A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has been detained pursuant to order dated 10/01/1989 passed by the District Magistrate Panchmahals at Godhra. The order of detention is passed under the provisions of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1986 (for short the Act) ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a licence holder issued under the provisions of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing Control and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order of 1981 This control order is issued under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act 19559 As disclosed in the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner-detenu it is alleged that the petitioner indulged in several irregularities in respect of essential commodities such as wheat rice sugar and pamolein oil. It is inter alia alleged that he did not maintain proper accounts that he issued fake bills and that the stock which was meant for distribution to the card holders was not distributed to them but he sold away the same is the open market in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Control Order 1981 and that of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 On the basis of the material placed before him the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supply of essential commodities. Hence the order of detention. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the said order and has prayed that he be sot at liberty forthwith. ( 3 ) THE order has been passed by the District Magistrate. Therefore as provided under Secs. 3 (2) and (3) of the Act the order can remain in force for a period of twelve days unless the same is in the meantime approved by the State Government. It is an undisputed fact that the order has been passed on 10/01/1989 and it has been approved by the State Government on 23/01/1989 Thus the order has not been approved within the period of 12 days from the date of passing of the order. It is an undisputed fact that the order has been passed on 10/01/1989 and it has been approved by the State Government on 23/01/1989 Thus the order has not been approved within the period of 12 days from the date of passing of the order. The period of twelve days expired on 22/01/1989 while the order has been approved on 23/01/1989 Therefore the question can the approval of the order of detention by the State Government on 13th day i. e. after the order of detention having lost its efficacy and after it became a dead letter can be validity approved and can such approval infuse life therein ? If not can it be allowed to remain in operation ? ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents submits that 22/01/1989 was Sunday and therefore the Government offices of the State Government were closed as it was a public holiday. Since the offices were closed on January 2t the order of detention could not be approved on the 12th day but the same has been approved on the next working day i. e. on 23/01/1989 Therefore it is contended that the order of detention cannot be invalidated on this ground. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 ( 5 ) THE aforesaid contention cannot be accepted. Certain procedural safeguards are engrafted in all the statutes relating to preventive detention. These procedural safeguards are to be strictly complied with by the authority concerned. In the case of Sher Mohammad v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1975 SC 2049 similar question arose in the Context of the provisions of Sec. 3 (4) of Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971 As per the said provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act the State Government was required to report the fact of approval of the order of detention to the Central Government within seven days. There was delay to reporting the fact of approval to the Central Government In this connection the Supreme Court observed that the procedural mandate is inviolable except on peril of the order being voided. In para 5 of the judgment the Supreme Court has further observed as follows;in short there has been an infringement of the procedural safeguard. There was delay to reporting the fact of approval to the Central Government In this connection the Supreme Court observed that the procedural mandate is inviolable except on peril of the order being voided. In para 5 of the judgment the Supreme Court has further observed as follows;in short there has been an infringement of the procedural safeguard. This Court has In several rulings held that the liberty of the citizen is a priceless freedom sedulously secured by the Constitution. Even 80 during times of emergency in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution the said freedom may be curtailed but only in strict compliance with statutory formalities which are the vigilant concern of the Courts to enforce. IN view of the aforesaid settled legal position the learned Counsel for the respondents has not disputed the mandatory character of the provisions of Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. ( 6 ) SECTION 3 (3) of the Act inter alia provides that when any order is passed by an Officer mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. (3) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter. It is further provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. The scheme of the Act is such that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police may pass an order of detention as provided under Sec. 3 (a) of the Act. But such order would have maximum life of twelve days. Beyond the period of twelve days such orders cannot remain in force. If such order is to remain in force even beyond the period of twelve days it has got to be approved by the State Government within its life time i. e. within twelve days. This is the only meaning which can be given to the expression unless in the meantime occurring in the Section. If the life of the order is to be extended beyond the period of twelve days only when the order is alive the life is required to be injected therein by the State Government by approving the same. This is the only meaning which can be given to the expression unless in the meantime occurring in the Section. If the life of the order is to be extended beyond