JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J 1. This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4.4.1978 passed by Civil Judge, Hardoi in Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1976 (Om Prakash v. Sheo Ram and others) dismissing the defendant's appeal and confirming the judgment and decree dated 10.9.1976 passed by Munsif East, Hardoi in Regular Suit No. 85 of 1987 (Sheo Ram v. Om Prakash and Others) by which the plaintiff's suit was decreed with costs. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiffrespondents filed a suit for specific performance of contract of sale regarding plot no. 557 measuring 4 Bigha, 13 Biswa situate in village Gyanpur, Pergana Balamau, Tahsil Sandila, district Hardoi and for relief of possession and in the alternative prayed for a decree of Rs. 500 against the defendantappellant on the allegation that the defendant no. 2 was Sirdar in possession of the disputed land and on 22.1.1967 the said defendant agreed to sell the disputed land in favour of the plaintiff. A part of the contract was that the defendant no. 2 would obtain Bhumidhari certificate and execute the saledeed within two months of the agreement for a consideration of Rs. 900 out of which he received Rs. 500 as earnest money. The allegation was that since the defendant no. 1 was influencing the defendant no. 2 to execute the saledeed in his favour one Jagdish Prasad, son of the plaintiff, dispatched a post card to the defendant no. 1 on 22.2.1967 informing him about the agreement of sale in his favour whereupon the plaintiff himself approached the defendants and asked the defendant no. I and his father not to get the saledeed executed as there was an agreement to sell in his favour but despite their assurance to the contrary the defendant no. 1 got the saledeed executed in respect of the disputed land for a consideration of Rs. 1000 on 6.3.1967 after obtaining Bhumidhari certificate having deposited 10 times of the land revenue. Certain other conditions regards factors responsible for getting the saledeed executed were also indicated. The defendant no. 2 contested the suit on various grounds, inter alia, on the ground that there was an agreement to sell the disputed land between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 and he had received Rs. 500 as earnest money; that the defendant no. Certain other conditions regards factors responsible for getting the saledeed executed were also indicated. The defendant no. 2 contested the suit on various grounds, inter alia, on the ground that there was an agreement to sell the disputed land between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 and he had received Rs. 500 as earnest money; that the defendant no. 1 had been approaching and sometime thereafter the defendant no. I and his father having persuaded him to execute the saledeed in respect of the same property for Rs. 1000 by exercising undue pressure on him since the father of the defendant no. 1 was the village Pradhan and an influential person and therefore the defendant no. 2 agreed to execute the saledeed. Another written statement was filed by the defendant no. 2 on 1.9.1967 denying all the plaint allegations and adding that there was no agreement to sell between the plaintiff and him nor he received any earnest money and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to get Rs. 500 from him either. After the second written statement was taken on record the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Whether there was an agreement to sell between the defendant no. I and the defendant no. 2 on 5.1.67 and the sale deed dated 6.3.67 was executed in pursuance of the said agreement? 2. Whether any agreement to sell was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 on 22.1.67 and the plaintiff had paid Rs. 500 as earnest money? 3. Whether the defendant no. 1 had no knowledge of the agreement dated 22.1.1967? 4. Whether the defendant no. 1 is bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If so whether the sale in his favour is not affected by the prior agreement? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance? 6. Whether the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as alleged? The trial court decided issue no. 2 in affirmative, issue no. 1 in the negative and while deciding issues 3 and 4 held that the defendant no. 1 was not bonafide purchaser for value without notice. On issue no. 6 he held in affirmative as also issue no. 5 in affirmative decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The learned Munsif examined oral and documentary evidence in arriving at its conclusions. 1 in the negative and while deciding issues 3 and 4 held that the defendant no. 1 was not bonafide purchaser for value without notice. On issue no. 6 he held in affirmative as also issue no. 5 in affirmative decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The learned Munsif examined oral and documentary evidence in arriving at its conclusions. Before the lower appellate court the defendant no. 1 appellant pressed four points (i) as to whether he was bona fide purchaser for value without notice; (ii) as to whether there existed any agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff; (iii) as to whether there was any prior agreement to sell the disputed property in favour of the defendant no. I and (iv) as to whether the plaintiff had been ready and willing to get the saledeed executed; and agreeing with the findings of the trial court on examination of oral and documentary evidence, as also submissions of the parties' counsel, affirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. He opined that the defendantappellant had failed to prove his case and that there was no justification for him to interfere in the decree of the court below. Aggrieved, the defendant no. 1, appellant, has come in second appeal before this court. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have been taken through the pleadings of the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) restricts specific performance of a contract as indicated in subsection (a), (b) and (c). This section provides as under: 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have been taken through the pleadings of the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) restricts specific performance of a contract as indicated in subsection (a), (b) and (c). This section provides as under: 16. Personal bars to relief Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person (a) Who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential terra of the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with or in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the contract; or (c) Who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation: For the purposes of clause (c) (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. 