JUDGMENT RAVI S.DHAVAN 1. This petition is by Vidya Kendra, Ghaziabad, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as "the Society ". This Society has established and runs an educational institution by the name of Seth Mal (Vidya Kendra) Inter College, Ghaziabad, hereinafter referred to as the College and the College is represented by a committee of management. The Society is the petitioner no 1 and the Committee of Management is petitioner no 2 2. The respondent no. 2 Kase Mal, is an employee of the College and works as a CT grade teacher since 23 January, 1961, confirmed on 27 January, 1962 On 1 July, 1967 he was appointed as a trained graduate teacher in Drawing and was confirmed as such after one year. These facts are otherwise not relevant in the issues raised in the present writ petition During the year 1972 a post of a lecturer in Mathematics was vacant. The post was advertised for seeking applications from the eligible candidates. The respondent no 2 was one amongst many others who had applied and the institution selected him in preference to an outside candidate and permitted him to work on this post from 8 July, 1972. Inevitably, the Committee of Management was obliged to seek the approval of the District Inspector of Schools on the recommendations male by the Selection Committee to appoint the respondent no. 2. It is the respondent's case that he was appointed on probation of one year. On this there is no issue. This has to be so as the conditions of service prescribed under Chapter III of the Regulation under section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 spell out the period of probation under Regulation 8 for one year. An appointment even on probation cannot be made without the approval of the District Inspector of Schools and the appointment on probation takes effect from the date when the approval or sanction has been granted. The approval also signified the date since when the appointment is to take effect. The appointment and approval is to be seen in the context of the law when the appointment was made and to take effect as the procedure prescribed it. The approval also signified the date since when the appointment is to take effect. The appointment and approval is to be seen in the context of the law when the appointment was made and to take effect as the procedure prescribed it. In 1972, the relevant provision was Section 16-F. In reference to the present context it read- "16-F (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter specified no person shall be appointed as a.........teacher in a recognised institution unless he- (a)............ (b) has been recommended by a Selection Committee constituted under subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be of the said section and approved,......and in the case of a teacher by the Inspector." 3. As these are matters of record and law there is no issue on this. The approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools in permitting the appointment on probation is with effect from 1-8-1972. This implies that the respondent no. 2 was appointed on the post of a lecturer in Mathematics on probation of one year, with effect from this date. 4. A period of probation must either end on confirmation or continues or comes to a close by the incumbent receiving the substantive appointment. Should the management seek confirmation or otherwise in reference to the probation period it must process the papers in accordance with Regulation 13. It casts an obligation upon the Head Master or the Principal to prepare confirmation papers and send them alongwith his remarks and certain other records, and place it before the Committee of Management for its consideration. The decision of the Committee of Management is to be recorded in a formal resolution. Thus, in the case of the respondent no. 2, the Principal of the College submitted his report in accordance with the regulation and the matter was put before the Committee of Management in its meeting of 18 June, 1973 to consider the matter of confirmation of the respondent no. 2 on the post of a lecturer which he was holding as a probationer. The Committee of Management decided not to grant a substantive appointment to the respondent no. 2 and confirm him on the post which he was holding as it was not satisfied with his services during the period of probation. 2 on the post of a lecturer which he was holding as a probationer. The Committee of Management decided not to grant a substantive appointment to the respondent no. 2 and confirm him on the post which he was holding as it was not satisfied with his services during the period of probation. It sets on record a resolution to this effect on 18 June, 1973, and forwarded it to the office of the District Inspector of Schools, the next day. While the matter was reaching the District Inspector of Schools on 19 June, 1973 two things happened simultaneously. First, the District Inspector of Schools was considering the resolution of the Committee of Management and the other, the respondent no. 2 was applying for leave to absent himself from the scene of affairs and not to present himself in the College until it was to reopen on 8 July, 1973 after the summer vacations. The absence of the respondent no. 2 between 19 June, 1973 to 8 July, 1973 at some stage will become a relevant factor as much argument has taken place on the advantage to be derived during the period of his absence. The District Inspector of Schools awarded approval to the decision of the Committee of Management not to continue the probation or confirmation of the services of the respondent no. 2 by his letter of 25 June, 1973. The Committee of Management acted upon this communication of the District Inspector of Schools the very next day, but it was a matter of record that the respondent no. 2 chose not to make himself available and not to return till 9 July, 1973. An issue was being raised on when he could actually receive this communication. Thus, while there was a dispute that the letter sent by the Committee of Management on 27 June, 1973 by the registered post as well as under certificate of posting was not received by the respondent no. 2, the latter accepts that he received this letter according to his own logic when he returned to the college on 9 July, 1973. 5. The contention of the respondent no. 2 is that he joined the college on 8. July, 1973 and the communication that his probation was not successful was received by him on 9 July, 1973. 2, the latter accepts that he received this letter according to his own logic when he returned to the college on 9 July, 1973. 