JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - Rakesh Kumar, the petitioner, has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against UPTRON INDIA LIMITED, U. P., Lucknow, for quashing the order contained in Annexure-I, which reads as under : "The period of your contractual employment will end today after-noon as stipulated in the letter No. UDSL ; PER ; EST : 1530, dated 31st March, 1987. You are directed to collect your full and final payments from the Cash Counter of the Company (at Shri Pratap Bhawan) today between 14.30 Hours to 16.30 Hours positively." 2. The petitioner was appointed, after selection, as helper vide order, dated 25-7-1985 passed by the General Manager (respondent No. 3). The petitioner joined his duties on 1-8-1985. His initial appointment was for a term of one year, which was subsequently extended on 31-7-1986 on all terms and conditions, which were specified in the initial ofter made on 25-7-1985 This letter stated thus "The second tenure of your employment in the Company will commence on 1st August, 1986 as aforesaid, failing which the appointment oiler will lapse." 3. The petitioner accepted the offer. On 30-8-1986 another extension of service, which was called as contract, was given for three months expiring on 30-1-1986. Work remain un-finished, on account of which further extensions on 29-11-1986 and 31-11-1987 were given. The last extension expired on 31-3-1987. It was thereafter the order, contained in Annexure-I to the writ petition, terminating the employment of the petitioner had been passed. 4 Contending that the petitioner had remained in continuous employment for a period of more than 240 days, therefore, his termination amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(00) or Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner filed this petition. It was urged that the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, consequently, the retrenchment was null and void. In paragraph 13 of the writ petition it was urged that on 30-4-1987 Chandra Kumar, Ram Naresh Gupta, Chandrika Prasad and Aqeel Ahmad, who were similarly appointed and placed and whose services were also extended from time to time, had been retained in service by the respondent employer. This, according to the petitioner, amounted to hostile discrimination. Justifying the order, dated 1-4-1987, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the Uptron India Limited. This, according to the petitioner, amounted to hostile discrimination. Justifying the order, dated 1-4-1987, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the Uptron India Limited. It has been suggested that helpers were appointed by the Uptron India limited because of maintaining co-ordination between the two places, that is, Pratap Bhawan and Aish Bagh Factory and Ram Ashrey Building. For this purpose the respondents sent requisitions to the local employment exchange asking it to forward few names, who may be considered for being engaged on purely contractual basis for the above said jobs. It was clearly pointed out that the term of employment was purely contractual and temporary. The counter-affidavit stated that as the work was not finished, the fixed term of the petitioner, as well as that of others, was extended from time to time of which the last extension was upto April 30, 1987. According to the respondents, the petitioner was not retrenched, but on his services coming to end automatically for the term for which he had been appointed, the petitioner ceased to be in the employment of the respondents About the applicability of Section 2(00), the defence taken is, about clause (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This clause reads as under : "Termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein". The counter-affidavit has denied the allegations of discrimination. To the counter-affidavit, rejoinder affidavit had been filed by the petitioner reiterating the same allegations, which were made in the writ petition. 5. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the Uptron India Limited justifying the retention of Chandrika Prasad, Chandra Kumar, Ram Naresh Gupta and Aqeel Ahmad in service on the ground that all these four persons, including the petitioner, appeared before the Selection Board, whereas four persons were recommended for being appointed as helpers on their work and conduct being satisfactory. The petitioner and other four persons were not found fit as their performance during the employment was not satisfactory. The finding given by the Selection Board against the petitioner was ; "He is dull, weak in communication and does not understand instructions properly. Remains absent without prior permission. The petitioner and other four persons were not found fit as their performance during the employment was not satisfactory. The finding given by the Selection Board against the petitioner was ; "He is dull, weak in communication and does not understand instructions properly. Remains absent without prior permission. He has taken active part in the strike He was also not confident about the reply he gave during the interview. He is prone to giving excuses and avoids work. His performance during the employment was not satisfactory. No suitable." 6. One of the objections raised in the counter-affidavit is about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner being not as State within the meaning of Article i2 of the Constitution, the petition is not maintainable. 7. The respondent Uptron India Limited is a Government Company as defined in Section 61.7 of the Companies Act. It is an instrumentality or agency of the State and as such a Corporation in the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as held by the supreme Court in Central Inland Water transport Corporation Limited v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1571 . 8. This controversy arose in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 . In that case the Supreme Court held that it is immaterial for the purpose of d terminating whether the Corporation is the instrumentality or agency of the State or not; whether it is created by a Statute or under a statute. It said : "The inquiry has to be not as to how the justice person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government Company or a company formed under the Companies Act, 1956 or it may be society registered under the Societies Registration Act, I860 or any other similar statute." 