JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed that for quashing the judgment of the revisional court dated 29.10.1987 whereby delay has been condoned and a direction has been issued to decide the claim of the parties on merits. It appears that an objection was filed by the contesting opposite parties under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act with a prayer for condonation of delay as is evident from annexure -2' attached to the writ petition. The consolidation officer through his judgment dated 16.4.1987 did not condone the delay and rejected the objection as is evident from annexure 7' to the writ petition/ Aggrieved by the order of the consolidation officer, the contesting opposite parties had preferred a revision petition which has been allowed and now the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the judgment of the revisional Court. 2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners before me is that the consolidation officer was fully justified in rejecting the objection of the contesting opposite parties as barred by time and not condoning the delay of five years, as no sufficient cause was shown. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the revisional court has acted illegally and arbitrarily in interfering with the order of the Consolidation Officer without any ground. 3. Learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that only delay has been condoned by the impugned order and the parties have been afforded opportunity to contest their case on merits. Therefore, it is not a lit case where any interference should be made with the impugned judgment. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the ruling reported in Chamba Singh v. State of U.P. and others, ( 1974 RD 144 ) and has emphasised that the claim of the contesting opposite parties being not good on merit, there is no case for condonation of delay. The Consolidation Officer had lightly rejected the claim of the contesting opposite parties and the revisional court has mainly allowed the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the ground that its claim was good on merit. The revisional court has failed to record categorical finding on question of sufficiency of cause for delay. Therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. The revisional court has failed to record categorical finding on question of sufficiency of cause for delay. Therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. He has also invited my attention to the ruling reported in Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others, (1981 (supplement) Supreme Court Cases page 73) and has emphasised the following observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 : "... .Whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the proposition is well settled that when the order has been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the lower appellate court in exercise of its discretion allowing or rejecting the application to explain time, it cannot be interfered with in a revision unless the lower court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to the conclusion at no evidence." 5. In the present case, it has been emphasised that the revisonal court has not given any cogent reasons for interfering with the discretion exercised by the consolidation officer and, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has emphasised before me that under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, the revisional court enjoys very wide power and it can interfere with the improper order passed by the subordinate authority. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the revisional court was fully justified in interfering with the order of the consolidation officer when the contesting opposite parties were not served with the notice of the relevant proceedings. My attention has been drawn to the provision of Section 9 of the Act and rule 25-A(2) of the Rules. It was emphasised by the learned counsel for that the ground given by the revisional court for interference with the order of the consolidation officer is to the effect that there was no evidence that the contesting opposite parties had any information about the valuation of the disputed land. Therefore, the revisional court had ample powers to interfere with the order of the consolidation officer. 7. Therefore, the revisional court had ample powers to interfere with the order of the consolidation officer. 7. In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has force, under Section 8 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the valuation of the plot is prepared by the consolidation authorities concerned. Therefore, under Section 9, upon the preparation of the records and the statement mentioned in Sections 8 and 8-A of the Act. The assistant consolidation officer can correct the clerical mistake if any and send or cause to be sent to the tenure holders concerned and other persons interested notices containing relevant extracts from the current annual registers and such other records as may be prescribed showing - (i).................... (ii )............................ (iii) .................................... (iv) valuation of plots. Since the revisional court has observed that there is no evidence to the effect that the contesting opposite parties were served with any notice, therefore, I think the revisional court had ample powers to interfere with the orders of the consolidation officer who had not condoned the delay in preferring the objection under the Section 9 of the Act filed by the contesting opposite parties. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has invited my attention to annexure 2' to the writ petition and has contended that the contesting opposite parties had not taken specific plea to the effect that they had not received any notice contemplated by Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties should not be accepted in this regard. It has also been emphasised that the allegations made in paragraph 8 of the annexure 2' are wague and since the contesting opposite parties had knowledge about the consolidation proceedings in the year 1981 as is evident from annexure ' 1'attached to the writ petition, therefore, there did not exist any good ground for condonation of delay. On the materials in this case it is evidence that publication under Section 9 had taken place in the year 1981 and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the contesting opposite parties had knowledge about consolidation proceedings is of no importance. On the materials in this case it is evidence that publication under Section 9 had taken place in the year 1981 and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the contesting opposite parties had knowledge about consolidation proceedings is of no importance. Since the Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act casts a duty upon the consolidation authority to send notice to individual tenure holders and if there is no evidence on the record to show that relevant notice had been sent to the contesting opposite parties, I think that the revisional court was fully justified in interfering with the order of the consolidation officer in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The consolidation officer had not condoned the delay only on the ground that the publication under Section 9 of the Act had taken place in the year 1981 and the objection had been preferred in the year 1986 but the Consolidation Officer had failed to notice an important aspect that the Assistant Consolidation Officer had failed in his duty in not sending relevant notice to the contesting opposite parties. Since this aspect of the matter had not been taken into account by the consolidation officer while rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay, 1 think that the revisional court while allowing the revision petition has taken this aspect of the matter into consideration and therefore, it has ample power to interfere with the order of the consolidation officer. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners attacking the impugned judgment of the revisional court is not acceptable to me in the present case. There is no public about the dictum of law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners but even, according to the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the judgment of the consolidation officer suffered from patent error of law in not considering the important aspect of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, the revisional court was justified in interfering within the order of the consolidation officer. 9. No doubt the revisional court has not given the aforesaid reason in its impugned judgment but it has noted the relevant fact that there was no record to justify that the valuation of the disputed land was notified to the contesting opposite parties. Therefore, the revisional court was justified in interfering within the order of the consolidation officer. 9. No doubt the revisional court has not given the aforesaid reason in its impugned judgment but it has noted the relevant fact that there was no record to justify that the valuation of the disputed land was notified to the contesting opposite parties. On the aforesaid finding of facts, the applicability of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act are attracted to the fact of the present case. 10. During the Consolidation Operation, the right of a tenure holder is finally decided." Therefore, when the revisional court has condoned the delay and has afforded opportunity to the parties to contest their claim on merit, I think that the petitioners should not feel any of contesting their claim on merit before the consolidation authorities hereafter. To my mind, it is not a fit case where interference be made by this court with the impugned judgment 11. In view of the above mentioned conclusion, arrived at by me, it is not necessary to deal with other submissions made on behalf of the contesting opposite parties in the present case. 12. In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. Since the parties were represented before me, I have disposed of the writ petition at the admission stage. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.