ORDER S.D. Agarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings in suit No. 622 of 1975 filed in the Court of Judge Small Causes Court, Agra by Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta and Sharad Chand Gupta against the petitioner Sham Lal for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages. The case set up in the plaint was that the petitioner is a tenant of a portion of premises No. 2743 (old), 27(10)(?)(new) situated at Haveli Bahadur Khan, Dhuliaga, Kanpur of which Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta and Sharad Chand Gupta were the landlords. It was alleged in the plaint that inspite of an agreement between the parties that the petitioner tenant will not raise any constructions and will not make any alterations in the property let out, the petitioner had made material alterations, constructions and structural changes in the premises in suit. It was further alleged that the petitioner had substantially damaged the premises in suit by misusing it and that he had also demolished the 'chajjas' of the Kothas shown by letters ABCDEFG as per the schedule attached to the plaint. It was further alleged that the petitioner had not left any passage through the Sehan to the godown shown by letters ABCDEFG and has also not left 4 ft. wide strip open in front of the said godown. 2. In the plaint allegation was also made in regard to the inconsistent user of the 'phatak' as it was alleged that the petitioner was using it as a 'Gaddi' though it was to be used for passage only. The petitioner was also alleged to be a defaulter in the payment of rent. 3. The petitioner contested the suit on all counts. Ultimately the Judge, Small Causes Court framed eight issues, which are as follows :- 1. Whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent ? If so its effect ? 2. Whether the defendant has substantially damaged the premises in suit, if so its effect ? 3. Whether the defendant has made structural changes and material alterations in the premises in suit so as to diminish its value and to disfigure the same and reducing its utility ? 4. Whether the suit is bad for piecemeal (illegible) ejectment ? 5. 2. Whether the defendant has substantially damaged the premises in suit, if so its effect ? 3. Whether the defendant has made structural changes and material alterations in the premises in suit so as to diminish its value and to disfigure the same and reducing its utility ? 4. Whether the suit is bad for piecemeal (illegible) ejectment ? 5. Whether the defendant is using the premises in suit for the purpose for which it was not let out ? 6. Whether the notice of demand and to quit is illegal and invalid ? 7. To what relief are the plaintiffs entitled ? 8. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of M/s. Shyam Metal Works as alleged in w.s., if so its effect ? 4. The Judge, Small Causes Court held that the petitioner had committed default in the payment of rent, the petitioner had made material and substantial alterations in the property. He has also demolished the 'chajjas' of the kothas shown by letters ABCDEFG. The petitioner had also not left sehan to the godown shown by letters ABCDEFG and had also not left 4 ft. wide strip open in front of the godown. It was further held that the petitioner was using 'pathak' into a 'Gaddi'. It was further found that the petitioner had blocked the passage. The 'pathak' was being used as 'Gaddi'. In effect, it was found that the petitioner was using the premises in suit for the purpose for which it was not let out. The notice to quit was held to be legal and valid. In view of the above findings, the Judge, Small Causes Court by its judgment dated 13th August, 1982 decreed the suit for ejectment and for recovery of Rs. 1539/- on account of arrears of rent and pendente lite and further mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 8/- per mensem. 5. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner filed a civil revision No. 89 of 1982 under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The Additional District Judge, Agra by his judgment dated 1.3.1983 upheld the findings recorded by the Judge, Small Causes Court and dismissed the revision with cost. The petitioner has now challenged the judgment dated 13th August, 1982 as well as the judgment dated 1.3.1983 by means of the present petition in this Court. 6. The Additional District Judge, Agra by his judgment dated 1.3.1983 upheld the findings recorded by the Judge, Small Causes Court and dismissed the revision with cost. The petitioner has now challenged the judgment dated 13th August, 1982 as well as the judgment dated 1.3.1983 by means of the present petition in this Court. 6. The revisional Court has in detail mentioned the conduct of the petitioner and the manner in which he tried to delay the disposal of the suit. He has also stated that the petitioner inspite of an undertaking given by him before the District Judge, Agra did not eventually participate in the proceedings in the revision and tried to delay the disposal of the revision by using one tactic or another. The revisional Court has observed that the petitioner had engaged five Advocates of Agra besides one Jamuna Prasad and still nobody appeared to argue the revision before it. He delivered the judgment after hearing learned counsel for the opposite parties. 7. Since the petitioner was not heard by the revisional Court, in the interest of justice, I thought it proper to hear learned counsel for the parties at length on merits. I have, consequently, heard Sri Swami Dayal, Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Sri Prakash Gupta on behalf of respondent-landlords. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised four contentions before me to challenge the decree of eviction passed against the petitioner. 