4. The learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondents asserted that he had always been ready and willing to perform those conditions of the contract which remained to be performed by him. Subsection (c) puts a condition on the plaintiff that he must aver that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract according to its true construction. The learned counsel, in short, submitted that to succeed in the suit it was the duty of the plaintiff to show that he had performed the remaining part of the contract of his part according to its true construction. Insofar as relief against the parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title is concerned the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the provisions of section 19 of the Act which deals with it and in particular relied on subsection (c). Insofar as relief against the parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title is concerned the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the provisions of section 19 of the Act which deals with it and in particular relied on subsection (c). This subsection is reproduced below: 19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against (a) (b) (c) Any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant. (d) (e) The learned counsel has laid much stress on the facts as averred in the plaint and the written statement in reply thereof. He has stated that the plaint was dated 20.4.1967 and filed in the court on 29.4.1967 while it was admitted and registered on 1.5.1967 but it contained no pleading which was essential to enable him to obtain the decree as provided in Sections 16 and 19 of the Act and in particular that he was a transferee for value who paid the money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. The learned counsel submits that even though this was to some extent incorporated in the plaint by inserting paragraph 13 Aa in the plaint by an order of the Court dated 5.7.1975 but the amendment could not betaken into consideration, it being barred by time which should have resulted in dismissal of the suit. Even otherwise, on facts of the case, the learned counsel submits that the courts below misread the evidence in holding that the defendant no. 1 was not bona fide transferee for value without notice. This has been substantiated by the learned counsel by placing the judgment of the trial court as also of the lower appellate court which held that the appellant had failed to prove His case. 5. 1 was not bona fide transferee for value without notice. This has been substantiated by the learned counsel by placing the judgment of the trial court as also of the lower appellate court which held that the appellant had failed to prove His case. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the amendment allowed by the court at any stage, in the pleadings and in particular the plaint would relate back to the date of institution of the suit and not to the date on which it was so incorporated or allowed to be incorporated and that the unamended plaint could not be taken into consideration and as such, the pleadings were very clear and the suit had to be decreed and the courts below did not commit any error of law in doing so. He submitted that no misreading of evidence has also been done. 6. On the first submission regarding lack of necessary ingredients per provisions of Sections 16 and 19 of the Act for want of averments in the plaint to indicate that the plaintiff was purchaser for value in good faith and without notice, the learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in the case of Irfan Ahmad v. Nabil Ahmad Khan (AIR 1972 All page 15) and the case of Brij Kishore v. Smt. Mushtari Khatoon (AIR 1976 All page 399). In the case of Irfan Ahmad (Supra) which arose out of a suit for recovery of specific sums as profits on account of rent and value of furniture and fittings used by the defendant consequent on dissolution of partnership between the parties, an objection that such a decree could not be passed under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, the plaintiff sought to recover the amount as manse profits and prayed for an issue to be struck off and an amendment application was filed giving rise to the revision. On examination of the amendment application the court held that, in fact, the original plaint being meaningful no material injustice was likely to be caused to the contesting defendant and dismissed the revision. On examination of the amendment application the court held that, in fact, the original plaint being meaningful no material injustice was likely to be caused to the contesting defendant and dismissed the revision. Relying on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon ( AIR 1969 SC 1267 ) this Court held that: The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. 7. Their Lordships also held subsequently that: Since the name in which the action was instituted was merely a misdescription of the original plaintiff, no question of limitation arises, the plaint must be deemed on amendment to have been instituted in the name of the real plaintiff on the date on which it was originally instituted. 8. It will thus be seen that the facts of the case are, inter alia, different from the instant case. In this case material changes have been incorporated in the plaint, not only changing the nature of the case but at a very belated stage, after a lapse of about 8 years which have resulted in injury to the contesting defendant which cannot be compensated by cost and in the second place the plaint is not confined to misdescription of the original plaintiff or defendant whose names are already there on the record. The case of Irfan Ahmad (supra) is on a different footing looking to the facts and circumstances of the instant care and cannot be relied upon. The second case of Brij Kishore (supra) in which while placing reliance on the cases of Prabhu Narain Singh v. Jitendra Mohan Singh (AIR 1948 Oudh 307) and Warner V. Sampson (1959 (2) AIR 109) it was held that unamended Pleading is no longer material. A perusal of the case would indicate that it was a rent control matter in which two second appeals arising out of two suits were before the Court and the matter pertained to interpretation of Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act regarding forfeiture of lease for denial of landlord's title and the question of ownership of the property was not in dispute. In this case the question of belated amendment was the secondary issue and did not affect the result of the suits in view of questions of law involved and amendment of the pleading was not the main issue before the court. In the circumstances I do not find much force in this case which may support the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. 9. Coming to the question of misreading of evidence it will be found on a reading of judgments of the two courts below that the findings are based on wrong assumptions and presumptions which have no legs to stand upon and no judgment and decree can be sustained on such findings. Needless to refer to the documents and in particular the post card the posting of which does not raise any presumption that it was received by the addressee and he got notice of the facts indicated therein. The burden of proof lay on the person so asserting and a certificate of posting does not discharge that burden. Similarly the two courts below have read too much out of the evidence of D.W. 1 Gokul and D.W.7 Jura and as indicated above there is nothing in the entire oral evidence to clinch the case of the plaintiff for a decree. 10. No other submissions were made by the learned counsel for the parties. 11. For reasons hereinabove stated the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed with no order as to costs and the suit of the plaintiff (O.S. No. 85 1967) is hereby dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside. (Appeal allowed)