5. The contention of the respondent no. 2 is that he joined the college on 8. July, 1973 and the communication that his probation was not successful was received by him on 9 July, 1973. Thus, under the logic of the regulation the period of one year of probation was complete and he must now be confirmed. This is a ridiculous proposition, which contradicts every aspects of the regulation and if accepted, the entire law of probation would have to be re-written. The respondent no. 2 is quick to take advantage of his probation upon accord of the approval of the District Inspector of Schools to be effective from 1-8-1972. The respondent was permitted to work as a lecturer from 8 July, 1972 but without approval of the District Inspector of Schools. The approval alone would give status to the petitioner as a probationer and also the date since it would take effect. The approval came by the letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 1 August, 1972, not appended to the counter affidavit, but brought on record by the rejoinder affidavit, reference annexure 'RA-1'. Thus, an all important record, without which a probationer has no status under the law was evaded reference to in the impugned order dated 19 April, 1980, passed by the Deputy Director of Education, Region I, Meerut, respondent no. 1. However, the facts do not end here. 6. Resisting the attempt of the Committee of Management to judge the work of respondent no. 2 as a probationer and bring it to a close by not confirming him on the post of a lecturer, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 331 of 1973 before this Court on 15-11-1973. In this writ petition, however, there is no decision on merit as it was being dismissed, in effect on the ground of an alternative remedy in view of the amended clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as having abated under sections 58 of the 42nd Constitution (Amendment) Act. The Court permitted the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, if the respondent no. 2 was so advised that an appeal lay. The Court permitted the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, if the respondent no. 2 was so advised that an appeal lay. Though, the Court thought it proper to extend the statutory period of filing an appeal, in effect, the Court was waiving the limitation in respondent's favour to institute an appeal. In pursuance of the observation of the High Court the respondent did file an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, Region I, Meerut. The appeal did not specify under which section it was filed except that it was being done under the directions of the High Court. The High Court gave no such direction. It only gave the liberty to file an appeal should he be so advised. The appeal was filed on 19-2-1979. The so called appellate order was in favour of the respondent no. 2. This order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 19-4-1980 is annexure 6' to the writ petition. This order has been impugned by the Society and the Committee of Management. The issue in the so called appeal are in reference to the right of the management not to confirm an employee upon completing the period of probation and the right of a probationer, if the management is not satisfied with the period of probation, and does not confirm the appointment. At the very out set this Court may put on record that it is not going to the technical issues and thus, notwithstanding that the appeal may have been filed after seven years this Court considers it appropriate that the merits be tested. Thus, the matter of limitation is not engaging the attention of the Court but only the merits of the matter. 7. To whom is an appeal available, which appeal the respondent no. 2 took recourse to ? The answer to this is available from Section 16-G (3) (c) itself. In reference to the context it reads :- "(c) Any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education, against an order of the Inspector under clause (b)......" 8. Thus, the appeal would lie only in reference to those matters which are referred to in clause (b). Let clause (b) be seen. It reads as under :- "(b). Thus, the appeal would lie only in reference to those matters which are referred to in clause (b). Let clause (b) be seen. It reads as under :- "(b). The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce and enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management provided......" An observation of the High Court in an earlier petition that the petitioner may institute an appeal if so advised would not confer any jurisdiction upon the Deputy Director of Education nor gives any advantage to the petitioner when there may not be any statutory right of appeal. The High Court made it clear 'if so advised'. Then, upon the aforesaid appeal being filed the parties were at issues whether an appeal was maintainable or not. The Committee of Management contended that no such appeal lay. The jurisdiction to maintain an appeal was thus an issue before the respondent no. 1. 9. Sub-clause (c) of the Act, aforesaid, enjoins that an appeal is confined to matters referred to in sub-clause (b) and no other. Two actions of the management are amenable in appeal. One is punishment and the other is termination of service. Sub-clause (b) explains that where the management proposed an action of punishment or termination of service the Inspector may approve, disapprove or reduce and enhance such an action of the management and should the order of the Inspector aggrieve any party, an appeal shall lie to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. 10. To sustain an effort to maintain an appeal of the petitioner, the respondent no. 2 justified it on the logic that his services had been terminated by the management. The answer to this is provided on the record. If this has been so, respondent no. 2 would have been out of job. The answer to this is also available in the offer of appointment to the respondent no. 2 as a probationer. The respondent no. 2 was working in the same institution as a lecturer in Drawing in the LT Grade. The management showed him preference in giving him an appointment as a lecturer, in Mathematics in preference to an outside candidate. In effect, this would have been a promotion for the respondent no. 2, should the respondent no. The respondent no. 2 was working in the same institution as a lecturer in Drawing in the LT Grade. The management showed him preference in giving him an appointment as a lecturer, in Mathematics in preference to an outside candidate. In effect, this would have been a promotion for the respondent no. 2, should the respondent no. 2 have returned a satisfactory period of probation and the management chose to close the period of probation and gave him a substantive appointment. The said respondent would then have been promoted as a lecturer in Mathematics. It is not even the case of reversion. He was simply going back to bis substantive post as a Drawing teacher in the LT Grade. No termination of service was proposed by the management. The status of the respondent no. 2 being that of a probationer no appeal lay under Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act. One aspect in the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Education may be dealt with straightaway at this stage. The Deputy Director of Education has carved out a new case for the respondent no. 2 in making an expression to the effect that the period of probation coming to a close would tantamount to termination. If the order of the Deputy Director of Education were to be given effect to, in letter and spirit then the respondent no. 2 would be out of job. As in no uncertain terms this authority mentions that the respondent no. 2 has been terminated from his services. It must be fairly contended that even the Committee of Management has not taken the advantage of the observation made by the Deputy Director of Education. 