JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - The petitioner allottee of.a flat in Ashok Nagar Avas Yojana, Allahabad, being aggrieved by the notice dated 12th November, 1986 issued by Secretary Allahabad Development Authority rescinding the order of the Vice Chairman permitting petitioner. to pay the amount of sale price in instalments, and, directing her to deposit the entire balance of Rs. 79,000/- as the allotment was made on condition of paying entire amount cash down between 17th November, 1986 (sic) to 30th November, 1985 else the allotment made in her favour shall be cancelled and registration fee of Rs. 15000 shall be forfeited, filed this petition for quashing the notice. 2. Admittedly an advertisement was issued by the Vice-Chairman of Allahabad Development Authority inviting registrations for allotment of houses in Ashok Nagar Part 2 Avas Yojna from persons of Middle Income Group, that is persons having yearly income between six to fifteen thousand but not exceeding eighteen thousand. In pursuance of the advertisement the petitioner made an application for registration in September 1986, And an order was passed on next day by the Vice Chairman accepting her application. She deposited Rs. 15,000 on 30th September, 1986. On 7th October, 1986 Secretary of the Development Authority intimated petitioner that flat No. 4 in aforesaid Yojna had been allotted to her. She was further informed that estimated cost of construction was Rs. 94,000 out of which she had deposited Rs. 15,000 after adjusting which she should deposit Rs. 79,000 within three days of receipt of allotment order. Further after deposit of the aforesaid amount the construction shall be completed and possession shall be delivered to her subject to any increase in estimated value of the house. On 17th October, the petitioner made a written request to the Secretary/Administrator for grant of easy instalments, as she was facing financial crisis. It was accepted by the Vice Chairman who made an endorsement or a on 19th October directing the Secretary to ix instalments. On 12th November 1986 the impugned notice was issued by the Secretary against which this petition was presented on 28th November, 1986 on which the Bench, entertaining the petition directed the counsel for Development Authority to file counter-affidavit within two weeks and the petition was directed to be listed on 18th December, 1986. The Bench further directed that till 17th December, 1986 the allotment in favour of petitioner shall not be cancelled. The Bench further directed that till 17th December, 1986 the allotment in favour of petitioner shall not be cancelled. The petition was, however, listed on 2nd February, 1987. Even then no counter-affidavit was filed. Therefore, fresh interim order was granted directing that operation of the notice dated 12th November, 1986 shall remain stayed. The opposite parties were further directed to hand over possession of the house to petitioner who was directed to deposit Rs. 1000 per month towards balance of sale price. On 25th February the counter-affidavit was filed. It was stated that the Vice Chairman could not have allotted the flat in. favour of petitioner as under rules framed in pursuance of Section 56 of U.P. Urban Planning .and Development Act 1973 the allotment could be done by drawing of lots only. It was further stated that preference in allotment amongst Middle Income Group was given to a person who was willing to deposit entire amount cash down. And it was under this scheme that the allotment was made in favour of petitioner. In respect of grant of instalments it was averred that Vice-Chairman was not authorised to pass such order. And the impugned notice was issued on the decision taken by the Secretary with concurrence of the new Vice-Chairman. It was also stated that the flat was allotted to petitioner under Self-Financing Scheme under which the allottee is required to pay entire amount when the construction is completed. The claim of petitioner was also resisted and it was stated that petitioner did not come with clean hands in as much as she instead of disclosing name of her husband gave name of her father. And if her income disclosed in the application was clubbed with income of her husband who had also applied for one flat, then her income exceeded limit of Rs. 18,000/- Further she having inherited property from late Sri K.C. Saxena, was not entitled to any house as she owned property in the city. 3. And if her income disclosed in the application was clubbed with income of her husband who had also applied for one flat, then her income exceeded limit of Rs. 18,000/- Further she having inherited property from late Sri K.C. Saxena, was not entitled to any house as she owned property in the city. 3. While this petition was pending adjudication the Deputy Secretary of the Development Authority issued another notice on 8th July 1987 requiring petitioner to file an affidavit on or before 18th July disclosing details about her husband, and file certificate of income, She was further informed that from the stamp paper filed for registration the name of her husband became known and as he too has been allotted flat No. 3 in same Yojna it was clear that she had obtained allotment by concealing true facts. Therefore, she may clarify and show cause as to why the allotment made in her favour may not be cancelled. The notice was sent registered with acknowledgement due. But from the record produced by learned counsel for Development Authority it does not appear to have been served. The acknowledgement receipt could not be shown. And yet the allotment was cancelled. Even in the order produced by learned counsel for opposite party it is not mentioned that notice was served on petitioner. 