JUDGMENT B.L.Yadav 1. Whether Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 of the First statutes of the Allahabad University, requiring approval in writing of the District Inspector of Schools for any disciplinary action against Class IV employees of Degree Colleges, and the provisions of appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against the order of the District Inspector of Schools, are violative of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, are the points that fall for determination in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the Committee of Management, Hamidia Girls Degree College, Allahabad, seeking relief of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 9-11-1987 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, (Annexure-3 to the petition), disapproving the order of the Committee of Management, terminating the services of Smt. Asghari Begam, a Class IV employee and modifying it, and the order dated 25-3-88 (Annexure-6), passed by the Deputy Director of Education, IVth Region, Allahabad in appeal filed by the Committee of Management, partly allowing the appeal to the extent that in continuation of stoppage of two increments of Smt. Asghari Begam, it was also directed that during her suspension she would be entitled to her maintenance allowance and no other amount. 2. The portrayal of essential facts need not detain much. The aforesaid College is recognised as a minority institution and the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution of India apply to it. Respondent no. 3 was a IVth Class employee working as Dai in the college. She was alleged to be guilty of serious charges of misconduct including disobedience of the orders of Principal and other authorities of the College, and of having used unparliamentary language including misappropriation of a sum of Rs.600/-, as she was the employee deputed to open and close the office and to clean it. But she left the key with the almirah opened on 17-5-86. The charges being serious in nature, she was suspended from service on 5-7-86. The Principal of the College on 6-10-87 appointed Smt. Naseem Bano, Lecturer in Urdu as Enquiry Officer, who submitted her report on 30-10-86. Relying upon that report the Principal of the College terminated the services of Smt. Asghari Begam and sent that order for approval to the District Inspector of Schools under. The Principal of the College on 6-10-87 appointed Smt. Naseem Bano, Lecturer in Urdu as Enquiry Officer, who submitted her report on 30-10-86. Relying upon that report the Principal of the College terminated the services of Smt. Asghari Begam and sent that order for approval to the District Inspector of Schools under. Statutes 24.03 of the Allahabad University First Statutes, who after hearing the parties, set aside the order of termination and holding the charge of using unparliamentary language to be proved, directed by his order dated 9-11-87 (Annexure-3) that two increments may be stopped. Against that order the petitioner preferred an appeal under Statute 24.04 of the First Statute of the Allahabad University before the Deputy Director of Education, who by his order dated 25-3-88 partly allowed the appeal to the extent of maintaining the setting aside of the order of termination passed by the District Inspector of Schools. But he granted a bit more relief to the petitioner in the sense that during her suspension period the respondent no. 3 would be entitled only to her subsistence allowance and not to any other amount of her pay. Against this order the present petition has been filed. Sri M. A. Qadeer, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that as petitioner no. 2 was a minority institution the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution were applicable to the same. Hence Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 of the First Statute of Alld. University requiring approval of the District Inspector of Schools and the appeal to the Deputy Director of Education, were violative of Article 30 of the Constitution. It was also urged that in any view of the matter under Statute 23.03 the District Inspector of Schools, at the best has got the power to approve or not to approve the order passed or the punishment awarded by the Principal or the Committee of Management. But he has no power to modify the order of punishment or to substitute with another order. In the instant case he urged that either the order terminating respondent no. 3 from service ought to have been approved or disapproved, but he must not have ordered the setting aside of termination of service and substitute the same with an order withholding two increments of the employee concerned. Reliance was placed on St. In the instant case he urged that either the order terminating respondent no. 3 from service ought to have been approved or disapproved, but he must not have ordered the setting aside of termination of service and substitute the same with an order withholding two increments of the employee concerned. Reliance was placed on St. Josephs Higher Secondary School v. R. S. Sharma, 1976 AWC 143 = AIR 1976 Alld. 199 ; J. S. Mahasabha v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1979 ALJ 1079 and Saran Kumar Gaur v. State of U.P., 1988 ALJ 947 (DB). 3. The learned Standing Counsel was also heard and he supported the impugned order. It was urged that orders of District Inspector of Schools and Deputy Director of Education are perfectly correct and do not violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners as envisaged by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. The right of the minorities was only to establish and administer and not to mal-administer the institution. In case some regulatory measures were made applicable with a view to improve the working of the institution or the conditions of service of employees or teachers or with a view to prevent the arbitrariness of the management, the same could not be said to be an interference with the fundamental rights contemplated under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on Frank Anthony Public Schools Employees Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 . 4. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, ex abundanti cautela, the relevant provisions of Statute 24.03 and 24.04 are set out below :- "24.03 : Every decision of the appointing authority referred to in Statute 24.02 shall, before it is communicated to the employee, be reported to the District Inspector of Schools, and shall not take effect unless it is approved by him in writing : Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any termination of service on the ex-parte of the period for which the employee was appointed :- Provided further that nothing in this clause shall apply to an order of 19-Rep.-1989 suspension pending enquiry, but such order may be stayed, revoked or modified by the District Inspector of Schools. 