P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgment of the learned single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No. 6815 of 1987. Mr. R. H. Mehta takes notice and appears for respon- dents Nos. 1 to 3. By consent of parties the matter was taken up for final hearing today. ( 2 ) MR. V. J. Desai for Mr. J. A. Adeshra appeared for the appellant and strenuously contended that the punishment accorded to the appellant is disproportionate. The petitioner who was a driver with the Oil and Natural Gas Commission was served with an order which is Annexure E to the Special Civil Application whereby punishment of removal from service was imposed. Questioning this punishment of removal from service the appellant herein came forward with the Special Civil Application for issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropri- ate writ to quash and set aside the order dated 20/ 22/12/1986 passed by the respondent No. 2 herein which is Annexure E to the Special Civil Application. The said removal order which is Annexure E to the Special Civil Application was communicated to the appellant by Annexure F collectively. The charges against the appellant were: (1) He habitually remained absent from duty inasmuch as he had not deliberately and inten- tionally reported for duly with effect from 4/06/1982 unauthorisedly as it had not been regu- larised by grant of leave as per Rules; (2) He had disregarded official advice given to him to resume duty and to seek regularisation of the period of absence; (3) He had committed gross dereliction of duly; and (4) He had made false claim of compensatory off for 2 days in lieu of duly said to have been performed by him on 7th and 8/05/1989 which were holidays. He had availed of both these holidays and had not attended duty on either of these two holidays. It is clear from the charges that the appellant used to habitually absent himself from duty and as per the charges he has not reported for duly with effect from 4/06/1982 onwards. The statement of charges is dated 25/02/1983. He had availed of both these holidays and had not attended duty on either of these two holidays. It is clear from the charges that the appellant used to habitually absent himself from duty and as per the charges he has not reported for duly with effect from 4/06/1982 onwards. The statement of charges is dated 25/02/1983. There is a specific averment in the charge that the appellant disregarded the repealed official advice to him to resume duty and there is also an averment to the effect that he has wrongly stated that the performed duly on 7th and 8/05/1982. The Enquiry Officer in this ease found the charges proved and the Discipli- nary Authority and the Appellate Authority have agreed with the Report and passed the impugned order in question. The learned single Judge of our High Court after properly considering the facts of this ease dismissed the Special Civil Application. Aggrieved by the said order the pres- ent Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. ( 3 ) EVEN in the grounds of appeal there is no effective denial of his absence without permis- sion. In ground No. 9 (o) it has been slated that the appellant was morally mentally emotion- ally and financially broken and a situation was created whereby the appellant was constrained to leave Ankleshwar after informing his superior officer. In ground No. 9 (g) it has also been stated thatto build a further record against the appellant the respondent management sent three communications asking the appellant to report for duty knowing fully well that it is impossible for the appellant to comply with the said instructions. These things clearly indicate that the appellant never joined duly in spite of the memos issued by the Office and was continu- ously absenting himself from duty as and from 4/06/1982. No doubt in the memorandum of appeal the appellant has come forward with various grounds regarding his family difficul- ties and as to how he was not able to respond to the memos for joining the duty. Thus we are able to see that the appellant has abstained from duty without any proper reason as found by the Enquiry Officer which was ultimately approved by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. ( 4 ) MR. Thus we are able to see that the appellant has abstained from duty without any proper reason as found by the Enquiry Officer which was ultimately approved by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. ( 4 ) MR. V. J. Desai learned Counsel appearing for the appellant brought to our notice the judg- ment in the case of Sardarsingh Devisingh v. Dist. Supdt. of Police Sabarkantha and Others reported in 1985 G. L. H. 940 and strenuously contended that the punishment is disproportion- ate to the charges framed against the appellant herein. He tried to distinguish the decision in the case of Union of India v. Param Nanda reported in (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 177 stating that this Court can interfere if the findings are arbitrary mala fide or perverse. In this connec- tion we can usefully refer the observations made by the Supreme Court in (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 177 (supra ). In paragraph 27 of the judgment it states:27 We must unequivocally stale that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellant jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to im- pose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of Justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the con- clusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the con- clusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. The learned single Judge has also referred correctly to the judgment mentioned in (9189) 2 Supreme Court Cases 177 (supra) which is a judgment in the case of Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur reported in (1972) 4 Supreme Court Cases 618 In this case also the Supreme Court has hold:a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved acts of the case the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. The learned Judge also said:now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanor for which the punishment can be imposed it is not for the court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed the authority in imposing the punishment. The court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed provided it is justified by the rules is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established. The learned single Judge has also referred to the decision reported in 1985 G. L. H. 940 and distinguished the same in the facts of this case. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned single Judge on this aspect also. Mr. The learned single Judge has also referred to the decision reported in 1985 G. L. H. 940 and distinguished the same in the facts of this case. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned single Judge on this aspect also. Mr. V. J. Desai learned Counsel appearing for the appellant finally argued that the appellant ought to have been given an opportunity or representing his case by engaging an advocate. When we confronted him as to whether he has raised this point before the learned single Judge he has to admit that he has not raised this point before the learned single Judge. Apart from this aspect of the case there is absolutely no prayer even before the Disciplinary Authority for engaging an Advocate to represent his case. We are of the view that there is absolutely no handicap for the appellant simply because he has not been able to engage an Advocate. As a matter of fact he is agitating various issues including the payment of gratuity etc. before the appropriate forum. As far as the charge against the appellant is concerned which is the subject-matter of the Special Civil Application and the Letters Patent Appeal this is a matter which is borne out by the attitude of the appellant in his service and also from the records of the office. The question as to whether he unauthorisedly absented himself from 1982 on wards has been answered clearly and categorically without any difficult by the documents before us. The only explanation given by the appellant is that it was not possible for him to attend to the duties due to various circumstances such as he was not given night duty he was not given quarters at Ankleshwar and he was not able to shift from Ahmedabad to Ankleshwar since his large family is at Ahme- dabad. These are all sympathetic grounds which can be taken into account provided that the appellant has behaved reasonably in respect of his duties. On the other hand the appellant habitually absented himself and in this present case he was continuously absented from June 1982 onwards. Inspite of various memos issued by the office he had not resumed his duties. These are all sympathetic grounds which can be taken into account provided that the appellant has behaved reasonably in respect of his duties. On the other hand the appellant habitually absented himself and in this present case he was continuously absented from June 1982 onwards. Inspite of various memos issued by the office he had not resumed his duties. As regards his gratuity the same has been paid to the appellant and it is averred in the affidavit-in- reply filed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission that the Controlling Authority under the payment of Gratuity Act 1972 has passed an Award for payment of the gratuity to the appellant herein Considering all those aspect of the case we find it difficult to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by thee authorities concerned. Further the learned single Judge of our High Court in the Special Civil Application properly applied his mind and has come to the conclusion that the punishment is not disproportional to the charges Framed against the appellant herein. There is enough evidence on record to prove the charges levelled against the appellant herein. Taking into consideration all these circumstances we do not find that there is any factual or legal error in the judgment passed by the learned single Judge and accordingly this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. .