4. From facts narrated above it is apparent that the opposite parties instead of complying with interim order chose to disregard it. A public body is expected to act within the framework of law. It cannot assume a role which is not assigned to it. Once an aggrieved person approaches this Court and a n order is granted in his favour then its correctness or otherwise cannot be judged by such authority. The remedy under law is to get the order vacated or await the decision of writ petition. Any attempt to ignore the order or take fresh proceedings in respect of same matter which is sub judice adjudication cannot be countenanced. The averment in supplementary counter-affidavit that possession was not given to petitioner despite interim order as this Court would not have intended that possession should be given even though petitioner did not comply with conditions of allotment, leaves no room for doubt that they were labouring under self delusion and attempted to do what they should not have. 5. Asa matter of fact the opposite parties. 5. Asa matter of fact the opposite parties. due to their conduct were precluded from being heard yet considering importance of the matter and repeated assurance by their learned counsel to convey our displeasure the petition was heard on merits. The first question is if the allotment made in favour of petitioner suffered fro many irregularity. What was urged vehemently was that allotment could be done by drawing of lots, only, therefore, the allotment in favour of petitioner by the Vice-Chairman was bad. The argument was founded on sub-rule (1) of rule 7 of Allahabad Development Authority House Registration and Allotment Rules, 1983. It lays down procedure for allotment by drawing lots. But it does not preclude allotment in any other manner. Sub-rule (8) of rule 7 itself provides for allotment on cash down or instalments in any scheme. It is further clear from sub-rule (6) of rule 7 that the rules visualise allotment both by drawing of lots and otherwise as it lays down that the decision of the Development Authority in respect of registration or allotment shall be final but it shall not be empowered to alter any allotment made by draw of lots. Moreover, where allotment is made by draw of lots the procedure provided in the rules has to be followed namely the date, time and place has to be notified. There is no whisper in the counter-affidavit that allotment of any flat I was made after notifying date and place for draw of lots. Even the counter-affidavit admits that if any applicant is willing to pay entire balance of sale price cash down then preference is given and allotment is made in his favour. And it was under this scheme that allotment was made in favour of petitioner. It is, therefore, too late in the day to urge that allotment having been made without drawing of lots was bad. Nor is there any merit in the submission that the order of Vice-Chairman allotting the flat in favour of petitioner was gratuitous or it was not valid. The practice in public bodies of shifting stand and reviewing orders or describing them as gratuitous due to retirement or transfer of the official who passed the order should be strongly deprecated. The Administrator of Allahabad by virtue of the office he holds is the Vice- Chairman of Allahabad Development Authority. The practice in public bodies of shifting stand and reviewing orders or describing them as gratuitous due to retirement or transfer of the official who passed the order should be strongly deprecated. The Administrator of Allahabad by virtue of the office he holds is the Vice- Chairman of Allahabad Development Authority. The Act or the Rules do not provide for allotment by any Committee or Board. Reliance was placed on S. 18 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and it was urged that allotment could be made by Allahabad Development Authority only. The submission again a ?pears to be devoid of an substance. A very perusal of the section indicates that it applies to land and not to the houses. No effort has been made to establish that Allahabad Development Authority in matters of allotment of houses, works through any committee. The rules referred to above do not throw any light. Sub-rule(8) of rule 7 of the Rules referred above provides that allotment of house under any scheme could be made either on cash down or on instalments, considering the circumstances of the applicant. But who shall pass the order is not mentioned. The Vice-Chairman being at