JUDGMENT S D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings in Suit No. 1759 of 1975 filed by Smt. Shiv Dulari, respondent No. 2, against the petitioner, in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Kanpur, for ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed accommodation and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages with costs. 2. The property in dispute is premises no. 106/264, Gandhi Nagar, Kanpur. The rate of rent is Rs.19/- per month. The suit was dismissed by the trial court by its order dated 10th January, 1979. Aggrieved by the said decision, a revision was filed. The revision came up for hearing before the 1st Additional District Judge, Kanpur, who, by his judgment dated 6th April, 1981, allowed the revision, set aside the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit for ejectment and for pendente lite and future damages at the rate of Rs.19/- per month. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the decision dated 6th April, 1981, in the present petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me., His first contention is that the view taken by the revisional court, that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the deposit made under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a view manifestly erroneous in law. His second contention is that the tenancy of the petitioner, in fact, commence from the first day of each month and, consequently, four months' rent was not actually due on the date when the notice was given and, therefore, the suit for ejectment was not maintainable, as the case did not come under section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. In the instant case, the notice of demand and for determination of tenancy was issued on 26th July, 1976. This was served on the petitioner on 31st July, 1976 In the notice dated 26th July, 1976, the rent demanded was for the period from 23rd March, 1976, onwards. In the instant case, the notice of demand and for determination of tenancy was issued on 26th July, 1976. This was served on the petitioner on 31st July, 1976 In the notice dated 26th July, 1976, the rent demanded was for the period from 23rd March, 1976, onwards. Admittedly, the petitioner did not pay the rent within one month of the service of the notice, but he deposited the amount under Section 30 of the Act on 4th October, 1976, after a period of one month had already expired The question, therefore, is as to whether a deposit made under section 30 of the Act after the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice of demand and whether such a deposit can be taken to be a valid deposit rendering the tenant liable for eviction from the property. 5. Section 30 (6) of the Act clearly provides as under :- "30 (6). In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in sub-section (I) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub section (2)" 6. From the above sub section (6) of section 30 of the Act, it is clear that the person making a deposit under section 30 of the Act shall be treated to have made the deposit on the date when such deposit has been made. The effect is that on the date when the deposit has been made, it shall be deemed to have been paid to the landlord for the purposes of the Act. Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act lays down the ground on which a tenant can be held to be a defaulter liable for ejectment. It has been laid down that if the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service of the notice of demand then he would be held to be a defaulter. It has been laid down that if the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service of the notice of demand then he would be held to be a defaulter. The position, therefore, is that if more than four months' rent is due from the tenant and he has not paid rent within one month from the date of the service of the notice of demand then he would be held to be a defaulter. It, consequently, follows that in case the tenant wants to take benefit of the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act, he should make the deposit under section 30 of the Act within one month from the date of the service of the notice of demand upon him so that on the date of deposit, it is deemed that the amount bad been paid to the landlord under section 30 (6) of the Act. If, however, the deposit under section 30 of the Act is not made within one month then a tenant cannot be relieved of the default which had already been committed. In the circumstances, it is clear that if any deposit is made under Section 30 of the Act beyond the period of one month from the date of the service of the notice of demand upon the tenant then he cannot get the benefit of such a deposit and, in law, will treat him to be a defaulter liable for ejectment. 7. In Mohammad Shamin Ashmi v. The 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1980 ARC 203, this Court has also taken the same view, namely, that the deposit made under section 30 of the Act would not be of any consequence to a tenant if he has already committed a default within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 20 (2) of the Act. I respectfully agree with this decision. IN view of the above, it cannot be said that the view taken by the revisional court is incorrect in law. The first submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not substantiated. 8. I respectfully agree with this decision. IN view of the above, it cannot be said that the view taken by the revisional court is incorrect in law. The first submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not substantiated. 8. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel, in the plaint, it was specifically averred by the landlord that the tenancy commenced from 23rd of each English Calendar month and expired on the 22nd of each succeeding month. IN the written statement, this allegation is denied. It has been stated that neither this question was canvassed before the trial court nor before the revisional court and no evidence was led in support of the contention that the tenancy commenced from the first day of each month. This being a disputed question of fact, it cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. The position, consequently, is that the tenancy commenced from the 23rd day of each English Calendar month. The rent was due from 23rd March, 1976, and, consequently, on 26th July, 1976, when the notice was issued, more than four months' rent was due. It cannot, therefore, be said that the ground, as mentioned in Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act was not made out. Since more than four months' rent was due and a demand was made and a default was committed, the suit was clearly maintainable on that basis and the decree for eviction cannot be said to be bad on that account. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to that effect is also without substance. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The interim order dated 6th May, 1981, is hereby vacated. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.