JUDGMENT R.P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the VIIth Additional District Judge, Agra dated April 6, 1988, dismissing the revision and upholding the order passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Agra decreeing the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff Hazari Lal filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner on the ground that the plaintiff having purchased the house in dispute i.e. house no. 12/66, Dalhai, Tajganj, Agra, was the owner of the same of which the petitioner was tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 10.00 per month and since the petitioner did not pay any rent inspite of service of notice of demand on him and was in arrears of rent for a period from August 14, 1972 to June 28, 1975, the plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against him. 3. The petitioner contested the suit on the ground that he was not the tenant of the disputed accommodation and that he was not in arrears of rent and further denied having received any notice of demand dated May 5, 1975 terminating his tenancy and hence claimed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. The Judge, Small Causes Court appraisal of the evidence on record held that the defendant was tenant of the premises in dispute of which the plaintiff was the owner and the notice of demand was held to be served on the petitioner by refusal and the petitioner having been in arrears of rent and having not paid the same inspite of service of notice of demand on him, decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner went up in revision before the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Agra, respondent no. 1 who also dismissed the revision vide his order dated April 6, 1988. It is these orders which are in challenge before this court. 4. Heard Sri A.K. Banerji for the petitioner and Sri Prakash Krishna for the respondent. 5. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner went up in revision before the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Agra, respondent no. 1 who also dismissed the revision vide his order dated April 6, 1988. It is these orders which are in challenge before this court. 4. Heard Sri A.K. Banerji for the petitioner and Sri Prakash Krishna for the respondent. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the notice of demand was not served on him and it was never refused by the petitioner and the presumption that the registered letter correctly addressed was served on the addressee was a refutable presumption and when in the present case the petitioner had categorically stated that the notice was not served on him nor ever refused by him, the burden shifted on the plaintiff-respondent to prove due service of notice by examining the postman and the postman having not examined in the present case, the presumption was sufficiently rebutted by the denial of the petitioner regarding service of notice and hence the respondents 1 and 2 wrongly decreed the suit holding that the notice was duly served on the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the respondents 1 and 2 have considered the evidence of the petitioner regarding non-service of notice and the evidence led by the petitioner regarding non-service of notice has not been believed hence the finding of the respondents 1 and 2 on this point is a decision on a pure question of fact. If the evidence in regard to rebuttal is insufficient or is not believable then in that event the factum of rebuttal is not established and hence it is not open to the petitioner to re-agitate this question of fact before this Court in writ jurisdiction. 7. In view of the submission made by learned counsel for the parties the main question to be decided in the present case whether the presumption of service of notice under Section 114 of the Evidence Act has been sufficiently rebutted in the present case. 7. In view of the submission made by learned counsel for the parties the main question to be decided in the present case whether the presumption of service of notice under Section 114 of the Evidence Act has been sufficiently rebutted in the present case. In the case of Ram Nath and others v. Angan 1984 (2) A.R.C. 290, a Division Bench of this Court held that where registered envelop containing the correct address of tenant is posted to him and if the addressee a tenant either refused to take notice or could not be met, the notice shall be deemed to have been properly served on the addressee. In that case also the defendant had denied to have received the notice. It was contended by the plaintiff in that case that the notice had been sent by registered post to the defendant and hence it should be deemed to have been served on him. It was further contended that since the envelop contained the endorsement of the postman that the defendant refused to accept the envelop, the notice should be deemed to have been served on him. The Division Bench relying on the Full Bench decision of this court reported in Ganga Ram v. Phoolwati AIR 1970 Alld. 446, held that where a registered envelop containing the correct address of the tenant is posted to him and if the addressee tenant either refused to take notice or could not be met, the notice shall be deemed to have been properly served on the addressee. In the present case also there is no dispute that the address on the registered letter containing the notice was correctly written and the endorsement of the postman was that the petitioner had refused to accept the notice. In the circumstances, it was held by the Division Bench case of Ram Nath ( supra ) that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove personal service of notice on the defendant or to examine the postman and the notice must be deemed to have been served on the addressee tenant. 8. In the circumstances, it was held by the Division Bench case of Ram Nath ( supra ) that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove personal service of notice on the defendant or to examine the postman and the notice must be deemed to have been served on the addressee tenant. 8. In the case of Bharat Pandey v. IInd Additional District Judge, Varanasi and another 1984 (1) A.R.C. 279, it was held that where there is an endorsement of refusal on the letter sent by registered post to the correct addressee, there is a rebuttable presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the notice was tendered and refused by the addressee. There is further presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act of the genuineness of endorsement. The distinction between the two presumptions is that the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act may or may not be drawn by the court but the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is a presumption of law which has to be drawn by the Court. Once there is a presumption of refusal, it is open to the defendant to rebut the same. The question whether presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act is rebutted or not, is always a question of fact and the court should consider, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties concerned. It was further held that there is no rule of law that in a case where there is an endorsement made by the postman of refusal on the letter sent by registered post, the uncorroborated denial by the addressee must in all cases be accepted as correct. It is for the court, on the basis of appreciation of all the facts and circumstances of the case, to decide whether it should or should not believe the denial by the addressee. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed above. The court is called upon-to consider whether the evidence led by the petitioner is believable or not. The finding of the court on this point is a decision on a pure question of fact and if the evidence in regard to rebuttal is insufficient or is not believable then in that event the factum of rebuttal is not established. The court is called upon-to consider whether the evidence led by the petitioner is believable or not. The finding of the court on this point is a decision on a pure question of fact and if the evidence in regard to rebuttal is insufficient or is not believable then in that event the factum of rebuttal is not established. In the case of Smt. Mithilesh Kumari v. IInd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others 1982 (1) A.R.C. 33, it was held that after the evidence of non-service of notice is considered by the court, it is open to the court to believe or not to believe the same and the finding by the court on this point regarding service of notice is on pure question of fact. Therefore, if the evidence in regard to rebuttal is insufficient or is not believable then in that case the factum of rebuttal is not established. It was further observed that it is a choice of the plaintiff whether he would examine the postman or not. If the evidence produced in rebuttal is not believed, then the non-production of postman has no effect at all. The burden is on the defendant-tenant to rebut the presumption and lead evidence to establish that the notice is not served. If the court comes to the conclusion that the defendant's evidence is not believable and consequently evidence was found insufficient to establish rebuttal, this is in the realm of appreciation of evidence. A finding based on appreciation of evidence will be a finding on a question of fact. 9. In the case of Ram Kishan v. Smt. Shanti Devi and others 1986 (1) A.R.C. 315, it has been held that as a matter of law it is not always necessary that when the defendant denies the fact of having refused the notice tendered to him by registered post, the postman should necessarily be examined to rebut that denial by the defendant. The question whether the denial of the defendant was acceptable on the face of it or belied by other material evidence on record, was a question which has to be gone into by the court of fact without being oppressed by the circumstance that the postman was not examined. The non-examination of the postman by itself cannot furnish adequate ground in law to negate the case set up by the plaintiff. 10. The non-examination of the postman by itself cannot furnish adequate ground in law to negate the case set up by the plaintiff. 10. In the case of Ram Naresh Pathak and others v. Smt. Shyam Kunwar 1983 (2) A.R.C. 440, it was held that whether there are circumstances on account of which the bare denial by the defendant ought to be accepted is for the trial court to consider and if the trial court comes to the conclusion in the facts and circumstances of the present case, bare denial of the defendant is not worthy of reliance, the trial court would be competent to reject that denial and hold that the notice must be deemed to have been duly served on the evidence and the denial by him was not worthy of credence. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the petitioner categorically denied that he refused service of notice and clearly stated that no notice was ever served on him by the postman and hence the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act is clearly rebutted and in the circumstances it was incumbent on the plaintiff respondent to have produced the postman in support of his case that the notice was offered to the petitioner who refused service of notice and the same having not been done, the respondents 1 and 2 have wrongly held that the notices were duly served by refusal. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of K.C. Chaterji v. G.P. Singh and others 1981 A.R.C. 281, where it was held that there is a presumption of service of registered notice where the notice is correctly addressed and there is a postal endorsement of "refusal" by the addressee. But the presumption stands rebutted on the denial of that by the addressee. However, in that very case it was observed that it is another matter that the veracity of the defendant tenant's statement might be thrown in doubt by his own conduct or other evidence available on record in which case the denial of the defendant tenant might be rejected on the ground that the same is not worthy of belief. 12. The petitioner also relied on the case of Darshan Kumar v. Raja Ram Jaiswal 1982 (2) A.R.C. 239. In that case also the notice was returned with the postal endorsement "refused". 12. The petitioner also relied on the case of Darshan Kumar v. Raja Ram Jaiswal 1982 (2) A.R.C. 239. In that case also the notice was returned with the postal endorsement "refused". It was held that presumption of service arises but the said presumption is rebuttable if the defendant denied that he never refused from service being effected on him. It was, however, observed that the question of presumption can be decided only on the basis of evidence led by the parties, in case the statement of the defendant is not disbelieved. In the present case before me the respondents 1 and 2 have appraised the statement of the defendant that he never refused service of notice on him and hence the case of Darshan Kumar ( supra ) does not apply to the facts of the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the case of Smt. Sona Devi v. District Judge, Basti 1983 (1) A.R.C. 799, where it was held that when a notice is tendered by the postman to the addressee, he either accepts it or refuses it. In case he refuses, the postman has to make an endorsement and return the same to the post office. Where the allegation of service by refusal is challenged, it becomes the duty of the plaintiff to prove by cogent evidence that the registered cover containing the notice was duly presented to the addressee and he declined to accept the same. Since in the case before me the respondents 1 and 2 have, upon appraisal of the evidence on record disbelieved the statement of the petitioner that he never declined to accept the notice addressed to him and on examination of the evidence the case of the petitioner was disbelieved on this point and hence the presumption of due service of notice under Section 114 of the Evidence Act clearly arises and the bare denial of the defendant regarding service of notice on him in the facts and circumstances of the present case has not been held to be worthy of reliance. The Judge, Small Causes Court has clearly observed that the postman went for service of notice on the petitioner five times. The Judge, Small Causes Court has clearly observed that the postman went for service of notice on the petitioner five times. The question whether the notice was refused by the petitioner or not is a question of fact and the respondents 1 and 2 having disbelieved the version of the petitioner on the point of service of notice on him, it is not open to this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and to arrive at a finding contrary to those arrived at by respondents 1 and 2. The non-examination of postman regarding the refusal of notice is not fatal to the case. In the present case, the tenant had led evidence to discharge the burden which evidence was considered by the respondents 1 and 2 and they came to the conclusion that the defence evidence was not believable and hence the evidence led by the petitioner was not found sufficient to establish rebuttal. This is clearly in the realm of appreciation of evidence and it is not open to this Court to interfere on this question of fact on reappraisal of the evidence in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently I find that no illegality has been committed by the respondents 1 and 2 in holding that the notices have been duly served on the petitioner. 13. In the result, I find no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed.