JUDGMENT 1. - This State-appeal arises out of the judgment of the acquittal dated March 13, 1978, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar, acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (in short, 'the Act'). 2. The case as made out against the respondent by the Food Inspector, Aklera, (PW 1) was that on October 14, 1976, he purchased 660 Ml milk from the respondent, Motilal, on a consideration of Rs. 1.25p. after giving a prescribed notice (Ex. P. 1), and a receipt of Rs. 1.25p. (Ex. P. 2) was also given to the respondent; that, the milk purchased was divided in three equal parts, and after adding 18 drops of formalin in each bottle, sealed the milk in three clean and dry bottles-out of which, one bottle was sent for analysis purposes to the Public Analyst who opined vide Ex.P 6, that the sample was adulterated by reason of its containing about 42% of added water. After completion of the required formalities of sampling and obtaining the report of Public Analyst, the necessary sanction for prosecution of the respondent was obtained, and the complaint was presented in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar, who framed the charges against the respondent, and then recorded the evidence of the prosecution and the respondent. The respondent was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C, but he denied the allegations levelled against him by the prosecution. 3. The respondent had moved an application before the trial Court for weighing the sample milk which was given to the accused. The learned trial Court got the sample weighed in Court through the Food Inspector where upon, the weight of sample milk was found to be 300 ml. On this reading of the weight the learned trial Court concluded that the milk which was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst was not more than 60 ml. and in this view of the matter, the sample which was sent to the Public Analyst was in contravention of Rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, (in short, `the PFA Rules'); in support of the aforesaid finding and conclusion, the learned trial Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court reported in 1977 Cr. L.R. Rajasthan p. 592 and then acquitted the respondent. Hence this appeal. 4. L.R. Rajasthan p. 592 and then acquitted the respondent. Hence this appeal. 4. At the very outset, both, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the respondent, fairly and frankly conceded that in view of the plethora of decisions of the Apex Court wherein it has been laid down that Rule 22 of the PFA Rules was only directory and must always be construed to be so, and further that, it was for the Public Analyst to say as to whether the quantity of the sample sent to him for analysis was sufficient for analysing, or not; it is patently clear that the acquittal of the respondent by the learned trial Court was legally erroneous. In this regard, an authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court can be cited here and which was in Ramdas Bhikaji Chaudhari v. Sadanand and others, 1980 (1) S.C.C. 550 . 5. Confronted with the above situation, learned counsel for the respondent, then contended that though the judgment of acquittal becomes erroneous but in view of the fact that in the instant case, a valid sanction has not been given under Section 20 of the Act, for presenting the complaint against the respondent before the trial Court. Against this, the learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that in the present case, the District Magistrate Jhalawar, vide sanction (Ex.P. 7) has accorded valid consent for present the complaint before the competent court, and this order of sanction (Ex.P. 7) was passed by the District Magistrate on the request of the Food Inspector, Jhalawar and the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Grade I, Jhalawar, 6. Shri P.K. Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent, in order to fortify his aforesaid contention, cited the following decisions. 7. In State of Rajasthan v. Ramesh Cband, 1986 Cr. L.J. Raj. p. 544 , the Food Inspector was authorised to file complaint but the complaint was filed by the A.P.P. of the Court. In Sadra v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Raj. Cri. Cases p. 301 consent to file complaint was accorded by the Municipal Board to the Food Inspector but the complaint was filed by the A.P.P. In Deo Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Raj. Cri. Cases p 304 a consent to file complaint was given in the name of Food Inspector but the complaint was filed in Court by the A.P.P. 8. Cri. Cases p 304 a consent to file complaint was given in the name of Food Inspector but the complaint was filed in Court by the A.P.P. 8. In the afore-cited cases, the presentation of the complaint was held to be bad in law and on this ground, it was observed by this Court that the trial in the case was vitiated and the accused were acquitted by the Court. 9. As stated earlier, in the present case, both, the Food Inspector and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Court made a request to the District Magistrate for obtaining consent of the District Magistrate to file a complaint before the Court against the present respondent. In the order of sanction dated 24th June, 1977 (Ex.P. 7) it has been written as under: "Both the District Food Inspector, Jhalawar and the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Gr. I, Jhalawar have requested to accord sanction to prosecute the aforesaid Shri Motilal s/o Dev Lal r/o village Turkadia u/s 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954". In the concluding para of the aforesaid order, it has been stated as under : "Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, sanction is hereby accorded after examining all the records produced by the District Food Inspector, Jhalawar and available in this office for the prosecution of Shri Motilal s/o Dev Lal r/o village Turkadia Tehsil Aklera u/s 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954," A copy of this order (Ex. P. 7) was forwarded to the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Grade I, Jhalawar and Shri Pripa Ram Deval District Food Inspector, Jhalawar, alongwith case diary. 10. It is thus clear that in the instant case, where if it is held that the sanction was given to both, the Assistant Public Prosecutor Jhalawar, and to the Food Inspector, Jhalawar then the respondents cited authority does not help him because, the facts of the afore cited decisions are different to the one in hand. 11. Then, Shri P.K Sharma, learned counsel for the accused contended that in the instant case, looking to the contents of Ex. 11. Then, Shri P.K Sharma, learned counsel for the accused contended that in the instant case, looking to the contents of Ex. P. 7 it can be said that none of the persons was authorised by the learned District Magistrate to file the complaint in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar because, in the body of the order of sanction (Ex. P. 7) none of the persons who would file complaint has been named. I do not agree with the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the accused respondent because, in the body of the order of sanction (Ex. P. 7) as quoted by me above, it has been specifically mentioned that the Food Inspector and the Assistant Public Prosecutor both had requested to accord sanction for prosecution of Motilal and this request was allowed by the District Magistrate. Looking to the contents of Ex P. 7 it can be very well said that the consent to file complaint was given in favour of both, the Food Inspector and the Assistant Public Prosecutor I of the Court. In the present case, the complaint has been filed by the the A.P.P. of the Court and in these circumstances, I do not find any infirmity or irregularity or illegality in the presentation of the complaint. 12. Further, the learned counsel for the accused-respondent argued that the judgment of acquittal has been passed in the year 1978 on the basis of checking done by the Food Inspector on 14.10.76, and moreso, after the acquittal which remained in force for about 10 years, the matter has come up for final adjudication before this Court now in the year 1988; in this view of the matter, the learned counsel submitted that the ends of justice would not meet if the respondent is sent to jail. Counsel, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State also admitted that long time has elapsed. In my opinion, there is justification in the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. I have gone through the evidence on record. The Milk which was purchased by the Food Inspector on 14.10.1976 which on analysis by the Public Analyst was found to be adulterated, is sufficient to show that the respondent had committed the offence under Section 7/16 of the Act. I have gone through the evidence on record. The Milk which was purchased by the Food Inspector on 14.10.1976 which on analysis by the Public Analyst was found to be adulterated, is sufficient to show that the respondent had committed the offence under Section 7/16 of the Act. In Ramdas Bhikaji v. Sadai and (supra), while maintaining the conviction of the accused, the Apex Court observed that, "we do not think that we should take those facts into consideration while imposing the sentence on the respondent". Having considered all these peculiar circumstances of the case. I am of the opinion that the ends of justice do not require that the respondent be sent to jail, now. 13. For these reasons, therefore, I allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar, dated 13th March, 1978, and convict the respondent, Motilal, under Section 7/16 of the Act. But, looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as aforesaid, I sentence the respondent, Motilal to fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only), in default, 3 month's R.I. The respondent is directed to deposit fine of Rs. 1,000/- within three months from today. His bail bonds shall be cancelled. *******