T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) IT is necessary to mention at the outset that this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution was entertained by us on 30-1-1989 on submission being made that the law laid down by two learned Single Judges of this Court to their under-mentioned decisions, required reconsideration (1) Mahavir Kumar v. Phool Chand, 1986 MPRCJ 310 and (2) Govind Prasad Yadav v. Jagdish Prasad Verma, 1987 MPRCJ 296. ( 2 ) WE have, therefore, limited in this matter our decision on the question merely of maintainability of the appeal filed as per memo of appeal (Annexure-P/4) by non-petitioner No. 3 (tenant) in the Court of the Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. The appeal was filed against order passed on 1-11-1988 by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, for short, 'the R. C. A. ', in a proceeding initiated by the petitioner/landlady under S. 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, the 'act'. By that order, the non-applicant-tenant was held in default by the R. C. A. for submitting neither the list of his witnesses nor producing his witnesses to comply with the direction made in that regard and further opportunity to do so as denied to him. In, appeal, the tenant/ appellant submitted that his case could not be closed by the R. C. A. by the impugned order as on that date, an application under O. 6, R. 17, CPC was filed by him and on that, landlady/respondent was to be heard and no evidence had to be taken. In the memo of appeal S. 31 of the Act is quoted as the provision under which the appeal was filed, Counsel for the parties concede that the appeal is pending disposal in the concerned Court and no final decision has been rendered therein. ( 3 ) BEFORE we examine decisions aforementioned, we have considered it proper to took at the Scheme of the Act. As many as seven Chapters cover the entire corpus of the Act, but special notice has to be taken of the fact that Chapter III-A was inserted by the Legislature for the first time in the year 1983 by Act No. 27 of 1983 apparently in derogation of the general provision contained in Chapter 111, captioned 'control of Eviction of Tenants". The Act has been further amended in 1985 by Act No. 7 of 1985 and thereunder new S. 23-J has been inserted in Chapter III-A. The Chapter is endowed with the caption, "eviction of Tenants on Grounds of "bona Fide" Requirement". But, also noteworthy is the heading of S. 23-A "special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement. " S. 23-B empowers the R. C. A. to issue summons "in relation to very application referred to in S. 23-A"and S. 23-C specifies the circumstances under which the tenant's entitlement to contest the proceeding initiated u/s. 23-A can be circumscribed. However, special mention has to be made of S. 23-D because of the matter it contains, as is reflected in its heading "procedure to be followed by Rent Controlling Authority or grant of leave to tenant to contest". In sub-sec. (1) itself of S. 23-D, it is provided that the R. C. A. has to dispose of finally the application made u/s. 23-A within six months of the order of granting of leave to the tenant to contest application. U/s. 23-E, provision is made for High Court to entertain a revision petition and about that, we have to say much later. Section 23-F specifies that for a period of six months only, the stay order of High Court or of the R. C. A. against the eviction allowed, shall operate. S. 23-G deals with recovery of possession for occupation and the right of re-entry of the tenant. S. 23-H deals with deposit of rent during pending proceeding for eviction or for revision, while under S. 23-I, a landlord is warned against making frivolous application under S. 23-A and tenant also is similarly warned against making frivolous application for seeking leave to defend or for adjournment, on the pain of suffering "heavycompensatory costs not exceeding six months rent of the accommodation at a time as the Rent Controlling Authority may fix". Let it be noted now that in 1985, Legislature having reviewed the social conditions and constitutional imperatives, considered it proper to modify the scope and ambit of Chapter III-A and accordingly inserted S. 23-J under which it defined the term "landlord" for the purpose of Chapter III-A. In other words, the benefit of the said law enacted in Chapter III-A has come to be limited now, thereafter, to the special category of landlords described in S. 23-J, namely, such persons as :" (I) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or any State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place". ( 4 ) THE Chapter heading of Chapter V has to be noted. It runs thus:-- "appointment of Rent Controlling Authorities Their Powers, Functions and Appeals". Section 31 is included in this Chapter and we may profitably, therefore, extract that provision in extenso : additional District Judge-" (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act to the District Judge or an Additional District Judge having territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Judge) and the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. (2) An appeal under sub-sec. (1) shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order made by the Rent Controlling Authority. Provided that in computing the period of thirty days the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded. Provided further that the judge may for sufficient reasons allow an appeal after the expiry of the said period. (1) shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order made by the Rent Controlling Authority. Provided that in computing the period of thirty days the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded. Provided further that the judge may for sufficient reasons allow an appeal after the expiry of the said period. "however, we may also note that in so far as power of R. C. A. are concerned, something more has to be read in Chapter VI and in that connection, we may read S. 38, wherein tenant has been given the right to approach the R. C. A. for redressal of his grievance regarding cutting off or withholding essential supply or service by the landlord. There are other provisions also in the Act wherein provisions are made when the R. C. A. can be approached in different circumstances for different purposes. Those are in Ss. 8, 10, 17, 25 and 37 of the Act, what is apparent, therefore, is that Chapter V is not self-contained Code dealing with the 'powers' of the R. C. A. (or 'appeals' for that matter its heading is misleading ). This position, we have stressed for the special reason that the scope of the power to be exercisable in an appeal u/s. 31 aforequoted has, therefore, to be spered out otherwise and that provision a priori cannot operate in respect of exercise of powers by the R. C. A. under all circumstances and all cases. ( 5 ) WE are of the view that although in S. 31, provision is made for an appeal from "every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act", the scope of appeal thereunder must be held, to exclude from its purview the orders passed under Chap. III-A. For this, we read clear mandate in the express language of S. 23-E (1) which we