JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - Brig. B.B. Chadha, (Retired) General Manager, Balmer Lawrie and Company Limited, Mathura has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 14th April 1986 and the order dated 3rd March, 1986 (Annexures 16 and 8 respectively). The petitioner, Brig. B.B. Chadha, was Commandant, 509 Army Base Workshop and Station Commander, Agra in 1985 when he was approached by Sri N. Guha, the Executive Director of M/s. Balmer Lawrie and Company with an offer of appointment to the post of General Manager in the respondent Company. The petitioner accepted the offer and, thereafter, joined the respondent Company as General Manager for its operation at Mathura on 15th April, 1985, The photostat copy of the appointment letter dated 7th January, 1985 has been filed as Annexure I to the writ petition. The appointment was on probation for a period of one year from the date he joined. The relevant clause of appointment letter on which arguments were addressed before us is as under : "9 (a) You will be on probation for a period of one year from the date you join us. This period of probation may be extended/curtailed at the sole discretion of the Company. During the period of probation your services may be terminated by either the Company or yourself by given one month's notice in writing and without assigning any reason. The Company reserves the right to offer you one month's salary in lieu of notice'." 2. Clause 10 provides for confirmation on satisfactory completion of probation. 3. Before the probationary period expired, the petitioner was terminated by a letter dated 14th April, 1986. The termination order is as under "You were appointed on probationary basis in terms of our letter No. DS/BBC/1 dated 7th January 1985 for a period of 12 months. Your joined the Companys service on 15th April, 1985. The probationary period has expired on the close of the Companys normal office hours today the 14th April, 1986. Kindly note that the Company has decided not to extend the probationary period and not to confirm you on the expiry of the probationary period and accordingly, you have ceased to be in the Companys service on the close of the Company's normal office hours today. Final adjustment or settlement of your dues, if any, to or from the Company will be advised separately." 4. Final adjustment or settlement of your dues, if any, to or from the Company will be advised separately." 4. Challenging the aforesaid letter, the petitioner urged that the ground, that his work was unsatisfactory during probationary period, is only a clog, ruse or camouflage and "the real reason was that Sri N. Guha, Executive Director in collusion with M.S. Khanua manipulated the accounts for the financial year 1984-85 and tried to show reduced losses as against the actual losses. It was on account of the petitioners attempt to stop the mal-practises in the Company, the policy adopted by Sri Rajiv Singhal, Sri S.B. Mandal and Sri S. Ram Gopal, who were subordinates to the petitioner, the authorities found out a pretext to terminate the petitioner. The termination order the petitioner alleged, was penal and, as such he was entitled to an opportunity being given by the respondent Company and that as it had not been done, the termination was liable to be quashed. 5. In the counter-affidavit, the allegations have been denied. It has been alleged that an overwhelming majority of officers posted at Mathura were displeased and dissatisfied with the petitioner, consequently, the management transferred him to Calcutta, the Corporate Head Quarter in order to give him a new opportunity. The petitioner imputed undeserving allegations against N. Guha and other officers. It has been averred that the petitioner made allegations against N. Guha only for the purpose of the writ petition since Guha was the Controlling Officer of the petitioner. It has been stated in Para 32 of the counter-affidavit that the petitioner accepted the transfer but subsequently resile from that position. The assertion that the petitioner was punished in respect of any charge much less on account of any difference between him and others, have been asserted to be false. 6. The petitioner has reiterated the allegations made in the writ petition. 7. The first question that was raised by the petitioners counsel was that the M/s. Balmer Lawrie and Co. was a Corporate wholly controlled by the Union of India and as such, it was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Long chain of authorities were cited by the petitioners counsel for establishing that M/s. Balmer Lawrie Company was a Government Company falling under Section 617 of the Companies Act, as such, Article 12 of the Constitution applied. 8. Long chain of authorities were cited by the petitioners counsel for establishing that M/s. Balmer Lawrie Company was a Government Company falling under Section 617 of the Companies Act, as such, Article 12 of the Constitution applied. 8. Section 617 of the Companies act reads : "A definition of Government Company ; For the purposes of (this Act) Government Company means for company in which not less than fifty one per cent of the (Paid up share capital) is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments, or partly by the Central Government, and partly by one or more. State Governments and includes a company which is a subsidiary of a Government Company as thus defined)". 