the period of twelve days only when the order is alive the life is required to be injected therein by the State Government by approving the same. It cannot be done after the order gets itself extinguished. The State Government cannot approve a dead order and inject life into it. It is beyond the scope of the power of the State Government. The very pre-condition of the exercise of power of approving an order passed by an Officer mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) of the Act is that it can be exercised in the meantime i. e. within a period of 12 days. This provision does not prescribe a period of limitation for anything to be done by any particular authority. It prescribes the period of life for which an order of detention passed by an Officer under the provisions of Sec. 3 (2) of the Act will remain in force. This is a vital distinction to be borne in mind. ( 7 ) IN this context the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 on which reliance is placed may be examined. The Section reads as follows:10 Where by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken In any Court or Office on a certain day or within a prescribed period then if the Court or Office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period the Act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or Office is open; provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act 1877 applies. (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January 1887 analysing the Section it becomes clear that for applicability of the Section the following conditions should be fulfilled: (1) The period should have been prescribed for the performance of the sot; (2) Such act is required to be done or taken in any Court or Office; and (3) The prescribed period should expire on a holiday. If all the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled and it is also shown that the act which was directed of allowed to be done within a prescribed period has been done on the next working day then only as per the provisions of the section the act should be considered to have been done within that prescribed period. However Sec. 3 (3) of the Act does not provide any period of limitation. It deals with the scope and extent of power conferred on officers mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) of the Act. The Officers mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) of the Act are empowered to pass detention order which will have limited life of twelve days. This provision has nothing to do with the period of limitation. The second condition of the applicability of the section is that an set is required to be taken or done in a Court or Office. This is also not applicable The act of approval of the order of detention can be performed by the State Government any where and at any time. The appropriate Officer of the Government exercising powers on behalf of the Government can pass an order of approval during the Office hours as well as outside the Office hours. Such order can be passed in Office and outside the Office also. Similarly such an order can be passed even on holidays. Just as an order of detention can be passed on holiday Similarly it can also he approved on holiday. It may be approved in Office or outside the Office during the Office hours or outside the Office hours. The State Government is not required to undertake the exercise of approving the order of detention in a Court or in an Office. It may be approved in Office or outside the Office during the Office hours or outside the Office hours. The State Government is not required to undertake the exercise of approving the order of detention in a Court or in an Office. Therefore interpreting the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 it is evident that the provisions of the Section cannot be applied to the actions to be taken by the Government under the provisions of Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. ( 8 ) SECTION 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the case of Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh AIR 1957 SC 271 . The Supreme Court has described the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Acts 1897 as beneficial one (para 6 of the judgment ). The provision is made to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday on the next working day. Where therefore a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or Office and that period expires on a holiday then according to the Section the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the Court or Office is open. For that Section to apply therefore all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed and that period should expire on a holiday. In the context it should be emphasised that such act is required to be performed in a Court or Office. Such a beneficial provision cannot be interpreted liberally so as to curtail the liberty of a citizen otherwise than in accordance wi (h law. Such a construction would be both beyond the scope of the provisions of the Section and also against the object with which the provision is enacted by the legislature. The object of the provision is beneficial It is not detrimental. It is with a view to enable a person to do something which he could not do for no fault of his own. It is not meant to harm him. It is enacted for doing something good to him. The object of the provision is beneficial It is not detrimental. It is with a view to enable a person to do something which he could not do for no fault of his own. It is not meant to harm him. It is enacted for doing something good to him. Therefore both from the point of view of scope of the Section and the object with which it is enacted the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1857 cannot be invoked and the respondents cannot be given the benefit of the same. ( 9 ) IF the interpretation of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted it would run counter to the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 inter alia provides that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. In the instant case the procedure established by law is contained in the provisions of Secs. 3 (2) and 3 (3) of the Act. Section 3 (2) empowers the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to pass an order