9. The first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by which the tenancy of the petitioner was determined was invalid in law for the reasons that six months' notice was not given. The second contention is that the Courts below have erred in not giving the petitioner the benefit of the provisions of Section 20, sub-section (4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The third contention of the learned counsel is that the Courts below have erred in passing a decree for ejectment against the petitioner on the ground mentioned in Section 20, sub-clause (2)(d) of the Act. The fourth and last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Courts below have erred in holding that the petitioner let out to him and consequently, he is liable for eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 20, sub-section (2)(d) of the Act. The fourth and last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Courts below have erred in holding that the petitioner let out to him and consequently, he is liable for eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 20, sub-section (2)(d) of the Act. 10. I will now consider seriatim the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is invalid, as six months' notice is required because the lease was for manufacturing purposes. 12. In order to appreciate this contention raised by the learned counsel, it is necessary to quote Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It reads as under :- "106. In the absence of a contract of local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable, on the part of either lessor of lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence or if such tender or delivery is not practicable affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." 13. From a reading of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act quoted above, it is clear that only in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of the either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy. It is, therefore, clear that if there is no contract to the contrary then if the lease is for manufacturing purposes then six months' notice is required for determination of the lease. 14. A rent note was executed by the petitioner-tenant on 7th March, 1967. It has been found by the trial Court that this rent note was executed by the petitioner-tenant. This rent note has been attached as Annexure 'CA-9' to the counter-affidavit. In paragraph 1 of this rent note, it has been clearly specified that the period of the lease will be eleven months and the tenancy will be month to month. Para 2 states that the rate of rent will be Rs. 80/- per month. Para 6 is very specific. It clearly lays down that in case the landlord wants to determine the tenancy then a notice of only 30 days is required for terminating the tenancy. 15. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner clearly agreed with the landlord that the lease though for manufacturing purposes will be determinable by a notice of 30 days. It is further clear that it shall not be a lease from year to year, but shall be a lease from month to month. There being a specific contract to the effect that the lease would be a monthly lease, the lease cannot be deemed to be a lease from year to year (determinable) on six months's notice. In the circumstances, I do not find any invalidity in the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act issued by he respondent. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that the rent note dated 7th March, 1987, is not admissible in evidence, as it has not been registered. In this connection, he has relied upon Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 Allahabad 326 and Ram Sarup v. Smt. Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, AIR 1974 Allahabad 424. In so far as the case of Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P. (supra) is concerned, learned counsel has relied upon an observation made in the said case that as a result of holding over, the old lease is terminated, but the lease is renewed. In so far as the case of Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P. (supra) is concerned, learned counsel has relied upon an observation made in the said case that as a result of holding over, the old lease is terminated, but the lease is renewed. The terms of the new lease would, however, be the same as the old lease except that it would be a lease from year to year or from month to month according to the nature of the tenancy. These observations made are being read in isolation. If the judgment is read as a whole and, in particular, paragraph 12 of the said judgment, it has been clearly laid down that it is only in a case where there is no agreement to the contrary and the lease being for industrial purposes would be deemed to have been renewed from year to year, as specified in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The ultimate decision in the case of Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P. (supra) is to the effect that if there is no contract to the contrary then alone, a lease for manufacturing purposes would be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable either on the part of the lessor or lessee by six months' notice expiring at the end of the year of the tenancy. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the case of Zahoor Ahmad v. State of U.P. (supra) does not advance the argument raised on behalf of the petitioner. 17. In so far as the case of Ram Swarup Jain v. Smt. Janki Devi Bhagat Trust (supra), is concerned, the view taken in this behalf of that a document of lease for a period of twelve months and less must be registered and cannot be received in evidence unless it is registered in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act. This case relates to a case of lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. A lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is a bilateral document executed both by the lessor and the lessee. In the instant case, it is not a lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is only a rent note executed by the tenant alone. 