C. and their Lordships after consideration of catena of cases held that a Commission of Inquiry is not a Court properly so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government for the information of its mind" in order for it to decide as to the course of action to be followed, it is therefore, a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court" 18. In view of the aforesaid findings I have no hesitation in holding that it was for the Union of India to act upon the findings given by the Commission, if the powers are not even vested in the Commission itself how it can be concei-ved of that a common man unconnected with the inquiry can use that report for the purpose of adjudicatory process or for prosecuting some one on the basis of findings unless he has himself primary evidence in his own knowledge. Hence if the Government on examination finds that anything requires to be investigated by police or otherwise then the same can be done in accordance with the procedure established by law but it is not permissible to file a complaint on the basis of this report by any person unless he has evidence to confront that allegation. There is yet one another danger that in case it is being permitted to do so then thousands of complaints can be filed on the basis of this one report in various courts like the one filed before the Magistrate in Jaipur and if would result in abuse of the process of law. Besides this there is absolutely no fact mentioned in the complaint, a perusal of which may constitute an offence. I may also observe that there is no dispute that allegation mentioned in the complaint the complain-ant has no direct or indirect evidence to substantiate in his possession. In view of the fact that I am of the opinion that the complaint did hot disclose any offence and also that for some of the offences mentioned therein there was legal bar by the Court. 19. Under S. 33 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to. In view of the fact that I am of the opinion that the complaint did hot disclose any offence and also that for some of the offences mentioned therein there was legal bar by the Court. 19. Under S. 33 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to. as "the FERA") it is the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India or any office of Enforcement not below the rank of Chief Enforcement Officer can call for information and have the power of search and seizure contemplated by a statute cannot be transferred under the orders of a Magistrate and it is clearly borne out that but for S. 45 police has not been empowered to enquire or investigate under the said Act. Besides this, no facts have been mentioned which warranted the application of S. 45 of FERA. Similarly, under S. 100 to 108 of the Customs Act, legislature has empowered different authorities for different purposes. The powers given to various authorities under the Act could not have been transferred or made subordinate to the police by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. In fact, the learned Magistrate did not at all look into the complaint and made the sweeping observations in his order which were absolutely unwarranted. The learned Magistrate transgressed his jurisdiction by directing the C.B.I. to investigate into the offences which even do not fall within his own purview. The Magistrate at the end of the impugned order dated 14.12. In fact, the learned Magistrate did not at all look into the complaint and made the sweeping observations in his order which were absolutely unwarranted. The learned Magistrate transgressed his jurisdiction by directing the C.B.I. to investigate into the offences which even do not fall within his own purview. The Magistrate at the end of the impugned order dated 14.12. 1987 directed as under:— ^^vr% n.M izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156¼3½ ,oa 155¼2½ ,oa vU; lqlaxr fof/k /kkjkvksa ds v/khu ;g funsZk fn;k tkrk gS fd iqfyl v/kh{kd ¼lh-ch-vkbZ-½ fu;ekuqlkj jkT; ds le{k fofgr izkf/kdkjh ls ijkekZ djds lHkh oSf/kd vis{kk,a iwjh djsaxs ,oa vU; izorZu funskky; rFkk lhek kqYd ,oa vk;kr fu;kZr ds eq[; fu;a=d ls ;Fkk visf{kr vis{kk,a iwjh djrs gq, vUos"k.k fof/k vuqlkj iwjk djsxs ,oa ftu /kkjkvksa ds vijk/kksa ds fy;s iwoZ eatwjh visf{kr gks] mudks vfHkizkIr djsaxs ,oa ftuesa ifjokn isk fd;k tkuk gks ml gn rd vUos"k.k esa ,df=r fd;s x;s lk{; dks rRlEcU/kh izkf/kdkjh dks fu;ekuqlkj lEHkyk le>k nsaxsA bl vUos"k.k dks ;Fkk kD; kh?kz izkFkfedrk ds vk/kkj ij fd;k tkdj vUos"k.k dh izxfr dks ekfld rkWj ij U;k;ky; ds le{k isk djsaxsA ;fn dksbZ fof/kd rduhdh leL;k mRiUu gks rks bl U;k;ky; ls mldk lek/kku vfHkizkIr djsaxsA blh lEizs"k.k ds lkFk ewy ifjokn i= layXu nLrkostksa lfgr vUos"k.k gsrq Hkstk tkrk gSA ifjokn dh ,d izfr U;k;ky; esa j[kh tkos ftlds lkFk vUos"k.k dh izxfr dk ifj.kke uRFkh fd;k tkrk jgsA bl vknsk dh izfrfyfi lwpuk ,oa vko;d dk;Zokgh gsrq x`g lfpo] Hkkjr ljdkj