11. Now the merits of the case for the purposes of deciding the status of the said respondent ; whether he is to be confirmed on the substantive post of a lecturer in Mathematics notwithstanding that the management had not intended to confirm him on this post. 12. The answer to this lies on the conditions of service under Chapter III framed under Section 16-G, aforesaid. These are the regulations in reference to the appointment, probation, confirmation and termination. Regulation 7 prescribes that a person selected for a substantive appointment is also to be placed on probation from the date of joining of duty. Thus, the appointment of the respondent no. These are the regulations in reference to the appointment, probation, confirmation and termination. Regulation 7 prescribes that a person selected for a substantive appointment is also to be placed on probation from the date of joining of duty. Thus, the appointment of the respondent no. 2 having been approved as a probationer the date of joining of duty is the letter of appointment which is to be issued in accordance with the direction of the Inspector. The date of joining duty in so far as the respondent no 2 is concerned is 1-8-1972, the probation takes effect from this date. Regulation 8 says that a period of probation for a teacher shall be one year. Thus, logically reading Regulations 7 and 8 together the sanction of the respondent no. 2's post being effective from 1-8-1972, the period of one year is to be reckoned from this date. Where the law prescribes, in reference to the contex that a post takes sanction since approval is granted, then the validity of the post is from the date of approval. On this aspect, in a matter under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 a Bench of this Court has already held it so in the matter of Arya Kanya Pathshala v. Smt. M. D. Agnihotri, 1971 ALJ 893. Regulation 12 refers to the period of probation of a Principal, or the Head Master, which may be extended for a period of 12 months. A similar provision is not contained in a reference to a teacher. Regulation 11 in reference to a teacher mentions that unless before the expiry of the period of probation the management decides to send the probationer back to his substantive appointment, then he would be confirmed on the post in the grade at the end of his probation. Regulation 11 itself, during the period of probation permits the management in reference to the services of a Head Master, Principal or a teacher to terminate the services, dismiss, discharge, remove or reduce an incumbent in rank. If the incumbent is not working in the same institution then it means termination of services and if the incumbent is working in the same institution then with an unsuccessful period of probation, he or she goes back on the substantive post and it is not termination of service or reduction in rank. 13. A reference was made on behalf of the respondent no. 13. A reference was made on behalf of the respondent no. 2 to Regulation 25 implying thereby that as his services have been terminated, he was entitled either to one month's notice or one months' pay in lieu thereof. The respondent no. 2 cannot see his services in isolation on an end of probation. The entirety of the context is to be seen as the respondent no. 2 was a teacher in C. T. grade, who was seeking a higher post as a lecturer. There would have been a possibility, as it was a post upon competition without outsiders, who may have been and could have been considered. It was the grace of the management to have considered the respondent no. 2 in preference to any other. The respondent no. 2 was merely given an appointment as a lecturer to have an opportunity of promotion and he was on probation of one year. The services of respondent no. 2 were not terminated. He merely returned to his substantive post as a teacher in C. T. grade. 14. Thus, the services of the respondent no. 2 in reference to Regulation 25 have not been terminated during the term of his probation. The probationer may fault the management if it does not take a decision within one year. In that case by default he gets the right to be confirmed. Should the management decide to terminate his services during the period of probation then under, Regulation 25 he is entitled to receive a notice or one month's pay in lieu of the notice. In the present case there is no question of any termination and the respondent no. 2 cannot be permitted to derive any advantage out of stray observation of the Deputy Director of Education, who has conferred the status of a terminated employee when the respondent no. 2 continues in the same institution as teacher. In fact, the Deputy Director of Education was over shooting his jurisdiction, firstly in entertaining an appeal, which did not lie and secondly in speaking more than the record. The respondent no. 2 has torn the context out of the impugned order that the Deputy Director of Education says that he is a terminated employee, thus, Regulation 25 applies. Let this argument also be tested and it does not give any more advantage to the respondent no. 2 if Regulation 25 were to apply. The respondent no. 2 has torn the context out of the impugned order that the Deputy Director of Education says that he is a terminated employee, thus, Regulation 25 applies. Let this argument also be tested and it does not give any more advantage to the respondent no. 2 if Regulation 25 were to apply. If the respondent no. 2 as a probationer had his services terminated during the period of probation then he is entitled to one months notice in lieu of pay and he is out of job. If the order of the Deputy Director of Education were permitted to remain in the entirety of it, the respondent no. 2 must loose his job as a teacher. 15. The order of the Deputy Director of Education, Region I, Meerut, respondent no, 1 dated 19 April, 1980, annexure 7' to the writ petition, is against the law and the regulations, aforesaid and is thus, quashed and set aside. 16. The writ petition is allowed with costs. Petition allowed.