JUDGMENT S.R. Bhargava, J. - This is defendants' appeal against order dated 30th April, 1982, passed by Vth Additional Civil Judge, Agra, in original suit no. 379 of 1983, granting ad-interim injunction to the plaintiff respondents. 2. Dispute between the parties relates to building no. 18/96 Gokulganj, Hathi Ghat Jamura Kinara District No. 3, Agra. Undisputedly defendant appellants are owner landlords of the said building, plaintiff respondent no. 1 to 7 and four others have been tenants in the building. Defendant appellants have been anxious to construct a three star Hotel. Hence they moved release applications against tenants under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction, Act, 1972 thereinafter called the Act) on the ground that they require the building for demolition and construction of a hotel. After crossing various stages the matter of release in respect of the tenants, plaintiff respondent nos. 1 to 47, reached Supreme Court in special leave petition. It is not disputed that release applications of other tenants are still pending. On 28.11.83 Supreme Court passed following composite and conditional order under section 21(1) a) and 21(6) of the Act : "(1) That before taking possession of the land in question the appellants must obtain the sanction of authorities concerned of building plan. (2) That after obtaining the sanction the appellants shall intimate the respondents regarding sanction of the plan. (3) That from receipt of this information the respondent will get one year to vacate the premises. (4) That after giving possession within one year as mentioned above if the appellants do not commence the construction within three months from the date of possession, then the respondents will be entitled to get back possession of the land in question and further the construction must be completed within two years from the date of commencement of the construction. (5) That in case the appellants do not choose to make any construction, then they shall not sell the land to anybody and put in possession to the respondents. (6) That after being put in possession the respondents shall be entitled to make construction with the leave of the court. The appeals are accordingly disposed of without any order to cost." 3. On 20.2.1987 defendant respondent no. 8 Agra Development Authority granted sanction to the appellants for construction of a hotel. (6) That after being put in possession the respondents shall be entitled to make construction with the leave of the court. The appeals are accordingly disposed of without any order to cost." 3. On 20.2.1987 defendant respondent no. 8 Agra Development Authority granted sanction to the appellants for construction of a hotel. It is alleged that after obtaining the said sanction, defendant appellants served intimation of sanction upon the plaintiff respondents nos. 1 to 7 between 16th March and 2nd April, 1987. 4. Thereafter plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 filed application in Supreme Court praying for clarification of order dated 21.11.1983. and direction that the decree has become unworkable. They further prayed from direction that they should not be evicted till the other tenants against whom cases are pending in the High Court are evicted. Grounds urged by them were that for construction of a three star Hotel under the guidelines issued by the Director of Tourism, Government of India, certain minimum conditions must be satisfied regarding attached bath-room in every room in the hotel with specific size of the bathroom and the room and the hotel accommodation should be air-conditioned and should have adequate parking facilities. A three star hotel cannot be constructed on the land of the building in dispute. During the pendency of release applications, Agra Development Authority vide its letter dated 7.5.1975 rejected sanction for three star hotel. Landlords could not obtain no objection certificate from the P.W.D. and Tourism Department. But subsequently they submitted plan for an ordinary hotel. They conceded that they would leave a strip of 60 Ft. of land from the premises in dispute. They obtained sanction which is contrary to the need pleaded by them and tenants cannot be compelled to vacate various conditions were imposed upon the landlords. They will not be able to raise construction over the proposed site without satisfying all the conditions. One of the conditions imposed is that the landlords will have to leave 60 Ft. of land from the centre of the road up to the boundary of the premises towards Jamuna Kinara road. On the main road side M/s. Bharat Petroleum, C.P. Gupta Khem Raj and Fatehabad Transport Co. are tenants. The case against Bharat Petroleum is pending in the lower court at initial stage. So is the case against other three tenants. Until the said four are evicted landlords cannot start construction. On the main road side M/s. Bharat Petroleum, C.P. Gupta Khem Raj and Fatehabad Transport Co. are tenants. The case against Bharat Petroleum is pending in the lower court at initial stage. So is the case against other three tenants. Until the said four are evicted landlords cannot start construction. Sanction has been obtained by the landlords by suppression of facts and misrepresentation, other grounds of review were also urge Supreme Court dismissed this application. In March 1998 plaintiff respondents No. 1 to 7 filed suit for declaration that sanction dated 20.2.87 is not a valid sanction as contemplated in the order of the Supreme Court. They further sought permanent injunction restraining defendant appellants from dispossessing them under the order of the Supreme Court. They attacked the sanction on the ground that under the terms of the sanction defendant appellants have to surrender land which they cannot do without evicting other tenants against whom cases are still pending at initial stage that under the sanction of the defendant appellants are bound to make construction within three years which in this case is not possible that sanction covers the portion both under their occupation as well as the portion in occupation of other tenants against whom cases are pending at initial stage and for sanction being operative the other tenants must be evicted, that the sanction has been obtained by a fraudulent misrepresentation that the defendant appellants will obtain possession from all the tenants that misrepresentation was intentional and the defendant appellants fully knew that they could not get possession from other tenants against whom cases are pending at initial stage and that the sanction is not for three star hotel as contemplated in the order of the Supreme Court. 5. While the application for ad-interim injunction was pending, sanction was suspended. After that the impugned order granting ad-interim injunction was passed. The impugned order restrains the defendant appellants from dispossessing the plaintiff respondents no. 1 to 7 until they obtain proper sanction from Agra Development Authority. In the impugned order learned lower court found prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff respondents. It emphasised suspension and came to conclusion that in case plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 are dispossessed they will suffer irreparable loss. 6. After the impugned order defendant appellants filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the suspension order. It emphasised suspension and came to conclusion that in case plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 are dispossessed they will suffer irreparable loss. 6. After the impugned order defendant appellants filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the suspension order. In the said writ petition High Court issued interim order suspending the operation of order suspending sanction. High Court permitted the proceedings pending before Agra Development Authority. It allowed the appellate to make further constructions in pursuance of the sanctioned plan at their own risk. 7. Being aggrieved with the order of Ad interim injunction defendants have come in appeal to this court, parties have exchanged affidavits and have been heard at admission stage. Hence the appeal is being finally decided at this stage. 