the apex any order passed by him in absence of any other instructions or order has to be taken as an order of Development Authority. That appears to be practice as well. In Rajendra Singh v. Allahabad Development Authority, 1987 All LJ 842 also the allotment was made by the Vice-Chairman. In any case even this much is not stated in-the counter-affidavit that allotment of houses under this scheme or any other scheme was made by any committee or board or any other authority. There is no reason thus to hold that the allotment order passed by Vice- Chairman was gratuitous or it was not binding. Apart from it after the allotment order w passed it was acted upon and the Secretary of the opposite party No. 1 intimated that flat has been allotted to her. In absence of anything to show that the Vice-Chairman acted beyond scope of authority the opposite party is bound by the order passed by him. The secretary who under the Act is not even a member of Development Authority nor ' he empowered under rules to act on behalf the authority could not take a decision contrary to the Vice-Chairman even with concurrence of new Chairman. The secretary who under the Act is not even a member of Development Authority nor ' he empowered under rules to act on behalf the authority could not take a decision contrary to the Vice-Chairman even with concurrence of new Chairman. 6. It was also submitted that the flat sunder Ashok Nagar Avas Yojna were built under Self-Financing Scheme and, therefore, preference was given to those persons who could deposit amount in lump sum. Although argument was built on averments made in para 4 of the supplementary counter-affidavit but it could not be substantiated from.any material on record. In advertisement issued by Allahabad Development Authority inviting applications for allotment of houses under aforesaid scheme it was notified that the houses were being constructed to be allotted on Hire Purchase basis. It was not denied in counter-affidavit nor it has been denied even in supplementary counter-affidavit. Opposite parties have not cared to file any document to establish that the scheme was changed from Hire Purchase Scheme to Self-Financing Scheme by Development Authority. In Rajendra Singh's case, (1987 All LJ 842) (supra) this very scheme came up for consideration by a Bench of which one of us (R.M. Sahai, J. wasa member). It was held that once a policy decision was taken and applications were invited under Hire-Purchase Scheme it could not be converted into Self-Financing Scheme without any decision by a competent authority. The claim of opposite parties, therefore, that the scheme stands converted into Self-Financing Scheme, and petitioner was liable to deposit the entire balance of the sale consideration cash down, cannot be accepted. 7. Learned counsel for Development Authority then urged that Vice-Chairman was not empowered to grant instalments, consequently notice issued by Secretary for cancellation of allotment due to non-payment of the entire amount of Rs. 79,000/- within three days from the date of service of allotment order, did not suffer from any error of law. Admittedly on an application moved by petitioner on 17th October, 1986 after the allotment order dated 7th October, 1986 was served on petitioner, the Vice-Chairman directed Secretary to grant easy instalments to petitioner. If the Vice-Chairman, as has been held above, was the authority competent Ito allot flat to petitioner or persons who were applicants in aforesaid scheme and the scheme as a Hire Purchase Scheme there appears o reason as to why he could not grant the instalments. If the Vice-Chairman, as has been held above, was the authority competent Ito allot flat to petitioner or persons who were applicants in aforesaid scheme and the scheme as a Hire Purchase Scheme there appears o reason as to why he could not grant the instalments. Even sub-rule (8) of Rule 7, referred to earlier, permits payment either by cash down or in instalments. The argument if learned counsel, therefore, that instalments ere granted contrary to rules, has to be ejected. It was open to Vice-Chairman to consider application of petitioner and in case e was satisfied, on the circumstances then existing, then he could have granted instalments as provided in sub-rule (8) of Rule 7 irrespective whether scheme was Hire Purchase or Self-Financing Scheme. Argument of learned counsel for opposite parties that other persons with cash down were available, therefore, the order for payment by instalments, should not have been passed, again appears to be misconceived. The fixation of instalments has nothing to do with the allotment of flat. Allotment is made under particular scheme in accordance-with rules framed by Development Authority. Once allotment of Flat was made in favour of petitioner of flat No. 4, she acquired right to obtain possession on payment of balance amount. Manner of payment could be both cash-down or by instalments. In case authority who allotted house to petitioner and was competent under rules was satisfied that petitioner was in financial crisis and was entitled to payment by