24.04. Appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 24.03 shall lie to the Regional Dy. 24.04. Appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools under Statute 24.03 shall lie to the Regional Dy. Director of Education " Even though Article 30 of the Constitution is very popular and often quoted, but it is better to set out the relevant portion of it as follows :- "30 (1). All minorities whether based on religion or language, shall have a right to establish and administer education institutions of their choice" 5. As regards the point as to whether Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 of the First Statute of Allahabad University are violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, it is to be remembered that before coming to the actual scope of Article 30 (1) and to judge whether the provisions of Statute 24.03 and 24.04 are violative of Article 30 (1), it is better to recollect that the provisions of the Constitution are not to be taken just like mathematical formula, rather they are to be taken as a living institution. Its significance cannot be gathered just by taking dictionary meaning of the words employed. In this connection it is better to make a reference to an observation in Gompers v. U. S., 233 US 604 (610) by Oliver Weadell Holmes, J. as under "The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulae. Having their essence in their form, they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal. It is to be gathered not simply by taking words and dictionary, but by construing their origin and line of growth " 6. The principle of interpretation of the Constitution was pointed out in Union of India v. Sankal Chand, AIR 1977 SC 2328 , by Bhagwati J., who has laid down an impeachable principle for interpretation of an Article of the Constitution as follows ;- "The words used in an statute cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and contents are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. And when I use the word 'context' I mean it in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. And when I use the word 'context' I mean it in its widest sense as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy. The context is of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the words used in a statute" Any way, I am of the view that consideration of the scope of an Article dealing with the fundamental right cannot absolve the courts from giving effect to the intention of the framers of the Constitution as expressed in the draft committee's report, to which intention effect was given by the Constituent Assembly, nor it has absolved the courts from basic principles of construction of the Constitution that these provisions should not be interpreted in isolation. The expression 'minority', may be a religious minority or a minority in language. What is significant for our purpose is the expression 'right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.' In order to claim the benefit of this provision, it has to be established that the community must be a minority community and the next is that it must have established an institution, and the third is that it shall have a right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The word 'and' joining the expression 'right to establish' and 'right to administer' has been used conjunctively and not disjunctively. In order to claim benefit of the said Article, the minority community has to prove that it has established an institution and has also administered it. Only establishing an institution or administering the same would not be sufficient. In the present case it appears that the college was a minority institution and it was also established and administered by the said community. Now there remains a problem about the meaning to be assigned to the expression 'administer'. Article 29 (1) gives cultural or linguistic minority community a right to conserve its language or culture Article 30 (1) on the other hand, confers on religious or linguistic minority a right to establish educational institutions of their own choice. It appears that the object of Article 30 (1) is wider than mere conservation of culture or script. The expression 'administer' indicates right to manage and conduct affairs of the institution. It appears that the object of Article 30 (1) is wider than mere conservation of culture or script. The expression 'administer' indicates right to manage and conduct affairs of the institution. In other words, it is a right to establish an institution and to manage and conduct its affairs in such a way so that it may conserve the interest of the community and scholars. The expression 'administer' may include choosing its managing committee to have a choice for teachers, to use its properties for the benefit of the institution and to select its own medium of instruction. But the laws framed with a view to have regulatory measure in order to have standard of excellence in respect of educational institution, cannot be said to deprive the minority community of its right to administer. It is to be kept in mind that right to establish and administer an educational institution, but the opposite or negative right to mal -administer is not there. Similarly the provisions which are aimed at safeguarding the excellence of the institution cannot be said to be inconsistent. 7. In Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India (Supra), the question was whether section 12 of the Delhi Schools Education Act, which provides that the provisions of Chapter II dealing with terms and conditions of the services of employees, directing that there must be equalisation of pay of teachers of private institution equal to other institutions would not be applicable to the teachers of non-minority schools and the Frank Anthony Public School was a minority school. It was held in that case that section 12 of the said Act was discriminatory and offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court under para 7 (page 318), quoted with approval an observation of seven judges Constitution Bench in Kerala Education Bill, 1957 ( 1959 SCR 995 ) = AIR 1958 SC 956 as follows :- "What Article 30 (1) says and means is that the religious and linguistic minorities should have a right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also. In other words, the Article leaves it to their choice to establish such educational institutions as will serve both purposes, namely the purposes of conserving their religion, language, culture, and also the purpose of giving a thorough, good general education to their children The next thing to note is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities whether based on religion or language, two rights, namely the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implication of the article under consideration are the words "of their own choice". It is said that the dominant word is "choice" and the content of that article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community may make it. The ambit of the right conferred by Article 30 (1) has, therefore, to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the points of view of the educational institutions themselves " Under para 8 the following observations were quoted : - "The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-administer. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in un-healthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided " 8. In Rev. It stands to reason, then that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided " 8. In Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbaj v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 63 III SCR 837 = AIR 1963 SC 540 , it was observed as follows :- "If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution the right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) will be but a teasing illusion, a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution, effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test the test of reasonbleness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other person who resort to it" In State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc., AIR 1970 SC 2079 , it was observed that it was conceded by the petitioners that the State or the University to which this institution was affiliated, may prescribe standard of teaching and scholastic efficiency. It was also considered that to a certain extent the conditions of employment of teachers and physical training of the students must be regularised. It was also pointed out that the standard of education was not the part of management and it was to be decided by the State. It was also held that the State may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers. Such regulations do not bar directly upon the management. As such although they may indirectly affect the right of the State to regularise the education, educational standard and allied matters cannot be denied. 9. In Ahmedabad St. It was also held that the State may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers. Such regulations do not bar directly upon the management. As such although they may indirectly affect the right of the State to regularise the education, educational standard and allied matters cannot be denied. 9. In Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 , a decision of 9 Judges Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it was observed as follows :- "The right of minority to administer educational institutions does not, however, prevent from making reasonable regulations in respect of those institutions. The regulations have necessarily to be made in the interest of the institution as a minority educational institution. They have to be so designed as to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education. The right to administer educational institutions can certainly not include right to mal-administer............ The State can regulate to ensure the excellence of education, in the true interest of efficiency of administration, health and morality and public order. Such regulations are not restrictions on the right which is guaranteed for securing proper functioning of the institution " 10. In that case reference was also made to the observations made in the State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (Supra), and it was held that it was permissible to make regulations to ensure regular payment of salary before a particular date of the month. It may also provide that those minorities as members of the staff are not held guilty of the activities against the national interest as the minorities are as such a part of the nation as the majority. Ultimately it was observed that a regulation which is designed to prevent maladministration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution. But as under sections 51-A, 52-A etc. Ultimately it was observed that a regulation which is designed to prevent maladministration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution. But as under sections 51-A, 52-A etc. the Vice-Chancellor was given a blanket power with no guidelines, those sections were held to be an abridgement of the rights of management and as such they were (Consequently held to be ultra vires, while the minority view consisting of Beg, J. and Dwivedi, J. upheld the validity of sections 51-A and 52-A. In that case (Frank Anthony Public School v. Union of India), it was held that section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, which makes provision of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided minority institutions, was discriminatory not only because it makes section 10 inapplicable to minority institutions, but also because it makes sections 8 (1), 8 (3), 8 (4), 8 (5), 9 and 11 inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. In Mrs. L. Theclamma v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1210 , considering the earlier decision including Frank Anthony Public School's case and several other cases it was held that section 8 (4) of the Delhi Education Act, 1973 does not infringe Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. It was held as follows :- "While the right of the minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice cannot be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof can validly be prescribed. It cannot be doubted that although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with the management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action. The provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the management's right to take disciplinary action. Consequently before suspending a teacher it is incumbent on the management of a minority institution to obtain prior permission of the Education Officer " 11. The Division Bench decisions of this Court in St. Consequently before suspending a teacher it is incumbent on the management of a minority institution to obtain prior permission of the Education Officer " 11. The Division Bench decisions of this Court in St. Josephs Higher Secondary School v. Ravi Shanker Sharma, (Supra), and J. S. Mahasabha v. District Inspector of Schools (Supra), and Saran Kumar Gaur v. State of U.P. (Supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, considered whether section 16-G (3) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act was held to be violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. All these decisions of this court were in the teeth of the law declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Theclamma's case, AIR 1987 SC 1210 (Supra), and in Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Associations' s case, AIR 1988 SC 37 (Supra). With profound regards and all minority, I am of the considered view that section 16-G (3) (a) was a measure of protection to teachers of such institutions without interfering with the management's right to take disciplinary action, hence that section 16-G (3) (a) could not be said to offend Article 30 (1). 