9. In Para 3 of the counter-affidavit of S.K. Sinha, who was the Managing Director of respondent No. 1, it has been stated that: "The respondent Company is Public Limited Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and there is no direct equity participation either with the President of India or the Government of India in its share capital except that 61.19% of its equity shares are held by another Government Company, namely, I.B.P. Co, Ltd. (in which the President of India directly holds majority shares) and the residual part of its equity are being held by others namely, Financial Institutions, body corporate and various individuals." 10. From the above, it transpires that the respondent No. 3 is covered within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act being subsidiary of the Government Company. 11. Section 4(3) of the Companies Act lays down the criterion which has to be satisfied in determining whether one company is a subsidiary of another. It is admitted that 61.19% of shares are owned by a Government Company. Thus Section 617 applies to the present case. 12. Previously, a Government was not considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It has been now ruled conclusively by the Supreme Court that a Corporation or a Company owned by the Government would be other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The expression authority means a body invested with power to command or to give an ultimate decision. It has been now ruled conclusively by the Supreme Court that a Corporation or a Company owned by the Government would be other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The expression authority means a body invested with power to command or to give an ultimate decision. In Sabhajeet Tiwari v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329 and the other Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghubanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331 , the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution was considered by the Supreme Court. Consequently, respondent No. 3 is held to be an authority in the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 13. The next question that arises is whether to employees of a Corporation which is an authority, Article 311 of the Constitution would apply. It is settled and admits of no controversy that even if a corporation is authority, Article 311 of the Constitution will not apply to its employees inasmuch as they are not that civil servants and thus not entitled to the protection offered by Article 311 of the the Constitution. In Tekraj v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 469 , Para 21, the Supreme Court says : "While we were referring to the cases in an earlier part of our judgment, we have noticed the caution indicated by this Court that even if some institution becomes State within the meaning of Article 12, its employees do not become holders of civil posts so as to become entitled to the cover of Article 311. They would, however, be entitled to the benefits of Part III of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to examine the appellants case keeping Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in view as on the concession of Dr. Anand Prakash the proceedings will have to reopen." 14. What happened in the instant case was that the services of the petitioner was terminated in accordance with Clause 9(a) of the appointment letter. According to it, the petitioner was appointed on probation why one year. A person employed or appointed on probation is on trial. The employer watches his work and conduct and if on evaluation on the same, his work is found not satisfactory his employer has a right to terminate him. 15. According to it, the petitioner was appointed on probation why one year. A person employed or appointed on probation is on trial. The employer watches his work and conduct and if on evaluation on the same, his work is found not satisfactory his employer has a right to terminate him. 15. As to what is the purpose of keeping a Government servant or any one else on probation has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 494 . The Supreme Court says : "Period of probation gave a sort of locus penitential to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficiency sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period of probation. Viewed from this aspect, the Courts held that termination of service of a probationer during or at end of a period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more when a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to." 16. The period of probation furnishes a valuable opportunity to observe the work of the probationer. If the employer is not satisfied with the work of his servant may not be retained by being absorbed in regular service. He can be dispensed with as well. The power to put the employee on probation for watching his performance is the prerogative of the employer. In the instant case, we have noted above that the petitioner had been appointed on probation. Respondent No. 3 was entitled to watch his work and conduct. From the various correspondence filed along with the counter-affidavit, it appears that the employer was not satisfied with the petitioner as he had been found to be deficient. He was given a chance by being transferred to Calcutta, but the petitioner did not avail it. It is not necessary for us to mention in our judgment the details about the work of the petitioner as the annexures filed along with the counter-affidavit establish the same. He