kkldh; lfpoky;] x`g ea=ky;] ubZ fnYyh] iqfyl egkfunskd ¼lh-ch-vkbZ-½ Hkkjr ljdkj ubZ fnYyh] iqfyl egk funskd] jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqj] x`g vk;qä jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqj dks Hksth tkosA 20. The learned Magistrate except making over the case for investigation had no jurisdiction express or implied to issue such directions without there being any material before him. He could not direct a rowing and fishing enquiry in a vacuum muchless direct the CBI to do what was not even in its own powers. It was expected of the learned Magistrate that he should have kept judicial restraint and ought not to have transgressed its powers and make the order what is not a judicial order. A perusal of the order from beginning to end appears as if the same has been written more for publicity than for legal ends. His Lord-ships Honble Mr. It was expected of the learned Magistrate that he should have kept judicial restraint and ought not to have transgressed its powers and make the order what is not a judicial order. A perusal of the order from beginning to end appears as if the same has been written more for publicity than for legal ends. His Lord-ships Honble Mr. Justice E. S. Venkalaramiah speaking for the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumar Vs. R. Venkataraman (22) held as under : "While we expect every conscientious citizen eligible to file an election petition to question and election on the grounds prescribed by the Act we do not wish that any petitioner should make use of this court as a forum to file a petition without giving adequate thought to its contents and also to the provisions of law governing the case merely to seek some cheap publicity. We regret to say that seeing ones name in newspapers everyday has lately become the worst intoxicant and the number of people who have become victims of it is increasing day by day." From the perusal of the complaint as well as from the order it appears that the purpose of filing the complaint was not more than what has been considered by Supreme Court qua petitioner in that case. 21. Mr. Mahesh Chand Dausawala has very ably, lucidly and persuasively advanced arguments whether the Magistrate empowered to. decide economic offence cases and try CBI matters and jurisdiction to refer the matter under S. 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the CBI or whether there is only one police station of the CBI at Delhi or that there is no such police station at Jaipur and further the question about the interpretation of Ss. 5 & 6 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, but I would refrain from expressing my opinion on those points In this case I am of the opinion that once I am satisfied on the primary question that the complaint does not set out the allegations constitute aft offence for which the complainant has any material with him to substantiate and entertain such a complaint by itself is an abuse of the process of the court. 22. 22. Regarding offence under Official Secret Act the complainant has repro-duced the form of oath of Shri V.P. Singh and has said that he was bound by the said oath and since his conduct, behaviour, working and statements have been against it, it constitutes a punishable offence. Similar has been said about Shri Bhurelal and Vinod Pandey. Suffice it to say that not a word has been mentioned about particular conduct, behaviour, working or statements from which the com-plainant wants the court to infer commission of offence under the Official Secrets Act, the entire complaint is vague and indefinite and a perusal of the entire com-plaint shows that the same is verbose and has been filed though the complainant has no knowledge personal or from any source about any of the facts or circumstances leading to the commission of offence. Similarly about the meetings in various hotels and places in Raj. for the purposes of giving jurisdiction to Raj Court. The allegations are too remote. The phraseology used is too vague to . infer as to where, when and between whom the conspiracy has been hatched in State of Raj. Lesser said about the contents of the complaint better it is. In my opinion no complaint can be permitted to be proceeded in relation to the matters alleged where the complainant is wholly and totally ignorant about the facts and about which he wants to make only a rowing and fishing enquiry as mentioned above. The courts time can not be permitted to be wasted in such litigations unless the concrete matter is available with the complainant. 23. For the aforesaid reasons I set aside the order, dated 14. 12. 1987 passed by Shri Om Prakash Sharma, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur (Economic Offences), by which he directed the CBI to conduct investigation into the allegations levelled in the complaint filed by Shri Mani Bhadra Bagra and quash the entire proceedings.