instalments no exception could be taken to it. At least not by Secretary who could not overrule the decision of Vice-Chairman without any authority in is favour or any decision by a committee empowered to do so. Action of Secretary to say the least was unjustified. Further averments in pars 19 of the writ petition that instalment was granted to one Surendra Kumar who has been allotted house No. 21, was not controverted. The action of opposite party, therefore, for cancelling allotment for non-payment of entire amount even if would have been justified under rules being discriminatory is liable to be struck down. 8. It was vehemently urged by learned counsel that petitioner being guilty of incorrect disclosure and concealing facts was not entitled to any relief in writ jurisdiction. A copy of the application for allotment has been filed along with writ petition. 8. It was vehemently urged by learned counsel that petitioner being guilty of incorrect disclosure and concealing facts was not entitled to any relief in writ jurisdiction. A copy of the application for allotment has been filed along with writ petition. It does not disclose name of husband instead of name of father is mentioned Income is shown to be Rs. 15,000/- per year and in column meant for disclosure if any house of Development Authority has been allotted to any member of family it was stated in negative. Much was argued on last statement in application namely that no house has been allotted to any member of the family. It was pointed out that since a house had been allotted to husband of petitioner disclosure was incorrect. The application was made on 18th September, 1986. It is not stated in counter-affidavit that on this date allotment order had been passed in favour of husband of petitioner. Requirement in column No. 8 is in present. Therefore, if allotment was made in future to husband of the petitioner who was also applicant it cannot be said that disclosure was incorrect and allotment was liable to be cancelled on this ground. Nor is there any merit in submission based on non-disclosure of husband's name. The application clearly indicated that petitioner was a married lady. She, therefore, did not conceal her status. If the opposite parties were doubtful they could have made inquiries from petitioner before making any allotment. But the order passed in her favour could not be said to have been obtained by fraud because the opposite parties were informed that she had not judicially separated from her husband. 9. As regards income the Rule 5(6) provides that any allotment made in favour of a person can be cancelled if its found that his income at the time of registration was more than the maximum provided for any category. In the application and affidavit filed by petitioner she disclosed her income as Rs. 15,000/- per year. It is not the claim of opposite parties that her income was more. In the application and affidavit filed by petitioner she disclosed her income as Rs. 15,000/- per year. It is not the claim of opposite parties that her income was more. But what was argued by learned counsel was that if income was clubbed with income of husband, as laid down by this Court in Deepak Gula ti v. Allahabad Development Authority, 1986 UP LBEC 734 : 1985 All LJ NOC 4 then it exceeded maximum provided in advertisement and, therefore, the disclosure being incorrect the allotment was liable to b ' cancelled. The opposite parties appear to be labouring under misapprehension about the exercise of power under the rules. Such provisions are made to achieve the objective of making the houses available to persons of a particular category. Therefore, the allotment can be cancelled only in rare cases where the applicant is found to have misled the authorities. Can the petitioner be said to be guilty of it? The extent of her income was never disputed. The legal argument of clubbing the income could arise only if it was established that petitioner had any income of her own from any source. The averments made in counter-affidavit that the petitioner inherited property of late K.C. Saxena Advocate, and has been made without any sense of responsibility. It is sworn on basis of information but the source has not been disclosed. It cannot be taken notice of. 10. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. Notice issued on 12th November, 1986 is quashed. Subsequent notice dated 8th July, 1987 is also quashed. Since both the notices have been quashed order cancelling allotment of petitioner automatically falls. 11. The opposite parties f and 2, are further directed to hand over possession of flat No. 4 in Ashok Nagar Avas Yojna, Allahabad, within a period of two weeks from the date a copy of this order is served on them. Petitioner undertakes to deposit Rs. 2,000/- per month towards payment of balance amount till entire amount is exhausted. 12. Although it was fit case in which exemplary cost could have been awarded against opposite party but fervent appeal and pursuance of learned counsel for opposite party prevented us from imposing any personal cost. Petitioner shall, however, be entitled to her costs.