JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. - The above noted three writ petitions have been filed against a common judgment of the revisional Court dated 8-10-1974. Therefore, all the above writ petitions are being dealt with and decided through a common judgment. The dispute amongst the parties is about share in the disputed land. 2. In writ petition No. 2846 of 1975 Bechu and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others the only contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the contesting opposite parties Nos. 2 to 6 in this petition were transferees of the petitioners and they had lost their claim before the appellate authority and had not filed any revision petition before the revisional court yet their claim has been recognised by the revisional court through the impugned judgment. Thus there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record and the impugned judgment should be quashed. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted that the contesting opposite parties have got their due share in the disputed land who had purchased the property from the petitioners. The claim of the petitioners is not fair and honest in denying the title of the contesting opposite parties. Therefore, it is not a fit case where interference should be made at the instance of the petitioners. 4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I think the petitioners' claim is not fair and honest in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The petitioners had sold the property to the contesting opposite parties and, therefore, in equity the contesting opposite parties are entitled to claim their share from the share of the petitioners in the disputed land. 5. The technical argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the contesting opposite parties being transferees had not preferred a revision petition, therefore, their claim could not be examined by the revisional court is not acceptable to me. The powers enjoyed by the revisional court under Section 48 of the Act are wide. The revisional court can interfere with the judgment of the subordinate authorities even when the impugned order is only improper. The powers enjoyed by the revisional court under Section 48 of the Act are wide. The revisional court can interfere with the judgment of the subordinate authorities even when the impugned order is only improper. In the facts and circumstances of the case the appellate authority had negatived the claim of the transferees of the petitioners only on the ground that the sale-deeds were executed in their favour due to the help rendered by the contesting opposite parties to the petitioners and adequate and proper consideration had not passed. Whereas, the revisional court has accepted the claim of the contesting opposite parties (transferees of the petitioners) on the ground of equity and has also found that some consideration had passed to the petitioners while executing the sale-deed in favour of the contesting opposite parties. In this background I think that the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. After reading the impugned judgment I find that the share of the petitioners has been correctly determined by the impugned judgment. The share of the transferees has been adjusted from the land which falls to the share of the petitioners. Therefore, substantial justice has been done between the parties. To my mind, it is not a fit case where any interference be made at the instance of the petitioners. The writ petition fails. 7. As regards writ petition No. 2845 of 1975 the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the observation made by the Board in its judgment, contained in Annexure CA-1, to the following effect in paragraph 3 : "I, however, find that the defendants, in the above pedigree have admitted that the plaintiffs are of the same degree of relationship with Kishun Dayal as Deep Narain, defendant. Defendants are, therefore, estopped from denying the plaintiffs' co-tenancy." Relying upon the above observation, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the plaintiff in the suit was granted half share in the disputed land. Therefore, the petitioner being heir of Deep Narain would be entitled to the same share which was given to Bechu and Sechu (Petitioners in writ petition No. 2846 of 1975). 8. Therefore, the petitioner being heir of Deep Narain would be entitled to the same share which was given to Bechu and Sechu (Petitioners in writ petition No. 2846 of 1975). 8. In the judgment, contained in Annexure CA-1, a pedigree has been given and on the observation made by the learned Member that Deep Narain was equally distantly related with Kishun Dayal, therefore, the petitioner being heir of Deep Narain claims that he would get the same share as was given to the plaintiffs Bechu and Sechu. True, while repelling the contention raised by Deep Narain that he had got sole tenancy right, it has been observed by the Board that Deep Narain was equally distantly related to the original tenure-holder as Bechu and Sechu. The claim of Bechu and Sechu in the suit filed by them was declared as half but the share of other defendants or even of Deep Narain was not declared in the suit. The claim of Deep Narain for sole tenancy on the ground of adverse possession has been repelled. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Pheku being heir of Deep Narain should get half share in the disputed land. No other point has been pressed in this writ petition. On the material placed before me I do not find that the impugned judgment of the revisional court suffer from any patent error of law. It has not been disputed before me that Bechu and Sechu had half share in the disputed land according to the decision of the revenue court. Only on the ground of equally distantly relation with the original tenure-holder, the petitioner is trying to claim larger share in the disputed land than awarded by the revisional Court. The petitioner has utterly failed to show that he would get half share in the disputed land. To my mind, the half share claimed by the petitioner was rightly distributed amongst the persons mentioned in the impugned judgment regarding Khata Nos. 29 and 47. In the revenue suit as well as in the basic-year entry before the consolidation authorities, the petitioner's father Deep Narain was recorded with others as co-tenure holder and the claim of the person recorded as co-tenure holder had been accepted in the revenue suit which only declared that the plaintiff in the suit had half share in the disputed land. In the revenue suit as well as in the basic-year entry before the consolidation authorities, the petitioner's father Deep Narain was recorded with others as co-tenure holder and the claim of the person recorded as co-tenure holder had been accepted in the revenue suit which only declared that the plaintiff in the suit had half share in the disputed land. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner in this writ petition does not appear to me fair and honest claim. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the observation made by the second appellate court regarding relationship of the petitioner's father with original tenure holder will not entitle the petitioner to claim half share as was awarded to plaintiff of the original suit. To my mind, the claim of the petitioner has no legs to stand and this writ petition also deserves to be dismissed. 9. As regards writ petition No. 735 of 1975 it is noteworthy that the learned counsel for the petitioner has impugned the judgment of the revisional court only on the ground that the share allotted to the petitioner was wrong. According to the petitioner he would get ?th share in the disputed land. Before me, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been above to demonstrate how he would get ?th share in the disputed land. However, a perusal of the writ petition indicates that the claim of the petitioner about ?th share is based on the admission contained in the objection filed by Jai Narain and others. To my mind, since all the co-sharers had not admitted the claim of the petitioner to the extent of 1/3 of half share in the disputed land, the petitioner cannot claim l/6th share in the disputed land. However the determination of share by the revisional court through the impugned judgment cannot be characterised as patently erroneous in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The claimants in the disputed land have utterly failed to prove their relationship with the original tenure-holder. Therefore, the determination of their shares on the basis of the pedigree is untenable. I think that the revisional court has determined the share of the petitioner on the basis of being recorded as co-tenure holder over the disputed land. The claimants in the disputed land have utterly failed to prove their relationship with the original tenure-holder. Therefore, the determination of their shares on the basis of the pedigree is untenable. I think that the revisional court has determined the share of the petitioner on the basis of being recorded as co-tenure holder over the disputed land. Since there is no other basis to determine the claim of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the impugned judgment cannot be characterised as suffering from any patent error of law. The claim of the petitioner in this writ petition is also based on mis-apprehension and mis-appraisal of the pleadings and evidence on record. Therefore, this writ petition has also no legs to stand. 10. In the result for the foregoing discussion, all the three writ petitions have no merit and they are hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.