18. A lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act is a bilateral document executed both by the lessor and the lessee. In the instant case, it is not a lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is only a rent note executed by the tenant alone. It is, in fact, an unilateral document and, as such, the principle laid down in the case of Ram Sarup Jain v. Smt. Janki Devi Bhagat Trust (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. In this connection, it is relevant to quote an extract from the Transfer of Property Act by Mulla wherein the law in regard to rent notes has been stated : "But whether a rent note is a lease as defined in this section is a question on which there was a conflict of decisions. The Allahabad High Court held that a lease must be a deed signed by the lessor. This view was taken by the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in the earlier cases, but was abandoned in later cases by the Madras High Court and by the High Court of Calcutta. The Bombay and Rangoon and Patna High Courts had followed Allahabad. This conflict of decisions is now settled by the amendment of Section 107 which requires a lease to be signed both by the lessor and by the lessee. A rent note or a Kabuliyat signed only by the intending lessee is not a lease under this Act, but would be a lease under the Registration Act and the question of its registration would be decided under that Act. A rent note not compulsorily registerable under the Registration Act, executed by a tenant in favour of landlord, if not registered can be relied upon to establish the relationship existing between the parties. A rent note executed by the tenant alone is not a "lease" within the meaning of Section 107 and does not require registration." 19. I agree with the statement of law, quoted above from Mulla's Transfer of Property Act. 20. A rent note executed by the tenant alone is not a "lease" within the meaning of Section 107 and does not require registration." 19. I agree with the statement of law, quoted above from Mulla's Transfer of Property Act. 20. A similar question was examined by this Court in Ram Sewak v. Abdul Majiad, AIR 1980 Allahabad 262 Hon. Deoki Nandan, J. held that a rent note which had been executed by a tenant alone is not a lease within the meaning of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, as such, it does not require registration. The decision in this case fully applies to the present case and I respectfully agree with the same. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the rent note dated 7th March, 1967, did not require registration. It is admissible in evidence and, consequently, I am of the opinion that there was a clear contract to the contrary down in the rent note dated 7th March, 1967, and as such, six months' notice for determining the lease was not required. 21. In this connection, the learned counsel has also relied upon a decision in Jai Aggarwal v. 6th Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, (1987)2 ARC 506. In this case also, the alleged rent note was signed both by the lessor and the lessee and, as such, it was held that it was a lease within the meaning of Section 107 of the Transfer Property Act. In view of the facts of this case, where the rent note has been signed only by the lessee, the principle laid down in the case of Jai Ram Aggarwal v. 6th Addl. District Judge, Allahabad (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. 22. In any case, if for the sake of arguments, it is taken that the rent note is not admissible in evidence and it cannot be looked into for determining whether there was any contract to the contrary, as laid down under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, then too on the basis of pleadings of the parties in the case, it is clear that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy agreed to between the parties and, consequently, six months' notice is not required. 23. 23. In Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Devi, 1968 All LJ 721, it has been held that in case it is proved from the pleadings of the parties that the tenancy was from month to month then it would be a case of contract to the contrary as provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and in such a case, six months' notice for determining the tenancy would not be required. The decision in this case was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment is reported in 1969 All India Rent Control Journal 440, Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Devi. This question was recently considered by Hon. A.N. Verma, J. in Smt. Ram Moorti Devi v. Additional District Judge, Meerut (1982(2) A.R.C. 403). Relying upon the decision in the case of Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Devi (supra), it was held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act embodied a rule of construction for finding out the duration of a lease. If there was no other evidence and circumstances, the lease would be deemed to be from year to year terminable on six months' notice where it is for manufacturing purposes. If there was an indication that the tenancy was from month to month, the lease would be liable to be terminated on a month's notice even if it was for manufacturing purposes. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Hon'ble A.N. Verma, J. 24. I have now to examine as to whether from the pleadings of the parties it can be culled out as to whether the tenancy was from month to month or otherwise. 