12. In Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Association's case, AIR 1988 SC 37 (Supra), the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, particularly about the reference and reduction of sentence etc. provided under sections 9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the said Act No. 14 of 1947 were held to be applicable to minority institutions including the Medical College Hospital Employees and the law declared was in the following terms :- "The provisions of Industrial Disputes Act which provides for reference to an industrial dispute to an industrial tribunal or labour court for decision in accordance with the judicial principle, have to be declared as not to be violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. These provisions have been enacted in accordance with the principles accepted by the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organisation. These provisions have been enacted in accordance with the principles accepted by the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organisation. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 which is a basic document declaring certain specific human rights in addition to proclaiming the right to work as a human right treats equitable conditions of work, prohibition of forced labour, provision for adequate remuneration, the right to at limitation of work hours, to rest and leisure, the right to form and join trade unions of one's choice, the right to strike etc. also as human rights. The Preamble of our Constitution says that our country is a socialist republic Article 41 of the Constitution provides that the State shall make effective provision for securing right to work Article 42 of the Constitution provides that the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Sections 10, 11-A. 12 and 33 of the Act cannot, therefore be construed as interfering with the right guaranteed under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution " The law declared by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Division Bench Case of this court including St. Josephs Higher Secondary School's case, (Supra), and J. S. Mahasabha v. D.I.O.S. (Supra), contain earlier views. Similarly in Saran Kumar Gaur v. State of U.P. (Supra), was a case where the point was whether section 16-G (3-A) contains the blanket power on the District Inspector of Schools to grant or refuse the approval and whether the said provision was violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, was a case different than the provisions contained in statutes 2403 and 24.04 of the First Statute of Allahabad University. In that case, the case of Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union, AIR 1988 SC 37 , and also All Bihar Christian Schools' Association case, AIR 1988 SC 305 , were not considered The decisions of this Court not being in respect of validity of Statutes 24.03 and 24.04, are distinguishable. 13. In that case, the case of Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union, AIR 1988 SC 37 , and also All Bihar Christian Schools' Association case, AIR 1988 SC 305 , were not considered The decisions of this Court not being in respect of validity of Statutes 24.03 and 24.04, are distinguishable. 13. Now coming to the validity of Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 of the First Statute of the Allahabad University, suffice it to say that Statutes 24.03 makes obligatory on the part of the appointing authority of Class IV employees to refer every result of disciplinary action or the punishment to the District Inspector of Schools and the same shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the District Inspector of Schools. Statute 24.04 provides that against the order of District Inspector of Schools, appeal shall lie to the Regional Deputy Director of Education These measures for obtaining approval of the District Inspector of Schools or providing an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education, were regulatory measures and were made for ensuring proper conditions of service of Class IV employees or other persons and with a view to ensure a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action the provisions contained under these statutes were made, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Theclamma's case, and were designed to afford some measures of protection to Class IV employees or other persons employed in the minority institutions. These are salutary provisions with a view to maintain excellence and for the purpose of ensuring educational standard. These are not the provisions with a view to interfere with the management's right of a minority institution to take disciplinary action. 14. To put it differently, the right of minority under Article 30 (1) was to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. But the same was not to mal-administer. Regulatory measures were contemplated by Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 with a view to improve working of educational institutions or conditions of service of employees or teachers and with a view to prevent arbitrariness of the management. Hence these statutes could not be said to be violative of Article 30 (1). I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that these provisions (Statutes 24.03 and 24.04) were not in any way either unconstitutional or violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Hence these statutes could not be said to be violative of Article 30 (1). I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that these provisions (Statutes 24.03 and 24.04) were not in any way either unconstitutional or violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. There is yet another aspect of the matter. So far as the case of Sent. Asghari Begam, respondent no. 3 was concerned, Statutes 24 03 and 24.04 were social beneficent legislation, inasmuch as the arbitrariness of the management was to be kept under control by providing approval by the District Inspector of Schools and the appeal before the Deputy Director of Education. These provisions have to be interpreted in that light so that IVth Class employee may get justice. In these hard days of soaring prices it need not be said that the Preamble of our Constitution says that our country is Socialist Republic and the State has to make provisions for security justice and humane conditions of work. It does not appear justified for the Deputy Director of Education to make modification in the order of District Inspector of Schools to the effect that the IVth Class employee Smt. Asghari Begam would be entitled to subsistence allowance during the period of suspension particularly when charges were not substantially proved. The order of District Inspector of Schools was with a view to do social justice, hence that need not have been interfered with in appeal. 1 am, therefore, of the view that the order of Deputy Director or Education making modification in the order of the District Inspector of Schools that Class IV employee Smt. Asghari Begam shall be entitled only to subsistence allowance during the period of suspension, was an order not justified to that extent. In other words the modification by the Deputy Director of Education in the order of District Inspector of Schools was unjustified. The respondent no. 3 Smt. Asghari Begum would be entitled to benefits in respect of her pay and other emoluments as directed by the District Inspector of Schools. 15. Applying posteriori and priorari reasonings and subject to aforesaid little modification, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.