8. Normally in appeals against orders of temporary injunction appellate court does not interfere. But when the order is apparently unreasonable or there has been change in the circumstances or discretion has been exercised by the lower court in a capricious or arbitrary manner the appellants Court is bound to interfere. 9. In the instant case the lower court did not pay adequate attention to the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the review application of the plaintiff respondents. Even if the application was disposed of by one word order dismissed "Article 142 of the Constitution of India gives full sanctity to the order. The one word order should be interpreted to mean that all the points raised in the review application were considered and rejected. Secondly in the proceedings subsequently the High Court has stayed the operation of orders suspending the sanction, the case cannot proceed on the assumption that there is no sanction. Thirdly it should not be forgotten that temporary injunction can be granted only when a permanent injunction can be granted. If there is any reason for refusing permanent injunction in the suit, temporary injunction should also be refused. For implementing this principle clause (a) in the proviso was added to Order 39 Rule 2 C.P.C. 10. According to this clause where no perpetual injunction can be granted in view of the provisions of section 38 and section 41 of the Specific Relief Act temporary injunction should not also be granted. For implementing this principle clause (a) in the proviso was added to Order 39 Rule 2 C.P.C. 10. According to this clause where no perpetual injunction can be granted in view of the provisions of section 38 and section 41 of the Specific Relief Act temporary injunction should not also be granted. Clause (h) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 lays down that when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust an injunction cannot be granted. It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff respondents that objection to this effect was not taken in the lower court or in the grounds of appeal and so this court should not interfere on this ground. Purpose of Clause (b) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act is evidently to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. Courts are already choked with huge number of cases and if they are themselves not serious to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, their working may stop. Injunction is a discretionary relief and before exercising discretion courts are bound to see that in process of granting injunctions they are not themselves choked, so even when a plea under clause (h) of section 41 has not been raised, the court can summoned refuse injunction under this clause. It should not be forgotten that in our country there is a section which thrives on multiplicity of proceedings and seeking different forms for undoing debates but for their own existence the courts have to choke this practice. Lastly availability of equally efficacious relief is a pure point of law and there is no bar against the court to raise it in appeal. 11. It has been seen above that the Supreme Court granted conditional and composite release under sections 21(l)(a) and (6) of the Act. For enforcing obedience of the order of the Supreme Court landlords have two remedies. They can approach the Supreme Court under the contempt of court Act and get the plaintiff respondents punished. That will however not secure possession. It has been seen above that the Supreme Court granted conditional and composite release under sections 21(l)(a) and (6) of the Act. For enforcing obedience of the order of the Supreme Court landlords have two remedies. They can approach the Supreme Court under the contempt of court Act and get the plaintiff respondents punished. That will however not secure possession. They will have to come back to the prescribed Authority under section 23 of the Act which empowers the Prescribed Authority to use or cause to be used such force as it may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made under section 21 or an appeal under section 22, as the case may be, and for putting the landlords into possession. Sub-section (2) of section 23 makes it clear that section 23 contemplates an order of the prescribed authority in proceedings under this section. When an order is contemplated the tenants are at liberty to file objection even in the proceeding under section 23. It is evident from the pleadings that the plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 have objection against executality of the order of the Supreme Court and what they contended is that despite sanction the order of the Supreme Court is not executive because of specific terms of sanction itself and because of the background in which the order of the Supreme Court was passed. All these objections can be heard and disposed of by the prescribed authority itself. Thus the plaintiff respondents have efficacious relief under the Act itself. Their suit for declaration and injunction is nothing but a device of seeking alternative for undoings debate Clause (h) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act does not permit that. 12. Then it is evident from the affidavit filed on behalf of the defendant appellants that they have moved application under Section 23 of the Act before the prescribed authority. Plaintiff respondents have knowledge of proceedings under Section 23. They can file objections in that proceedings and obtain adjudication on the points raised by them, if possible and not earred by the decision of the Supreme Court in dismissing the review application of the plaintiff respondents. 13. Lastly injunction should not be issued for perpetuating litigation. Learned lower court has restrained defendant appellants from evicting plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 till defendant appellants obtain proper sanction. 13. Lastly injunction should not be issued for perpetuating litigation. Learned lower court has restrained defendant appellants from evicting plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 till defendant appellants obtain proper sanction. After this order proper sanction shall remain a point of controversy and shall give rise to undoing litigation. Is discussed above, the question whether in view of the sanction the Supreme Court order is executable or not has to be decided by the prescribed Authority under section 23 of the Act and the Civil Court should obtain from creating difficulties for the prescribed Authority. 14. In the result I hold that in the circumstances of the case the discretion exercised by the lower court is unreasonable and apparently illegal. Hence the appeal must succeed. ORDER 15. Appeal is allowed, order under appeal is set aside. Application of plaintiff respondents 1 to 7 for ad-interim injunction shall stand dismissed. Defendant appellants shall get the cost of this appeal from respondents 1 to 7.