of detention and detain a person for a period of twelve days. Beyond that period (of twelve days) if such detention is to remain in operation in the mean time i. e. within a period of twelve days the State Government must approve the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police. This procedural requirement is mandatory. This not mere procedural formalities. It is a matter of substance also. In such matters there cannot be any pat facto approval. Because after expiry of the period there will be nothing to approve. The order itself would have become extinct and there would be no life in it. On the expiry of the period of twelve days the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or Police Commissioner comes to end end. In absence of approval of the order of detention within prescribed period the detention of any person beyond the prescribed period even for a moment would be otherwise than in accordance with law. On the expiry of the period of twelve days the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or Police Commissioner comes to end end. In absence of approval of the order of detention within prescribed period the detention of any person beyond the prescribed period even for a moment would be otherwise than in accordance with law. If the detention is to continue beyond the period of twelve days before expiry of the period of twelve days the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police as the case may be should have been approved by the State Government. Then only further preventive detention can be said to be in accordance with the procedure established by law If there are two possible interpretations of any provision of law and one of them is counter to the Constitutional provisions and is likely to encroach upon the fundamental rights of a citizen such interpretation has got to be avoided. The interpretation which is more in accord with the provisions of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of citizens should be adopted. ( 10 ) IN this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1986 (3) SCC 141 . Therein the provisions of Sec. 167 of Criminal Procedure Code came up for interpretation. As provided under Sec. 167 if charge-sheet is not filed within a period of sixty/ninety days as the case may be the accused would be entitled to be released en bail. In this connection provisions of General Clauses Act 1897 and Limitation Act 1963 were sought to be invoked. Repelling the contention after referring to the language of Sec. 167 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the proviso thereto in para 32 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:as the terms of provision with reference to the total periods of detention can be interpreted on the plain language of the proviso itself we do not think it is necessary to invoke the provisions of the General Clauses Act or seek guidance from the Limitation Act to construe the terms of the proviso. Thus it is evident that the cases in which the question of individual liberty of a citizen is involved the Courts have to look at the slightest infringement or abridgment thereof seriously. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents relied upon Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Rajibhai T. Chottani v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in [1989 (1)] XXX (1) GLR 309. In that decision one of us (myself) was a party wherein the question arose as to whether there was delay in reporting to the Central Government about the detention of the petitioner-detenu as required under Sec. 3 (4) of the Act. Section 3 (4) of the Act inter alia provides that whenever the State Government approves the order of detention passed by an Officer of the State Government the State Government has to report within seven days the fact of detention to the Central Government together with the grounds 6u which the order has been passed and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity of the order. The question arose as to whether such report was made within seven days or not. In that context for the purposes of computing the period reference was made to the principles underlying the provisions of Sec. 9 of the General Clauses Act 1897 In the judgment it is inter alia observed as follows (at page No. 311 of GLR):it is therefore clear that Sec. 9 of the General Clauses Act statutorily recognises the well established principle applicable to construction of statutes that ordinarily in computing time the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Hence apart from Sec. 9 of General Clauses Act the above principle will apply. (emphasis supplied)FROM what is stated hereinabove it should be clear that the Court has not applied the provisions of the General Clauses Act 1897 to the question involved in that case. On the contrary it is made clear that even apart from the provisions of General Clauses Act how a statute was required to be interpreted. Moreover in that case the question did Dot arise as to whether the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act. 1897 would be applicable or not. On the contrary it is made clear that even apart from the provisions of General Clauses Act how a statute was required to be interpreted. Moreover in that case the question did Dot arise as to whether the provisions of Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act. 1897 would be applicable or not. Therefore the reliance placed on the aforesaid decision is of no help to the respondent. ( 12 ) IN the facts of the case it is clear that the requirement of approving the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate within twelve days as provided under Sec. 3 (2) of the Act has not been fulfilled. After the expiry of twelve days there cannot be any approval of the order of detention because after the expiry of twelve days there was no order in existance. By that time it has already got itself extinguished. For this reason and for the reasons stated hereinabove the continued detention of the petitioner cannot be held to be legal and valid. ( 13 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The continued detention of the petitioner-detenu is held to be illegal and void. The petitioner is ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule made absolute accordingly. .