25. The plaint of the suit out of which the present writ has been filed has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. In para 1 of the writ petition, it has been categorically stated that the property in dispute was let out to the petitioner on a rent of Rs. 80/- per month and its tenancy used to start from the first day of every English Calendar month. A copy of the written statement of the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-2 to the petition. Para 1 of the written statement is as under : "1. In para 1 of the plaint only the fact that the defendants firm Shyam Metal Works has been and is tenant in the premises. A copy of the written statement of the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-2 to the petition. Para 1 of the written statement is as under : "1. In para 1 of the plaint only the fact that the defendants firm Shyam Metal Works has been and is tenant in the premises. The details of the property and extent of tenement is wrong. The plan too is not correct, the defendant has been a tenant since the time of his father. The property was taken for manufacturing purpose for the benefit of defendant firm which now is constituted of defendant and other members of the family. The rest is denied. Further facts shall appear from additional pleas." 26. From a reading of paragraph 1 of the written statement, it is clear that there is no specific denial to the averments in the plaint that the property was let out at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month. In fact, there is a clear assertion in the written statement in paragraphs 4(d), 6 and 16, which are quoted below : "4(d) The alleged roof was constructed with consent of landlord viz. Shri Jagram Gupta who used to deal with the defendant a very long time back when rent was enhanced. The Kothas on the east were also included in the tenements subject to further enhancement in rent ultimately to Rs. 80/- per month." "6. The allegations in para 6 of the plaint are denied. There was no agreement of the short alluded to in this paragraph. In any case, after the Kothas were included in defendant's tenements subject to enhancement of rent from Rs. 40/- to Rs. 80/- there was no need left for any passage separately. The kothas could always be approached from defendant's tenements." "16. The defendant is a very old tenant since the time of his father and grandfather of the plaintiff, the rent has been enhanced from time to time. The last enhancement was done when the rent was raised from Rs. 40/- to Rs. 80/- and kothas on the east which were useless for the plaintiff and used to remain vacant were included in the defendant's tenement." 27. In the above paragraphs, there is a clear admission of the petitioner himself that it was a monthly tenancy and the rent fixed ultimately was Rs. 80/- per month. 28. 40/- to Rs. 80/- and kothas on the east which were useless for the plaintiff and used to remain vacant were included in the defendant's tenement." 27. In the above paragraphs, there is a clear admission of the petitioner himself that it was a monthly tenancy and the rent fixed ultimately was Rs. 80/- per month. 28. Since from the pleadings of the parties, it can be clearly culled out that the tenancy though for manufacturing purposes, but it was a tenancy from month to month therefore, there was a clear contract to the contrary, as specified under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, in the instant case, the tenancy has to be taken a tenancy from month to month and, consequently, six months' notice is not required for determining the tenancy. In view of the above, I do not find any force in the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 29. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Courts below have erred in not giving him benefit of the provisions of Section 20 sub-clause (4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 30. I have examined the findings given by the trial Court as well as appellate Court. Both the Courts have found that the petitioner has committed default in payment of rent. This finding has not been challenged. 31. Section 20 sub-clause (4) of the Act provides that in any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit, the tenant unconditionally pays or the tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the buildings due from him them the tenant may be relieved against his liability for eviction. The question whether benefit of Section 20 sub-clause (4) can be given to the petitioner is dependent upon facts. He did not raise this question either before the trial Court or before the appellate Court and as such it is not possible for this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to go into this disputed question of fact. No useful purpose will be served by remanding the case, as the decree for ejectment has to be upheld on other grounds. 32. No useful purpose will be served by remanding the case, as the decree for ejectment has to be upheld on other grounds. 32. The third contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Courts below have erred in holding that the petitioner is liable for ejectment on the ground mentioned in Section 20(2)(d), namely, that the petitioner is guilty of inconsistent user of the property let out. 33. Clause 9 of the agreement executed between the parties clearly lays down that the main door (phatak) will be used only as a way for other tenants for agrees and ingress and that no interference will be caused by the petitioner in the said way. In clause 10, it was further laid down that a 4 feet wide strip shall be left in the sehan for the purpose of use by the other tenants inside the 'phatak'. In clause 10, it was further specially provided that the petitioner will have nothing to do with the staircase leading to first floor as well as the roof. The trial Court has categorically found that the petitioner has not left sehan to the godown shown by letters ABCDEFG and has also left 4 feet wide strip open in front of the said godown. It has been further found that the petitioner is also using the phatak into 'Gaddi' and also using staircase and roof of the tenanted property in the manner inconsistent for the purpose for which it was let out. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the Courts below in this regard are erroneous in any manner whatsoever. 34. The last contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the finding recorded by both the Courts below to the effect that he has made material and substantial constructions in the property let out to him, and, consequently, the petitioner is liable to eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 20 sub-clause (2) of the Act, is erroneous in law. 35. The findings recorded by the Courts below are based on the report submitted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner's report is clauses (a) to (h) which relate to alterations in the building. It is quoted below :- "(a) in the entrance of the property in suit on the left side there was a chabutra in the main gate cum pauli passage about 2ft. The Commissioner's report is clauses (a) to (h) which relate to alterations in the building. It is quoted below :- "(a) in the entrance of the property in suit on the left side there was a chabutra in the main gate cum pauli passage about 2ft. wide and 4 ft. in length and 2 ft. high of gumma bricks without cement plaster. The said chabutra is shown by letter A in the site plan. (b) Thereafter, going ahead in the said passage I found a tank that too by the side of the passage. The same appeared to be new construction. It is 9" high and is about 2' in length. By the side of the said tank in the west-south thereof there was a boundary leading from the wall pillar of the southern verandah to the southern wall thereof. This wall was about 14' high. The said tank is shown by letter B and the wall is shown by letter C. (c) There is also a new wall constructed by gumma bricks without plaster from first pillar of the southern verandah leading to the 2nd pillar and thereafter from 2nd pillar direct to the southern wall of the premises. This wall is about 4' is height and it is 6'-9" from east to west and 10' from south to north shown by letter D. (d) The southern verandah at the height of 6' in the half width and full length of the verandah the same has been converted into a Duchatti by putting a long iron girder from west to east and putting an iron girder from west to east and putting an iron girder on southern wall covered with stones. The said construction also appears to be new construction and shown by letter E. (e) That the construction at Point F is without bricks. It is resting on iron girders about 15' high. It is about 18' in length and 10' in width. It is covered by girders and wooden sleepers fixed by iron bolts. There is a tank at point G built of stones and bricks pillars. It is about 4 high on which some Farmas of the defendants were kept. From the southwest corner of the said end there is a Kothari about 8"-4" from north to south and 5"-9" from west to cast. It is covered with wooden beams and stones. There is a tank at point G built of stones and bricks pillars. It is about 4 high on which some Farmas of the defendants were kept. From the southwest corner of the said end there is a Kothari about 8"-4" from north to south and 5"-9" from west to cast. It is covered with wooden beams and stones. There was a Shivling and Batia's Saligram etc. in the said temple. I found a Ghanta hanging from the ceiling of the Kothari and an Arti, a Ghantali and some utensils were found kept in the said Kothari. The floor of this Kothari is of Mosaic and a portion of the wall is also of mozaic. It was also pointed out to me that the white wash coatings in this Kothari are quite smooth. The said Kothari is shown by letter H. Towards west of this Kothari there is a well covered with iron Jal. Adjacent to the said temple to the south, there is a Kothari having a gate towards south 5'-9" x 4'-1' covered by wooden beams and stones. They also appear to be now constructions. (f) Adjacent to the said Kothari to the west there is one water tap and there is also a water reservoir which is measuring about 3'. There are two water tanks as well on the same side of the water reservoir which also appear to be new construction. (g) The plaintiff also pointed out that the chajjas of the two Kothas existing on the extreme east have been broken which I found correct. (h) The plaintiff pointed out that there are joints in every pillar at the level thereof of the verandahs and that on the extended pillars the tin shed has been laid down. I found tin shed is of course resting on the pillars but joints in the pillars at the level of the roof were found in 6 or 7 pillars and not in every pillar. The height of the pillars on northern side above the roof is 8' while the pillars on the southern side are of 4' height from the roof level and the tin shed is resting on these pillars." From the report of the Commissioner, it is clear that material alterations have been made in the property which have not only diminished the value or utility of the building let but also has disfigured it. In effect the entire building let out has been changed and as such, I do not find any legal infirmity in the findings recorded by the Courts below. 36. In Sohan Lal v. Ram Prakash, (1988)2 All Rent case 243, it has been held that even a tin shed with pucca pillar and raising of the platform making it permanent amount to material alteration. 37. In the instant case the verandah has been enclosed. Duchattis have been made, a tin shed has been constructed and a room has been constructed and many other constructions have been made. It is a clear case where material alterations have been made which has not only diminished its value but has also diminished its utility and has disfigured the building. In the circumstances, I do not find any legal infirmity in the findings recorded by both the Courts below. 38. In the result, I do not find any merit in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 6.2.1984, is hereby vacated. Parties shall bear their own costs.