quote. "23-E. Revision by High Court- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 31, S. 32, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter". We have no doubt that the special law enacted in S. 23-E is in derogation of the provisions contained in S. 31 and Legislature therefore, made its intention clear by using non obstinate clause in S. 23-E and further using the words "any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter". We have no doubt that the special law enacted in S. 23-E is in derogation of the provisions contained in S. 31 and Legislature therefore, made its intention clear by using non obstinate clause in S. 23-E and further using the words "any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter". We are also of the view that support for this proposition can be read in the object of the special law enacted in Chapter III-A. When eviction is sought by the specified category of landlords having resorted to the provisions of S. 23-A of the Act, Legislature meant for the special procedure prescribed in Chapter III-A to be followed for disposing of the appllication of the specified category of landlord under S. 23-A within time-frame prescribed in Section 23-D so that disposals of such matters arc expeditious. It is a notorious fact that civil litigations are too protracted and special care was taken by the Legislature, therefore, to ensure that in the course of the proceedings under Chapter III-A, when any order was passed by the R. C. A. It was necessary to provide the leap-frog procedure by envisaging a revision directly to the High Court. Accordingly, if it is held that the provisions of S. 31 should be construed to envisage an appeal from every order of the R. C. A. including any order passed under Chapter III-A, the very object and purpose of enactment of special law made in Chapter III-A shall be defeated. ( 6 ) WE have now to examine the two decisions, aforesaid. It appears to us that due importance has not been attached to the language used by the legislature in S. 23-E (1) even in the later decision (Govind Prasad, 1987 MPRCJ 296), which had followed Mahabir Kumar, (1986 M PRCJ 310 ). In both cases, an order passed by R. C. A. in a proceeding under S. 23-A was challenged in the earlier case u/s. 13 (6) of the Act, in the later case, it was an order refusing to review the decision already rendered transferring the case to Civil Court for trial. In both decisions the impugned orders were held appealable according primacy to the provisions of S. 31 of the Act. While Mahabir Kumar focussed only on sub-sec. (2) of S. 23-A Govind Prasad surveyed the field with reference only to Ss. In both decisions the impugned orders were held appealable according primacy to the provisions of S. 31 of the Act. While Mahabir Kumar focussed only on sub-sec. (2) of S. 23-A Govind Prasad surveyed the field with reference only to Ss. 29, 31 and 33 of the Act as also R. 6 of the Rules framed u/s. 50 of the Act. ( 7 ) WE are also of the view that it will be wrong to attach any importance to the fact that S. 29 of the Act empowers the R. C. A. to exercise powers envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure because there is a clear distinction between conferment of power and of regulation of procedure by enactment of special law, providing special procedure for dealing with certain matters. Therefore, even if R. C. A. has exercised powers in accordance with any provision of C. P. C. in a proceeding under Chapter III-A, that, in our opinion would not, and cannot, change the nature of the procedure legislatively envisaged in that Chapter of the Act. In other words, we may also say that S. 29 clearly envisages itself that CPC in terms, is not to apply to a proceeding before the R. C. A. Indeed, it is for that reason that the legislature has envisaged thereunder that to suit particular circumstances of any case only those powers as are specified in sub-sec. (1) of S. 29 can be exercised by R. C. A. to deal with matters effectively as lying within its special jurisdiction. We are definitely of the view that even if any Rules arc framed in derogation of the parent law, namely S. 50 read with S. 29 (d) of the Act, those Rules can in no manner impair or indent the purpose, object and indeed the scope of the special law enacted in Chapter III-A. On the rationale of the two decisions if we have to say anything else, we may add that the words "under this Act" appearing in S. 31 must yield in primacy to thewords "under this Chapter" used in S. 23-E, but that imperative was ignored. R. C. A. 's order passed in relation to any proceeding not relatable to an application u/s. 23-A may attract S. 31, but that provision can have no scope to operate in the field occupied by Ss. R. C. A. 's order passed in relation to any proceeding not relatable to an application u/s. 23-A may attract S. 31, but that provision can have no scope to operate in the field occupied by Ss. 23-A and 23-B of Chapter III-A which must obviously exclude operation of the general law contained in chapter V. ( 8 ) FOR all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the law laid down by this Court in the afore-cited two decisions on the scope of S. 31 of the Act needs to be reviewed. For the various reasons aforesaid and our conclusion above-referred, we have taken the view that law has not been laid down correctly in those two decisions in that regard. We are clear in our minds that when R. C. A. exercises its jurisdiction in relation to an application u/s. 23-A of the Act by passing any order with respect to trial or disposal of that application and not only when the final order is rendered in the proceeding, that decision would be only to revision by this Court under S. 23-B, indeed, all interlocutory orders by the R. C. A. with respect to that proceeding under S. 23-A would only be revisable by the Court. In respect of those orders appellate jurisdiction u/s. 31 cannot be exercised, that is barred u/s. 23-E (1 ). Additional support for this view has to be read in sub-sec. (2) of S. 23-E which High Court is authorised to act even suo motu "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceeding of the R. C. A. ". Emphasis added Legislature's deliberate endeavour to ensure time-bound disposal of the proceedings under S. 23-A has to be judicially supported by giving due importance to the two words "any order", in both sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 23-B. ( 9 ) IN the result, we have no hesitation to hold that this petition must succeed and it is accordingly allowed. We hold that the second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge Gwalior, in whose Court Civil Misc. Appeal No. 67 of 1988 is pending, has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide that appeal. We hold that the second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge Gwalior, in whose Court Civil Misc. Appeal No. 67 of 1988 is pending, has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide that appeal. That appeal has to be dismissed as not maintainable and necessary order in that regard shall be passed by the learned Second Additional Judge. Let a copy of this order be communicated to him for doing the needful. No costs. Petitioner allowed. .