9. For what we have said above, we do not find any merit in the objection raised by the respondent that since the Corporation is not State, the writ petition is not maintainable. The next question that arises for determination is about the breach of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may be noted that Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been adopted from Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The next question that arises for determination is about the breach of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may be noted that Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been adopted from Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-N of the U.P. industrial Disputes Act does not confer or create a right. Section 6-N is worded in negative form. No workman, as indicated in the open part of the section, shall be retrenched by his employer until the condition enumerated therein are complied with. This section does not give any positive or unregulated right of retrenchment to the employer. The alleged conditions of Section 25-F are complied within termination of service, if amounts to retrenchment, it would be invalid. 11. The case of the Uptron India Limited is that there was a automatic termination of service, hence it could not amount to retrenchment and as such, compliance of either Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, or Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not necessary. It may be correct to say that automatic termination by efflux of time cannot amount a retrenchment. See Hindustan Steel Limited v. Presiding Officer, AIR 1977 SC 31 . 12. It is settled that any violation of Section 6-N(b) or Section 25-F(b) makes a termination order illegal. But, the point that arises for consideration, in this context, is whether : (1) In the event of non-compliance of Section 6-N(b)/25F(b) the a relief for reinstatement should be automatic, or (2) the labour court should have considered other alternative relief to the workman ? 13. It has been urged before us by learned counsel for Uptron India Limited that the termination being in pursuance of the contract, under which the petitioner was entitled to work only tor limited period, the relief of reinstatement would be unjustified. In that contention counsel also urged that the petitioner had appeared before the Selection Committee and after evaluating his work and conduct the Selection Committee did not find him and other four persons fit; whereas some other persons had been found fit and recommended for selection. The fact that the petitioner had not been selected could not be successfully denied. What was urged was that a proper opportunity had not been given. That by itself does not entitled the petitioner to get the relief of reinstatement. The fact that the petitioner had not been selected could not be successfully denied. What was urged was that a proper opportunity had not been given. That by itself does not entitled the petitioner to get the relief of reinstatement. The proper thing, it appears to us, is that since the petitioner alleged that his termination amounted to retrenchment, he should have raised an industrial dispute by means of an application under Section 4-K. In that case the industrial court could go into the question whether the termination of the petitioner is camouflage or only a pretext for not continuing him in service and on that basis mala fide. In the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution it is not possible for us to go into that controversy. 14. Whether a writ petition should be entertained or not is matter or discretion and the Court can refuse to entertain a writ petition if it thinks that the alternative procedure is effective, speedy and appropriate. 15. In Writ Petition No. 5219 of 1986, decided along with several others, a Division Bench of this Court in Santosh Kumar Rathore v. District Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another, gave several reasons for holding as to why a writ petition in a matter pertaining to the termination of service of a co-operative employee be not entertained. One of the reasons, which were given, was : "Faced with such a situation, the Industrial Tribunal or Court may refuse to order reinstatement and may merely award compensation which may not be in excess of the amount specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6-N. This right of substitution of the employers order by its own order is available to the Industrial Court or Tribunal, and not to this Court. This is our reason for holding that on the facts of the present petitions especially, the alternative remedy is more efficacious for doing complete justice between both the parties." 16. In support of the view taken in this case, the Division Bench had, placed reliance on several decisions including that of the Supreme Court, the details of which are mentioned below : (1) Union of India v. Kali Charan, 1978 (37) FLR 232 ; (2) Munnilal Sharma v. The Executive Officer, 1981(43) FLR 32 ; (3) Macneil and Megor Ltd. v. R.K. Prashar, 1980(41) FLR 209 ; (4) 1984 UPLBEC 500 ; and (5) Hazi Mohd. Salim v. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Federation, WP No. 1797 of 1982, Connected with W. P. No. 398 of 1983, Nirankar Prasad v. Co-operative Sugar Factories Ltd. and others, decided on 23-7-1984. 17. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2352 of 1983, Om Prakash Jaiswal v. Mukhya Pariyojna Adhikari and others, a similar controversy was decided by us on 23-9-1988. In that case also we rejected the writ petition following the decision given in Sripat Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U.P. and others, 1983 ACJ 395 . In Om Prakash Jaiswal case (supra) we held that the appropriate courts for the petitioner was to approach the industrial court. It may be noted here that the special leave petition filed in Supreme Court against the decision in Santosh Kumar Rat hares case (supra) was dismissed. The relevant portion of the Supreme Court's judgment is quoted below : "We find no infirmity in the judgment and order of the High Court, decline to interfere under Article 137 of the Constitution on the that the petitioners have alternative remedy under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. Interim order shall continue for a period of one month to enable the petitioners to avail of the alternative remedy." 18. For that we have said above, we dismiss the writ petition.