was given a chance by being transferred to Calcutta, but the petitioner did not avail it. It is not necessary for us to mention in our judgment the details about the work of the petitioner as the annexures filed along with the counter-affidavit establish the same. The petitioner's counsel has made an effort by referring to the writ petition, its annexures and rejoinder affidavit to establish before us that the petitioner was never at fault and that he did his work efficiently but because of the bias of Sr. N. Guha, he was not confirmed. Counsel for the petitioner also stated that as the ground on which the petitioner was not confirmed amounted to casting of stigma, the termination order was punitive and, as such, under the Rules, it was incumbent on respondent No. 3 to a formal enquiry by leading evidence in its possession against the petitioner and giving an opportunity of a confronted enquiry to the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that at one point of time the respondents had agreed for holding an enquiry, but subsequently, the idea was dropped as there was nothing in its possession to prove the charges. 17. We have stated above that the employees of Government Companies were not civil servants and so not entitled to the protection offered by Article 311 of the Constitution. Apart from the latest judgment cited above, others to which reference may be made here, are Abani Bhushan Biswas v. Hindustan Cables Ltd., (1968) 38 Com Cases (Cal) 528 and Nagaraja Rao D.M. v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1969) 39 Com Cases 396. But Article 311 of the Constitution is not available to the public sector undertakings and they could not act arbitrarily and discharge the service of an employee at its whim capriciously and arbitrarily. 18. After having heard the counsel for the parties and going through the record, we are of opinion that there is nothing to show that the decision of respondent was arbitrary or capricious or was not reached in good faith or actuated with improper consideration or influenced by extraneous considerations. There is no arbitrariness in respondents action of terminating the petitioner by finding that his work was not satisfactory. The decision was not mala fide, 19. Article 14 of the Constitution strikes an arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. There is no arbitrariness in respondents action of terminating the petitioner by finding that his work was not satisfactory. The decision was not mala fide, 19. Article 14 of the Constitution strikes an arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. 20. The scope and ambit of Article 14 have been the subject matter of a catena of decisions. One fact of Article 14 which has been noticed in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, deserves special mention because that effectively answer the contention of Mr. Yog. The Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in a concurring judgment in Royappa's case observed as under : "The basic principle which, therefore informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith to use the words of pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all - embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude, (quality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabin ed and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits." 21. Sri A.K. Yog, placing reliance on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojonath Ganguly and another, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , urged that as the Corporation was state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the petitioner could not be terminated which amounted to dismissal in this case without holding an enquiry after levelling charge on him. He submitted that clause 9 of the agreement conferring power on respondent No. 3 not to confirm the petitioner is arbitrary and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. The petitioner had been terminated in this case because during the probationary period his work was not found to be satisfactory. The termination order is innocuous and does not impose any stigma. Consequently, the termination of the petitioner could not be considered as punishment, this was the argument of the learned Advocate General. It may be true that the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment as even an innocuously worded order terminating the service in the circumstances of the case could establish that the order was punishment. It may be true that the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment as even an innocuously worded order terminating the service in the circumstances of the case could establish that the order was punishment. 23. Under the terms and conditions of service, the petitioner was liable to serve the Company in any part of the India and could be transferred at the sole discretion of the Company. The Manual of Service - Terms and Conditions of Officers had been approved by the Board of Directors of the respondent Company by which the petitioner was bound. Chapter 14 deals with liability for transfer and general conditions. Clause 14 (b) of the same provides for transfer of an officer. This clause was applicable to the petitioner. He knew about the same and had conveyed an unequivocal acceptance of the respondent Companys said letter of transfer dated 3rd March, 1986. 24. On behalf of the petitioner, counsel argued that the use of the word normally' in Clause 14(b) indicates that generally and only in exceptional cases transfer could be made. It only mentions that a transfer will not take place as a rule, but it could not invalidate the transfer of the petitioner. 25. On the basis of the allegations made in the petition, counsel urged that as his transfer was made on various charges levelled against him in which an enquiry had also been ordered, therefore, it was punitive and not in ordinary course of business. What was stated was that he had developed strains in his relationship, not only with the officers immediately under him, but his altitude had led to erosion of his image with almost the entire team of officers in the two units under him. He failed to enlist co-operation of officers in the Company. 26. In the counter-affidavit, several instances have been cited for stating that the petitioners work had not been found satisfactory and it was with a view to give an opportunity that he had been transferred to Calcutta which the petitioner accepted, but subsequently, resided. The petitioner reported to S.K. Sinha, Managing Director, M/s. Balmer Lawrie Company on 3-3-1986 after accepting the transfer from Mathura to Calcutta and thereafter, absented himself for 4th and 5th March, 1986 without any reason. The petitioner reported to S.K. Sinha, Managing Director, M/s. Balmer Lawrie Company on 3-3-1986 after accepting the transfer from Mathura to Calcutta and thereafter, absented himself for 4th and 5th March, 1986 without any reason. The attitude of the petitioner made it clear that he was not interested in going to Calcutta. Consequently ; as the period of probation was to expire on 14-4-1986, it became necessary for the Company to review his performance and take a decision based on his unsuitability established for the position of General Manager at Mathura, the Company decided not to confirm him or extend his probation at the expiry of his probation period on 14-4-1986. The allegation made by the petitioner was arbitrary, does not have any merit. It was for the Company respondent No. 3 to evaluate the work of the petitioner and on evaluation, it was found that the petitioner could not in the interest of the Company be confirmed. 27. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that at one time, respondent No. 3 had taken a decision to hold a formal enquiry against the petitioner for the charges on which his service was terminated, the said respondent having not held it, was not justified in terminating the petitioner on the basis of adverse impressions which it gathered. 28. The version given in the counter-affidavit establishes that the petitioner himself was not willing to cooperate in the enquiry. At one time, there was something of an enquiry, but subsequently, finding that the petitioner himself was not interested in the same, gave it up. This is dear from the writ petition as well as the counter-affidavit. 29. Ravindra Kumar v. U.P. Handloom Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 2408 , the Supreme Court held that if after suspension in contemplation of the disciplinary action, the employer decides not to continue the departmental proceedings by making an order terminating the service, the termination could not be vitiated. What is required in the case of a Corporation is to find whether the termination is arbitrary being based on no justified grounds. What is required in the case of a Corporation is to find whether the termination is arbitrary being based on no justified grounds. In Ravindra Kumar (supra) the appellant was a temporary servant of the U.P. Handloom Corporation, a public sector undertaking, both under the contract of service as also service Rules governing the employee, the employer had right to terminate him by giving one months notice, the Court held that the order of termination being innocuous, terms, does not caste a stigma and as it does not visit it on the evil consequences, the order was not vitiated. 30. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali, 1980 LLJ 155 , during extended period of probation, the Medical Officer was proceeded departmentally, but subsequently, the enquiry was abandoned and service terminated in terms of the appointment letter, the Supreme Court held that the order was not by way of punishment. It was termination simplicitor. The case of Central inland Water Transport Corporation relied upon by the petitioners counsel is on different point. In that case, the Supreme Court held that clause 1 of Rule 9 of "Service and Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, 1979" entitles the employer to terminate the service of the employee by giving one months notice being opposed to public policy and also ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution, to the extent that it conferred upon the Corporation the right to terminate the employee by giving three months notice in writing of paying him the equivalent of three months basic pay. In the instant case, the controversy before us is neither directly nor remotely covered by the law laid down in the present case. The petitioners work was not found satisfactory on evaluation during probationary period. Respondent No. 3, therefore, did not extend his probation. We have found the justification in the appointment of an employee on probation, There is a salutatory principle behind it. Purporting that respondent No. 3 acted in exercise of the power aforesaid, the termination of the petitioner was not arbitrary. 31. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.